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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a discussion about the inadequacy of the Canadian confessions rule in light 
of what modem forensic psychology reveals about the human mind, and the propensity of 
legally-sanctioned interrogation tactics to cause suspects to make false confessions. 
Contemporary forensic psychology research makes it clear that many of the techniques 
used in police interviewing and interrogation can have the effect of subverting or overbearing an 
individual's free-choice and can cause them to make a false confession. Yet many of these same 
techniques are considered acceptable according to the Canadian law of voluntariness. This thesis 
examines the confessions rule and examines the key features of an involuntary confession as 
defined by the Canadian courts. The thesis also compares the structure and content of two 
different methods of interrogation used by contemporary police: the Reid Technique, and the 
PEACE model. The thesis will demonstrate the problems associated with each interrogation 
method, and will show how a suspect can be led into making an involuntary or false confession. 
The content of this thesis can be broken down into a number of stages. The first stage 
takes a historical approach to the development of confessions law in England and shows how the 
judges of the nineteenth century gave shape to the basic rule for the admissibility of confessions 
evidence: the voluntariness doctrine. Next, the application of voluntariness in Canada is 
examined as the English law was adopted in Canadian cases. The concept of voluntariness then 
expanded on Canadian soil to take on additional features, which are discussed. These different 
historical developments are evaluated in light of Herbert Packer's crime-control and due process 
models. 
ii 
Following this, there will be a discussion of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms' impact 
on interrogation and confessions, where the protective capability of the section 1 0( b) right to 
counsel is explored. 
In the next stage, this thesis will discuss the privilege against self-incrimination with a 
focus on the fact that many scholars want to do away with this ancient right and move towards an 
"accused-speaks" model. This thesis presents an argument against this line of scholarship and 
argues in favour of the necessity of this right to trial fairness. 
This study then focuses on an analysis of the different police interrogation techniques 
available and discusses their merits and shortcomings in light of findings in forensic psychology, 
sociology and police science. This analysis aims at shedding light on the practice of custodial 
interrogation, and the connection between police interrogation techniques and false confessions will 
be explored. 
Finally, this thesis will suggest a model for reform in the area of pre-trial questioning: a 
return to the practice of examination by a magistrate in court. It will be argued that a revived 
model of magisterial examination with built-in protections to ensure fairness of the process 
would be the ideal replacement for pre-trial custodial police interrogations, would drastically 
reduce the number of false confessions and would be more in keeping with concerns of fairness 
and due process than current crime-control influenced police interrogations. 
iii 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent miscarriages of justice have highlighted serious failings within the criminal 
justice process. Perhaps the most important issues of those that might be raised relates to the 
significance of confessions evidence as being probative of guilt, the procedures governing the 
admissibility of confessions at trial, and the custodial interrogations that are used to procure 
confessions from suspects. 
One of the major problems behind these miscarriages of justice is the false confession. 
Recent American research shows from a sample of 252 wrongful convictions, 421 were the result 
of false confessions. 2 These were not merely unelaborated admissions of guilt. The same 
research found that persons giving false confessions have a tendency to offer "surprisingly rich, 
detailed, and accurate information"3 about how and why the crime was committed.4 This body 
of research shows us that false confessions do not happen by chance5; "they are carefully 
constructed during an interrogation and then reconstructed during the criminal trial that 
follows. "6 
1 Brandon L. Garrett, "The Substance of False Confessions" (2010) 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1051 at 1052. 
2 Ibid. In other words, 16% of wrongful convictions resulted from false confessions. These individuals were 
exonerated by post-conviction DNA evidence. Also, Bedau & Radelet identified false confessions as the leading 
cause of wrongful convictions in the 350 cases they studied in the United States. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. 
Radelet, "Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases" ( 1987) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21-179. Also see study of C. 
Ronald Huff, Arye Rattner & Edward Sagarin, "Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public 
Policy" ( 1986) 32 Crime and Delinquency 518. See also Arye Rattner, "Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful 
Conviction and the Criminal Justice System" (1988) 12 L.& Hum Behav. 283-293. 
3 Ibid at 1054. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. at 1056. 
6 Ibid at 1055. For a blatant example of a false confession that contains rich details ofthe crime in question, we can 
look at the case of Commonwealth of Virginia v. David Vasquez, [1984]. The defendant in this case was 37 years 
old and he was borderline mentally retarded (Vasquez Memorandum in Opposition p. 16, Found online 
http://www .law. virginia.edulpdf/faculty/garrett/falseconfess/vazquez_ david_ suppression_ motions. pdf). On January 
25, 1984, the body of the victim was discovered. Her hands were tied behind her and a noose around her neck was 
suspended from an overhead pipe. Vaginal swabs from the victim disclosed the presence of sperm (Memorandum in 
Opposition p.1 ). Forensic .exam-ination revealed that the noose used in the killing had been cut from a length of rope 
wrapped around a carpet in her basement (Memorandum in Opposition pp. I-2). The neighbours disclosed that 
Vasquez had been observed walking in front of the victim's house within the general timeframe in which the victim 
had been murdered. The defendant used to live in that neighbourhood and he was known in the area. He was 
described by neighbours as having an abnormal personality. He was taken from his place of employment for 
questioning and the defendant eventually gave 3 statements (Memorandum in Opposition pp. 2-I6). Vasquez 
repeatedly asked for information on why he was being questioned and during the course of the interview on several 
occasions he asked to see his mother and a psychiatrist. All of his requests were denied. On his last interview he 
confessed to the murder. The following transcript shows how the officers fed detailed facts to Vasquez: 
Det I: Did she tell you to tie her hands behind her back? 
Vasquez: Ah, if she did, I did. 
Det 2: Whatcha use? 
Vasquez: The ropes? 
Det 2: No, not the ropes. Whatcha use? 
Vasquez: Only my belt. 
Det. 2: No, not your belt ... Remember being out in the sunroom, the room that sits out to the back of the 
house? ... and what did you cut down? To use? 
Vasquez: That, uh, clothesline? 
Det. 2: No, it wasn't a clothesline, it was something like a clothesline. What was it? By the window? Think about 
the Venetian blinds, David. Remember cutting the Venetian blind cords? 
Vasquez: Ah, it's the same as rope? 
Det. 2: Yeah. 
Det. I: Okay, now tell us how it went, David-tell us how you did it. 
Vasquez: She told me to grab the knife, and, and, stab her, that's all. 
Det. 2: (voice raised) David, no, David. 
Vasquez: If it did happen, and I did it, and my fingerprints were on it ... 
Det. 2: (slamming his hand on the table and yelling) You hung her! 
Vasquez: What? 
Det. 2: You hung her! 
Vasquez: Okay, so I hung her. 
Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent (New York: Harvard University Press, 20 II) at 43-44. 
Despite the blatant manipulation of the defendant by the detectives, the Court admitted Vasquez's statement into 
evidence. As a result of this ruling, Vasquez plead guilty to second-degree murder in order to avoid the death 
penalty. However, 5 years later he was exonerated as the actual perpetrator was discovered (Dana Priest, "At Each 
Step, Justice Faltered for VA Man" Washington Post (16 July 1989,) A I. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that false confessions occur. 7 In R. v. 
Oickle, Iacobucci J. " ... drew on social science research, accepting that hundreds ofverifiably 
false confessions have been offered in real cases, cataloguing various types of false confessions, 
and discussing the police tactics that are prone to elicit untruthful statements. "8 He also 
" ... explained that the confessions rule needed to be restated in light"9 " ••• ofthe phenomenon of 
false confessions."10 "At the same time, the majority emphasized that the protections afforded 
the accused under the confessions rule must always be balanced against society's interest in 
effectively investigating crimes."11 Professor Lisa Dufraimont has argued that "[s]o long as the 
confessions rule reflects this balance, difficult questions about the fair treatment of suspects and 
the reliability of confessions are unavoidable. The law requires trial judges to draw the line 
between acceptable persuasion and improper coercion on a case-by-case basis. Despite its 
merits, this approach leaves open the door for coercive practices to be used by police and 
condoned by courts in individual cases."12 
This thesis argues that at the root of the problem of false confessions is the coercive 
nature of custodial interrogation. Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not, to date, 
7 Lisa Dufraimont, "The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current Law and Future Directions" in 
Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulous eds., The Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty Five Years Later 
(Markham: LexisNexis, 2008) at 257. In a recent Supreme Court ruling in R. v. Hart, [2014] S.C.J. No. 52, the 
Court reconfirms the possibility of false confessions in the context of Mr. Big operations. The Court stated: 
Suspects confess to Mr. Big during pointed interrogations in the face of powerful inducements and 
sometimes veiled threats - and this raises the spectre of unreliable confessions. (Paragraph 5) 




12 Ibid. at 260. 
recognized police custodial interrogations as inherently coercive, the Supreme Court of the 
United States did so in its seminal Miranda v. Arizona ruling. 13 
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to 
subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of 
intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human 
dignity. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's 
most cherished principles -that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. 
Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free 
choice.14 
Ensuring that any confession given is the result of an individual's free choice is thought 
to be the best way to ensure that the contents of that confession are reliable. When free choice is 
vitiated, the police run the risk of obtaining a false confession, and putting an innocent in serious 
legal jeopardy. "Involuntary confessions are excluded because they are often untrue."15 
The seriousness of the legal jeopardy results because of the way confessions evidence is 
treated in court. There is a widely held view that confessions evidence is indispensible to the 
discovery and prosecution of criminal offences because of its compelling character. Wigmore 
writes: 
[t]he confession of a crime is usually as much against a man's permanent interests as anything 
well can be ... no innocent man can be supposed ordinarily to be willing to risk life, liberty, or 
property by a false confession. Assuming the confession as an undoubted fact, it carries a 
persuasion which nothing else does, because a fundamental instinct of human nature teaches each 
one of us its significance.16 
It has been claimed that more than any other type of evidence, confession evidence works to 
" ... alleviate doubts in the minds of police officers, judges andjurors."17 Confession evidence 
13 Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
14 Ibid at 467-58. 
15 Supra note 7 at 25 I. 
16 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1970), vol. 3, 820b at 303. 
17 E.D. Driver (1968) "Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion", 82 Harv. L. Rev. at 42. 
plays a crucial role in a large proportion of criminal convictions. 18 The potential for false 
confessions and the evidentiary significance of a confession once obtained, is insightfully 
summed up by H. Richard Uviller, who writes: 
We have so little difficulty sliding along the connective inferences from a direct verbal report of 
culpability to factual guilt that a detailed description of the route seems almost superfluous. Our 
ready acceptance takes little account of the misperceptions, the distortions of supposition, and the 
misplaced psychological or moral responsibility that may divert the mind to a false conclusion of 
self-accusation. Despite its hidden frailty, the confession remains the queen of the evidentiary 
chessboard.19 
The false confessions that plague our justice system are, predominately, coerced ones. 
The interrogation room is isolated and austere, and save for a phone call to his or her lawyer, the 
detainee is cut off from anyone who will help him to resist the interrogation tactics that are 
deployed against him by his adversary, an agent of the state. The police have themselves 
developed and trained in the use of an arsenal of manipulative psychological techniques to use 
against their captives. The most widespread training program is the Reid Technique. In this 
thesis it is shown how the Reid Technique is used to turn the recalcitrant suspect into one that is 
pliant and willing to make a confession. 
The common law confessions rule does not provide adequate protections against Reid 
tactics. the confessions rule is designed to provide protection against manipulative behaviour by 
18 M. McConville, & J. Baldwin, "The Role of Interrogation in Crime Discovery and Conviction" (1982) 22(1) Brit. 
J. Crim. 165 at 166. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Hart, (Supra note 7) stated that: 
unreliable confessions present a unique danger. They provide compelling evidence of guilt and present a 
clear and straightforward path to conviction (paragraph 6). Unreliable confessions have been responsible 
for wrongful convictions - a fact we cannot ignore (Paragraph 6). 
19 H. Richard Uviller, "Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of 
Access and Restraint" 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1137 at 1138. 
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persons in authority by excluding unreliable or coerced statements20 The test for admissibility is 
voluntariness and not reliability.21 Involuntary statements are excluded. 
But since involuntary confessions are often unreliable, Canada's "common law confessions rule 
is well-suited to protect against false confessions.""22 
This thesis is in disagreement with the suitability of this rule for guarding against false 
confessions, in light of the kind of tactics that are available to police. The confessions rule says 
that any statement that is either the result of police trickery23 that would shock the conscience of 
the society or a quid pro quo threat or promise held out by a person in authority; has been 
procured under oppressive circumstances; or is not the product of an operating mind or an 
informed choice, is involuntary and should be excluded from evidence, taking the totality of the 
circumstances into account. 24 The finding of the trial judge is entitled to considerable 
deference. 25 
There are two problems with this. First, the tactics available have the power to provoke 
confessions that are factually involuntary, but are not involuntary at law. The confessions rule 
does not go far enough to ensure the fair and decent treatment of interrogated suspects or to 
inhibit police trickery.26 However, the police have been given a very wide latitude to employ a 
20 Dufraimont, supra note 7 at 251. 
21 Ibid. at 252. 
22 Ibid.; Also seeR v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38 at para 47. 
23 Welsh S. White, "False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards against Untrustworthy Confessions" (1997) 
Harv. C.R. -C.L.L. Rev. 105 at 145. See also Welsh S. White, "Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions" (1978-
1979) 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 581 at 582. Professor White condemns all fonns of police trickery. 
24 Skolnick and Leo describe this test as an elusive standard and they assert that "Under that loose and subjective 
guideline, an admission is held up against "all the facts" to decide whether it was the product of a "free and rational 
will" or whether the suspect's will was "overborne" by police pressure." Jerome H. Skolnick and Richard Leo, "The 
Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation" (1992) 11 Crim. Just. Ethics 3 at 4. 
25 Supra note 7 at 252. 
26 Ibid. at 256. 
wide range of tactics to extract confessions from suspects. 27 The Court in Dickie held that 
"proper police techniques" rarely give rise to false confessions. "28 But the Court did not define 
what constitutes proper techniques. 29 The existing rules of confession permit officers to use 
pressure tactics to extract confessions from detained individuals. 30 The officers do not have to 
take "no" for an answer and the case of R. v. Singh highlights the sad reality that saying "no" ll 
times may not be enough to argue that the suspect's free will has been overwhelmed. The Court 
in Singh pointed out the need for taking a contextual approach to the issue of statement 
admissibility. However, as Professor Dufraimont reminds us: 
The contextual approach which eschews categorical judgements about specific interrogation 
practices, gives police flexibility to use a wide range of tactics to pressure suspects to confess. 
From the perspective of law enforcement, this flexibility is a desirable feature of the confessions 
rule.31 
Second, the contextual approach to assessing voluntariness in combination with the 
deference shown to the trial judge provides far too much of an opportunity for judges to import 
judgements about the accused at the voir dire on the admissibility of the statement32 that may not 
be fair. Allowing for an analysis that is necessarily contextual/3 may invite the trial judge to 
consider factors such as an accused person's age, race, gender, prior criminal record or lack 
thereof, or demeanour and conclude that the accused is the type of person who would not be 
influenced by any threats or promises that may have occurred, or would not find the atmosphere 
of the interrogation room intimidating. Other accused persons may be treated more leniently 
based on their personal characteristics. 
27 Ibid. at 258. 
28 Ibid. at 260. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. at 261. 
31 Ibid. at 259. 
32 Ibid. at 266. 
33 Supra note 22 at paras. 22-23; R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC II, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11 at para. 71. 
Some have suggested that the solution to the problem of coercive interrogation is to 
change the way that interrogations and confessions are carried out. It is thought that by 
eliminating certain types of interrogation room practices the protection of the accused in the 
interrogation room could be improved. Steven Penney, for example, has argued that " ... limiting 
the length of interrogations, restricting the questioning of vulnerable suspects, banning the use of 
false evidence, and prohibiting specific misrepresentations as to the strength of evidence"34 
Others have called for a reform in the training program used by Canadian officers; a move from 
the Reid Technique to the PEACE35 model. 
In my view, such recommendations, while certainly an improvement, do not go far 
enough toward addressing the problem of coercive interrogation. What is really required, if it is 
our objective to ensure that confessions are truly voluntary, is the replacement of custodial 
interrogation with a different kind of system for questioning criminal accused. 
What is proposed in this thesis is a revival of a system of judicial examination of accused 
persons. The judicial examination model would involve justices of the peace asking an accused 
to make a statement regarding the Crown's allegations against him, in open-court, at his 
appearance for bail, within 24 hours of arrest. The accused would be asked to make the 
statement directly, without the benefit of counsel speaking on his behalf, but he would be free to 
assert and effectively exercise his right to silence, indicate as much to the court and refrain from 
providing any reply to the magistrate's questioning. Upon such an assertion, the questioning 
34 Penney, cited in Dufraimont, supra note 7 at 297-298. See also: Professor Don Stuart states that the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Oick/e provides the " ... police with a manual for a wide range of excessively coercive interrogation 
techniques." Don Stuart, "Oickle: The Supreme Court's Recipe for Coercive Interrogation" (2000) 36 C.R. (5 ) 188 
at 188-91; Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed., (Toronto: Thomson Carswe11, 2005) at 
134-42; Edmund Thomas, "Lowering the Standard: R. v. Oickle and the Confessions Rule in Canada" (2005) I 0 
Can. Crim. L. Rev. 70; Penney, cited in Dufraimont, supra note 7at 262. 
35 PEACE is an acronym which stands for Planning & Preparation, Engage & Explain, Account, Closure, and 
Evaluation. These components provide a structure that can be used for a11 types of investigative interview. 
would stop. If the accused provided an explanation, it would be the prerogative of the presiding 
justice of the peace to conduct an examination for the truth. 
A system of this kind would eliminate the coercive nature of interrogation, and would 
ensure that nearly all statements given were voluntary. From a false confessions standpoint, 
nothing could be more effective in terms of almost eliminating them, than a model such as the 
one proposed. 
With an understanding that modern practices of obtaining confessions and dealing with 
them at trial may be more fully understood when considered in historical context, this thesis 
begins in the first chapter by tracing the development of the practices deemed acceptable and 
unacceptable to the courts' with respect to the admissibility of confessions in nineteenth century 
England. It documents the courts development and treatment of the doctrine of voluntariness, 
which holds that only confessions that were made voluntarily are admissible into evidence. Of 
additional concern is the reliability of evidence as being the chief motivation for the inquiry into 
a statement's voluntariness. The courts' view that statements which are reliable should be 
admitted into evidence takes shape during this period and informs the scope of the voluntariness 
inquiry. Also of concern during the nineteenth century is the assumption by police of a power 
that hitherto belonged to the judiciary: the power to question suspects. With the statutory 
creation of professional police services and legislative reform to the powers of judges we see the 
examination of suspects move from magistrates to police, and begin to see custodial 
interrogation develop as a mode of procuring confession evidence. 
Moving from the nineteenth century into the twentieth, the thesis will continue to chart 
the course of the development of the full modern-day doctrine ofvoluntariness. We see many 
issues which arose in the nineteenth century settled in the I914 ruling of R. v. Ibrahim, where a 
narrow definition ofvoluntariness is subscribed to by the court. We then see the doctrine emerge 
in the Canadian case law in the I922 case of R. v. Prosko. 
By the time voluntariness enters the Canadian case law, the scope ofvoluntariness is such 
that threats or promises made to an accused person by a person in authority during the course of 
questioning will lead to the inadmissibility of any confession that resulted from that questioning. 
Throughout the twentieth century in Canada we see a more robust definition of voluntariness 
take shape, where the additional considerations of operating mind, oppressive circumstances and 
informed choice are added to the doctrine through the case law. These rulings will be examined 
in light of Herbert Packers models of due process and crime control to show how these 
imperatives have influenced judicial thinking and the development of the law. Herbert Packer's 
models are a useful tool that we use to characterize developments in the case law on 
voluntariness. We can see how, over time, the confessions rule comes to take on a shape that is 
more favourable to either due process imperatives or crime control imperatives. In other words, 
Packer's two models provide us with a means by which to track and measure the ebb and flow in 
the law governing interrogations and the admissibility of confessions. 
Chapter 2 will deal with section I 0( b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
and examine how this section has impacted the admissibility of statements procured by 
interrogation into evidence. Of particular interest in this examination is the question of whether 
the section I 0( b) right is capable of providing any protection, in addition to the voluntariness 
doctrine, to detained individuals. 
From a discussion of the right to counsel, we move to a considered examination of the 
related privilege against self-incrimination in Chapter 3, which is a battle-ground between 
proponents of crime-control and due process. This chapter will explore the arguments for and 
against retaining such a right, and will ultimately argue in favour of its retention. Whereas the 
fiercest critics of the privilege, like Jeremy Bentham, argue that it is of great assistance to 
criminals, the privilege should be understood, it is argued, as representing a "complex of values" 
which defines the nature of the relationship between the state and the individual in a liberal 
democracy and is an integral part of our criminal justice system. 
The chapter will then turn its attention to the historical development of the privilege in 
the Canadian context and the scope of the protections afforded by it. There will also be a 
discussion of the section 7 right to silence, and how this right has been treated in the case law. 
Following the discussion of the privilege's history, the thesis will turn to the rationales 
for a privilege. Here we find two types of rationale, the systemic rationales which justify the 
operation of the privilege in relation to other aspects of the criminal justice system; and 
individual rationales that attempt to frame the importance of the privilege in terms of respect for 
individuals. The arguments for systematic rationales highlight the need for allowing witnesses to 
safely testify without the danger of incriminating themselves and the need to force the state to 
meet its burden of proof without using the accused as a testimonial resource. The arguments for 
individual rationales tend to focus on the inherent cruelty of compelling an individual to 
incriminate himself, the need to combat the invasion of privacy that this entails, and the need to 
show respect for the individual and their autonomy. While some advocates of eliminating the 
privilege argue that it is natural that persons should be called on to account for their actions to 
their peers, it is argued in this thesis that the relationship between the individual and the state is 
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of a fundamentally different nature than one between peers. In a liberal democracy, for a set of 
reasons that are explored, the individual is clearly recognized as sharply differentiated from the 
state. 
The rationales for keeping the privilege are then themselves explored. They are: the fact 
that ours is an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of justice; to prevent inhumane 
treatment in eliciting statements; notions of fair play; to prevent the abuse of power by the state; 
because self-deprecatory statements are unreliable; the cruelness of compelled testimony; to 
prevent the innocent against wrongful conviction; to avoid the strengthening of circumstantial 
cases through questioning; and because the privilege safeguards the individual's private enclave 
from state intrusion. 
Chapter 4 will discuss one of the main models of police interrogation, and a major cause 
of false confessions, the Reid Technique. It will be shown that within the scope of the legal 
requirements of voluntariness and the Charter protections, there is ample room for police 
scientists to have developed an arsenal of highly effective interrogation techniques. These 
techniques, it will be argued, can cause an accused person's will to be overborne in actual fact, 
but still fall within the scope of a legally voluntary confession. This situation leads to the 
predicament of the prisoner who is led through the nine-steps of the Reid Technique into making 
a false confession. 
This chapter will discuss the prevalence of Reid tactics in Canadian interrogation rooms; 
outline the main tactics; discuss the nine-step Reid model; and address the ethics of using the 
technique. Following this, the reaction of detained persons to the use of these techniques upon 
them shall be explored. Here the various classifications of confession are discussed, and it is 
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shown that the Reid interrogation tactics create a substantial risk of railroading detainees into 
making false confessions. On this ground, it is argued that the Reid Technique should be 
prohibited from use. 
In the next chapter, Chapter 5, the thesis discusses the effect that confessions evidence 
has in court and the reasons why jurors are unlikely to believe that an accused person who made 
a confession could be innocent. The chapter then continues on to give some examples of false 
confessions that have happened in Canada and the United States. The narrative provided is 
intended to illustrate for the reader just how these things happen in our system of justice and to 
provide some context for the higher level discussions already encountered. 
Following this there will be a discussion of how the courts in various jurisdictions around 
the country treat Reid Technique-obtained statements and view the use of police trickery. It is 
found that courts tend to downplay factors relating to the atmosphere created by Reid 
interrogation and its impact upon the suspect. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, in particular, have given very wide latitude to the amount of permissible 
trickery in a custodial interrogation setting. 
After having introduced the reader to the Reid Technique, and following as well from the 
discussion of how confessions evidence is treated in court, an alternative model is introduced. 
Chapter 6 acquaints the reader with the PEACE model of investigative interviewing. PEACE 
has been introduced as an ethical alternative to the Reid Technique and similar interrogation 
models in the United Kingdom. 
The PEACE model specifically avoids many of the interrogation tactics employed in a 
Reid-style interrogation and makes use of active listening and rapport-building between the 
interviewer and the suspect, in order to coax a confession from him. It is thought that the 
PEACE model is less likely to result in false and unreliable confessions than more aggressive 
approaches exemplified by Reid. 
After discussing the real and perceived advantages of PEACE, criticisms of the model 
and the responses to them are discussed. Namely that it is merely an incomplete version of the 
Reid Technique; the PEACE model will not work effectively in Canada because our laws are 
different than those in the United Kingdom; or that the model is simply "soft" and does not get 
confessions. A further consideration is then discussed: whether the PEACE model poses a threat 
to the right to silence. Since its introduction in the United Kingdom in the nineties, the right to 
silence has effectively been undermined by creating an adverse inference against an accused 
person who refuses to answer questions during their interrogation. 
In the final chapter of the thesis a proposal for the reform of interrogation and 
confessions in Canada is proposed. That proposal is the return to judicial examination of 
arrestees with new safeguards built in for their protection. 36 In this chapter the shortcomings of 
both the Reid Technique and its proposed alternative, the PEACE model are discussed. Then a 
36 To my surprise towards the end of my research for this thesis, I discovered that in as far back as 1931, there had 
been some discussions about replacing police interrogations with in-court questioning. This was in response to the 
urgent need to remedy the problem of police beatings. In 1946, Professor McGormick summarized the fmdings of 
the Wickersham Commission in 1931 in the following fashion: 
The Wickersham Commission in 1931 reported that probably the best remedy for the evils of the third 
degree "would be the enforcement of the rule that every person arrested charged with crime should be 
forthwith taken before a magistrate, advised of the charge against him, given the right to have counsel and 
then interrogated by the magistrate. His answers should be recorded and should be admissible in evidence 
against him in all subsequent proceedings. If he choose not to answer, it should be permissible for counsel 
for the prosecution and for the defense, as well as for the trial judge, to comment on his refusal" [Footnote 
#139 in Professor McGormick's article cites: National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 
Report No. 11, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931) 5]. Doubtless he should be informed also that he is 
not required to answer [Footnote# 140 of Professor McGormick's article reads as follows: See the rule 
proposed by Prof. J. B. Waite, a member of the Advisory Committee, Prel. Draft, FED. RUlEs CriM. Pnoc 
(1943) 249. It was rejected by the Committee. Id. at 253]. Even so, it has been suggested that the procedure 
would infringe the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.- C.T. McGormick, "Some Problems 
and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions" (1946) 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239 at 277. 
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description of what judicial examination is, is provided. Following this, there is a discussion of 
what new safeguards must be introduced to ensure that the examinations meet a greater level of 
fairness then the judicial examinations from days of yore. Finally, there will be a discussion of 
the advantages of such a system in comparison to regimes of pre-trial custodial interrogation. 
Possible arguments against the proposal will be addressed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Doctrine of Voluntariness 
As it will be shown, the eighteenth century English courts developed a concept that all 
statements made to persons in authority had to pass the test of "voluntariness". The original aim 
of this new concept or doctrine was to ensure that the statements procured from suspects were 
indeed reliable, before those statements could be admitted into evidence against them. 
From its humble beginnings the doctrine of voluntariness has taken a long journey 
towards refinement both in England and in North America. Throughout the centuries the 
concept of voluntariness has been expanded from an initial concern regarding reliability to 
incorporate considerations such as threats and inducements, free-choice, operating mind, 
oppressive circumstances, and the notions of overborne wills, and totality of circumstances.• 
From its inception the inquiry into the voluntariness of a statement has always revolved 
around official questioning. It later evolved into the examination of police interrogation methods 
and the effects of interrogation on the admissibility of a particular confession. 
The term "voluntariness", by its definition emphasizes freedom of will and in the context 
of criminal law the doctrine is an inquiry into " ... volitional and cognitive impairment. "2 The 
subject matter of the voluntariness inquiry consists of notions such as overborne wills, volitional 
and cognitive impairments, the effects of inducements on the minds of suspects3 and " ... the issue 
of causation. "4 
1 Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth and the Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993) at 59-61. 
2 Ibid. at 60. 
3 Ibid. at 59-61. 
4 Ibid. at 61. 
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However the task of defining voluntariness is not restricted to criminal law; rather this 
problem occupies a large part of moral philosophy. Philosophers have grappled with the 
problem of free will versus pre-determination for thousands of years, and this particular problem 
occupies an important place in moral philosophy. For example, Aristotle ties the question of 
voluntariness into the issue of initiative5 when he argues that if the action of a person is caused 
by internal initiative then that action is voluntary, but if the action is initiated by an external 
source, it is involuntary. 6 
Hence, a person under severe threat of harm should be excused from committing immoral 
actions as he or she was operating under duress. 7 However, by the same token, certain actions, 
like murdering one's own mother, can never be forgiven,8 even if the person is left with the 
choice of dying or else committing such a terrible deed. 9 
However, Aristotle's definition has limited utility outside of moral philosophy as it 
appears that he sets the bar too high. The law should allow for greater latitude " ... for human 
weakness."10 Unfortunately, moral philosophers like Aristotle were not criminal lawyers and 
therefore, the realities of the inherent pressures inside police interrogation rooms, did not inform 
their thought processes. The prospect of being strip-searched before being forced to sit alone in 
the interrogation room, which usually consists of a single chair and a table, for hours, before one 
is visited by a state agent for questioning presents a very different challenge than the ones that 
individuals usually encounter in their normal, everyday lives. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Aristotle, Ethics, book V (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986). See also supra note 1 at 61. 
7 Grano, Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. at 62. 
-17-
As social animals, every day we have to make decisions about our lives, and often these 
decisions are guided by a cost-benefit analyses. The exercise of free choice in our every day 
decisions may be constrained to some extent by economic and social factors, or by personal 
shortcomings; however being in police custody presents a very different set of pressures. A 
person in police custody is isolated from all his or her friends, family and resources. The state 
has total control and power over the person and even the preservation of his or her dignity is at 
the discretion of the police. While in police custody, there is no equality or parity between the 
state and individual 11 and when one adds the coercive stresses of interrogation, one may 
rightfully become very sceptical of the argument that a person still retains his or her free-will. 
While in custody, the police have the resources and the training to manipulate the 
suspect's free-will or the police can resort to trickery to overbear a person's will not to confess. 12 
Hence, it is argued that at times there may be a causal connection between police conduct and the 
impairment of volition or cognition. 
As Professor Donald Dripps states: 
The vast majority of confessions do not result from the suspects "free will and rational intellect" 
any more than they result from irrationality, mistake and manipulation. Any expectation that 
truly voluntary confessions are available on a systemic basis depends either on insupportable 
factual assumptions or on an interpretation of voluntariness that reduces the word to signifying no 
more than the absence of third degree methods. 13 
It is therefore suggested that the test of voluntariness, at least in the custodial setting, is 
inadequate to address the coercive nature of custodial confessions. The Supreme Court of 
11 Irene Rosenberg & Yale Rosenberg, "A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions" (1989) 68 
N.C. L. Rev. 69 at 110. See also R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151. 
12 Supra note I at 33. 
13 Donald A. Dripps, "Against Police Interrogation- And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (1988) 78 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 699 at 700. 
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Canada in R. v. Oickle14 held that the key consideration for admission of a statement is the 
determination of the issue of"whether the will of the subject has been overborne". 15 This 
simplest of formulations, however, runs counter to the proposition that a person in custodial 
interrogation typically does not possess much free-will. 16 
As Professor Steven Penney explains, the notion that we can "isolate a person's "free 
will"''17 is highly problematic. 18 He notes that the decision to speak to authorities is informed by 
various considerations19 and "it is impossible to say whether a decision stems purely from 
"internal" influences or whether it has been introduced by an "external" force."20 
Professor Penney notes that courts have sometimes substituted other "proxies"21 for 
voluntariness.22 He notes that these courts substitute some other proxy for the "subjective 
measure of free choice. "23 He argues that the nature of the proxies is determined by the political 
orientation of the judges. The conservative minded judges " ... use reliability"24 as a proxy for 
voluntariness. The liberal judges use the "but for"25 test for voluntariness. The "but for" test 
refers to statements " ... that would not have been made "but for" the coercive pressures of 
14 R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 
15 Ibid. at para. 57. According to professor Herbert Fingarette, the concept of"overbome" (p. 82) will is a dead end 
ifwe assume the legal implication ofthis concept (p. 82) " ... as arising out of some subjective condition of inner 
psychic trauma or breakdown" (P. 82)- Herbert Fingarette, "victimization: A Legalist analysis of coercion, 
deception. Undue influence, and excusable prison escape" (1985) 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 65. Also see supra note 
I at 82. 
16 Fingarette, ibid. at 77. The author claims that the courts lack the tools to conduct an objective assessment of 
when someone's will has been overborne. P. 76-77. 
17 Steven Penney, "What's Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the 










interrogation. "26 The problem with the proxies, he observes, is that " ... they produce extreme 
results. "27 
Professor Penney suggests that according considerable deference to courts to exclude 
what they may perceive to be unreliable statements does not sufficiently insulate the system 
against wrongful convictions. 28 Some judges may not be sophisticated enough to understand 
"the phenomenon of false confessions. "29 Hence, to lower the risk of false confessions, 
"prophylactic protection"30 is needed. He argues that the confessions rule should prohibit" ... all 
interrogation techniques that experience and study have shown are apt to produce false 
confessions. "31 
Based on these assertions one of the central claims of this thesis is that the confessions 
rule is not very well suited to prevent false or involuntary confessions. This claim is based on 
the proposition that the confessions rule provide the police with wide latitude to badger and 
pressure reluctant suspects and the rules allow the courts to show a high degree of tolerance 
toward questionable police tactics. Given that there are only few loose constraints on police 
questioning, the prosecutors can often persuade judges " ... who are ill-informed about or 
unsympathetic towards the false confession problem"32 that the confessions obtained are indeed 
reliable and hence admissible. 33 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid at 296. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.; See also Welsh White, "False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy 
Confessions" (1997) 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105 at 153. 
32 Penny, Ibid. at 297. 
33 Ibid. 
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Keeping these introductory remarks in mind, let us now examine the emergence of the 
doctrine of voluntariness in England and the refinement of this doctrine in Canada. 
The Development of Voluntariness: 
The nineteenth and early twentieth century was an important time in the development of 
voluntariness. During this time we see the crystallization in the case law of a concern with the 
unreliability of involuntary confessions as being the key reason for the evolution of an 
exclusionary rule. The cases that follow show the process by which the confessions rules took 
shape and how reliability became a key concern. 
Also of importance to our inquiry in this chapter is the shift of pre-trial questioning of 
accused persons from magistrates in court34 to police, and then eventually to no one, as judges 
began to come down against police custodial questioning altogether,35 only to have custodial 
questioning once again assumed by police in the early twentieth-century shortly after the 
issuance of the Judges' Rules.36 
Professor Levy finds that an exclusionary rule for involuntary confessions was 
recognized as early as 1726.37 Lord Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert, in his Law of Evidence 
(written before that year, but actually "not published until thirty-years later"38), " ••• stated that 
though the best evidence of guilt was a confession:"39 but this Confession must be voluntary and 
without Compulsion; for our Law ... will not force any Man to accuse himself; and in this we do 
certainly follow the Law of Nature, which commands every Man to endeavor his own 
34 Ian Bryan, Interrogation and Confession: A Study of Progress, Process and Practice (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing, I 997) at 3 I -36 
35 David Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century (London: Hambledon Press, 1998) at 230. 
36 Ibid. at 234. 




Preservation; and therefore Pain and Force may compel Men to confess what is not the truth of 
Facts, and consequently such extorted Confessions are not to be depended on. "4° From this early 
treatise, there was a concern with unreliable evidence.41 
During the late eighteenth-century the rules of confessions began to find their first clear 
articulation through the courts.42 In R. v. Warickshall 43 "the judges had defined an involuntary 
confession as one "got by promises or threats, "44 and gave this as the proper basis for exclusion. 
The court also introduced reliability to the case law as the basis for a confessions rule,45 and 
provided the rule that derivative evidence gained from an induced confession is admissible even 
where a confession is not. 46 
40 Reprinted in L. Levy, Origins ofthe Fifth Amendment 327 (1968) Also cited in, Capitan Fredric Lederer, 
"Voluntariness Doctrine" (1976) 74 Mil. L. Rev. 72. 
41 According to Gudjonnson, the case of R. v. Perry (1660), 14 How St. Tr. 1312 was a decisive turning point in the 
emergence of the doctrine ofvoluntariness in England. In this case, the defendant, John Perry, after a rigorous 
"interrogation by the Justice of the Peace" (Gisli H. Gudjonsson. The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: 
A Handbook (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2003) at 166) confessed to murdering his master William 
Harrison (p. 166). Perry also implicated his mother and his brother in the murder - (Fred Kaufman, The 
Admissibility of confessions, 3rd ed., (Toronto: The Carswell Company Limited, 1979) at 15). As a result of this 
confession, all "three were executed." (Kaufman p. 15). However, 2 years later, Harrison returned to the village, 
stating that "he had been kidnapped and sold to the Turks." (Kaufman p. 16). 
Gudjonsson states that this case had a chilling effect on the consciousness of English judiciary to a point that it lead 
to: 
Legal re-evaluation of uncorroborated confessions in England, although a corroboration requirement was 
never universally accepted and was not applied to prosecutions other than murder. (p. 167) 
42 R. v. Waricksha/1 (1783), 168 E.R. 234 is the first clear statement of the voluntariness principle (Steven Penney, 
"Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View" (1997-98) Am. J. Crim. L. 309 at 320). However 
White's Case (1741) 17 How St. Tr. 1079, and Rudd's Case (1775) 1 Leach. 115 demonstrate that there was some 
concern in the courts before W aricksha/1 with voluntariness (Steven Penney, "Theories of Confession Admissibility: 
A Historical View" (1997-98) Am. J. Crim. L. 309 at 321 ). In White's Case, White's counsel asked the Court to 
inquire whether the confession had been voluntarily made, for "if it was not ... it ought not to be read." According 
to Levy, after White's case, the judge agreed that a statement obtained by threat/promise should not be used (Supra 
note 37 at 328). "A generation later it had become an accepted rule that any confession not free and voluntary must 
be rejected because no credit could be given to it." (Supra note 37 at 328). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Supra note 35 at 221. 
45 William Gangi, The Court and Confessions: Justice at the Expense of Truth? (Ann Arbour: University 
Microfilms, 1971) at 14. 
46 Supra note 42. "Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as inadmissible, under a consideration whether 
they are or are not entitled to credit. A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit ... but a 
confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or fear comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be 
considered as the evidence of guilt that no credit ought to be given to it; and it is therefore rejected." 
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This limited definition of voluntariness "left unanswered two important questions',47 for 
nineteenth-century judges to struggle with. 48 "First, did the identity of the person offering the 
inducement matter?',49 Secondly, "would any promise or threat exclude a confession, however 
trivial and whatever its subject matter?"50 
By 1840 the answer to the first question was given. 51 "Only an inducement held out 
by"52 or with the sanction of a person in authority (that is a person in a position to influence the 
conduct of the prosecution) would exclude."53 With Regards to the other question, in R. v. 
Warickshall and later cases, it was stated that the reason for the exclusionary rule 54 was " ... the 
likely unreliability of confessions obtained by inducements, it followed that the only inducements 
which ought to exclude were those of a kind calculated to lead the prisoner to make an untrue 
confession."55 This is the narrow interpretation ofvoluntariness. Although there was some 
equivocation on this issue between different rulings, the matter was settled by R. v. Ibrahim. 56 
In 1842, Lord Chief Baron Joy published a treatise on confessions wherein he advocated 
for the proposition that reliability should be the true test of admissibility. 57 Joy wrote that the 
"threat or inducement held out must have reference to the charge, and be such as would lead [the 
suspect] to suppose that it would be better for him to admit himself guilty of an offence which he 
had never committed."58 Joy cited in support of his view, a number of English cases, including 




51 R. v. Taylor (1839) 8 C & P 733. See also Ibid. 
52 Bentley, Ibid. 
53 Ibid.; R. v. Moore, [ 1852] I 69 Eng. Rep. 608. 
54 Bentley, Ibid. 
ss Ibid. at 221 and 222; See also supra note 42. 
56 Ibrahim v. R., [19I4] A.C. 599. 
51 Supra note 35 at 222 
58 Henry Holmes Joy, Confession in Criminal Cases (Dublin, I 842) at 13. 
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R. v. Green59 and R. v. Lloyd,60 " ••• where the removal of the prisoner's handcuffs, and a promise 
to allow him to see his wife, were respectively held not to render the confessions which followed 
inadmissible. "61 
As Joy was writing his treatise, the reliability test was not yet commonplace despite 
Warickshal/.62 Proof of any kind of temporal inducement was generally "sufficient to 
exclude, "63 obviating the need for any kind of voir dire to examine the possibility of whether a 
particular inducement may have caused the accused make a false confession. 64 Judges took this 
approach for two reasons. 65 First, because there was no foolproof way of examining the 
influence of a given inducement upon suspect's mind;66 and second because many judges felt 
that there was need for caution before introducing a confession into evidence. 67 Cases where the 
suspect had been given an exhortation to tell the truth, such as "it would be better to confess"68 
or some other such phrase indicating an advantage, would also lead to the exclusion of any 
confession that followed. 69 In R. v. Drew, the Court " ... held that to caution a person that 
anything he said would be given in evidence for or against him constituted an inducement,"70 
because that may motivate the suspect to lie in the hope of gaining an advantage for his trial. 71 
59 R. v. Green (I834) 6 C & P 655 
60 R. v. Lloyd(I834) 6 C & P 393. 
61Supra note 35 at 222; see also Ibid. and supra note 59. 
62 Bentley, ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid.; Peter Mirfield, Confessions (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1985) at 50. 
66 Bentley, ibid; See also Thomas Starkie, Evidence, ii: A Practical treatise on the Law of Evidence (London; 
Hansard and Sons, I824), at 36; R. v. Thompson (1783) I Leach 29I "It is almost impossible to be too careful ... on 
this subject" (Hotham B). 
67 Bentley, ibid.; See also R. v. Thomson, ibid. 
68 Bentley, ibid. 
69 Ibid. at 222-223; see also R. v. Kingston (1830) 4 C & P 387; R. v. Dunn (183I) 4 C & P 543; and R. v. Jarvis 
[ I867] LR I CCR 96. 
70 Bentley, ibid. at 223. 
71 Ibid. Coleridge J, the judge in Drew, applied the same reasoning in other cases such as R. v. Morton (I 843) 2 M & 
Rob 5I4; and R. v. Hornbrook, (1843) I Cox 54. 
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The practice of frequently excluding confessions was coming under increasing 
criticism. 72 Some critics called for reform by advancing the position that " ... all confession 
evidence should be admitted, leaving it for the jury to decide what weight it deserved, subject to 
the safeguard that no jury should be permitted to convict upon confession evidence alone." 73 
In Baldry (1852), the Court took up the reformers point of view and overruled the line of 
cases exemplified by R. v. Drew. 74 The Court held that the current state of affairs, which meant 
the generous approach of the judiciary to voluntariness, was too favourable to suspects. 75 
But it should be understood that the pre-Baldry legal environment was not completely 
rosy for suspects taken into custody.76 Significantly, courts refused to " ... treat oppressive and 
unfair conduct towards a prisoner, falling short of improper inducement, as a ground for 
exclusion."77 If no improper inducement was found to have been used then a suspect's 
confession would be found admissible, 78 regardless of" ... how unfair or reprehensible his 
72 Bentley, ibid at 224. See also R. v. Row (1809) Russ & Ry 153. 
73 Bentley, ibid. See also Law Magazine (1842) Law Mag (1st series) 17; Criminal Law Commissioners, 8th Report, 
app A, at 281 & 307. 
7 Bentley, ibid.; See also R. v. Baldry (1852) 5 Cox 523. 
75 Bentley, ibid. at 225; Baldry's defence counsel argued that ''the law cannot measure the force of the influence 
used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of 
influence has been exerted," (Supra note 65 at 57). The presiding judges rejected this. Pollock C.B.: "The question 
now is whether the words employed amount to a promise or a threat? We are not to torture this expression, or to say 
whether a man misunderstood their meaning, for ... the words are to be taken in their obvious meaning." 
In 1872, then, a confession extracted from two young boys was allowed into evidence notwithstanding that there had 
been an exhortation to tell the truth.R. v. Reeve and Another (1872) 12 Cox 179. The exhortation was: ''you had 
better as good boys tell the truth". 
76 Supra note 34 at 74. 
77 Supra note 35 at 226. 
78 Ibid. 
treatment might have been in other respects."79 Thus, certain police tactics designed to deceive 
a suspect to confess would not necessarily lead to exclusion of confession. 80 
There was also an effort by judges in the first half of the nineteenth-century to find 
solutions to the problem of the misreporting of confessions. 81 There were cases in the 1820s and 
1830s where confessions were excluded because they had not been written down at the time of 
the interrogation82 and because they had not been recorded verbatim.83 But this issue was settled 
in favour of admission in R. v. Roche84 in 1841.85 In that case Denman LCJ declined to exclude 
a statement of a prisoner that was taken down in the third person. Thereafter, " ... judges no 
longer treated paraphrasing"86 as a reason to exclude a statement. 87 
The questioning of suspects by police, rather than by a magistrate in court, began to enter 
the recorded cases in the 1820s with R. v. Thornton. 88 In that case, the Court held admissible a 
confession extracted by police questioning, where there were some oppressive circumstances at 
play.89 This raised the issue of how far police would be permitted to go in questioning those they 
79 Ibid 
80 Ibid. at 226-227; Bentley explains that the law was extremely tolerant of the police practice of using oppressinve 
and unfair tactics to extracrt statements from suspects. He cites a number of cases to support his position. He states 
that confessions extracted from suspects in state of drunkenness (R. v. Spilsbury), distress (R. v. Dewey), sever pain 
(R. v. Mitchell) or coercing a confession from a child (R. v. Wild), illegal arrest, lying about the strength of the case 
(R. v. Barley), promises that the confession would not be used in court (R. v. Shaw), using a clergy (R. v. Gilham) 
were all admitted to evidence. 
The review of the cases provided by Bentley confirms his position. For example, in R. v. Spilsbury, "the prisoner 
was drunk at the time; and it was imputed that the constable had given him liquor to cause him to be so." (Supra 
note 34 at 74). 
81 Bentley, ibid at 227. 
82 Ibid; See also R. v. Sexton ( 1822) 1 Burn's Justice of the Peace (29th Ed., 1848-49) at I 086. 
83 R. v. Mallet (1830) MSS Greaves. 
84 R. v. Roche (1841) C & M 341. 
85 Supra note 35 at 227. 
86 1bid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 R. v. Thornton (1824) I Moo 27. Thornton was arrested "perhaps illegally" (according to Bayley J). He was a 14 
year old boy at the time of his arrest and " ... before he had eaten lunch. He had been given no food before he 
confessed, over five hours later." (Supra note 65). 
89 Supra note 35 at 229. 
arrested. 90 There was debate on this point in the early part of the nineteenth-century, 
particularly on the point of whether the administration of a caution would suffice to allow police 
questioning or whether, on the other hand, there was a bright-line prohibition.91 But by the 
1850s, a new doctrine came into force.92 All forms of police questioning were declared to be 
improper, 93 hence, overruling the judgment in Drew " ... that to caution a prisoner was an 
inducement rendering his reply inadmissible,"94 LCJ Campbell remarked emphatically in Baldry 
" ... that prisoners were not to be interrogated." 95 This case resolved this important issue for the 
rest of the century. 96 
The broader question of" ... how far officers might legitimately question persons against 
whom there was suspicion but who had not yet been arrested"97 went in the other direction. The 
judges ruled that until the point of arrest, " ... a suspect might be questioned after a proper 
caution, although even here the power should be exerciesd sparingly."98 Mellor J., in R. v. Mick 
states: 
... magistrates are not allowed to question prisoners, or to ask them what they have to say; and it 
is not for policemen to do these things. It is assuming the functions of the magistrate without 
90 Ibid. at 230. 
91 Ibid. at 233; Hill's Case (1838); R. v. Doyle (1840) 1 Craw & D 396; and R. v. Toole (1856) 7 Cox 244. 
92 Bentley, ibid. at 230. 
93 Ibid; See also R. v. Baldry (1852) 2 Den 430. 
94 Bentley, ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. at 232. 
98 R. v. Berriman (1854) 6 Cox C.C. 388; and R. v. Reason (1872) 12 Cox 228. In Berriman the trial court set out 
the following standards for police questioning: "If there is evidence of an offence, a police officer is justified, after 
a proper caution, in putting to a suspected person interrogatories with a view to ascertaining whether or not there are 
fair and reasonable grounds for apprehending him. Even this course should be sparingly resorted to. But here there 
was nothing whatever to show that any offence had been committed by any one ... and then it is sought, by 
questioning the prisoner on the subject, to establish from her own lips, the crime itself, as well as her guilty 
connection with it. What has been done here I have every reason to believe was done from no improper motive. It 
was, doubtless, an error of judgment, but I wish it to go forth amongst those who are inferior officers in the 
administration of justice, that such a practice is entirely opposed to the spirit of our law." 
those precautions which the magistrates are required by the law to use, and assuming functions, 
which are entrusted to the magistrates and to them only.99 
It was further noted by the Court in R. v. Reason, 100 that "after the prisoner is taken into 
custody it is not the duty of the constable to ask any questions." 101 
99 R. v. Mick, (1863) 176 Eng. Rep. 376 at 376. 
100 Reason, Supra note 96 at 228; Penney, supra note 42 at 324 note 81. 
101 Penney. ibid. at 324 n. 80 & 8 I 
One wonders why judges were so inclined to exclude confessions and prevent the involvement of police in the mid-
nineteenth century compared to today. Wigmore states that during the early nineteenth century, judges developed "a 
general suspicion of all confessions, a prejudice against them ... and an inclination to repudiate them upon the 
slightest pretext" (3 Wigmore, I 970). 
Judges during this period seemed to limit themselves to " ... simply decide whether there had been a threat or a 
promise" (Supra note 65), and did not concern themselves with the question of "whether such a threat or promise 
would have been likely to induce an untrue confession" (Supra note 65). In Enoch and Pulley, for example, "a 
woman who had Pulley in her custody told Pulley that she had better tell the truth or it would lie upon her and the 
man would go free."- (Supra note 65) Parke J. held Pulley's resulting statement inadmissible since it was made 
following an inducement (Enoch and Pulley, (1833) 5 C. & P. 539; See also supra note 65). Conversely, in 
Thornton, the focus on whether there had been a promise or a threat was to the detriment of the accused, as no 
attention was paid by the Court to the long duration of the detention in view of the fact that the accused had not 
eaten lunch before his arrest (R. v. Thornton, I Mood 27; See also supra note 65). In R. v. Spilsbury (I 835) 7 C. & 
P. 187, " ... Coleridge J. admitted a confession made while the accused was drunk specifically because it had not been 
obtained through hope or fear" (See also supra note 65). In some cases a different approach was taken (Supra note 
64 at 50). In R. v. Court (1836) 7 C. & P. 486, "the accused had been told ''to be sure to tell the truth". Littledale J." 
rejected the argument that the accused " ... would have taken this to mean that it would be better for him to confess" 
(Supra note 65) 
Moreover, the law evolved in such a way as to be " ... rigid and unable to adapt to the circumstances of the individual 
case. It became settled law that any statement to the accused to the effect that he "had better confess" or that "it 
would be better for him to confess" would render his confession inadmissible" (Supra note 65 at 5 I). This was so, 
in spite of the fact that these were relatively vague statements. On the one hand they may be taken to mean that the 
suspect would gain advantage at his trial if he confessed; but it might equally be taken to mean simply that he ought 
to confess (Supra note 65 at 51). In R. v. Croydon (1846) 2 Cox C.C. 67, " ... a person seeking a statement from 
Croydon about a burglary said to him: "I dare say you had a hand in it; you may as well tell me all about it." counsel 
for Croydon argued that "You may as well tell me" was the equivalent of"You had better tell me"" (Supra note 65 
at 51). The judge "ruled that the words were a sufficient inducement and excluded the confession." (Supra note 65 
at 51). 
Additionally, judges appear, on occasion, to be concerned with the " ... propriety ofthe conduct of the person 
questioning the suspect" (Supra note 65 at 5 I). In R. v. Sexton, for example, the suspect told the policeman who was 
questioning him " ... that he would tell all about it" (a burglary) if the officer provided him with " ... a glass of gin (R. 
v. Sexton (1822) I Burn's Justice of the Peace (29th Ed., 1848-49)). Best J. refused to admit the confession, stating 
that it had been "very improperly obtained" (Supra note 65 at 5 I). 
We must also not forget the influence that the pervasiveness of capital punishment must have played in the minds of 
the judges. It isn't necessarily that the judges of nineteenth century England were particularly generous in 
comparison to their modern day peers, though the reported cases often make it seem so (see for example, cases such 
as R. v. Mills, 6 Car. & P. 146, Gurney B., wherein it was held that the words "it is of no use for you to deny it, for 
there is a man and a boy will swear they saw you do it," rendered the prisoner's statement inadmissible; similarly, in 
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"Prior to Jervis's Act,"102 the reasons given by judges for prohibiting the police 
questioning of suspects was that doing so would infringe on the powers of judges; 103 however, 
after the passage of the Act, which did away with magisterial examination, 104 the justification 
switched to one which said, since judges and magistrates were not permitted to examine an 
accused, it was unacceptable that the police, who were perceived to be inferior to them, were 
permitted to examine suspects. 105 There were other reasons offered by the judges as well, 
including unfairness to the accused, 106 faulty recollection might cause the officer to inaccurately 
record the statement, 107 or the officer's bias may lead him to inadvertently mistake a suspect's 
words. 108 
Professor Steven Penney notes the importance of whether or not police were permitted to 
engage a suspect in interrogation or whether that was to remain the sole purview of the 
R. v. Warringham 15, Jur. 318, the words "it would be best for him if he would tell how it was transacted," was held 
to exclude a confession; Rather there were a vast number of capital offences on the books right up until the early 
1800s (see: Black Act, 9 Geo. 1 c. 22. The Act introduced the death penalty for over 50 criminal offences). It was 
not until 186 I that Parliament reduced the number of capital crimes to five: murder, treason, espionage, arson in 
royal dockyards and piracy with violence (see: 24 & 25 Viet; c. 94 to c. 1 00). It is perhaps the case that the judges 
did not want the often poor and indigent defendants to face the gallows for crimes having causes related to their 
poverty. 
102 Supra note 35 at 230; Indictable Offences Act 11 & 12 Viet. c. 42 (1848). John Jervis introduced four Acts in 
1848, including the Indictable Offences Act (Supra note 34. 101). 
The Act formally " ... empowered justices to conduct public hearings into cases being prepared for trial by the 
prosecution, and after being satisfied of a prima facie case, to commit the accused for trial. Should the prosecution 
fail to satisfy all the justices, the accused was to be discharged. The statute also imposed a formal duty on justices, 
following the examination of prosecution witnesses, firstly, to caution the accused that he was not obliged to answer 
the charge and, secondly, to give the accused to understand "that he has nothing to hope from any promise of favour, 
and nothing to fear from any threat which may have been holden out to him to induce him to make any admission or 
confession of his guilt."" (Supra note 34 at 84). 
103 Bentley, ibid. 
104 Ibid 
105 Ibid.; R. v. Mick (1863) 3 F & F 822; R. v. Gavin (1885) 15 Cox 656; and R. v. Male and Cooper (1893) 17 Cox 
689. 
106 Bentley, ibid. at 231; R v. Stokes ( 1853) 17 J ur 192. "We are not always certain it is fairly done." 
107 Bentley, ibid.; Toole, supra note 89. 
108 Bentley, ibid. 
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magistrates. 109 As he notes, with the emergence in the late nineteenth century of "large-scale, 
professional, uniformed police departments"110 in most major urban centres in England and the 
United States, "the locus of criminal investigation shifted from preliminary judicial proceedings, 
where the privilege against self-incrimination was not operative, to police interrogation. The 
question of the day was whether any of the legal principles limiting the admissibility of 
confessions in a judicial forum would be applied to police. " 111 
The response of the police to Baldry came in 1873,112 when a directive in the 
" ... Metropolitan Police General Orders"113 was issued that forbade the officers to obtain a 
confession from suspects at police stations on felony charges."114 This was expanded in 1893 
when " ... General Orders and Regulations issued by the Commissioner"115 specifically prohibited 
the questioning of suspects. 1 16 
The 1912 Judges Rules were issued to provide guidance to police on when and in what 
manner it would be acceptable to question suspects. 1 17 It is important to note that these rules did 
not have the force of legislation and were not enforceable in court; rather they were guidelines to 
assist police in their administration of questions. 118 The rules were designed to capture the 
essence of the common law's position with regards to the admissibility of statements and they 
conveyed two important points that the police were permitted to question a suspect before he has 
109 Penney, supra note 42 at 322. 
110 Ibid. 
Ill Ibid. 
112 Supra note 35 at 231. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid.; PRO, MEP 8/3 Prisoners, para. 8. 
115 Bentley, ibid. 
116 Ibid; PRO, MEP 8/4, paras. 203, 203 and 306. 
117 Supra note 34 at 127. 
118 Ibid. at 128; R. v. Voisin (1918) 13 Cr. App. R. 89. 
-30-
been charged, 119 or arrested, 120 but after arrested, the police were prohibited from questioning the 
suspect. 121 
Shortly after the Judges Rules were issued, the case of R. v. Voisin was decided in 1918, 
wherein the Judges Rules would not be adopted as having binding legal force. 122 In that case, the 
accused had been detained in custody and questioned, the The Court of Criminal Appeals failed 
to scold the police conduct for interrogating and not cautioning the accused, and hence it took the 
position that the judiciary is prepared to sanction custodial interrogations. 123 It therefore showed 
the Judges' Rules did not provide an effective limitation on police powers124 and ushered in the 
era of custodial interrogation. 
In the case-law of the nineteenth century it is possible to discern two competing concepts 
of voluntariness: one broad and one narrow. 125 " Under the broad interpretation, consideration 
was to be given to circumstances beyond the force of threats and promises, which might work to 
render an extra-judicial confession involuntary."126 These include factors such as" ... the effect 
on the accused of the inherently compelling pressures of criminal investigations, the strength of 
mind of the accused, and the legality of questions inviting incriminatory replies ... ".127 
119 R. v. Brackenbury (1893), 17 Cox C.C. 628; and R. v. Booth and Jones (1910), 5 Cr. App. R. 177. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Supra note 34 at 128. 
122 Voisin, Supra note 118. It was specified in R. v. Voisin that the Judges Rules do not carry the force of law: "In 
1912 the judges, at the request of the Home Secretary, drew up some rules as guidance for police officers. These 
rules have not the force of law; they are administrative directions the observance of which the police authorities 
should enforce upon their subordinates as tending to the fair administration of justice. It is important that they 
should do so, for statements obtained from prisoners, contrary to the spirit of these rules, may be rejected as 
evidence by the judge presiding at the trial." See also supra note 34 at 129. 
123 T.E. St. Johnston, "Judges' Rules and Police Interrogation in England Today" (1966) 57 Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology and Police Science 85 at 87. 
124 Supra note 65 at 197. 
125 Supra note 34 at 116. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
In the narrow approach to voluntariness, where only threats and promises are considered, 
" .. .is the assumption that a person in a position of authority, such as a police officer, must act in 
some overt way to induce an involuntary confession."128 This latter view held that considering 
factors other than clear threats or promises fall outside of the judicial inquiry on voluntariness of 
a confession.129 The courts began to increasingly rule in favour of the narrow interpretation of 
voluntariness,130 and this tendency was cemented in the 1914 case of R. v. Ibrahim. 131 
Since Warickshall the confessions rule has not been without controversy. In the 1809 
case of R. v. Row, 132 to cite another example, Chambre J. was critical of the "obscurity and 
discordance" of confessions admissibility in criminal matters. This criticism was again echoed 
by Lord Sumner in the seminal 1914 English case of R. v. Ibrahim, when he stated that: "The 
English law is still unsettled, strange as it may seem, since the point is one that constantly occurs 
in criminal trials," and he then went on to try to settle the law in that same judgment.133 Lord 
Sumner stated the basic confessions rule as follows: 
It has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law, that no statement by an 
accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shewn by the prosecution to have been a 
voluntruy statement, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice 
or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority.134 
Lord Sumner's rule in Ibrahim has become known as the "Ibrahim Rule". 135 According 
to the original formulation of the Ibrahim Rule "voluntary" simply means the absence of fear or 
128 Ibid. at 117. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Supra note 56 at 614. 
132 R. v. Row (1809), 168 E.R. 733 at 734. 
133 Supra note 56 at 614. 
134 Ibid. at 609. 
135 Rene. J. Marin, Admissibility of Statements, 9th ed. (Aurora: Canada Law Book INC., 2002) at 1-4, para. I I 0. 
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inducement caused by a person in authority. 136 The simple absence of these two elements would, 
according to this formulation, suffice to qualify a confession as voluntary. The language of the 
Ibrahim decision suggests that the voluntariness of a statement depends upon whether there was 
some overt act by a person in authority rather than upon any subjective considerations that may 
have compelled a suspect or accused person to make the statement. 
The lack of subjective considerations given in the Ibrahim ruling is particularly 
disturbing when one considers the factual background of the case. In Ibrahim, the accused, was 
a low-ranking Afghani soldier, serving in the British army, when he was approached by Major 
Barrett, his British commanding officer, and was asked "why have you done such a senseless 
act?" (referring to the commission of a murder of a native officer). 
It is doubtful that anything the accused may have said in response to the specific question 
put to him by his commanding officer could be considered as "voluntary". The considerations 
that might have come into play in a hypothetical court's determination of whether or not Ibrahim 
voluntarily confessed might have included: the peculiarities of the relationship between the 
soldier and his commanding officer as a function of the prevailing culture of British imperialism 
at the time; the relative levels of sophistication between a English-born British officer with the 
educational resources of the empire accessible to him and a soldier from the comparatively 
undeveloped and feudal Afghanistan; and the influence of the dominant military culture which 
says that a foot-soldier is to obey the orders (and answer the questions) of his commanding 
officer, and that to do otherwise could be construed as insubordination. 
136 V.D. Buono, "Voluntariness and Confession: A Question of Fact or A Question of Law?" (1976-77)19 Crim. L. 
Q. 100 at 100. 
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The Ibrahim court did not take the matter in any of these directions, and thus, rather than 
any nuanced consideration of how a power imbalance between a suspect and a person in 
authority might influence the voluntariness of the former person's statements, we are left with a 
test that contemplates only the perceived intent of the person in authority. Did the person in 
authority mean to threaten or induce the suspect or accused person? The conspicuous absence of 
any consideration of the questioned individual's subjective circumstances in Ibrahim makes this 
important ruling, highly objectionable, in my view. The British judiciary was clearly capable of 
appreciating the intimidating nature of the interaction between a superior and an inferior in a 
feudal setting by the time Ibrahim was considered, but elected not to address it in any 
meaningful way. 
The failure of the House of Lords to take into account the mental impact of a British 
major confronting an unsophisticated Afghani foot soldier was inexcusable. Beyond the 
distastefulness of the decision (perhaps as a creature of its historical epoch), we are additionally 
left with a test that inadequately addresses the complexity that is at play in relations between 
detained suspects and the persons who have authority over them in the context of the 
voluntariness of statements. 
The response by Lord Sumner to criticism of his decision in Ibrahim may be found in this 
passage: 
In truth, except that Major Barrett's words were fonnally a question they appear to have been 
indistinguishable from an exclamation of dismay on the part of a humane officer, alike concerned 
for the position of the accused, the fate of the deceased, and the credit of the regiment and the 
service137 
137 Supra note 56 at 608. 
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On Lord Sumner's view, shocked and aghast in disbelief, Major Barrett blurted out the 
nearly rhetorical question "why have you done such a senseless act", without having had any 
investigative motivation in doing so; but rather motivated by his humanity and concern for 
everyone involved. To which Ibrahim would have offered his response: the incriminating 
statement. Whether Ibrahim was motivated by duty or shame, or because he felt threatened or 
thought he would receive favourable consideration- whatever the reason he responded to Major 
Barrett with a confession-- is not relevant in Lord Sumner's eyes. What counts are Major 
Barrett's "humanitarian" motivations in asking the question and, specifically the absence of a 
threat or promise. 
But the subjective reasons of the "good faith" of Major Barrett ought to be irrelevant to 
the inquiry; rather Lord Sumner should have been more concerned with the subjective reasons of 
the accused for making the statement. For how can it be known whether an interrogated person 
confessed something voluntarily by way of an investigation of the mind of the interrogating 
party? What Major Barrett had in his heart and mind when he asked the question has very little, 
if anything at all, to do with what Ibrahim had in his when he confessed. The House of Lords 
seems to have applied a subjective test to the wrong person. 
Despite the problematic nature of the ruling in Ibrahim, the flawed reasoning in this case 
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Prosko. However, although the Ibrahim 
case came to lay the foundation for the treatment of voluntariness in the common law of Canada, 
there was a considerable lack of definitive clarity in the reported cases throughout the twentieth-
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century.138 Some of the developments, and the complications, in the post-lbrahim criminal law 
of Canada are what we shall come to explore later in this chapter, beginning with Pros/co. 139 
However before we proceed to the discussion of voluntariness in Canada, let us explore 
Herbert Packer's models of Crime Control and Due Process in order to set out a theoretical 
framework for our examination of the doctrine of voluntariness. Packer's models are a heuristic 
tool to analyze features of a criminal process relative to the possibilities that might have been. 
Using these models, we can characterize judicial rulings and legislation as moving closer to a 
due process orientation, on the one hand, or alternatively closer to a crime control orientation. 
Packer's models may be used as a road map to put in perspective the shifting judicial orientation 
between the broad and narrow interpretations of voluntariness, throughout the process of 
refinement of this doctrine in Canada. 
Packer's Models of Crime Control and Due Process: 
In analyzing the law ofvoluntariness in Canada in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, it is useful to place the developments that occurred within the theoretical framework 
developed by Herbert Packer. 140 Packer advanced a theory that envisioned the system as being 
populated by ideological commitments as between " ... two poles, and the continuum that exists 
between them."141 "The continuum"142 consists of a "spectrum of choices,"143 "value 
138 R. v. Sileski (1921 ), 35 C. C. C. 368 at 369 (Que. C.A.), per GreenshieJds J .: 
Perhaps no part ofthe criminal law, during the last century, has received more attention from members ofthe Bench 
and Bar than that dealing with the admissibility or inadmissibility of so-calJed confessions, statements or 
declarations made by a suspected accused person. 
139 R. v. Prosko (1922), 63 S.C.R. 226. 
140 Herbert L. Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process" (1964) 113(1) U. Penn. L. Rev. 1; and Herbert L. 
Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968). 
141 Ian Bryan, "The Histories and Structures of Custodial Interrogation" (PhD Thesis in Law, The University of 
Warwick School of Law, 1994) [published] at 145. 
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systems"144 and assumptions145 that make up the criminal justice system. 146 The two poles of the 
theoretical construct represent " ... two separate"147 and distinct sides ofthat continuum.148 The 
two models were developed to represent the two extremes of the continuum: 149 the crime control 
model, and the due process model. 150 He stressed that the two models were "normative"151 and 
" ... not intended to be prescriptive."152 The crime control and due process models are, therefore, 
ideal types representing " ... the opposing ends of the continuum of values and ideologies that are 
subsumed within"153 and impact upon "the complexes of activity that operate to bring the 
substantive law of crime to bear (or to avoid bringing it to bear) on persons who are suspected of 
having committed crimes". 154 
The crime control model is centered around the notion 155 "that the repression of criminal 
conduct is by far the most important function to be performed by the criminal process." 156 A 
fundamental concern in this model is " ... the efficiency with which the criminal process 
operates."157 And "in order to operate successfully, [the system] must produce a high rate of 
apprehension and conviction,"158 and it therefore places159 "a premium on speed and finality." 160 
"Speed is promoted by maximizing the informal and routine elements of the process while 
142 Ibid. 
143 Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process" supra note 140 at 2; See also supra note 141. 
144 Packer, ibid. at 5. See also Bryan, Ibid. 
14
s Packer, ibid. at 7. See also Bryan, Ibid. 




ISO Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 5. 
151 Supra note 141. 
152 Ibid See also Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 2. 
1s3 Bryan, ibid. 
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s
4 Ibid.; See also Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 2. 
ISS Bryan, ibid. at 146. 
1
s
6 Bryan, ibid.; See also Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 9. 
1s7 Bryan, ibid. 
ISH Bryan, ibid.; Packer, "Two Models ofthe Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 10. 
1s9 Bryan, ibid. 
160 Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 10.; See also Ibid.; 
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finality is fostered by minimizing the occasions upon which the process may be subject to 
challenge. " 161 
According to this model, the system can be likened162 to "an assembly line or a conveyor 
belt", 163 "with each successive stage of the process performing routinized functions, the success 
of which is gauged by its ability"164 to quickly move the case along to a guilty plea. 165 
The presumption of guilt plays a central role in this model. 166 The crime control model 
needs to rely on the presumption of guilt in order to efficiently process a large number of 
criminals167 and as a result, the most important feature of this model is the early determination 
of guilt. 168 The thinking is that the police and prosecutors can be trusted to ferret out the 
innocent from the guilty. Once someone is charged, the screening by police and prosecutors, 
who have no interest in wasting resources on prosecuting the innocent, virtually guarantees that 
they are indeed guilty of the offence charged. 169 With a presumption of guilt in place, the 
"guilty" can be moved quickly through170 " ••• the remaining stages of the process."171 
"The presumption of guilt allows the non-adjudicative, preliminary and informal stages 
of the criminal justice process to achieve the "dominant goal" of the crime control model, the 
repression of crime through highly efficient and summary procedures. " 172 The other parts of the 
161 Packer, ibid.; See also Bryan, ibid. 
162 Bryan, ibid. 
163 Packer, ibid. at 11. 
164 Supra note 141 at 146. 
165 Ibid; See also Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 11. 
166 Bryan, Ibid: See also Packer, ibid. 
167 Packer, ibid.; Bryan, ibid. 
168 Bryan, ibid. 
169 Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 11. 
170 Supra note 141 at 146. 
171 Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 11.; Ibid. 
172 Packer, ibid. at 13; Bryan, ibid. 
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system are viewed as173 "unlikely to produce as reliable fact-finding as the expert administrative 
process that precedes them." 174 It is a goal of the model, 175 "to place as few restrictions as 
possible on the character of the administrative fact-finding processes and to limit restrictions to 
those that enhance reliability." 176 
Hence, the guilty plea is a key factor for the smooth operation of this this model. 177 With 
an early presumption of guilt, 178 " ••• the subsequent stages of the process are left to perform the 
largely ceremonial role of endorsing the presumption of guilt and legitimating it as legal guilt. 
Therefore, the extent to which the successive stages of the process permit challenges to the 
informal and efficient fact-finding process" 179 is small, and it is believed that they are 
"relatively unimportant and should be truncated as much as possible". 180 
Contrary to the crime control model, the due process model, is described as an 
" ... obstacle course."181 Under this model, the stages of the criminal justice process are 
"designed to present formidable impediments to carrying the accused any further along in the 
process". 182 
Given the coercive potential of the criminal law, "the criminal process must ... be 
subjected to controls and safeguards that prevent it from operating with maximal efficiency."183 
173 Bryan, ibid. 
174 Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140, at 11. 
175 Supra note 141 at 147. 
176 Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140, at 13. 
177 Supra note 141 at 147. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140, at 13. 
181 Supra note 141 at 147.; See also ibid 
182 Packer, ibid. 
183 Ibid. at 16. See also Supra note 141 at 14 7. 
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In contrast to the crime control model, the due process model draws a distinction between 
the concept of "legal guilt", as opposed to "factual guilt", and emphasizes the importance of the 
presumption of innocence. 184 An individual is presumed innocent until he has been found guilty 
by a court of competent jurisdiction.185 The presumption of innocence, is designed to protect the 
innocent " ... since the courts and not the informal and non-adjudicative organs of the criminal 
process (like the police) have the responsibility of determining"186 a person's legal guilt. 187 
A finding of guilt must therefore be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and only by 
admissible evidence in the context of trial process. 188 Such principle, therefore puts 189 "into play 
all the qualifying and disabling doctrines that limit the use of the criminal sanction against the 
individual."190 
The primary goal of the due process model is to restrict the ability of the state to move 
against individuals191 with "maximal efficiency". 192 It should not be thought, however that the 
due process model rejects the importance of"repressing crime."193 However, contrary to its 
rival, it takes the position that there should be a" ... formal adjudicative fact-finding processes 
which accept the possibility of error and allow the case constructed against the accused to be 
publicly evaluated by an impartial tribunal"194 




188 Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140, at 17; Bryan, ibid at 147 -148. 
189 Bryan, ibid at 148. 
190 Packer, ibid; Bryan, Ibid 
191 Bryan, ibid. 
192
• Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 16. See also ibid. 
193 Packer, ibid. at 13.; See also Bryan, ibid. 
194 Supra note 141 at 148. 
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The models proposed by Packer are useful in seeing the changes in judicial approach to 
the doctrine ofvoluntariness.195 Applying Packer's models to the existing case law on 
voluntariness, it becomes apparent that what is referred to as the narrow view of the 
voluntariness test rests closer196 to the" ... crime-control end of the spectrum of value choices. 197 
On the other hand, the broad view seems to share more in common with due process values. 198 
Confessions Rules under the Crime - Control Model 
According to this model the best possible evidence is an admission of guilt coming 
directly from the mouth of the accused. 199 The opportunity to hear the admission of guilt 
directly from the accused is too important to pass-up.200 The significance of such evidence 
becomes more evident, when one considers the fact that under this model, the police can detain 
individuals and hold them for questioning on mere suspicion and hearsay evidence. 201 Hence the 
police should be allowed to strike while the iron is hot. The ability of the police to extract 
statements from accused persons would save considerable state resources and in all likelihood it 
would lead to quick guilty pleas. The best time to get a statement is when the accused person is 
in the clutches of the state and totally isolated from his lawyer and his family. 202 This is based 
on the proposition that any contact between the accused and his lawyer or even his family would 
undermine the ability of the police to get a statement from the accused. 203 The undesirable effect 
195 Ibid 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid.: seeR. v. Baldry ( 1852); R. v. Johnston (1864) 15 ICLR 60; R. v. Miller (1895) 18 Cox C.C. 54; R. v. Booth 
and Jones, supra note 119. 
198 Bryan, ibid; R. v. Swatkins (1834) 4 Car. & P 548; Berriman, Supra note 98; R. v. Mick (1836) 3 F & F 322; and 
the minority decisions in R. v. Johnston (1864) 15 ICLR 60; R. v. Bodkin (1863) 9 Cox C.C. 511; R. v. Gavin (1885) 
15 Cox C.C. 656; R. v. Male and Cooper (1893) 17 Cox C.C. 689; R. v. Histed(I898) 19 Cox C.C. 16. 
199 Packer, "The Limits ofthe Criminal Sanction", supra note 140 at 187. 
200 Ibid. at 188. 
201 Ibid. at 176-177. 
202 Ibid. at 188. 
203 Ibid. 
of counsel's advice to the accused, which is to "say nothing,"204 would only frustrate the efforts 
of the police to hear the "truth" from the most useful source, which is the accused himself. 205 
Although the police should not be allowed to hold a suspect indefinitely,206 considerable 
latitude should be given to the police to continue their interrogation, until they can overcome the 
resistance of the accused person. 207 The amount of time that an accused can be held at the 
station, before he is taken to court should be reasonable. 208 The determination of the 
reasonableness of this time period cannot be subject to "hard and fast rules."209 Rather it should 
vary from case to case depending on the character of the accused, the seriousness of the charges 
and the complexity of the case.210 
The time spent by the accused in police custody is considered to be a part of investigative 
detention211 and therefore the accused is not entitled to any of the procedural protections that 
may be available to him during the judicial phase of the proceedings against him.212 Should the 
accused wish to challenge the legality of his arrest, his lawyer can always bring a habeas corpus 
motion before a court.213 However, for the time that the accused is in police custody, he belongs 













According to crime-control model counsel has no business in interfering with the 
investigative stage of the process, and his/her proper place is in the courtroom.215 This is 
important, because the unwelcomed intrusion of defence counsel, invariably by telling his/her 
client to keep quiet will effectively foreclose the prospects of bringing the case to a speedy 
resolution and that would obviously defeat the goals of the crime-control model.216 The end 
result being that the guilty party may ultimately "get away" with his crime and that would 
compromise the safety of society?17 
The rules governing interrogations should be sufficiently flexible, so that they do not 
impair the ability of the police to discover the "truth"?18 Any violations of the rules should 
either be perceived as "good faith"219 on the part of the officers or they should be dealt with 
internally by imposing administrative sanctions on officers who are guilty of flagrant violations 
of the rules.22° For example, if an accused person is held for a very long time at the police 
station, then the officers responsible for this violation should only be disciplined internally to 
ensure that such incidents do not happen often. However the accused person who has suffered 
from the violation of his rights is not entitled to any procedural relief.221 
The crime-control model does not condone coerced confessions. 222 The fears of 
unreliability associated with coerced confessions puts this type of evidence at odds with the 
principle aim of this model, which is the discovery of the "truth". 223 The possibility of a 
wrongful conviction compels this model to approach the problem of coerced confessions with 
215 Ibid. at 203 
216 Ibid. at 202 
217 Ibid. at 202-203 
218 Ibid. at 188. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid. at 188-189. 




some degree of caution. 224 The crime-control model does not advocate the use of formal legal 
rules to test the reliability of statements. The desirable method for this model is to conduct a 
factual inquiry at the judicial level, on a case-by-case basis, to determine whether or not the 
conduct of the officers was so abusive that it effectively forced a false confession from the 
accused person.225 For example, the severe beatings and the indignity that the accused persons 
experienced in the notorious case of the Birmingham Six, before the coerced confessions were 
obtained,226 may just be enough to raise reliability concerns under this model. Hence, the 
challenge for the accused person in such a case would be to convince the jury that their 
allegations of torture at the hands of the police are credible. 227 This is due to the fact " ... the use 
of force is not itself determinative of the reliability of a confession and should therefore not be 
conclusive against the admissibility of a confession. "228 Rather: 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid. 
A defendant against whom a confession is introduced into evidence should have to convince the 
Jury that the circumstances under which it was elicited were so coercive that more probably than 
not the confession was untrue. In reaching a determination on that issue, the trier of fact should of 
course be entitled to consider the other evidence in the case, and if it points towards guilt and 
tends to corroborate the confession, should be entitled to take that into account in determining 
whether, more likely than not, the confession was untrue.229 
226 In 1975 the Birmingham Six were convicted of murder arising from the 1974 pub bombings that killed 21 people. 
Six individuals were arrested and were convicted on the basis of confessions and circumstantial evidence linking 
them to other IRA members. The six men- Patrick Hill, Gerry Hunter, Richard Mcllkenny, Billy Power, Johnny 
Walker, and Hughie Callaghan claimed that they were beaten by the police to falsely confess to their involvement in 
the bombing. There was evidence that the six men were assaulted at the jail, however given the uncertainty about 
the timing of the assaults, the trial judge determined that their confessions were voluntary and hence they were 
admitted into evidence. The jury convicted all six ofthem of21 counts of murder. The six men were eventually 
exonerated when the Home Secretary referred their case for the second time to the Court of Appeal. The Court of 
Appeal then decided that the convictions were unsafe and they were all released in 1991. (Kent Roach and Gary 
Trotter, "Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terrorism", (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2005) at p. 9-10). 
227 Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, supra note 140 at 189. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
Hence, it follows that for the proponents of the crime-control model, extended periods of 
detention without access to counsel, coupled with limited physical abuse of the accused in the 
hands of the police, may still not be a good enough reason to exclude a statement. 
Confessions Rules under the Due-Process Model 
The proper standard of arrest under the due-process model is reasonable and probable 
grounds. 230 This model has no tolerance for arrests based on mere suspicion, or on flimsy 
grounds. The police should already have a viable case against an accused person, before they 
proceed to place him under arrest. 231 Therefore, under such circumstances, the police do not 
need to rely on the confession of an accused person in order to develop a case against him.232 
Upon arrest, the accused person should be taken without unreasonable delay before a 
court of competent jurisdiction for a show-cause hearing.233 At his first court appearance and the 
subsequent appearances the accused should also be allowed to challenge the legality of his 
arrest234• 
At this stage of the proceedings, as in all stages of the proceedings the accused is entitled 
to the presumption of innocence235 and therefore he should be granted bail while he awaits the 
disposition of his charges. 236 On this view, the only purpose of a bail hearing is to negotiate the 
terms and the conditions of release. 237 





2351bid. at 161. 
236 Ibid. at 215. 
237 Ibid. at 216. 
The accused is also entitled to the effective assistance of counsel from the moment of his 
arrest, right through to the end of the proceedings against him.238 The assistance of counsel at 
the moment of arrest however is absolutely crucial. This is based on the fact that at this point in 
time the gross disparities in resources between the accused and the state are at their greatest. 239 
The time of the arrest is an important stage in the proceedings because the accused has not had 
the chance to rally his forces and he is isolated from everyone, and hence the state has full 
control over him. Under such circumstances an accused person should not be interrogated, 
before a proper warning has been administered to him. 240 
Despite such a warning if the accused nevertheless makes an inculpatory statement to the 
police, the admissibility of such a statement can still be challenged under the following criteria: 
1. Should the police interrogate the accused do not warn or if the warning was not 
understood by the accused;241 
2. If he was questioned right after the warning and before he had a chance to decide whether 
he wishes to contact counsel or explicitly waive his right to counsel;242 
3. If the statement was extracted from the accused, after the failure of the police to bring the 
accused to court as soon as practicable;243 
4. If the statement was obtained as a result of threats. 244 
Should the accused be able to show any of these violations the statement should not be 
admitted against him. 245 This is necessary in order to discourage the police from extracting 
statements that violate the rights of an accused person. 246 
238 Ibid. at 203. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. 






The policy grounds for excluding statements in the due process model is not restricted to the 
fear of unreliability, but also this model takes the view that even truthful statements should be 
excluded, if it can be shown that the admission of such statement would be fundamentally unfair 
to an accused person. 247 According to the principles that govern this model, taking advantage of 
a suspect's lack of sophistication, his ignorance or even his timid character is unfair and 
therefore the admission of such statements into evidence should be banned on grounds of 
fairness. 248 
This model also takes the position that, unlike the crime-control model, the hearing to 
determine admissibility should be held in the absence of the jury.249 And should the statement be 
ruled inadmissible, the jury should never be made aware of the content of the excluded 
statement. 250 
Having conducted a brief review of Packer's models, we can now draw on these models in 
explaining Canadian developments in the area of the voluntariness doctrine, in the 20th and 21st 
centuries. These models help by providing us with an theoretical framework to evaluate the 
changing orientation of the Canadian judiciary with regards to the admissibility of statements 
over successive generations. 
246 Ibid 
H. L. Packer describes proper Police warning under due-process model in the fo11owing fashion: "As soon as a 
suspect is arrested, he should be told by the Police that he is under no obligation to answer questions, that he will 
suffer no detriment by refusing to answer questions that he may answer questions in his own interest to clear himself 
of suspicion but that anything he says may be used in evidence, and, above all, that he is entitled to see a lawyer if 
he wants to do so." Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, supra note 140 at 192. 




The Development of Voluntariness in Canada: 
The Narrow Approach to Voluntariness: 
Modem day voluntariness in Canada has become more refined than the law as it was 
stated in Ibrahim. Recall in Ibrahim the three components of the inquiry. No statement by an 
accused is admissible in evidence against him unless the prosecution can show it not to have 
been obtained by a threat or a promise held out by a person in authority. 251 These principles 
were adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada and applied in the 1922 case of R. v. Prosko, 252 
wherein the accused had been taken into custody in the United States and was told he was going 
to be deported back to Canada. Upon hearing this he said "I am as good as dead if you send me 
over there."253 Prosko was wanted in Canada on the capital offence of murder. When the 
authorities asked Prosko why he would be "as good as dead"254 he made an incriminating 
statement implicating himself in the murder. 
The significance of R. v. Prosko is that it introduced the narrow definition of 
voluntariness into Canadian law. Prosko was operating under the apprehension of a threat-
namely that his deportation might result in his execution if he were convicted of murder. 
However the court did not entertain this objective circumstance, and limited its analysis, as in 
Ibrahim, to the actions of the persons in authority and whether those actions created any 
inducements. The Court found that there was not "the slightest evidence that Prosko' s 
statements or confessions were induced or obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope 
251 Supra note 56 at 609. 
252 Supra note 139.; Supra note 17 at 281. 
253 Prosko, Ibid. at 4 (Q.L.). 
254 Ibid. 
of advantage exercised or held out,"255 by either of the officers who received his confession, and 
that the statements were voluntary.256 
The Supreme Court's adoption of the narrow definition ofvoluntariness shows its 
embrace of a crime control agenda where the totality of the circumstances and subjective factors 
are dismissed in favour of looking to whether a state agent provided any direct promises or 
threats. 
In R. v. Boudreau257 the Supreme Court restated its commitment to the narrow 
interpretation of the rule258 and to the crime control agenda.259 Although the Court's ruling 
touched on subjective factors260 by suggesting that the aura of authority created by the presence 
of state agents may cause apprehension in the minds of the accused, this concern was not 
meaningfully elaborated upon. Rather, the Supreme Court chose to make the presence of some 
overt act calculated to induce fear or hope the linchpin for exclusion. 
The Supreme Court, by stating the basic principles of the admissibility of statements in 
their narrow form in Boudreau, 261 paved the way for a "mechanistic application of the rule of 
absence of hope and fear." 262 The narrow definition of the rule places the focus of the inquiry 
on the state agents263, rather than on accused persons. The application of the narrow definition 
255 Ibid. 
256 Ibid. 
257 R. v. Boudreau, [1949] S.C.R. 262. 
258 Supra note 136 at 102. 
259 Ibid. 
260 
"No doubt arrest and the presence of officers tend to arouse apprehension which a warning may or may not 
suffice to remove, and the rule is directed against the danger of improperly instigated or induced or coerced 
admissions" Supra note 257 at 6 (Q.L.). 
261 Supra note 135 at 1-4. 
262 Supra note 136 at 123. 
263 Ibid. at 126. 
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presumes the voluntariness of a statement264; unless it is shown that the state agents through 
some overt acts have raised the hopes of an accused or they have caused him fear. The narrow 
definition results in courts limiting their focus in reviewing the actions of state agents.265 
In R. v. Fitton266, the Supreme Court issued a strong crime control ruling by refraining to 
address standards of police conduct as part of the voluntariness inquiry. The judges refused to 
consider the impact that the oppressive circumstances created by the police would have had on 
the mind of the accused and his propensity to make an incriminating statement as being a ground 
for exclusion, and therefore reiterated the narrow definition of voluntariness. Rather it was to be 
left to the discretion of the trial judge. Fateaux J. writes: 
Assuming that it could be said that the conduct of the police in the circumstances of this case was 
not in accordance with the [English] Judges' Rules, it was, particularly ... within the discretion of 
the trial Judge, if otherwise satisfied that the test ofvoluntariness ... had been met, to admit these 
statements in evidence ... And, if on the view of the trial Judge formed on the voir dire, the 
occasion arose for him to exercise this discretionary power, I find it impossible to say that he 
failed to do so judicially in admitting them in evidence.267 
The fact that the accused may have a subjective belief about the coercive nature of his 
ordeal, was not a sufficient ground to exclude a statement; rather the subjective factor had to be 
" ... attributed to some conduct on the part of the"268 state agents. 269 It appears that the conduct of 
the officers to keep the accused detained at the police station all day, without any formal charges, 
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid. at 127. 
266 R. v. Fitton [1956] S.C.R. 958 (Q.L.). In Fitton, the accused was picked up, without being formally charged, for 
the murder of a thirteen year old girl. Detained at the station, the accused was asked what his movements had been 
on the previous day, and he made an exculpatory statement. He was kept at the police station all day, and then in the 
evening, at 5 p.m., the officers returned and told the accused that they had discovered facts that showed his earlier 
statement was false. There was some more conversation and the accused then made a highly damaging remark. 
After this remark he was formally arrested for murder and cautioned. He then made a statement, in the form of 
questions and answers, which was taken down in writing and signed by him. At the trial both the oral and the written 
statements were admitted in evidence, without objection from the defence, but on appeal it was contended that they 
should not have been admitted. 
267 Ibid. at 21. 
268 E.J. Ratushny, Self-Incrimination in the Canadian Criminal Process {Toronto: Carswell, 1979) at 104. 
269 Ibid. 
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was not sufficiently egregious, according to the Supreme Court of Canada. It may be argued that 
the Supreme Court is guilty of ignoring the impact on the mind of the accused, of the officer's 
decision to detain the accused all day, and how such a lengthy detention may have influenced the 
accused to make an inculpatory statement. The Crown is not required to go further and show 
affirmatively that the statement was not otherwise influenced by the course of conduct adopted 
by the police. In other words, there needs to be a causallink270 between the actions of the police 
and the subjective state of involuntariness.271 
The Burden of the Prosecution 
Three due process rulings, R. v. Sankey,272 R. v. Thiffaulr73 and R. v. DiclC74 were made 
between R. v. Prosko and R. v. Boudreau. 
Sankey stands for the proposition " ... that while, on the one hand, questioning of the 
accused by the police ... will not per se render his statement inadmissible, on the other hand, the 
burden of establishing to the satisfaction of the Court that anything in the nature of a confession 
270 E.J. Ratushny, "Unraveling Confessions" (1971) 13 Crim. Law Q. 453 at 458. 
271 The Court was critical of the Ontario Court of Appeal's position that the accused's subjective mind should be 
considered, independent of police action (Ibid). The Court held that the majority of the Court of Appeal has treated 
the expression 'freely and voluntarily', used in Boudreau v. The King as if it (Ibid.) " ... connoted only a spontaneous 
statement, one unrelated to anything as cause or occasion in the conduct of the police officers; but with the greatest 
of respect that is an erroneous interpretation of what was there said. The language quoted must be read primarily in 
the light of matters that were being considered. As the opening words show, there was no intention of departing 
from the rule as laid down in the authorities mentioned; the phrase 'free in volition from the compulsions or 
inducements of authority' means free from the compulsion of apprehension of prejudice and the inducement ofhope 
for advantage, if an admission is or is not made. That fear or hope could be instigated, induced or coerced, all these 
terms referring to the element in the mind of the confessor which actuated or drew out the admission. It might be 
called the induced motive of the statement i.e. to avoid prejudice or reap benefit." Supra note 266 at 5; Also see Ibid. 
272 Sankey v. The King, [1927] S.C.R. 436, [1927] 48 Can. C.C. 97 (Q.L.). 
273 Thiffault v. The King, [1933] S.C.R. 509, (1930) 60 Can. C.C. 97. 
274 R. v. Dick(1941), 87 C.C.C. 101 (Ont. C.A.). 
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or statement procured from the accused while under arrest was voluntary always rests with the 
Crown. "275 
The significance of the case, however, is that it provided some additional clarity about 
what would be required for the Crown to discharge this burden by indicating that it cannot be 
done "merely by proof that the giving of the statement was preceded by the customary warning 
and an expression of the opinion oath by the police officer, who obtained it, that it was made 
freely and voluntarily."276 The Court, however, does not provide any specifics, in this case, of 
what will be required of the Crown to establish voluntariness, given that the officer's sworn 
testimony that he administered the caution and that the statement was free and voluntary is 
insufficient. 
Thiffault v. The King, a murder case, decided in 1933, came to the Supreme Court of 
Canada on appeal from Quebec, where the question as to the admissibility of a statement alleged 
to have been made by the accused to Quebec Provincial Police officers was considered.277 The 
Court however took great umbrage to how the written statement was procured in this case, noting 
that it had been ''plainly calculated to incriminate" Thiffault.278 The Court took issue with the 
fact that there was no verbatim record of what transpired during the interrogation 
(notwithstanding that the document produced by the clerk was read back to the accused, and he 
signed it), because "it is not a correct statement of what the accused said and intended to say."279 
The signed statement disregarded any explanation that Thiffault may have provided to his 
275 Supra note 272 at 5. 
276 Ibid 
277 Supra note 273 at 97. Mr. Thiffault was indicted for setting his house on fire and killing his wife and son. They 
were sleeping upstairs at the time of the fire. After the fire, Thiffault was picked up and detained as a "material 
witness". Subsequently he gave a written statement to the police, and that statement contained a false account about 
the origin of the fire. 
278 Ibid. at 98. 
279 Ibid at 101. 
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interrogators and simply converted his response into an admission in support of the Crown's 
theory. 280 Thus, the Court found that the signed statement should not have been introduced into 
evidence in the absence of an explanation from the clerk who prepared it.281 
The Court went on to insist that the persons administering the interrogation must be made 
available as witnesses during the voir dire on admissibility. "Where such a statement is elicited 
in the presence of several officers, the statement ought, as a rule, not to be admitted unless (in the 
absence of some adequate explanation of their absence) those who were present are produced by 
the Crown as witnesses, at least for cross-examination on behalf of the accused." Thus, the court 
required by this rule, that the officers present and the clerk who wrote down the statement, be 
made available to the defence for cross-examination as a necessary pre-condition to 
admissibility. 282 
A third ruling for due process was R. v. Dick. 283 The Court in Dick also stated that it 
is "an abuse of the process of Criminal Law to use the purely formal charge of a trifling offence, 
upon which there is no real intention to proceed, as a cover for putting the person charged under 
arrest, and obtaining from that person incriminating statements ... it is trifling with the long-
established maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, and has more than the mere appearance-but, 
in the intended result, it has at times the effect-of a trial by the police in camera before even the 
charge has been laid". 284 
The judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Dick is a clear indication that the original 
charge against an accused person should be a real charge, and not merely a pretext for detaining 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid. at 103. 
283 Supra note 274. 
284 Ibid at 110-11. 
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a suspect in order to extract a confession for a much more serious offence285, or for "an entirely 
different offence".286 
These three rulings imposed additional requirements on the state in the voluntariness 
inquiry. Sankey imposed the burden on the Crown for demonstrating that the statement was 
voluntarily given; Thiffault created the requirement that the interrogating officers and the clerk 
writing down the statement be made compellable as witnesses for the voluntariness inquiry and 
highlighted the problems that the Crown would have if it tried to introduce statements into 
evidence that were not taken verbatim; and Dick condemned the practice of picking up someone 
on a minor charge to go on a fishing-expedition for serious, incriminating information. 
Reliability as the Ultimate Criterion for Admissibility: 
According to Wigmore "the principle upon which a confession is treated as sometimes 
inadmissible is that under certain circumstances it becomes untrustworthy as testimony". 287 The 
exclusive reliance of Wigmore on untrustworthiness for excluding statements, begs the question 
as to what is the real issue is determining voluntariness; are the confessions rule really just about 
establishing the reliability of statements? 
The judicial response to that question came in the case of R. v. Hammond. 288 This was an 
English murder case and on the voir dire, the accused was cross-examined as to the truth of his 
inculpatory statement and the accused openly admitted to its truth.289 The statement, despite the 
285 In Dick the accused, while in custody, had made seven statements to the police over a period of25 days. The 
police had deliberately prevented her from seeing her counsel, before she had signed one of her statements. 
Originally the police had charged the accused with vagrancy. The real intention of the police, however was to use 
the charge of vagrancy to keep her in jail, in order to extract confessions with regards to the murder of her husband. 
286 Supra note 274 at I 13. 
287 Stuart Ryan, "Involuntary Confessions" (I 960) 2 Crim. L.Q. 389 at 391. 
288 R. v. Hammond(l94I), 28 Cr. App. R. 84 (C.C.A.). 
289 The cross-examination of Hammond proceeded as follows: 
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trial judge's reservations about the appropriateness of the question290, was admitted and the 
accused was convicted of murder. 
The Court of Criminal Appeal, however, did not share the apprehension of the trial judge 
and it held that the question as to the truth of the statement " ... was a perfectly natural 
question."291 The Court of Criminal Appeal was of the view that the question was relevant to the 
collateral issue of credibility.292 Hence rendering" ... nugatory the ancient and honourable 
maxim nemo tenetur seispsum accusare .... "293 
The immediate impact of Hammond was to turn the question of voluntariness on its head, 
and the rules governing the admissibility of confessions were inverted, as reliability became the 
ultimate criteria. The truth became the overriding factor in determining the admissibility of a 
statement294 and not the vicious beatings that Hammond allegedly suffered at the hands of the 
Q: Your case is that this statement was not made voluntarily? 
A: Yes 
Q: What you are now saying is that you were forced into saying what was true by something that 
was done. Is that right? 
A: Yes sir. 
Q: So you did kill Mr. Roberts? 
A: Yes, sir. 
See: Kaufman, supra note 4 I at 46. 
290 Kaufman, ibid. The trial judge admitted the statement for other evidence that were elicited from the accused, 
rather than his admission of guilt. 
291 Supra note 288 at 86: Ibid.; Supra note 270 at 281. 
292 Hammond, ibid; Kaufman, ibid. Ratushny, ibid. 
293 Austin M. Cooper, "Admissibility of Confessions" (1958-59) 1 Crim. L.Q. 46. 
294 The notion that truth is the determining factor did not begin with Hammond. In fact, as discussed above, the 
origins of the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent facts can be traced all way back to W aricksha/1 (Supra, note 
42). A more explicit confirmation ofthat doctrine was stated in R. v. St. Lawrence (1949), 93 C.C.C., where the 
Supreme Court of Ontario stated at 391: 
Where the discovery of the fact confirms the confession- that is, where the confession must be taken to be 
true by reason of the discovery of the fact - then that part of the confession that is confirmed by the 
discovery of the fact is admissible, but further than that no part of the confession is admissible. 
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police.295 In other words truth dictated admissibility. Hence the use of violence, threats, 
promises, etc. may no longer lead to the exclusion of statements, due to the fact that the adoption 
of dishonourable or illegal methods by state agents in obtaining statements would not necessarily 
affect their admissibility. 
A Short-Lived Boost to Due-Process Values 
The immediate Canadian response to the reactionary ruling in Hammond was the re-
affirmation of the governing rules of confession. The British Columbia Court of Appeal in 
Weighi/l296 held that the purpose of voir dire is " ... to discover not whether the confession is true 
(which is for the jury alone) but whether it is voluntary and hence admissible as evidence".297• 
The ruling in Weighill clearly rejected Hammond and that left some room for optimism that in 
Canada the courts could be poised to introduce concerns about fairness (not just reliability) into 
the confessions' rules. 
The Forces of Crime Control Strike Back 
These hopes were short lived, however, as the issue was raised again in R. v. LaPlante. 298 
In that case, the Ontario Court of Appeal took the holding in Hammontf99 one step further. It 
concluded that Hammond permitted not simply the accused to be questioned as to whether or not 
the statement was true, but also to be asked whether or not he is guilty of the crime charged. In 
the Court's view, the answer would be relevant to the accused's credibility. This was starkly at 
295 Hammond had said that he had given a statement to the police as a result of a vicious beating. 
296 R. v. Weighi/J (1945), 83 C.C.C. 387 (B.C.C.A.). 
297 Ibid. at para 12. 
298 R. v. LaPlante [1958] O.W.N. 80 (C.A.). 
299 
"In respect of the second ground, we can add nothing to the reasons given by Mr. Justice Humphreys in R. v. 
Hammond. The evidence given by the accused in cross-examination on the voir dire that the statements made by 
him were true, touches the issue of credibility ... and his answers in respect of both matters to the questions put by 
counsel for the crown were relevant to the issue as to whether or not the statements made by him were voluntary" 
Ibid at 81 (C.A.). 
odds with Weighill, 300 which had held that the voir dire on the admissibility of a statement is 
about voluntariness and not an inquiry about the truth of the statement. 
The issue at stake here requires some further elaboration. If the Crown asks the accused 
at the voir dire whether or not his incriminating statement is true or asks him whether he is guilty 
of the crime charged, the accused is immediately put in a no-win situation. No matter what he 
says, his credibility will be affected. If he admits to being the killer, then he would seem more 
likely to be a liar, because killing is generally seen as a more serious moral violation than lying, 
and if someone was willing to kill, they would be willing to lie. If he denies that the statement 
he made is true, he admits to being a liar, and his credibility is likewise affected. It follows from 
this that the question cannot provide much insight into the accused's credibility, it can really only 
harm it. 
What the Court is really concerned with here is assessing the reliability of the statement; 
it is motivated by a desire to get the guilty. If the accused admits that the confession is true, then 
the judge will be tempted to find a reason to let the statement into evidence; and why not? 
Although fairness may be technically at issue, the bottom line is that the accused just admitted to 
committing the crime. 
A voir dire on the voluntariness of a confession is not meant to be an inquiry into the 
truth of the confession; it is an inquiry into whether it was voluntarily made. Whatever limited 
probity on the issue of credibility is substantially outweighed by the potential prejudice of 
permitting this sort of inquiry into a question that is ultimately peripheral to the question of 
voluntariness. 
300 Supra note 296. 
One year later the same Court, in the case of R. v. McAloon301 , approved the trial judge's 
charge to the jury, which was inconsistent with its earlier position in LaPlante. This is based on 
the fact that in McAloon the trial judge had invited the jury to act upon a true and yet an 
involuntary statement. The trial judge charged the jury in the following fashion: "Even if you 
think the statement was not voluntary, yet, if you think it was true, you may act upon it".302 
According to L.K. Grabum the trial judge in McAloon was telling the: 
... jury in plain, unmistakable and unambiguous language that in the final analysis it is the truth of 
the statement that matters, and not the question of adherence to the niceties of the law. The Court 
of Appeal held His Honour's direction to be unimpeachable.303 
Although the Ontario Court of Appeal in LaPlante paid lip service to the priority of 
voluntariness over truth, in McAloon the same Court re-asserted the view that " ... it is the truth 
and not the voluntariness of the statement which is the paramount question of fact for the 
jury"304• Hence the trend that had begun with Hammond was quite forcefully followed by the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in LaPlante and McAloon and also by the Supreme Court of Ontario in 
St. Lawrence. 305 
These rulings have been seen, by some at least, as indirect nods of approval for the use of 
dishonourable methods by state agents to extract confessions, in any which way possible.306 The 
301 R. v. McAloon, [1959] 124 C.C.C. 182 (Ont. C.A.). 
302 L. K. Graburn, "Truth as the Criterion of the Admissibility of Confessions" (1963) 5 Crim L.Q. 1960 415 at 423. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. at 424. The Court held that once a statement is admitted the question of its voluntary character goes only to 
its weight. 
305 R. v. St. Lawrence [1949] 7 C.R. 464, [1949] O.R. 215 (S.C.O.); Ibid. "It is submitted that the Hammond, 
LaPlante, St. Lawrence and McAloon cases indicated a trend toward a discretion on the part of a trial judge to admit 
the truthful but involuntary statement." -Supra note 302 at 424. 
306 
"It is submitted that the result of the decision in the Hammond case goes far beyond mere permission to Crown 
counsel to test the credibility of the accused and gives police officers carte blanche to treat an accused as roughly as 
they wish in order to obtain an incriminating statement from him for evidence in criminal proceedings."- Supra note 
293 at47. 
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use of such methods to obtain even truthful statements, offends democratic values307 and hence 
they should be resisted. Fortunately, judges in other provinces were not keen to follow the lead 
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in LaPlante. In R. v. Hnedish308, Mr. Justice Hall, of the 
Saskatchewan Superior Court, explained: 
Accordingly while giving the LaPlante judgment the respect it commands as a judgment of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal, I am left with the conviction that because its foundation is on so unsure 
a footing as the obiter dicta of Hammond's case, I cannot follow if09 or accept it as good law in 
Saskatchewan.310 
The Supreme Court Upholds Crime-Control Values 
Ultimately the question came before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. DeClercq.311 
In DeClercq the accused, while testifying on the voir dire, was questioned by the presiding judge 
about the truth of his statement.312 The accused, in response to questions posed by the presiding 
307 
"To admit even fully corroborated confessions obtained by such methods would, it is submitted with utmost 
respect, be repugnant to what the writer believes to be still and what he hopes will continue to be our accepted 
standard and principles of justice". Supra note 287 at 399. Ryan was referring to the effects ofthe rulings in St. 
Lawrence, LaPlante and McAloon. 
308 R. v. Hnedish [1958], 29 C.R. 347 (Sask. S.C.). 
309 In Hnedish, ibid. Hall J. also suggested that " ... it is not permissible for crown counsel to ask questions 
concerning the truth of the facts recorded in the statement. The issue being tried is not the truth or otherwise of the 
so-called statement (which is for the jury alone), but whether it is voluntary and so admissible. It would be 
repugnant to the accepted standards and principles of justice to transmute what was initially an inquiry as to 
'admissibility' of a confession into an inquisition of an accused under the guise of credibility". - C.C. Savage, 
"Admissions in Criminal Cases" (1962-63) 5 Crim. L. Q. 49 at Ill. 
31° Kaufman, supra note 41 at 48. 
311 R. v. DeClercq, [1968] S.C.R. 902. 
312 The trial judge himself asked the accused: 
Q: Give the witness the exhibit. Is that the statement you signed? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Is it true? 
Defence Counsel: Now, in addition to that, the question of whether the statement is true or is not true is not 
material here. 
The Court: I think it is. 
Defence Counsel: It is purely whether the statement is voluntary or not. 
(Eventually the proper statement was put to the witness). 
The Court: I think it is very important whether it is true or not. I note your objection and I think it is a 
proper question taken at this time. 
Defence Counsel: There are all sorts of cases. 
The Court: Yes. I have read them all. I am quite familiar with them and I am satisfied with my ruling. 
Accused: Yes, Your Honour. 
The Court: All right. 
...., 59...., 
judge, confirmed the truth of his statement. The statement was admitted and the accused was 
convicted. On appeal, a majority at the Ontario Court of Appeal held that they were bound by 
LaPlante. However, Mr. Justice Laskin's dissented, sending the case to the Supreme Court. 
The question before the Supreme Court was, again, whether the trial judge had erred in 
law when he asked DeClercq, who was giving evidence on a voir dire into the admissibility of 
his statement, whether or not the statement was true. The trial judge had insisted on an answer 
despite an objection from defence counsel.313 The question that arose was, if the accused says at 
voir dire that the statement he gave was true, does this have any impact upon the determination 
of whether it was voluntary, and thus admissible? 
For the majority, Martland J. wrote: 
I am in agreement with the conclusions stated in the Hammond case. While it is settled 
law that an inculpatory statement by an accused is not admissible against him unless it is 
voluntary, and while the inquiry on a voir dire is directed to that issue, and not to the 
truth of the statement, it does not follow that the truth or falsity of the statement must be 
irrelevant to such an inquiry. An accused person, who alleged that he had been forced to 
admit responsibility for a crime committed by another, could properly testify that the 
statement obtained from him was false. Similarly, where the judge conducting the voir 
dire was in some doubt on the evidence as to whether the accused had willingly made a 
statement, or whether, as he contended, he had done so because of pressure exerted by a 
person in authority, the admitted truth or the alleged falsity of the statement could be a 
relevant factor in deciding whether or not he would accept the evidence of the accused 
regarding such pressure.314 
Accused: ... except for a few details, I would say the statement is correct. 
Reproduced from Hon. Fred Kaufman, supra note 41 at 48 & 49. 
313 Supra note 311. 
314 Ibid. at 912. 
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Thus, according to the majority in DeClercq, such an inquiry by the judge would be 
permissible so long as that inquiry was related "solely to the weight to be given to the evidence 
on the issue as to whether or not it was voluntary."315 
DeClercq provided another opportunity for Mr. Justice Hall who had become a judge of 
the Supreme Court, since giving his ruling in Hnedish, to re-visit the question and give a more 
refined set of reasons for his opposition to the issue. Hall J. took the position that the question is 
wrong in law, because it offends the rule against self-incrimination. Moreover Hall J. held that 
the question removes an important safeguard against improper pressures by state agents against 
an accused. 316 
Hall J. was joined in dissent by Spence J. and Pigeon J. For Spence J. the question was 
irrelevant and had no probative value in determining the issue ofvoluntariness.317 And Pigeon J. 
was of the view that permitting the question would lead to the erosion of confession rules, and 
this might weaken a necessary safeguard against potential police abuses. 318 
JIS Ibid. 
316 Hall J. explained: 
The problem is whether the truth of the statement is relevant to this inquiry. It is obvious that it is not 
directly relevant because fundamentally it is relevant only to the main issue, namely the guilt or the 
innocence of the accused. However, it is contended that it is indirectly relevant as bearing on the 
credibility of the accused testifying on the voir dire. But is it not rather a petition principal, trying to 
find out from the accused whether he is guilty in order to decide whether to admit his confession as 
evidence of his guilt? 
Whenever the statement or confession amounts to an admission by the accused that he has committed 
the offence of which he is charged, the truth of the incriminating statement is but theoretically 
distinguishable from his guilt. If the statements is totally incriminating, asking the accused testifying 
on the voir dire: "Is the statement true?" is tantamount to asking him: "Are you guilty of the 
offence?" But that is precisely what an accused may not be asked unless he chooses to testify at the 
trial". -Supra note 31 I at I 8-19 (Q.L.). 
317 Kaufman, supra note 41 at 52. 
318 Ibid. at 54. 
The majority of the Supreme Court, however, through its process of reasoning, concluded 
that the question was somehow relevant to the credibility of the accused. The position of the 
Supreme Court is partly based on the assumption that a trial judge is presumably able to disabuse 
his/her mind from the evidence that he/she has heard at the voir dire. This means that the 
question becomes permissible because the trial judge is presumed to have the capacity to 
disabuse him/herself of the potential influence of this information in discharging his/her other 
functions. This seems like an especially optimistic presumption in cases where a trial judge 
presides without a jury and is charged with responsibility for not only making the required legal 
rulings but also required to make the key factual findings about guilt or innocence. 319 
The interesting aspect of the ruling in DeClercq was that all the nine judges unanimously 
agreed that the question to be decided on a voir dire is voluntariness and not the truth of the 
statement.320 However the majority seems to have allowed the question on the truth of the 
statement, in an indirect attempt to "purify"321 or establish the reliability of an accused's 
statement. It is quite obvious that such an approach stands in sharp contrast with the legitimate 
purpose of a voir dire. 322 
Transformation of the voir dire into "an inquisition of an accused, under the guise of 
credibility"323 leaves much to be desired. The conventional wisdom seems to suggest that, the 
admission of an accused to the truth of his inculpatory statement helps to boost his credibility. 
Therefore, his evidence on the involuntary features of his statement should be more believable. 
However, despite the remarkable show of honesty by the accused persons in Hammond, 
319 Supra note 287 at 396. 
32
° Kaufman, supra note 41 at 54. 
321 Supra note 309 at 57. 
322 Ibid 
323 Ibid. at Ill; Supra note 308 at para I 0. 
LaPlante, DeClercq, etc. the courts still disbelieved their respective claims that their statements 
were involuntarily given and each confession was ultimately ruled admissible. 
It would be safe to suggest that DeClercq is a massive encroachment upon the already 
narrow scope of voluntariness rules. When one adds DeClercq to the restrictive approach of 
Ibrahim, Boudreau, Fitton, etc. one is left with considerable doubts about the protective abilities 1 
of the confessions rule. It is difficult not to see the DeClercq question as little more than a direct 
attack on the integrity of the confessions rule, and it should therefore be eliminated. The fallacy 
of the argument that the question is somehow relevant to the issue of credibility has already been 
exposed by the Privy Council in R. v. Wong Kam-ming. 324 
I contend that the DeClercq question simply amounts to asking the accused if he is 
guilty.325 Pushing such a question to the pre-trial stage where admissibility is being decided does 
little more than " ... put the cart before the horse". 326 
324 Ratushny points out that Supreme Court too readily adopted Hammond for its ruling in DeClercq, and yet, 
interestingly the Privy Council in R. v. Wong Kam- ming [1979] 2 W.L.R. 81, completely overruled Hammond and 
as a result Hammond is no longer a good Law in England. Hence our Supreme Court seems to be behind the times. 
(Kaufman, Supra note 41 at 56). It should also be stated that the factual background in DeClercq is even more 
disturbing than Hammond. This is so because DeClercq was a judge alone trial, and it was the trial judge himself 
who asked the question "is it true", rather than the prosecutor. 
325 The issue of admissibility of the question "Is it true" in Australia was dealt differently. In R. v. Toomey [ 1969] 
Tas. S.R. 99 (S.C.) the Court's position on this question has been described as follows: 
... to allow the question would strongly discourage the accused from testifying, thereby depriving the Court 
of his version of the interrogation, and thus undermining the policy ground of controlling improper police 
conduct. Furthermore, the knowledge ofthe confession's truth would tend to predispose the trial judge 
when addressing his mind to voluntariness. 
See: Mark Schruger, "Recent Developments in the Law Relating to Confessions: England, Canada and Australia" 
(1981) 26 McGill L.J. 435 at 479. 
326 Ibid. at 480. 
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The Judicial Discretion to Exclude and the Greater Erosion of the Confessions Rule 
The case of R. v. Wray321 represented another attempt by the Supreme Court to restrict 
the ambit of the confession rules to the narrow construction of Ibrahim rule. The Supreme Court 
in Wray recognized the narrowest possible judicial discretion to exclude evidence, which is not 
technically contrary to the Ibrahim rule. The Supreme Court held that judicial discretion is only 
designed to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial. However, a trial judge has no business 
extending his/her discretionary powers beyond the courtroom. In other words, the investigation 
and the interrogation stages fall outside of judicial discretion. 328 Wray thus eliminated the 
judicial discretion to exclude evidence that has been unfairly obtained, except in limited 
circumstances. 
The effect of the majority's ruling in Wray was to make illegally obtained confessions 
admissible into evidence on the basis of relevance (notwithstanding other considerations relating 
to reliability), provided that it: is not gravely prejudicial to the accused, its admissibility is not 
tenuous, and its probative value is not slight.329 Moreover, in relation to the question of 
reliability, derivative evidence that has been discovered due to an involuntary confession 
(including one which has been illegally obtained) may be used to confirm the truth of the 
portions of that confession that relate to the discovered evidence. 
327 R. v. Wray, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.): The accused was charged with murder, as a result of a shooting which 
had occurred during the robbery of a gas station. Upon the arrest of the accused, the police used trickery, duress and 
inducements to compel the accused to make certain incriminating statements and lead them to the place where they 
could recover the gun. While the police were working on the accused, his lawyer was being kept at bay. At the trial 
the Crown argued that, even though the statements were involuntary, nevertheless, based on the doctrine of 
confirmation by subsequent facts, the evidence of him leading the police to where the gun was recovered was 
admissible. However the trial judge disagreed and used his discretion to exclude this evidence and he entered a 
directed verdict. The Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling of the trial judge and the matter was appealed to 
the Supreme Court. 
328 A.F. Sheppard, "Restricting the Discretion to Exclude Admissible Evidence" (1972) 14 Crim. L.Q. 334 at 336. 
329 Supra note 327 at para. 54. 
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The Wray decision was consistent with the Supreme Court's commitment, until that 
point, of making "truth" seeking the primary value of the Canadian criminal justice system. The 
cases of St. Lawrence, McAloon, DeClercq, Wray, etc. all seem to form a pattern which indicates 
that the principles of fairness and the desire to control abusive conduct by state agents would 
take a secondary and subservient role to the preeminent objective of discovering the "truth". 
These judgments implicitly assume that the rationale of the confessions rule is reliability alone. 
The Broadening of the /bra/tim Rule: Operating Mind and Oppression 
Since the adoption of the Ibrahim rule the Supreme Court has faithfully been applying it 
in determining the admissibility of statements by accused persons. The narrow construction of 
the Ibrahim rule, along with the effective elimination of judicial discretion, created a legal 
culture that would appear to have left little room for the doctrine of oppression. This was 
particularly true in light of a ruling such as R. v. Fitton,330 where the accused had been detained 
all day without charge and had been told, when the police returned to confront him, that they had 
found evidence that showed his earlier exculpatory statement (made without receiving a caution 
of any kind) was false. Hence, it was unexpected that there should have been a recognition of 
psychological oppression in R. v. Horvath331 and R. v. WartfB2 following rulings such as that. 
330 Supra note 266. 
331 R. v. Horvath (1979), 44 C.C.C. (2d) 385 (S.C.C.): In this case the accused was a seventeen-year-old youth, who 
was charged with the murder of his mother. Shortly after his arrest he was subjected to a grueling interrogation that 
lasted for more than three hours. Within a few hours of the frrst session, he was taken for a polygraph test that lasted 
for four hours. During the second phase of his interrogation the accused confessed to the murder of his mother. At 
his tria] a psychiatrist testified that the polygraph specialist had by his voice and his methods unwittingly induced a 
mild state of hypnosis. The trial judge agreed with the expert evidence and excJuded the statement. The acquittal of 
the accused was appealed and eventually the case reached the Supreme Court. A divided Court (split 4:3) upheld the 
trial judge's ruling. 
332 R. v. Ward(I979) 44 C.C.C. (2d) (S.C.C.) 498: Ward was appealing from an Alberta Court of Appeal's reversal 
ofhis acquittal from a charge of criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle causing death. At trial he 
was acquitted after the trial judge held his statement inadmissible. The accused in this case was injured in the 
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The Supreme Court in Horvath and Ward for the first time recognized the doctrines of 
operating mind, and oppression as grounds for the exclusion of statements. The Supreme 
Court's fresh look at the rules governing the voluntariness test seemed to have broken the 
previous stranglehold that the Ibrahim rule had on the admissibility rules. The cases of Horvath 
and Ward were significant, because they marked a willingness by the Supreme Court to consider 
the impact of other factors on the issue of voluntariness333 beyond Ibrahim's narrow 
fear/inducement formula.334 Thus the fear/inducement formula was no longer exclusive335; rather 
oppressive conduct by state agents also became a subject of consideration by the judiciary.336 
The Supreme Court in these two rulings once again confirmed that reliability was not the sole 
concern of the confessions rule.337 
The Court in Ward took the position that while the voluntariness analysis requires a 
determination of whether statements were "freely and voluntarily" made, the analysis may go 
beyond the narrow questions of whether there was the presence of a "hope of advantage" or a 
"fear of prejudice" flowing from a promise or threat "in consideration of the mental condition of 
the accused" at the time of the statements.338 Spence J., indicated that he viewed the trial 
judge's voluntariness analysis to have been the correct approach. The trial judge had "engaged in 
a consideration ofboth the mental and physical condition of the accused, first, to determine 
whether a person in his condition would be subject to hope of advantage or fear of prejudice in 
accident and was unconscious for a while. He was described by independent witnesses to have been in the "state of 
shock", when he spoke to the police. 
333 David Tanovich, "The Charter Right to Silence and The Unchartered Waters of a New Voluntary Confession 
Rule" (1992) 9 C.R. (4th) 24 at 37. 
334 Beverly M. McLachlin & Andrea. Miller, "Rothman: Police Trickery: Is The Game Worth The Candle" (1982) 
16 U.B.C. Law Rev. I I5 at I I9. 
335 Edmund Thomas, "Lowering the Standard: R. v. Oickle and the Confessions Rule in Canada" (2005) I 0 Can. 
Crim. L. Rev. 69 at 78. 
336 Supra note 334 at I23. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Supra note 332 at 506. 
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making the statements, when perhaps a normal person would not, and, secondly, to determine 
whether due to the mental and physical condition, the words could really be found to be the 
utterances of an operating mind. "339 A reasonable doubt on either of these issues would be 
sufficient to exclude a statement following a voir dire; the fact that the trial judge had a 
reasonable doubt on both of these issues ensured that he was justified in his refusal to admit the 
evidence, on the view of the Supreme Court. 340 
The Court bolsters the ruling in Ward by referring to it as a consistent application of the 
principles drawn from Boudreau v. The King,341 wherein Rand J. wrote: 
339 Ibid 
340 Ibid. 
The cases of Ibrahim v. The King [1914] A.C. 599, R. v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K.B. 531, andProsko v. 
the King, 66 D.L.R. 340,37 Can. C.C. 199,63 S.C.R. 226, lay it down that the fundamental 
question is whether the statement is voluntary. No doubt arrest and the presence of officers tend 
to arouse apprehension which a warning may or may not suffice to remove, and the rule is 
directed against the danger of improperly instigated or induced or coerced admissions. It is the 
doubt cast on the truth of the statement arising from the circumstances in which it is made that 
gives rise to the rule. What the statement should be is that of a man free in volition from the 
compulsions or inducements of authority and what is sought is assurance that that is the case. 
The underlying and controlling question then remains: Is the statement freely and voluntarily 
made?342 
341 Supra note 257. 
342 Supra note 332 at 505-06. This presents an incredibly expansive view of the scope of the voluntariness analysis, 
which has undoubtedly been significantly scaled back in more recent rulings. In particular, with respect to the issue 
of"operating mind", in R v. Whittle the Supreme Court ruled that to have an operating mind the accused need only 
have "sufficient cognitive capacity to understand what he or she is saying and what was said/' including, ''the ability 
to understand that the evidence can be used against the accused." (R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914.) 
This went against earlier suggestions in Clarkson that voluntariness might require the accused to have a more 
thorough understanding ofthe consequences ofspeech.(R. v. Clarkson [1986] I S.C.R. 393 at 393-395). Moreover, 
it was ruled that suspects need not be capable of exercising "analytical reasoning," or making "a good or wise choice 
or one that is in her interest." (R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914 at 933, 939, 941-42.) The effect of the view 
articulated in Whittle is that courts have held that suspects affected by intoxicating substances, mental illness, 
intellectual disabilities, or biochemical imbalances may still be capable of making legally "voluntary" statements. 
(See: R .. v. McKenna, [1961] S.C.R. 660; R. v. McPherson, 2000 MBCA 157 at para. 2; R. v. Richard(l980), 56 
C.C.C. (2d) 129 (B.C.C.A.); and R. v. Hartridge, [1967] I C.C.C. 346 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Whittle; R. v. Nagotcha, 
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 714, 109 D.L.R. (3d) I, 32 N.R. 204,51 C.C.C. (2d) 353; R. v. Santinon (1973), II C.C.C. (2d) 121 ! 
(B.C.C.A.). R v. Otis (2000), 151 C.C.C. (3d) 416 at para. 41 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C., [2001] I 
S.C.R. xvii; R. v. Sabean (1979), 35 N.S.R. (2d) 35 (C.A.); R. v. Arke/1 (1980), 54 C.C.C. (2d) 266 (B.C.C.A.); R. v . 
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The Supreme Court in Horvath departed from the narrow reading of the Ibrahim rule that 
the meaning of "free and voluntary" in the test only refers to statements that have not been 
induced by any hope of advantage or fear of prejudice, and holds that a statement "may well be 
held not to be voluntary, at any rate, if it has been induced by some other motive or for some 
other reason than hope or fear."343 
Beetz J. (with Pratte J. concurring) agreed with the majority in that Horvath's statements 
were inadmissible, but reached this conclusion "on narrower grounds confined to the matter of 
hypnosis. "344 On the point of oppression, Beetz J. indicates that he takes the view (along with 
Martland J. and the dissenting judges) that Horvath was not a case appropriate for considering 
whether "oppression" within the meaning of the English Judges' Rules ought to be recognized as 
a ground for excluding a confession, because the trial judge had made a specific finding that 
there was no oppression on the facts of Horvath; the issue was the hypnosis.345 Importantly, 
Beetz J. does not conclude that the circumstances did not constitute "oppression". Rather, he 
simply explains that he would not pronounce upon the meaning of that concept on the basis of 
the facts in Horvath.346 
The Effects of Ward and Horvatlt: Operating Mind and Oppression 
Ward and Horvath did not produce a clear definition of the test governing 
voluntariness.347 Spence J. and Estey J., in Horvath, held that the Ibrahim rule is not exhaustive, 
Hayes, 2002 NBCA 80 at para. 29 (diabetic condition); R. v. Bedard, [2000] O.J. No. 3992 (hypoglycemia); R. v. 
Taylor, 2008 ABCA 253, 433 A.R. 1 (hypoglycemia)). 
We return to a more detailed discussion of Whittle and Clarkson in Chapter 2. 
343 Supra note 331 at 405. 
344 Ibid at 412. 
345 Ibid at 429. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Supra note 334 at 123. 
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and the way the confession was extracted in that case, rendered the statement involuntary. 
Spence J. used the oppressive conduct of state agents as a ground to question the voluntary 
nature of the accused's statement.348 Spence J. described the oppressive conduct of the police in 
that case this way: 
... this boy is hammered in cross-examination by two most impressive police officers and then 
taken by a skilled and proved interrogation specialist and, with what the psychiatrist described as 
the most suggestive of questions, taken through a three-phase examination so that the learned trial 
judge characterized his condition at that time as one of"complete emotional disintegration". It is 
my strong view that no statement made by that accused under those circumstances can be 
imagined to be voluntary, and I do not find anything in the authorities which I have analyzed 
which would show me that the law is otherwise.349 
Beetz J. and Pratte J. also called for the expansion of the Ibrahim rule350 to capture the 
unique circumstances of this case, which included a statement made under hypnosis. As well as 
the latter statements, which were tainted by the earlier circumstances. 351 
The dissenting judgment representing the views ofMartland J., Ritchie J. and Pigeon J. 
stated that the circumstances in Horvath did not fall within the boundaries of the Ibrahim rule, 
and therefore, the statements were admissible. The minority did not wish to expand the Ibrahim 
rule, however, the dissenting judgment did refer to "oppression."352 
The expansion of the Ibrahim rule in Horvath was further extended in Ward. The 
Supreme Court in Ward concluded that the state of the mind of an accused is an important 
348 Spence J. and Estey J. also held that the word "voluntary" should be given its ordinary English meaning. 
349 Supra note 331 at 410. 
350 Beetz J. (and Pratte J. concurring) stated that: 
The principle which inspires the rule remains a positive one; it is the principle of voluntariness. The 
principle always governs, and may justify an extension of the rule to situations where involuntariness has 
been caused otherwise than by promises, threats, hope or fear, if it is felt other causes are as coercive as 
promises or threats, hope or fear, and serious enough to bring the principle into play." Extract taken from 
McLachlin & Miller, supra note 334 at 125. 
351 Alan Gold, "Confessions- Meaning of"voluntary"" (1982) 21 Crim. L.Q. 441 at 441. 
352 Kaufman, supra note 41 at 234. 
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consideration in establishing voluntariness. Thus Ward effectively added the need for an 
"operating mind"353 to the Ibrahim rule. The Supreme Court held that the confession of the 
accused was made while he was in a state of shock, and therefore, it was properly excluded. The 
Supreme Court unanimously held that exclusion is an appropriate remedy when the capacity of 
an accused to freely make a statement is in doubt.354 
The Re-affirmation of Ibrahim Rule in Rothman: The triumph of crime-control values 
The cases of Horvath and Ward may have given proponents of due process a ray of hope 
that the Supreme Court was on the road to reforming the confessions rule to place greater 
emphasis on concerns about fairness for criminal suspects and accused persons. However the 
decision of the majority of the Supreme Court in R. v. Rothman355 marked a clear return by the 
Supreme Court to its pre-Horvath stand of treating reliability as the most important goal of the 
confessions rule. 356 
In Rothman, the accused was charged with possession of narcotics for the purpose of 
trafficking.357 Upon his arrest, he declined to make a statement.358 The following day, an 
undercover officer, posing as a truck driver, was placed in his cell. 359 The undercover officer 
successfully engaged the accused in conversation and during the conversation the accused made 
an incriminating statement. 360 At his trial, the statement was ruled inadmissible361 and the 
accused was subsequently acquitted. The majority decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal set 
353 S. Schiff, Evidence in the Litigation Process, Vol. 2 (Barrie: Thomson Canada Ltd., 1993) at 967. 
354 Supra note 135 at 8-14.3. 
355 R. v. Rothman [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640,35 N.R. 485, [1981], 59 C.C.C. (2d) 30 (Q.L.). This case will also be 
reviewed in some detail in Chapter 3. 
356 Schruger, supra note 325 at 505. 





aside the acquittal and ordered a new tria1.362 The forceful dissent of Dubin J., however, sent the 
matter to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The majority decision in Rothman sent a clear message that the Supreme Court is not 
prepared to acknowledge a wider policy basis for the confessions rule than the issue of 
reliability.363 The majority also rejected a rationale based on the privilege against self-
incrimination, as that doctrine was only applicable to in-court testimony.364 Furthermore the 
majority made it quite clear that it" ... rejects any rationale based on concerns for the controlling 
of police conduct or for bringing the administration of justice into disrepute". 365 For the 
Supreme Court the issue in Rothman was whether the undercover officer was, in the mind of the 
accused, a person in authority. The majority concluded that since Rothman's ignorance of the 
officer's true identity did not affect the voluntary nature of his statement, the confessions rule is 
not engaged. The majority also stated that " ... Alwarcf66, Horvath, Ward, and Nagotcha361 did 
not change the confessions rule.368 
Martland J., writing for the majority, reasoned that a preliminary question raised by the 
facts was whether the undercover police officer was a "person in authority". If it were otherwise, 
the voluntariness rules would not apply and the confession would be admissible under the 
conventional hearsay exception for statements against interest. In other words, voluntariness was 
362 Ibid. 
363 Rosalind Conway, "No Man's Land: Confessions Not Induced by Fear of Prejudice or Hope of Advantage" 
(1984) 42 U. Toronto L. Rev. 26 at 38. Note: The author states that "an officer dressed as a fisherman entered his 
cell" (pg. 27). However, it appears that the author made a factual error. The undercover told the accused that he 
was a truck driver who was coming from a fishing trip.- See McLachlin and Miller, supra note 334 at 120. 
364 Alan Whitten, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (1986-1987) 29 Crim. L.Q. 66 at 78. 
365 Schruger, supra note 306 at 504. 
366 R. v. Alward & Mooney, [1979], l.S.C.R. 559. 
367 R. v. Nagotcha, [1980] I S.C.R. 714 
368 Schruger, supra note 325 at 504. 
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only in issue if the undercover police officer was a "person in authority". 369 Martland J. 
concluded that in deciding whether or not the person receiving the statement is a "person in 
authority" a subjective test should govern. Since Rothman did not regard the undercover officer 
as a person in authority, he was not, and therefore voluntariness was not a precondition to 
admissibility.370 Thus, it was an error in law for the trial judge to exclude the statement on this 
basis. 371 
The Court went on to express disagreement with the dissenting opinion from the Court of : 
Appeal, insofar as it had been argued that the privilege against self-incrimination was relevant on 
these facts.372 The Court cited the decision of Dickson J. in Marcoux and Solomon v. The 
Queen/73 wherein he states: "In short, the privilege extends to the accused qua witness and not 
qua accused, it is concerned with testimonial compulsion specifically and not with compulsion 
generally."374 Thus, for the Supreme Court the privilege only applies when a tribunal or 
authority is seeking to compel an accused to disclose something he does not want to disclose. 
It has been suggested that the " ... confession rule is the primary battlefield between the 
opposing forces of police powers on the one hand and the accused's rights on the other".375 If 
one agrees with this description then they would surely find Rothman a disappointing 
development. This is based on the fact that confessions rule has always been focused on the 
conduct of state agents. The obvious examples of confessions induced by violence, fear or 
369 Supra note 355 at 35. 
370 Ibid at 36. 
371 Ibid at 37. 
372 Ibid. 
373 1 L 1v.1.arcoux and Solomon v. The Queen ( 1975), 24 C. C. C. (2d) 1 at 4-5, 60 D.L.R. (3d) 119 at 122-3, [ 1976] 1 
S.C.R. 763 at pp. 768-9. 
374 Supra note 337 at 37. 
375 Supra note 351 at 443. 
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inducement have led to their exclusion.376 Entrapment has also been perceived by the judiciary 
as an undesirable method to extract confessions. The judicial abhorrence of entrapment was 
echoed by Lord Denman's declaration that "no prisoner ought to be entrapped into making a 
statement". 377 
In Rothman, however, the Court showed no apparent concern with the police entrapment 
of the accused. The ethical problems associated with condoning confessions induced by trickery 
are very serious. The use of trickery is generally more successful with weak minded or 
unsophisticated criminals. The dominant cultural norms in a prison environment may compel an 
inexperienced criminal to falsely boast or exaggerate his criminal activities in order to gain 
respect. The use of trickery raises the issue of fairness in the pre-trial environment. 378 
Furthermore the judicial approval of police trickery may lead to the erosion of public trust and 
support for the criminal justice system. 379 
Moreover it may be argued that Rothman marked the end of the progress made in 
Horvath and Ward in the widening of the confession rule to take better account of concerns 
about fairness. 380 The cases of Horvath and Ward were seen by many as representing a shift in 
emphasis, 381 from the narrow concept of fear/inducement to a much wider issue of whether a 
statement, flowed from an operating mind that was free from psychological oppression. The 
case of Rothman presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to further expand the 
confessions rule. Instead, the Supreme Court seized the chance to " ... elevate once again to the 
376 Supra note 334 at 116 
377 R. v. Arnold (1838), 173 E.R. 
378 Supra note 334 at 130. 
379 Ibid. 
380 Supra note 135 at 8-11. 
381 Ibid. 
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front rank of importance the elements of fear of prejudice or hope of advantage in determining 
whether a confession is admissible or not. "382 
The Advent of the Cltarter: 
The Charter had an enormous impact on criminal procedure. Formally the Charter's 
legal rights provisions impose constitutional restraints on the investigative powers of police, 
including their power to interrogate suspects.383 In the late 1980s and early 1990s many Charter 
rulings appeared which moved the system further towards the due process end of Packer's 
spectrum, and these judgements brought about changes in the investigative and the adjudicative 
stages of the criminal process. 384 Professor James Stribopoulos explains: 
The generous readings of sections IO(a) and IO(b), when combined with the Supreme Court's 
decision to read section 7 as including an unenumerated 'right' to silence by recognizing a fonn 
of that right as a 'principle of fundamental justice,' ultimately created a web of prophylactic rules 
that, at least in theory, serve to protect suspects under state control from being unfairly 
conscripted into furnishing evidence against themselves.385 
With respect to the Charter 's effect on police interrogation practices specifically, prior to 
1982 the only way to exclude a statement made by an accused person to police was by relying on 
1 
the voluntariness rule. 386 Specific guarantees found in the section 7 and 1 O(b) rights of the 
Charter put positive requirements on the police that relate to the admissibility of statements. In 
the 1990 case, R. v. Hebert, the right to silence enshrined in section 7 was made relevant when 
the Court read that section as requiring that the "principles of fundamental justice" be respected 
whenever "liberty" or "security of the person" are in jeopardy, including a right to choose 
382 R. v. Owen (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 538 at 547 (N.S.C.A.). 
383 James Stribopoulos, "Has the Charter Been for Crime Control? Reflecting on 25 Years of Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure in Canada" in Margaret E. Beare ed., Honouring Social Justice: Honouring Dianne Martin 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 352. 
384 Ibid. at 353. 
385 Ibid. at 356. 
386 Supra note 56. 
whether to speak to the authorities or remain silent.387 It was found that the right to silence will 
be violated when a police officer uses trickery to elicit a statement from a suspect in custody 
after they have asserted their right to silence. 388 
The impact of the Charter on the judiciary's changing course is perhaps most pronounced 
in the differing approaches employed by the Supreme Court of Canada as between Hebert and 
Rothman. The facts of the two cases are strikingly similar and yet the outcomes of these cases 
are completely different. Hebert was one of the first major statement cases before the Supreme 
Court of Canada since the introduction of the Charter. Hence, we need to review this case in 
some detail and contrast it with Rothman in order to appreciate the immediate impact of the 
Charter in the area of the admissibility of statements. 
Hebert: The resurrection of due-process values: 
The case of R. v. HeberP89 provided the Supreme Court with another opportunity to re-
visit the issue of police trickery, and hence to, " ... significantly change the state of law regarding 
cell conversations with undercover police officers. "390 The Supreme Court changed the law by 
overturning its own previous ruling in Rothman,391 and introduced the concept of informed 
choice into the Canadian law of voluntariness. 
The factual background in Hebert was similar to Rothman. In Hebert, the accused, like 
Rothman, makes an inculpatory statement to an undercover officer who was posing as a cellmate. 
Like Rothman, the accused in Hebert had asserted his right to silence. However, unlike 
387 Supra note 383 at 355. 
388 Hebert, supra note I I. 
389 Ibid. This case is also reviewed in Chapter 3. 
390 Michael Brown, "The American Approach to Cell Statements Make Good Sense" ( 1990) 77 C.R. (3d) I 94. 
391 Ibid. 
Rothman, the majority of the Supreme Court in Hebert took issue with the deliberate subversion 
of the accused's desire to maintain his silence. 392 
In Hebert, the accused had consulted with counsel and advised the police that he did 
not want to make a statement to them. An undercover police officer was placed in his cell and 
tricked him into making a statement. 393 During the course of his conversation with the disguised 
officer, Hebert made statements which implicated him in the robbery for which he was under 
arrest at the time. 394 
The Court conducted a Charter analysis to determine whether Hebert's rights to 
counsel and silence had been infringed. 395 The positions of the Crown and the defence were not 
at odds over whether a right to silence existed in Canadian law, but rather, they disagreed on the 
ambit of that right. The Crown took the view that the right to silence is captured in its entirety 
by the confessions rule as it stood at the time that the Charter was adopted, which would permit 
statements obtained by tricks to be admitted, as per Rothman.396 Hebert's defence argued that 
the right to silence guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter is broader than the confessions rule as 
it stood in 1982, and that the use of tricks to obtain a confession after a suspect in custody has 
chosen not to give a statement violates the Charter. 397 On the issue of the right to counsel, the 
disagreement was over whether the right to counsel is confined to the 1 O(b) right or if there is a 
392 This was achieved through police trickery. And police trickery has been defined as: " ... police elicitation of a 
confession by deliberate distortion of material fact, by failure to disclose to the defendant a material fact, or by 
playing on a defendant's emotions or scruples. Police trickery should be viewed as a type of fraud, the uses of 
which as an interrogation tool is inconsistent with our adversarial system of criminal justice because it allows the 
prosecution an unfair, indeed an unconstitutional, advantage at trial." Daniel W. Sasaki, "Guarding the Guardians: 
Police Trickery and Confessions" (1988) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1593 at 1595. 
393 Hebert, supra note II at 2. 
394 Ibid at 3. 
395 Ibid at 5. 
396 Ibid at 6. 
397 Ibid. 
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broader right to counsel given by the guarantee found in section 7 of the Charter not to be 
deprived of liberty except in accordance with the "principles of fundamental justice". 398 
The Court indicates that it is correct to view the principle of fundamental justice 
contemplated by section 7 of the Charter as being broader in scope than the particular rules 
which exemplify it.399 With respect to the right to silence in particular, the Court says that it is 
rooted in two specific common law concepts: the confessions rule and the privilege against self-
incrimination.400 The common theme that unites the two rules is "the idea that a person in the 
power of the state in the course of the criminal process has the right to choose whether to speak 
to the police or remain silent."401 
The court cited with approval the decision of Lord Reid in Commisioners of Customs 
& Excise v. Harz where he stated that he viewed the confessions rule as being rooted in both the 
principle that a statement made in response to a threat or promise may be untrue or 
untrustworthy; and that nemo tenetur seipsum prodere. 402 The court states that both versions of 
the confessions rule have voluntariness as a basic requirement, but differ in the way they "define 
voluntariness and choice".403 
Thus the majority of Supreme Court used Hebert to reinvigorate and expand the rules of 
confessions in two important ways. First, by adding the requirement of the need for an 
"informed choice". And, secondly, by rejecting the rule from Wray. The majority held that the 
398 Ibid. 
399 Ibid at 8. 
400 Ibid at 9. The Court specifies that the confessions rule makes a confession which authorities improperly obtain 
from a detained person inadmissible as evidence; and the privilege against self-incrimination precludes a person 
from being required to testify against himself at trial. 
401 Ibid at 10. 
402 Ibid. Nemo tenetur seipsum prodere means "no one is bound to betray himself'' Patrick Granfield, O.S.B., "The 
Right to Silence" (1965) 26 Theological Studies 280-98. 
403 Hebert, Ibid. 
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inquiry into voluntariness should also involve a consideration as to whether or not the decision 
by the accused to speak to the authorities was as a result of an "informed and meaningful"404 
choice. Therefore, the deliberate subversion of an accused's decision not to speak to the 
authorities could lead to a finding that the resulting statement was involuntarily given. 405 
Hence the narrow formulation of Ibrahim's test of fear/inducement, which was 
marginally expanded with the concepts of oppression 406 and operating mind, 407 was further 
. enlarged in Hebert by adding the need for an informed choice. 408 
404 Supra note 333 at 38. 
405 In Hebert, Mclachlin J. stated that" ... the act of choosing whether to remain silent or to speak to the police 
necessarily comprehends the mental act of selecting one alternative over another. The absence of violence, threats 
and promises by the authorities does not necessarily mean that the resulting statement is voluntary, if the necessary 
mental element of deciding between alternatives is absent. On this view, the fact that the accused may not have 
realized he had a right to silence (e.g. where he has not been given the standard warning) or has been tricked into 
making a statement is relevant to the question of whether the statement is voluntary" (at 23-24). It should be noted 
that McLachlin J. comments are hardly surprising. Prior to her appointment to the Supreme Court, while still a law 
professor at U.B.C., she wrote an article critical of Rothman (McLachlin and Miller, supra note 334). In that paper, 
she stated that: 
... courts in more recent times have shown little concern with police trickery as a means of securing 
confessions even though deceptive tactics may be equally or more coercive than the less subtle devices of 
violence, threats or promises. (at 116). 
406 Supra note 331. 
407 Supra note 332. 
408 Supra note 17 at 328-29. However, Professor Steven Penney is of the view that "the Hebert Court got it 
backwards" (Supra note 17 at 329) when they said that detained suspects "deserve greater protection from 
undercover elicitation than [non-]detained ones" (Supra note 17 at 329). The rule in Hebert, he says, "does little to 
protect suspects from wrongful conviction or abuse" (Supra note 17 at 328), and that its primary result is to 
safeguard "criminals from their own stupidity" (Penney, supra note 17 at 328). According to Professor Penney, "It 
is not reasonable for detained suspects to expect that police will refrain from using undercover agents to attempt to 
trick them into confessing" (Supra note 17 at 328). 
But contrary to Professor Penney's view of the Hebert ruling, it should be stated that the rule in Hebert does provide 
a useful protection. It discourages the scenario where a suspect of a serious offence is arrested on minor charges and 
put into custody so that an undercover operation can be used against them. The undercover officers in this situation 
would then be able to try to elicit statements about the more serious charges while posing as the cellmate of the 
detained suspect. This particular investigative technique is still used by police, however the Hebert ruling has 
placed certain important constraints on its use. The undercover officers, as a result of the Hebert ruling, can only act 
as listening posts, and they can no longer actively elicit information from their targets. Moreover, as a result of 
Hebert, the Supreme Court in Duarte (R. v. Duarte [ 1990] I S.C.R. 30) held that judicial authorization is required 
for these types of undercover operations and that requirement is now codified under section 184.2 (1) and (3) of the 
Criminal Code of Canada. It is argued that these were positive developments that emerged from the Hebert ruling. 
The Reinstatement of Judicial Discretion 
As noted, Hebert was also significant for its rejection of Wray. 409 It reasserted that 
" ... there is once again a discretion to exclude a confession if improperly obtained"410• The 
rejection of Wray in Hebert represented a fundamental departure from the Supreme Court's 
earlier position in Rothman. 411 The return of judicial discretion to exclude unfairly obtained 
confessions has significant implications for the rules governing the admissibility of confessions. 
As a result of this important development the scope of confession rules were expanded from 
reliability to further incorporate the issues of fairness. As a result of this expansion, the 
confessions rules came to include the consideration of important factors such as police trickery, 
concealing the identity of state agents, and active elicitation of accused persons. These factors 
have become subject to judicial scrutiny. 
However the Supreme Court in Hebert rejected the notion of an absolute right to silence, 
preferring instead, to allow state agents to persuade detainees to speak, short of depriving them 
of the choice to do otherwise. The Supreme Court failed to identify any bright line rule for 
demarcating the point at which the police would run afoul of the right to silence in their efforts to 
1 
persuade a person to speak who has expressed a desire not to do so. In other words, when would 
1 
police persuasion have the effect of depriving the detained suspect of their choice? The lack of a 
clear demarcating line in Hebert is highly problematic. This is based on the fact that the absence 
of any limits in police persuasion will allow the use of questionable techniques, such as the 
409 Supra note 327. 
410 Supra note 333 at 4I. 
411 In Hebert, McLachlin J. stated that: 
The logic upon which Wray, supra, was based and which led the majority in Rothman, supra, to conclude 
that a confession obtained by police trick could not be excluded, finds no place in the Charter. To say 
there is no discretion to exclude a statement on grounds of unfairness to the suspect and the integrity of the 
judicial system, as did the majority in Rothman, runs counter to the fundamental philosophy of the Charter. 
Hebert, supra note II at 31. 
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"Reid Technique"412 of interrogation. Furthermore, the unlimited use of police persuasion to 
overcome the resistance of a detainee may produce false confessions. 
Oick/e: A Due Process Setback 
The troubling case of R. v. Oickle413 represented a crude test for the protective abilities of 
confessions' rules. A quick review of some of the facts in this case will highlight the disturbing 
nature of the Supreme Court of Canada's approach in that decision. During nine hours of 
interrogation the accused broke down in tears; he had little sleep; the police made promises with 
regards to his fiancee and psychiatric counselling; the police administered a polygraph test and 
the results were misrepresented; police made promises to the accused to deal with his charges as 
a "package", while downplaying the moral culpability of the offences, and yet the resulting 
statements were still admitted. 
The Supreme Court in Oickle seized the opportunity to revisit the common law rules 
governing the admissibility of confessions, with particular emphasis on what will constitute 
improper police tactics and served to create an atmosphere of oppression or constitute an 
improper inducement. Very few limits were placed on the use of abusive tactics by the police.414 
The totality of the circumstances approach endorsed by the Court does " ... very little to deter 
overreaching"415 by the police.416 The voluntariness test is partly dependant" ... on the suspect's 
capacity for self-determination."417 It permits courts to conclude that notwithstanding the 
unfairness of the tactics used by police, " ... the suspect was able to make an autonomous decision 
412 The Reid Technique is the most pervasive method of police interrogation used in North America. This method 
will be examined in-depth in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
413 Supra note 14. 
414 Supra note 17 at 302. 
415 Ibid. at 303. 
416 Supra note 14 at paras 68 and 71. 
417 Supra note 17 at 303. 
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confess."418 The ability of a suspect to withstand police pressure might be on account of 
" ... intelligence, education, personality or experience. "419 However, suspects with less resilience 
may receive greater protection from the courts. 420 But it is difficult to see, what, if anything, 
supports such a distinction being upheld.421 As Penney notes "[s]uspects should not be required 
to endure abusive, degrading and dehumanizing treatment simply because they have unusual 
powers of resistance. "422 
At the time, the Supreme Court was faced with a long history of jurisprudence on the 
rules of confession. That history reflected what are essentially two contradictory philosophies. 
The first can be characterized as the conservative strand, reflected in a narrow interpretation of 
voluntariness, with its focus on reliability over fairness, had found ample support in cases like 
Ibrahim, Boudreau, Fitton, Declercq, Wray and Rothman. The second, a more due process 
oriented thread, was equally preoccupied with concerns about fairness, evidenced by cases like 
Horvath, Ward and Hebert. The Supreme Court in Oickle chose to use this case as an 
opportunity to finally resolve this long standing tension and choose as between these long 
competing philosophies: reliability versus fairness. 
The Supreme Court was keenly aware of this contradictory history, and in Oickle it 
discussed the opposing forces that had shaped the existing rules of confession. Iacobucci J. 
quoted Wigmore with approval, describing voluntariness as a "shorthand for a complex of 
values".423 According to Iacobucci J., these values are expressed in the twin goals of the 






423 Supra note 14 at para. 70. 
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an accused424 without unduly limiting society's need to investigate and solve crimes425• 
Iacobucci J. also stated that an analysis of confession rules must be contextual.426 
Moreover Iacobucci J compared and contrasted the negative right of an accused against 
torture or coercion through the use of threats or promises, captured by the Ibrahim rule, as 
opposed to the broader approach taken in Hebert to include the requirement of informed choice 
to speak to the authorities. 427 Iacobucci J. further extended this broader approach by discussing 
the scenarios in Horvath, Ward, and Hobbins428, and he concluded that the" ... confession rules 
embraces more than the narrow Ibrahim formulation; instead, it is concerned with voluntariness, 
broadly understood."429 Iacobucci J also touched on the dangers of false confessions, induced by , 
improper interrogation techniques430• However, he advanced the position that "only under the 
rarest of circumstances do an interrogator's ploys persuade an innocent suspect that he is in fact 
guilty and has been caught".431 
Furthermore Iacobucci J. held that "moral inducements" do not necessarily lead to the 
exclusion of a statement.432 The issue of moral inducements was particularly important in the 
context of this case. This is because the interrogators, on several occasions, told the accused that 
a confession would be good for his soul and would help him to win the respect of his family and 
424 Ibid at para. 69. 
425 Ibid. at para. 33. 
426 Ibid at para. 47. 
427 Ibid. at para. 25. 
428 R. v. Hobbins, [I982] I S.C.R. 553. 
429 Supra note I4 at para. 27. 
430 Ibid. at paras 34-46. At para. 37 Iacobucci J refers to four basic kinds of false confessions: I) stress-compliant; 
2) coerced-compliant; 3) non-coerced-persuaded; and 4) coerced-persuaded. And according to Iacobucci J " ... most 
cases of false confessions that come before the courts are ofthe compliant-coerced type." 
431 Ibid at para. 35, Iacobucci J approvingly quotes from a sociological study done by R.A. Leo & R. J. Ofshe, "The 
Consequences of False Confession: Deprivations of liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological 
Interrogation" ( I998) 88 J. Crim. L. of Criminology 429. 
432 
"A fmal threat or promise relevant to this appeal is the use of moral or spiritual inducements. These inducements 
will generally not produce an involuntary confession, for the very simple reason that the inducement offered is not in 
the control of the police officers." Dickie, Ibid. at para. 56. 
friends. Iacobucci J. was of the view that none of these suggestions by the interrogators 
amounted to threats or promises.433 He also rejected the argument that the suggestions of the 
interrogators regarding the possible questioning of the accused's fiancee about the arsons had an 
adverse impact on the voluntary character of the accused's statement.434 This was based on the 
conclusion that the inducements " ... regarding the respondent's fiancee lacked both the strength 
and causal connection necessary to warrant exclusion".435 As well, Iacobucci J discounted the 
concerns that the "mild inducements"436 by interrogators had an adverse effect on voluntariness 
of the accused's statement. He also went on to suggest that the deliberate exaggerations about 
the infallibility of the polygraph test was not determinative, as the accused showed some 
resistance against such suggestions.437 It should also be pointed out that Iacobucci J concluded 
that, although during his lengthy interrogation the accused was crying at different times, he did 
not appear to cry hard enough to support the proposition that there was a "complete emotional 
disintegration". 438 There were other arguments against the admissibility of the statements, which 
were rejected by the majority as capable of undermining voluntariness. These arguments 
included concerns about interrogators misleading the accused during the interrogation; 439 the 
fact that the accused had very little sleep before participating in the re-enactment; the deliberate 
433 
"To hold that the police officers' frequent suggestions that things would be better if the respondent confessed 
amounted to an improper threat or inducement would be to engage in empty formalism. The tapes of the transcript 
clearly reveal that there could be no implied threat in these words. The respondent was never mistreated. Nor was 
there any implied promise. The police may have suggested possible benefits of confession, but there was never any 
insinuation of a quid pro quo. I therefore respectfully disagree with the Court of Appeal that these comments 
undermined the confessions voluntariness." Oickle, Ibid at para. 80. 
434 Oickle, ibid at paras. 82-84. 
435 Ibid. at para. 84. 
436 Ibid at para. 87. 
437 Ibid. at paras. 94-100. 
438 Ibid at para. 98 & 99. 
439 Ibid. at para. 1 01. 
downplaying of the moral culpability of the offences; and the tactic of gaining the trust of the 
accused, only to abuse that trust, in an effort to extract an incriminating confession.440 
The majority of the Supreme Court essentially devised a two-part test.441 The first part 
said that a statement could be excluded if the reviewing court decided that the tactics employed 
would shock the community;442 failing that, the police deception should only be considered as 
one factor in the overall contextual analysis ofvoluntariness.443 In conclusion, the majority held 
that nothing about the circumstances, even when taken in combination, was sufficiently shocking 
to the community; nor did the over-all analysis of their impact on the second part of the two-step 
process warrant a finding of involuntariness in this case.444 
The dissenting judgment of Justice Arbour, however, showed a greater degree of 
sensitivity to the shocking nature of the facts in Oickle445• She pointed to a very important 
procedural problem in admitting the statement of the accused. That being the inadmissibility of 
the polygraph test, which would make it virtually impossible for the accused to fully repudiate 
440 Ibid at para. 74. 
441 Ibid at paras. 66 & 67. 
442 The Court specifies at paras. 66 & 67 that a police officer pretending to be a chaplain or a legal aid lawyer or 
injecting a diabetic with truth serum disguised as insulin would shock the community. Similarly, there may be 
situations that do not violate the right to silence or undermine voluntariness may nevertheless be so appalling as to 
shock the community. 
443 Supra note 14 at paras. 66 & 67. 
444 Supra note 14. 
445 Madam Justice Arbour, after reviewing the problematic factors in this case, summed up in her dissenting reasons, 
her conclusion by stating at paragraph 13 7 that: " ... it is my opinion that the foregoing representations constituted 
threats, promises, and inducements, within the meaning of the confession rule and, when combined with the 
prevalent ambiguity concerning just what was and was not admissible in court against the respondent, as we II as the 
oppressive atmosphere created by the 'infallible' polygraph test, they are sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to 
voluntariness of the respondent's confessions, first, to the car fire, and, later, to the rest. The combination of the lies 
and misrepresentations, which are not impermissible, with the inducements, which are, in my view caused the 
respondent to make involuntary admissions. The few instances in which he appeared to reject the representations 
made to him by the police officers were little more than desperate bravado and vain attempts to delay what he 
seemed to view as the inevitable fact that he would have to confess." Ibid at para. 137. 
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his confession at his trial. 446 This is based on the fact that " ... the accused's confession is 
intertwined with a 'failed' polygraph test."447 However the prejudicial implications of this 
problem did not seem to trouble the majority. 
The Supreme Court in Dickie was at a historical crossroads between two competing 
philosophical strands of the confession rules. However, the majority chose to assign greater 
value to reliability as opposed to fairness to an accused person. The shocking judicial tolerance 
of the uncomfortable facts in Oickle, only serves to undermine the valuable gains that were made 
in Horvath, Ward, Hebert, etc. It is quite clear that the Supreme Court decided to" ... set out the 
proper scope of the confessions rule"448 along the narrow lines of Ibrahim rule. 
One way of understanding Oickle is to see it as an effort to get away from categorical 
rules either way. The Court seems to say that not every threat or promise, no matter how slight, 
will be construed as vitiating free choice. Much would depend on context. For example, telling 
someone "we'll get you a sandwich when we are done here, okay" is clearly an "inducement", 
but Oickle says that it should not be seen as undermining voluntariness in every instance. It 
would if the detainee had not eaten for days, 449 for example, but it would not if he had just 
finished eating a large breakfast before coming down to the station for his interrogation.450 The 
determination of whether his confession resulted from a free choice or his will was overborne by 
446 The response by the majority of Supreme Court was quite troubling. According to the majority's ruling this 
problem only created a tactical disadvantage to the defence which is irrelevant to the issue of voluntariness!!! The 
Supreme Court held that such "tactical disadvantage" " ... if anything, it simply suggests prejudicial effect. 
However, given the immense probative value of a voluntary confession, I cannot agree that exclusion is appropriate" 
szr.ra note 14 at para. 1 02. 
44 Ibid at para. 140. 
448 Ibid. at para. 23. 
449 James Stribopoulous, "Spencer: Has the Confessions Rule Changed ... Again?" Case Comment, on R. v. 




oppressive circumstances depends on the nature and context of the totality of the circumstances 
under consideration. 451 
However, taking the totality of the circumstances into account is a dangerous approach to 
voluntariness. It means that no single factor can necessarily cause the exclusion of a statement, 
even a quid pro quo inducement. If a person in authority makes a threat or promise to a detained 
accused then personal and subjective factors may intervene in the analysis to determine that the 
accused was not swayed by this and did not have his will overborne by the inducement. But for 
a different person, the very same inducement might precipitate an involuntary confession 
because the will was overborne. Assessing the personal characteristics of accused persons at a 
voir dire may entail looking to a person's criminal record, or their demeanour. But it is very 
difficult for a judge to make accurate determinations on what a particular person's reaction to an 
inducement was with such limited information at his/her disposal. 
The Supreme Court's "overriding concern for reliability has the potential to provide 
considerable derivative protection against abuse. "452 But only if lower courts perceive Oickle as 
forbidding the use of those tactics which may lead to false confessions.453 However, if courts 
interpret Dickie as stating that only unreliable statements should be excluded, then the Oick/e 
decision will fail to serve as a deterrent to police abuse.454 By indirectly suggesting that the 
exclusion of statements should only be restricted to those instances where interrogation 
techniques may lead to false confesssions or "shock the community, the Court gave police 
451 Supra note 14 at paras. 58-62. 
452 Supra note 17 at 303. 
453 Ibid. 
454 Ibid at 304. "By finding that the defendant confessed voluntarily, the Court concluded that police acted properly ; 
in questioning him for six hours, offering him psychiatric assistance, threatening to interrogate his fiancee, 
disingenuously minimizing the seriousness ofhis conduct, suggesting that 'it would be better' if he confessed, 
duplicitously cultivating his trust and exaggerating the accuracy of his polygraph results." 
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permission to use considerable psychological manipulation."455Upon reflecting on the Oickle 
decision, Professor Penney poses a question for us to consider. He says that we must ask 
ourselves whether " ... the need for confessions is so great that we should countenance tactics 
that subject innocent people to prolonged isolation, badgering, intimidation, manipulation and 
deception."456 It is my position that the answer to Penney's question is as follows: As members 
of a democratic society, the abuse and the humiliation that Oickle suffered was not worth the 
price of the admission for his confession, whether he was guilty or not. 
It has been suggested that Oickle was the first major re-examination of the confession 
rules since the advent of the Charter.457 Although the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
confession rules may not have been problematic, the way in which it proceeded to apply those 
rules to the facts in Oickle was a major victory for the crime control forces. 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Oickle grants considerable latitude to state agents in 
extracting confessions from detainees, and hence, it represents a shift away from due process 
values. According to the ruling, the competing values of reliability and fairness dictate that only • 
the clearest of quid pro quos will result in a confession being excluded. While a confession 
obtained through fraud and deceit will be admitted, provided the deceit is not too shocking. 
Spencer and Singh: Further fortifying crime-control values 
Spencer was charged with 18 robberies.458 The last robbery was committed by four men, 
one of whom fired a handgun as they made their escape. 459 He was arrested late in the evening 
455 Ibid. at. 303-304. 
456 Ibid. at 304. 
457 Lisa Dufraimont, "The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current Law and Future Directions" 
(2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 249 at 249 and 254. 
458 R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC II, [2007] I S.C.R. 500. 
459 Ibid. at para 2. 
while driving a vehicle associated with three of the robberies.460 The vehicle was registered to 
his co-accused, his girlfriend, who was also arrested in relation to one of the robberies.461 The 
execution of a search warrant later that evening at their shared residence led to the discovery of 
the handgun, watches and jewellery from one of the robberies.462 While Spencer was in custody 
after his arrest, a police officer was returning him to his cell when Spencer asked about his 
girlfriend and the officer told him that he intended to recommend that both of them be charged 
with the possession of the handgun and the jewellery found in their residence. The police officer 
testified at trial that Spencer "then insisted on making statements". 463 
On the voir dire into the admissibility of these statements conducted at trial, Spencer 
advanced the argument that his statements should be inadmissible, first, because he was induced 
to confess by a hope of leniency for his girlfriend; and second that he was induced by a promise 
that he could visit with her.464 McKinnon J., the trial judge, following an 8 day voir dire, 
concluded that he was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Spencer's statements to the police ! 
were voluntary.465 
At the Supreme Court of Canada, Deschamps J. wrote for the majority. She concluded 
that the issue for the Court was whether the trial judge had applied the correct test, given that the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal had concluded that he had not.466 Deschamps J. restated the 
test from Oick/e, thereby confirming it as good law.467 The Oick/e factors to be considered under 
460 Ibid. at para 3. 
461 Ibid. at para 6. 
462 Ibid. 
463 Ibid at para 7. 
464 Ibid at para 8. 
465 Ibid. 
466 Ibid at para 10. 
467 Ibid. In that judgment, Deschamps J. tells us that in Oickle Iacobucci J. had emphasized the applicability of a 
contextual approach: "The application of the rule will by necessity be contextual. Hard and fast rules simply cannot 
account for the variety of circumstances that vitiate the voluntariness of a confession, and would inevitably result in 
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a voluntariness analysis include: the making of threats or promises, oppression, the operating 
mind doctrine and police trickery. 468 Threats or promises, oppression and the operating mind 
doctrine are to be considered together and "should not be understood as a discrete inquiry 
completely divorced from the rest of the confessions rule."469 On the other hand, the use of 
police trickery to obtain a confession is to be treated as "a distinct inquiry ... [given that] its 
more specific objective is maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system."470 
Deschamps J. reemphasized the Dickie Court's consideration of promises- namely, that 
they "need not be aimed directly at the suspect ... to have a coercive effect," but that the 
existence of a quid pro quo is the "most important consideration" when an inducement is alleged 
to have been offered by a person in authority.471 Crucially, the existence of a quid pro quo is not 
to be taken as an exclusive factor, or one that is determinative of voluntariness.472 
But then Deschamps turns to the other side of the equation, stating Dickie requires 
sensitivity to the particularities of the individual suspect and an application that is necessarily 
contextual, and moreover that: "Dickie does not state that any quid pro quo held out by a person 
in authority, regardless of its significance, will necessarily render a statement by an accused 
involuntary."473 Inducements become improper only when, "standing alone or in combination 
with other factors, [they] are strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of 
the subject has been overbome."474 Deschamps J states: 
a rule that would be both over- and under- inclusive. A trial judge should therefore consider all the relevant 
factors when reviewing a confession." - Ibid. at para 11. 
468 Ibid. 







Therefore, while a quid pro quo is an important factor in establishing the existence of a threat or 
promise, it is the strength of the inducement, having regard to the particular individual and his or 
her circumstances, that is to be considered in the overall contextual analysis into the voluntariness 
of the accused's statement.475 
Deschamps J. explains that the trial Judge, in the view of the majority, did not 
misapprehended (or misapply) the voluntariness test that had been laid down in Oickle.416 
While the Supreme Court in Oickle had stated a quid pro quo promise should generally 
lead to a finding of involuntariness, in Spencer it seemed to add another hurdle for the exclusion 
of statements. The Court in Spencer was confronted with a situation where a quid pro quo was 
indeed offered477 to the accused (that is, a visit with his girlfriend), and therefore, based on the 
reasoning in Oickle, the statement should have been ruled involuntary. However, the Court's 
solution to this problem was to add another caveat to the Oickle test by stating that the contextual i 
analysis of the strength of the quid pro quo inducement is the controlling factor. 
The contextual analysis in Spencer meant that, since the accused was a veteran savvy 
criminal, the promise to visit his girlfriend was not sufficient to overwhelm his freedom to 
choose to remain silent. Hence, in another context, for example, one can imagine an interrogator 
promising a single mother with no prior criminal history an opportunity to see her children only 
after she gives a statement, then perhaps such a quid pro quo promise would be strong enough to 
overbear the accused's free will. 
Although the Supreme Court's contextual approach in Spencer may be defended in some 
broad sense, nevertheless, this ruling is still in keeping with crime-control values, as it gives the 
475 Ibid. at para 15. 
476 Ibid. at paras 20,22 and 23. 
477 Supra note 449. 
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police " ... considerable leeway to offer inducements without rendering a statement 
involuntary."478 
Professor James Stribopoulos argues that although the Supreme Court's ruling in Spencer 
does not overrule any " ... existing cases,"479 however, " ... there is a real danger"480 that it will be 
interpreted in that way. 481 He argues that " ... the case should be read as reflecting no more than 
the sec showing deference"482 to the trial judge on the factual issue of a confession's 
admissibility,483 which is exactly what the Court says it is doing in the judgment.484 But the risk 
is that because it was decided that the officer's promise to let Spencer see his girlfriend did not 
vitiate his free choice, the bar for whether or not an inducement vitiates choice is being set 
increasingly high. 485 In Spencer, we have a situation where a quid pro quo is not sufficient to 
render a statement involuntary because it is not a strong enough inducement in light of other 
factors, whereas the Court in Oickle stated that "The most important considerations in all cases is 
to look for a quid pro quo offer from interrogators, whether it comes in the form of a threat or a 
promise". 486 The Supreme Court noted that the trial judge described Spencer as "aggressive and 
a 'mature and savvy participant', and that he unsuccessfully attempted many times to secure 
'deals' with the police."487 This indicates that the trial judge correctly interpreted the test from 
Oickle by taking the entire context into consideration without recognizing the presence of a quid 
pro quo as determinative in this case. 
478 Don Stuart, case comment, CarswellBC 2588 at 5. 
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Professor Hamish Stewart points to another important aspect of Spencer, which is the 
confusing nature of the Court's ruling. The Spencer ruling is confusing because the Court 
confirmed the trial judge's original finding, notwithstanding the fact that the trial judge used the 
wrong test for voluntariness.488 "Since the majority's reasons are not very clear about the proper 
test, Spencer can be read either as endorsing the trial judge's statement of the test or as merely 
deferring to the factual findings. "489 Stewart also says that on the former reading, "all four 
traditional branches of the confessions rule now reduce to one question: when the accused made 
the statement at issue, was his will overborne?',490 On the latter reading the question of whether 
the accused's will is overborne may be part of the inquiry, particularly on the operating mind 
branch of the test, but it is not determinative.491 The later reading of Spencer is more desirable, 
because" ... equating voluntariness with "overborne will'"'492 permits a ruling of inadmissibility 
when a court finds the decision of an accused to speak was motivated by a threat or a promise or 
the oppressive environment.493 
Moreover, the Spencer ruling creates an interpretive problem insofar as it opens the door 
for the lower courts to raise the bar as to what qualifies as a quid pro quo promise. According to 
Professor James Stribopoulos, Spencer changes nothing in terms of the law, but because the 
Supreme Court of Canada once again reaffirmed the admission of a statement, the message 
received might be that only egregious circumstances will warrant exclusion.494 He explained 
that, "it is hard not to be pessimistic about how the Supreme Court's judgment in Spencer will 
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likely be received in the trial courts."495 I agree with professor Stribopoulous that Spencer does 
not change the laws of confession. However, I wish to go so far as to suggest that the laws of 
confession cannot be changed. It is my position that no court in this country can take the 
position that threats and inducements in exchange for confessions is an acceptable practice; nor 
any court can say that creating an oppressive environment in order to extract a confession from 
an accused person should be tolerated. The courts, at least for the sake of keeping up the 
appearance of fairness, have to continue to condemn such practices. However, what the courts 
can do is to raise the bar so high that statements are only excluded under extremely egregious 
circumstances. This is precisely what the Supreme Court has done in Oickle, Spencer and Singh. 
The Court, without officially changing the law, has raised the threshold for exclusion so high that 
lower courts can now take extreme liberty in admitting many statements that should normally be 
excluded. 
Professor Lisa Dufraimont notes that under classical formulations of the confessions rule, 
"confessions elicited by threats and promises were involuntary by definition, and there was 
language in Oickle to suggest that quid pro quo offers by interrogators were per se improper, 
warranting the exclusion of any resulting statement."496 Spencer puts an end to that interpretation 
of Oickle,497 because Spencer " ... stands for the proposition that offering a quid pro quo does not 
necessarily render a resulting confession involuntary."498 
495 Ibid 
496s upra note 457 at 259. And see supra note 14 at paras. 57, and 78. 
497 Du.fraimont, ibid 
498 Ibid And see supra note 14 at paras. 13-14. 
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Singh: No Means Keep Tnring 
The accused, Jagrup Singh was charged with second-degree murder for the shooting 
" ... death of an innocent bystander who was killed by a stray bullet while standing just inside the 
doorway of a pub. "499 After being arrested, Singh was advised of his 1 0( b) Charter rights, and 
consulted with counsel, foiiowing which there were two interviews with Sergeant Attew, his 
interrogator.500 Sergeant Attew's technique was to listen to Singh state that he did not want to 
say anything, and then state that it was nevertheless" his duty or his desire to place the 
evidence"501 he had before Singh, or else" ... to deflect Singh's assertion"502 of his right to 
silence and engage him in "limited conversation."503 During the first interview, "Singh did not 
confess to the crime"504 but identified himself on surveiiiance videos. 505 
During the interviews Singh was forthcoming about his family, his background and his 
religious beliefs and employment, however he was not forthcoming about the incident; he 
affirmed his presence at the location on the night of the shooting, however he repeatedly denied 
being involved and asserted his right to silence. 506 He expressed his intention not to talk to 
police in numerous different ways: "he said he did not want to talk to police;"507 he told them "he 
had nothing to say;"508 he said "he knew nothing about the shooting;"509 and he indicated that 
"he wanted to return to his ce11."510 Before giving an inculpatory statement which placed him at 












the scene of the crime, and after being shown potentially incriminating photographs, Mr. Singh 
had already asserted his right to silence 18 times. 511 
On the voir dire the trial judge made a finding that Singh's statements were voluntary.512 
The trial judge also concluded that there had been no breach of Mr. Singh's section 7 Charter 
right to silence, and that he ought not to use his residual discretion to exclude the statements as 
the probative value of them (once edited) outweighed any prejudicial effect.513 
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court of Canada and the argument Singh made 
at that Court was that the courts below misinterpreted Hebert as permitting police to "ignore a 
detainee's expressed wish to remain silent and to use 'legitimate means of persuasion' to break 
that silence."514 Moreover, he argued that "the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the case at 
bar went even further and effectively extinguished the s. 7 right to silence when it questioned the 
utility of conducting 'a double-barrelled test of admissibility', stating that '[i]n the contest of an 
investigatory interview with an obvious person in authority' the expansive view of the common 
law confessions rule adopted in Oickle 'may leave little additional room' for a separate s. 7 
Charter inquiry". 515 
Singh's counsel also argued before the Supreme Court that the protection under section 7 
should be expanded to require police officers to inform those detained of their right to silence516 
Sll Ibid 
s12 Ibid at para. 3. 
SIJ Ibid. 
s14 Ibid. at para. 5. 
SIS Ibid. 
st6 Ibid. at para 6. 
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" ... and absent a signed waiver, to refrain from questioning any detainee who states that he or she 
does not wish to speak to the police."517 The majority decisively rejected this argument. 
At the Supreme Court of Canada the majority held, consistent with the B.C. Court of 
Appeal, that there is indeed no double-barreled test for admissibility, and that "in the context of a 
police interrogation of a person in detention, where the detainee knows he or she is speaking to a 
person in authority, the two tests for determining whether the suspect's right to silence was 
respected are functionally equivalent. "518 At common law the State has to prove a statement's 
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt as a precondition for admissibility, and it offers greater 
protection than the section 7 test,519 so " ... there is no point in conducting a distinct section 7 
inquiry."520 Ifvoluntariness is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there can be no finding that 
the right to silence guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter was violated in the making of that same 
statement.521 The section 7 protection, however applies as a "residual protection," that, "will be 
of added value to the accused in other contexts."522 The converse is true also; if" ... an accused is 
able to show on a balance of probabilities a breach of his or her right to silence, the Crown will 
not be in a position to meet the voluntariness test."523 
With respect to the scope of the applicable confessions rule, the Court stated that: 
511 Ibid 
518 Ibid at para. 25. The Court says: 
The symmetry between the confession rule and related Charter rights in so far as the requisite mental 
capacity is concerned was previously recognized in R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, where the 
Court held that the operating mind test at common law fuliy answers the mental capacity requirement 
for an effective waiver of the right to silence. 
519 Ibid. 
520 Ibid. 
521 Ibid. at para. 37. 
522 Ibid at para. 25. 
523 Ibid at para. 37. 
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.!-:-:.the common law recognizes an individual's right to remain silent. This does not mean, 
however, that a person has the right not to be spoken to by state authorities. The importance of 
police questioning in the fulfillment of their investigative role cannot be doubted. One can 
readily appreciate that the police could hardly investigate crime without putting questions to 
persons from whom it is thought that useful information may be obtained. The person suspected 
of having committed the crime being investigated is no exception. Indeed, if the suspect in fact 
committed the crime, he or she is likely the person who has the most information to offer about 
the incident. Therefore, the common law also recognizes the importance of police interrogation 
in the investigation of crime. 524 
The Court firmly acknowledges that the notion of voluntariness contemplates the 
principle that a person is not obliged to give information to the police or answer questions and 
that a detainee must have a meaningful choice whether or not to speak to state authorities. 525 The 
test focuses "on the conduct of the police"526 and the effect of that conduct " ... on the suspect's 
ability to exercise his or her free wiii,"527 and is an objective one which takes into account the 
characteristics of the accused. 528 
The most significant part of the decision was the majority's use of Iacobucci J.'s reasons 
in Oickle, wherein he indicated that " ... the Charter is not an exhaustive catalogue of rights. 
Instead it represents a bare minimum below which the law must not fail. A necessary coroiiary 
of this statement is that the law, whether by statute or common law can offer protections beyond 
those guaranteed by the Charter. The common law confessions rule is one such doctrine, and it 
would be a mistake to confuse it with the protections given by the Charter."529 Singh argued 
that the police officers should be required to inform the detainee of his or her right to silence, and 
in the absence of a signed waiver, refrain from questioning any detainee who states that he or she 
does not wish to speak to the police. 530 The majority looked at this proposition and rejected it on 
524 Ibid at para. 28. 
525 Ibid at para. 35. 
526 Ibid. para 36. 
527 Ibid. 
528 Ibid 
529 Ibid at para. 38. 
530 Ibid at para. 42. 
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the ground that it "not only ignores the state interests at stake ... it overshoots the protection 
afforded to the individual's freedom of choice both at common law and under the Charter."531 
More importantly, says the Court, the waiver argument "ignores the state interest in the effective 
investigation of crime,"532 and in light of the view that "the suspect may be the most fruitful 
source of information," it is "in society's interest that the police attempt to tap this valuable 
source."
533 The Court refers to Hebert in support of the notion that there must be a critical 
balance struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the state. 534 But the 
sleight of hand that the majority seems to engage in here is to conflate the interests of society 
(i.e. the societal interest in crime control) referred to in Singh, with the interests of the state, 
referred to in Hebert. Clearly, no consideration is paid to the notion that the interests of society 
might be served by emboldening the rights of the individual vis-a-vis state agents in the context 
of a custodial detention. 
In any case, the Court goes on to say that "legitimate means of persuasion"535 are 
permitted according to Hebert, 536 and that while the law "does not permit the police to ignore the 
detainee's freedom to choose whether to speak or not,"537 and "police persistence in continuing 
the interview, despite repeated assertions by the detainee that he wishes to remain silent, may 
well raise a strong argument that any subsequently obtained statement was not the product of a 
free will to speak to the authorities,"538 this was not such a case. 539 In light of the fact that 18 
531 Ibid at para. 43. The Court elaborates upon this by saying that unlike with the IO(b) right to counsel, which 
includes an "informational and implementation component" expressly, no such provision appears in respect of the 
rir,t to silence. 
53 Ibid. at para 45. 
533 Ibid 
534 Ibid. 
535 Ibid. at para 47. 
536 Ibid. 
537 Ibid. 
538 Ibid.; Rebecca Ross, "R. v. Singh: Addressing the Divide between the Section 7 Right to Silence and the 
Common Law Confessions Rule", Case Comment (November 15\ 2007) at 3.0sgoode, online: The Court< 
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assertions by Singh of the right to silence were ignored by the police interrogator, one cannot 
help but wonder what would constitute such a case? 
Samuel Walker points out that while the majority in Singh " ... stipulated that the test is an 
objective one"540, the question that they eventually insisted was determinative was subjective:541 
"The ultimate question is whether the accused exercised free will by choosing to make a 
statement."542 A truly objective test would ask" ... whether the conduct of the police would 
deprive a reasonable accused in similar circumstances of his free will to make a statement. "543 It 
therefore appears that the Supreme Court majority reduced the entire voluntariness inquiry to a 
subjective question. 544 This may be one of the reasons why the majority does not" ... sketch 
rough guidelines or rules that police can adhere to"545 If the Court had used an objective line of 
reasoning, they would have been concerned with creating guidelines to direct the police during 
interrogation. 546 
The majority's decision in Singh subsumes the section 7 right to silence under the 
doctrine of voluntariness. 547 "Singh forecloses resort to section 7 analysis as unnecessary: the 
confessions rule already protects the right to silence"548 where an individual is in police custody 
http://www. thecourt.ca/2007 I 11/0 1 /r-v-singh-addressing-the-divide-between-the-section-7 -right-to-silence-and-the-
common-law-confessions-rule/>. 
539 Supra note 499 at para. 48. 
540 Ibid at para. 8; also see Samuel G. Walker, "The Subjective-Objective Dimension in R. v. Singh: Rethinking the 
Distinction between the Common Law Confessions Rule and the Charter Right to Silence" (2009-20 I 0) 55 Crim. L. 
Q. 405 at 416. 
541 Walker, ibid. at417. 
542 Supra note 499 at para. 53. Also see ibid. at 418. 




541 Charron J. held that, when a detainee is interrogated by known police, the section 7 pre-trial right to si1ence 
provides no protection to the accused beyond the protection offered by the confessions rule. In such circumstances, 
"the confessions rule effectively subsumes the constitutional right to silence." (Supra note 499 at para. 39). See also 
sufra note 457 at 255-256. 
54 Dufraimont , ibid. at 256. 
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and knows that he or she is being questioned by the police. 549 The limitation of this right has 
been achieved at the expense of undermining the constitutional protections of detained suspects. 
The case of Singh provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to regulate police 
interrogation, and yet, the Court chose to jealously guard and even expand police powers by 
condoning the police efforts to ignore a suspect's choice to remain silent,550 even if the suspect 
asserts his right to silence ll times. The ruling in Singh calls into question the concept of "free 
choice", as relentless interrogation, in the face of repeated assertions of the right to silence, 
shows complete disregard for the wishes of the detained suspect by the police who are in total 
control of him. 
The important question that Singh raises is as follows " ... what amount of police 
persistence will signal an accused's descent into involuntary territory?"551 Clearly, saying "no" 
ll times simply means try harder for the Supreme Court and the police. Therefore, at what point 
police interrogation becomes so abusive that it would be impossible to defend it?552 Perhaps that 
can only happen in" ... cases involving exceptionally long interrogations or obviously vulnerable 
suspects. "553 
The other disturbing aspect of the Singh decision is the majority's unwillingness to 
forcefully show its disapproval of interrogators' efforts to urge Singh to ignore his lawyer's 
549 Supra note 499 at para. 37. See supra note 457 at 256. 
550 Supra note 538. 
SSl Ibid. 
552 Yale Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980). 
According to Professor Kamisar, the pressures of persistent police interrogation will lead defendants to believe that 
the police are legally entitled to answers and that there will be an "extralegal sanction for contumacy". 
553 Dale Ives and Christopher Sherrin, "R. v. Singh- A Meaningless Right to Silence with Dangerous 
Consequences" (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 250 (WLeC) at 3. 
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advice.554 The Court's failure to take a firm stand on this issue clearly undermines the 
importance of the lawyer's advice to the detained suspect. 555 
''Singh largely strips the right to silence of any real meaning. " 556 The Singh court seized 
on part of the obiter in Hebert: 557 "that within certain limits, continued police questioning after 
an assertion of the right to silence was permissible. "558 As a result of Singh, " ... suspects have no 
right to be formally informed of their right to remain silent,"559 and there is "no obligation on the 
police"560 to desist questioning except in the most seemingly "extreme circumstances. "561 
For our purposes, "the most important question that is raised by Singh is whether the 
majority's refusal to recognize an effective right to silence creates a greater risk of false 
confessions. "562 Singh may be a bad ruling for the innocent who waive the right to silence;563 
Charon J. closed the possibility that the right to silence would be " ... interpreted in such a way as 
to supplement the protection against false confessions afforded by the common law voluntariness 
rule. 564 There was the possibility that the right to silence would be used to regulate the kinds of 
practices that police could engage in when trying to elicit an incriminating statement. 565 Rather 




557 Ibid. at I. 
558 Ibid. 








thereby add protections against false confessions, the Singh decision makes it very clear566 that 
"the right to silence adds nothing to voluntariness"567 in the way of protections. 
Singh had asked for a Miranda-like rule, where the police would have to stop questioning 
a detainee after that detainee had asserted his or her right to silence. Fish J., who wrote for the 
minority, would have adopted such an approach, where the detainee could effectively cut-off 
questioning by invoking the right. He noted, for instance, that the existence of Miranda had not 
"paralyzed investigations in the United States" as the majority had supposed an emboldened 
right to silence would. 568 He also viewed "the right to silence"569 as "a constitutional promise 
that must be kept."570 
The dissent argued for a rule that would say that " ... a confession may well be considered 
voluntary under the common law rule and yet be obtained by state action that infringes section 
7."571 This should happen where" ... a police interrogator has undermined a detainee's freedom 
to choose. "572 But even if the confession meets the common law standards of admissibility, it 
does not necessarily represent a free choice to speak, for the purposes of the Charter. 573 A 
choice that is" ... frustrated by relentless interrogation is neither free nor meaningful."574 The 
dissent pointed out that the two rules, the confession rule and the right to silence, 575 " ••• have 
d"ffi d h h ld 0 d" 0 d 0 " 576 1 erent purposes an t us, s ou rematn tsttnct octnnes. 
566 Ibid. 
567 Ibid. 
568 Supra note 499 at para. 48. 
569 Ibid. at para 97. 
570 Ibid. at para 97. 







Singh may yet have a silver lining. "[T]he Supreme Court recognized for the first time 
that unrelenting interrogation of a suspect who repeatedly asserts the right to silence may result 
in the exclusion of a confession"577 under the confessions rule (and not under section 7). 578 
Moreover, although the majority in Singh had " ... declined to hold that persistent police 
questioning rendered the statements involuntary in that case, that holding was largely based upon 
deference to the trial judge, who had fully considered the effect of the persistent questioning 
during the voluntariness voir dire.579 "In different circumstances, such police persistence might 
have raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness."580 "This recognition of a right to silence 
existing within the voluntariness inquiry may in future ground further protection for interrogated 
suspects. "581 
Despite the possibility of such a silver lining, the ruling in Singh should be interpreted as 
another major victory for the supporters of crime control values. This is based on the fact that 
Singh essentially makes the right to silence irrelevant and it succeeds in expanding the 
permissible boundaries of police interrogation. The wide gap between the majority decision and 
" ... the strong dissent"582 reveals a tension that exists between " ... the rights of the accused"583 
. d hr h 0 • • hni ,584 and the agenda of cnme control advance " ... t oug Investigative tee ques. 
Conclusion 
577 Supra note 457 at 266. 
578 Supra note 499 at para. 47. Also see ibid. 
579 Dufraimont, ibid. 
580 Ibid. at 266-267. 
581 Ibid. at 267. 




I have traced the development of the confessions rule, first in 191h century England where 
the basic components were introduced, and then in Canada where new contours were added and 
a contextual approach to the question of voluntariness evolved. The case law in this area was 
discussed in view of Herbert Packer's models of due process and crime control, and it was 
shown that the courts are leaning increasingly in recent years towards a crime control orientation 
in the area of interrogation and confessions. It is apparent from this review that the protections 
provided by the modern confessions rule, at least in the way it is currently applied by the courts, 
is insufficiently protective of suspects in the interrogation room. 
With this in mind we now turn to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and in particular 
section I 0( b) which guarantees the right to counsel. We will explore this section for the 
purposes of discovering what protections in addition to the doctrine of voluntariness are provided 
to a suspect under interrogation, and we will discuss whether these protections create a web of 
prophylactic rules that are adequate to protect suspects from unfair state conduct. 
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Chapter 2: The Charter and the Right to Counsel 
Introduction 
Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the awesome power of the state is when a 
person is trapped in the "interview room." Typically in that situation, the state agent and the 
accused begin the process of engaging in a psychological chess match. However, this is a 
"game" played by two unequal players. The inherent power imbalance between the interrogator 
and the accused creates a very unfair situation which could lead to the inducing of false or 
involuntary confessions. 
The advent of the Charter and certain developments in the common law have, for the 
most part, moved the practice of interrogation from the use of brute force or explicit threats to 
the use of more sophisticated interrogation techniques to extract confessions from the detained 
individuals. these techniques, according to the experts in the field of interrogation, are 
indispensable for state agents to extract confessions from unwilling accused persons. 1 
In the previous chapter we discussed the existing shortcomings in the common law 
doctrine of voluntariness in protecting detained individuals from giving false or involuntary 
confessions. We now need to turn our attention to the discussion of the right to counsel in order 
to determine whether or not this right provides significant additional protection to detained 
individuals. 
Upon examining and analyzing the right to counsel, it will be shown that this right does 
not significantly alter the coercive nature of police interrogations. It is hoped that at the 
1 See discussion in chapter 4. 
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conclusion of this chapter it becomes clear that the right to counsel does not provide sufficient 
protection against false or involuntary confessions. 
The Nature of the Right to Counsel 
The adversarial nature of our system causes the right to counsel to be perceived as one of 
the most important rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred 
to as "the Charter"). This is due to the fact that defence counsel are expected to act as 
equalizers. It is presumed that a defence lawyer will ensure that all other constitutional rights of 
the accused are respected and his or her presence will help to bring balance and serve as a 
counterweight to the massive resources of the state which would otherwise overbear the accused 
individual. 
The right to counsel is designed to ensure the fundamental rights, such as the right to a 
fair trial, the presumption of innocence, the rights against arbitrary detention and unreasonable 
searches, and others, are not trampled upon by state agents. The purpose of the right to counsel 
and its companion right under section lO(a) is to protect individual defendants from conviction 
resulting from their ignorance of legal rights and procedures or not knowing the gravity of the 
situation they are in. 
Moreover, the right to counsel is designed to serve the important function of giving the 
appearance of fairness to the system. By strategically placing a defence counsel by the side of a 
defendant2 the state is then fully justified in marshalling their resources against the accused, 
under the pretext that the presence of a defence counsel will ensure the defendant is not forced to 
respond to state allegations from the position of disadvantage. 
2 Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights & the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Thompson Educational 
Publishing, 1994) at 200. 
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Section lO(a) 
Section IO(a) is often referred to as section IO(b)'s companion right. Section IO(a) is the 
right of any person who has been detained to be informed promptly of the reasons for their 
detention.3 The Supreme Court has ruled that this section imposes a duty upon police to tell 
suspects in "clear and simple language"4 " ••• about every offence they are under investigation 
for, and about any significant change in the nature of the investigation."5 The reasons given 
" ... need not be lengthy or technically precise;"6 rather, "it is sufficient if they convey the general 
extent of the suspect's legal jeopardy." 7 " ••• Changes in interrogation strategy do not trigger a 
significant change in legaljeopardy."8 Moreover, " ... there is no requirement that police inform 
the accused of the specific allegations,"9 or, the strength of the state's case" ... or even the exact 
charges against them."10 
The section IO(a) right requires that suspects be told of the reasons for detention in order to help 
them make informed decisions about whether to talk to police or consult with counsel and ensure 
that those who contact lawyers obtain the appropriate advice. 11 
Section 1 O(h ): 
A regulatory12 regime has emerged in Canada as a result of our Supreme Court of 
Canada's interpretation of IO(b) of the Charter. This provision gives everyone "the right on 
3 Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli, & James Stribopoulos, Criminal Procedure in Canada, 1st ed. (Markham: 
LexisNexis, 2011) at 300. 
4 R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 at para. 21. 
5 Supra note 3. 
6 Ibid. at 308. 




11 R. v. Evans, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869 at 886-87; R. v. Black, [1989] S.C.J. No. 81, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138 at 152-53; R. v. 
Smith, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 714 at 728; R. v. Borden, [1994] S.C.J. No. 82, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145 at 166; R. v. Latimer, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 at para. 28. 
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arrest or detention to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right."13 
As in the case of other Charter rights, section 24(2) of the Charter provides for the exclusion at 
trial of statements and other evidence obtained through a violation of these guarantees. 
To fulfill the "purpose" behind section 10(b) of the Charter, the Supreme Court has 
imposed obligations on police that move beyond the express language of the section. 14 The 
underlying purpose of the section, according to the Supreme Court, is to assist suspects to make 
informed, voluntary choices in their interactions with·police. 15 The right to talk to counsel, as 
well as the right to be informed of that right, are attempts to ensure that suspects are aware of 
their legal situation. 16 The Court has recognized that the rights in section 10 are particularly 
important in preventing suspects from unwittingly making inculpatory statements, 17 or to make 
them aware that they are not required to speak to police. 18 
The Court has not read section 10 of the Charter as forbidding police from using pressure 
tactics to provoke suspects to make self-incriminating statements; rather it has tried to strike a 
balance between the interest of suspects in avoiding self-incrimination and the need of the state 
to obtain confession evidence to prosecute criminal behaviour. A clear example of the courts' 
intention to strike a balance between the competing interests of the suspects and the state is the 
12 Steven Penney, "Triggering the Right to Counsel: "Detention" and Section I 0 of the Charter" (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 27I at para I. 
13 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. I O(b ), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (U.K.), I982, c. II. 
14 R. v. Brydges, [I990] S.C.J. No.8, [I990] I S.C.R. I90 at 202; Black, supra note II at I 52. 
15 R. v. Bartle, [I994] S.C.J. No. 74, [I994] 3 S.C.R I73 at I93-94; R. v. Sinclair, [20IO] S.C.J. No. 35, [20IO] 2 
S.C.R. 3IO at paras. 24-26. According to Professor Penney, the main purpose of section IO(b) " .. .is to help deter 
abusive interrogation practices, including those apt to produce false confessions. Supra note I2 at para 4. 
16 R. v. Manninen, [I987] S.C.J. No. 4I, [I987] I S.C.R. I233 at I242-43. 
17 Ibid; Brydges, supra note I4 at 203,206, 2I5; R. v. Prosper, [I994] S.C.J. No. 72 [I994] 3 S.C.R. 236 at 27I 
(S.C.C.); R. v. S.(R.J.}, [I995] S.C.J. No. IO, [I995] I S.C.R. 45I at para. 85; R. v. Jones, [I994] S.C.J. No. 42, 
[I994] 2 S.C.R. 229 at 254-55 per Lamer C.J.C., dissenting. 
18 Richard A. Leo, "The Impact of Miranda Revised" (1996) 86(3) J. Crim. L. & Criminology 621. 
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case of R. v. Sinclair. 19 This is a case where the Supreme Court ruled that the right to counsel is 
"a one-time-only opportunity ,"20 and " ... that the essential purpose of the right is informational 
rather than protective."21 Sinclair was arrested for murder. He was advised of his right to 
counsel.22 Subsequently, he briefly spoke to his lawyer for 2-3 minutes.23 This was followed by 
a 5 hour interrogation, and during that time he was denied the right to speak with his lawyer 
again, repeated! y. 24 
Timothy Moore and Andras Schreck, argue that Sinclair creates a dangerous situation for 
detained suspects. The Court decided that " ... while the police can try to persuade a detainee to 
give up his right to silence,"25 the detainee must make the decision to capitulate in the face of 
that persuasion26 " ••• entirely on his own"27 and without consulting counsel an additional time. 
19 Sinclair, supra note 15. 
20 Timothy Moore & Andras Schreck, "Canada Right to Counsel: Confessions of Dangerously Unrepresented 
Minds" online at jurist.org <http://jurist.org/forum/20 I 0/II /canada-right-to-counsel-confessions-of-dangerously-
unrepresented-minds.php> at 1 (PDF version). 
However, the Supreme Court in Sinclair held at paragraph 48 that "reconsultation is necessary in order for the 
detainee to have the information relevant to choosing whether to cooperate with the police investigation or not." 
Also see supra note 3 at 314. 
The Court in Sinclair also held at paragraph 52 " ... that, a second opportunity is warranted when police"(Supra note 
3 at 315). decide to apply to detained persons "[n]on routine procedures, like participation in a line-up or submitting 
to a polygraph." "In addition, the Court concluded that police who become aware that a detainee may not have 
understood "initials. 10(h) advice ofhis right to counsel" must provide another opportunity for consultation. Lastly, 
the Court held that an additional opportunity must be given if "police undermine the legal advice that the detainee 
has received." (Supra note 3 at 315). 
The Court was open to other possible circumstances to permit a right to reconsult counsel. However, the 
circumstances, as the Court put it, " ... must be "objectively observable"" (Sinclair, supra note I5 at paragraph 55; 
See also supra note 3 at315). The Court held, however, that lengthy interrogations do not give rise to a right for 
reconsultation (Sinclair, Supra note 15 at paras. 6I-63; See also supra note 3 at 316). The Court took the position 
that the police tactics of gradually confronting an accused with real or false evidence does not give rise to a right to a 
second consultation with a lawyer (Sinclair, supra note II at paragraph 60; see also: Supra note 3 at 316). 








Sinclair is problematic because, while the police will provide information on " ... the advantages 
of giving up the right to silence, the detainee has no corresponding source of information on the 
disadvantages. "28 In light of the risk of false confessions, the Sinclair ruling is troubling. As 
Moore and Schreck state: "the suspect's resolve may crumble in the face of evidence (real or 
fabricated) and his possible confusion regarding legal advice to remain silent is juxtaposed with 
the police's unremitting questions. "29 
In further discussing the section 1 0( b) jurisprudence, it will become apparent that 
attention must be paid to the need to deter abusive interrogation practices, including those that 
have a likelihood of producing false confessions. 
The Current State of the Law: 
In contrast to the doctrine of voluntariness, which applies to any statement made to 
authorities, s. 10 rights arise only upon detention or arrest.30 "Detention occurs when police 
physically or psychologically restrain suspects."31 Physical restraint arises when the police use 
force incidental to an investigative detention.32 "Psychological restraint arises when suspects 
either face legal liability for refusing to comply with police directives or reasonably believe that 
compliance is mandatory."33 The case law defines arrest to consist of the "actual seizure or 
touching of a person's body with a view to his detention, "34 or alternatively, the pronouncing of 
"words of arrest" if "the person sought to be arrested submits to the process and goes with the 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. at 1-2. 
30 Steven Penney, "What's Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the 
Post-Charter Era- Part II: Self-Incrimination in Police Investigations" (2003-2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280 at 307. 
31 Ibid.; R. v. Therens, [1985] I S.C.R. 613 at 641-42,per Le Dain J., dissenting, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481,45 C.R. (3d) 
97; R. v. Thomsen, [1988] I S.C.R. 640 at 648-49,40 C.C.C. (3d) 411,63 C.R. (3d) I. 
32 Section 25(1) ofthe Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 provides that police officers may use "as much force as 
necessary" when "authorized by law to do anything" if the officer "acts on reasonable grounds" 
33Penney, Ibid., Therens, supra note 27 at 642-44, perLe Dain J., dissenting, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481,45 C.R. (3d) 97; 
Thomsen, supra note 18 at 649. 
34 Supra note 3 at 124. 
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arresting officer."35 A failure by police officers " ... to use the word "arrest" is not 
determinative."36 It is " ... the substance of the encounter,"37 as indicated by " ... the use of 
language that reasonably leads an individual to conclude that he or she is in police custody, and 
not free to leave,"38 that will matter the most.39 
Section 1 O(b) imposes a number of obligations on the police. Most of these obligations 
have been created by the Supreme Court "as a consequence of its "purposive" interpretation"40 of 
the section.41 The right to talk to a lawyer, and the right to be informed of that right, are meant 
" ... to ensure that suspects are aware of their legal situation. ,,42 The Court has also emphasized 
that these rights assist " ... to prevent suspects from unwittingly making inculpatory statements."43 
The police have two types of duties imposed upon them to meet the objectives of section 
1 O(b ):44 informational duties, and implementational duties.45 The informational duties require 
the police to advise detained suspects " ... that they have the right to consult with a lawyer 






40 Supra note 30 at 307. 
41 Brydges, supra note 14 at 202; Black, supra note II at I 52. To help suspects make informed, voluntary choices in 
their interactions with police. 
42 Supra note 30 at 307-308; Supra note 16 at 1242-43. 
43 Penney, ibid. at 308; Ibid; Brydges, supra note 14 at 203,206 and 215; R. v. Pozniak, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 at 191, 
92 C.C.C. (3d) 289,33 C.R. (4th) I; Prosper, supra note 17 at 271. 
44 Penney, ibid. 
45 Ibid. at 315. 
46 Ibid. at 308; R v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 at 1I46, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193,73 C.R. (3d) 129. "Without delay" 
means that the police must inform suspects of their right to counsel "immediately upon detention". The only 
exception to this may be in urgent circumstances where "the police for their own safety have to act in the heat of the 
moment to subdue the suspect ... " For a more recent iiJustration of this requirement, we may look at the case of R v. 
Mian, [2014] S.C.J. No. 54. The Court held that the 22 minute delay in administering the right to counsel was 
unacceptable as the Court was of the view that the underlying facts of this case did not constitute "exceptional 
circumstances" (paragraph 74). See also paragraph 75. 
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services.47 Moreover, police must facilitate and make arrangements for detainees to contact duty 
counsel should they wish to do so.48 
The "implementational duties arise"49 once the required information has been 
conveyed. 50 The police can start the interrogation, once the suspect states he/she understands the 
caution and he/she does not ask to speak to a lawyer. 51 Should there be uncertainty about the 
suspect's ability to understand the caution, the police cannot start the questioning until he/she 
understands the caution. 52 The police should also provide suspects with "reasonable 
opportunity" to speak to a lawyer should he/she ask for a lawyer. 53 This involves providing 
access to a private telephone conversation with counsel. 54 The questioning cannot commence 
until the suspect has had a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel. 55 Suspects should exercise 
due diligence in contacting counsel. The lack of due diligence may amount to the waiver of the 
right to speak to counsel. 56 
47 Brydges, supra note 14 at 209-10; R. v. Pozniak, supra note 43; See also supra note 30 at 335. 
48 Pozniak, ibid. at 197. 




53 Ibid I should also point out that the Supreme Court in R. v. Taylor, 2014 SCC 50, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 495, held that 
the accused's right to counsel was violated when he was denied the opportunity to consult counsel while at the 
hospital. This is a case where the accused was involved in an accident while "under the influence." He was taken to 
the hospital and blood samples were taken from him before he was given the opportunity to speak to counsel. At the 
scene of the accident, Taylor requested to speak to counsel. However, he was not, at any point, afforded the 
opportunity to do so. The Court found that officers had ample time to make a telephone available to the accused 
(para. 31) and yet they failed to do so. This was attributed to lack of experience by the newly recruited officers 
(para. 15). Moreover, the Court found that there were no underlying urgent circumstances to justify the denial of 
providing the accused with an opportunity to speak to counsel in this case (para. 31 ). Also see case commentary-
Jordan Casey, "A Case About Complete Denial of Access to Counsel", Case Comment, on R. v. Taylor, (September 
19, 2014) The Court, Osgoode. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. at 310-311. 
56 Ibid. at 311. 
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After a suspect has spoken with his or her lawyer, the police can commence the 
interrogation. 57 Police are not permitted to attack the integrity or the competence of the 
suspect's counsel. 58 Moreover, the police cannot negotiate the resolution of the charges with 
detainees who asserted their right to counsel, in the absence of their counsel. 59 
A Critique of Section lO(a): 
The language of section 1 O(a) is simple. It states that: "Everyone has the right on arrest 
or detention to be informed promptly of the reasons therefore." However, when the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Evans set out to create an " .. .interpretive framework"60 for s. 10(a), the result 
was very disappointing. 61 The Supreme Court in its earlier decisions in R. v. Black and R. v. 
Smith had considered the connection between 10(a) and 10(b) rights62, but in Evans, the S.C.C. 
for the first time considered what constitutes a breach of s. 1 O(a). 63 
The compliance with section 10(a) only requires the police to provide enough 
information " ... to allow the accused to reasonably infer the substantive nature of the charges". 64 
The troubling nature of the "reasonable inference" test was defined by McLachlan J. in the 
following fashion: 
[w]hen considering whether there has been a breach of s. 1 O(a) of the Charter, it is the substance 
of what the accused can reasonably be supposed to have understood, rather than the formalism of 
the precise words used, which must govern ... The question is whether what the accused was told, 
viewed reasonably in all the circumstances of the case, was sufficient to permit him to make a 
57 Ibid.; R. v. Hebert, [I990] 2 S.C.R. I5I at I84, 57 C.C.C. (3d) I, 77 C.R. (3d) I45. 
58 Supra note 30 at 3 I I. 
59 Ibid. 




64 Ibid. at 147. 
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reasonable decision to decline to submit to arrest, or alternatively, to undermine his right to 
counsel.65 
As Professor Tanovich reminds us, the main issue with the Court's formulation of the 
reasonable inference test is that under this test the " ... onus of ensuring that the accused is 
informed has now shifted from the police onto the accused. The accused must now deduce, in a 
situation of high stress and anxiety, the nature of his/her jeopardy before deciding whether to 
exercise his/her fundamental right to counsel or right to silence. "66 
I contend that the dissent judgement in Evans, by Sopinka J., makes more sense. Sopinka 
J. pointed out the need for police to explicitly convey to the accused the true nature and the 
reasons for his/her arrest. 67 Sopinka J. used the following analogy to illustrate his point: "when 
an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, this (the reason for the warrant) is set out in writing in 
the warrant . An arrest without a warrant is only lawful if the type of information which would 
have been contained in the warrant is conveyed orally. "68 
A Critique of Section lO(b): 
Section IO(b) has been interpreted through the lens of free choice theory.69 What the 
Charter's framer's understood70 was " ... that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive."71 It 
has already been argued in this thesis that the doctrine of voluntariness provides little protection 
against such coercion. 72 The solution to this problem was to give detainees the right to contact 
65 Ibid 
66 Ibid. at 148. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid at 146. 
69 Supra note 30 at 312. 
70 Ibid 
71 Ibid. 
72 See also ibid. 
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counsel without delay 73 and to " ... require police to inform them of that right." 74 The free choice 
theory is premised on the principle that once detainees know about the extent of their jeopardy, 
then they can make a free and informed decision as to whether they wish to answer police 
questions or not. 75 
But there are flaws with section 10.76 Most troublingly, it gives the responsibility for 
dispelling the coercive atmosphere of the police interrogation to the police themselves -- the very 
people who will be conducting the interrogation. 77 "Requiring police to issue warnings puts 
them in a troubling conflict of interest,"78 because it is their job to collect confession evidence 
from the suspect. 79 Police in this situation may feel incentivized to cut corners in their 
administration of an accused's section 1 0 Charter rights. 80 The contradictions that this 
obligation creates for the police was described by Mr. Justice McClung in Brydges, when that 
case was dealt with at the Alberta Court of Appeal, before it made its way to the Supreme Court 
of Canada. McClung J. noted that: "A peace officer pursuing the investigation of a serious crime 
cannot rationally be expected to double as a legal advisor to his suspect. In an adversary system 
the police headquarters should not be confused with the legal aid office."81 Moreover P.B. 
Michalyshyn states that " ... police officers in an adversary system of justice cannot and should 







79 Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 2001) at 276. 
80 As Jerome H. Skolnick puts it " ... the policeman feels that most trials are a waste of taxpayers' money since, as 
one law enforcement spokesman put it, 'We do not charge innocent men."' and further he says that "The policeman, 
in short, is primarily interested in factual guilt, indeed, the idea of legal guilt leaves him cold and hostile" Jerome H. 
Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 
1966) at 197 and 203. See also supra note 30. 
81 Supra note 14 at para 9. 
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task of informing the detained or arrested person of the right. 82 Section 1 0 (b) of the Charter 
guarantees the right "to be informed" of the right to counsel. It does not say that the police must 
be the "informers"83 
Moreover the lack of a requirement for video-recorded statements84 leaves the door open 
for the police to lie about complying with section 10. In a hypothetical courtroom situation, 
when asked why they elected not to video record the interrogation of the accused, officers may 
say that they asked the accused whether he minded being recorded and that he indicated that he 
did. When they are asked why they left this decision to the accused, they may indicate that they 
wanted to make the accused feel more comfortable with the situation so that he would open-up 
and start talking. The point is that without a video-recording itself, the police can say anything 
happened with respect to the administration of 1 O(b) or the failure to properly administer it. 85 
82 Caplan argues that even the American Supreme Court in Miranda understood that " ... government's obligation 
was not to counsel the accused, but to question him." Gerald M. Caplan, "Questioning Miranda" (1985) 38 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1417 at 1423. 
83 P.B. Michalyshyn, "Brydges: Should the Police Be Advising Of The Right to Counsel" (1990) 74 C.R. (3d) at 
152. Moreover K. Jull offers another alternative. He points out that a well-publicized "legal emergency line" with 
an easy to remember code would considerably reduce the informational obligations of state agents and hence " ... the 
burden on police officers of demonstrating an informed waiver of rights would be easier to satisfy than at present. 
An accused person who waives rights or services that are easily accessible will have difficulty arguing later that the 
waiver was not an informed one". Kenneth Jull, "Clarkson v. R.: Do We Need a Legal Emergency Department?" 
(1987) 32 McGill L.J. 356 at 385. 
84 R. v. Oick/e, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 46. In Oick/e the Supreme Court stopped short of mandating recording as 
a prerequisite to admissibility. Instead, it was held that non-recorded interrogations are not to be considered 
inherently suspect, though recordings are useful to courts in assessing confessions. 
85 At this point it may be appropriate to comment at some length on the videotape recording of statements. 
Although we may view the practice of tape recording interrogations as a positive step forward and this view is 
supported by commissions of inquiry on wrongful convictions of Sophonow (The Inquiry Regarding Thomas 
Sophonow (The Investigation, Prosecution and Consideration of Entitlement to Compensation), Police Interviews 
with Thomas Sophonow in Vancouver, Recommendation 1), Guy Paul Morin (Fred Kaufman, The Commission on 
proceedings involving Guy Paul Morin, published by Ontario Ministry of Attorney General, 1998, volume II, p. 
1201, Recommendation# 96 (b)), and the Martin Committee Report (Report of the Attorney General's Advisory 
Committee on Charge Screening, Disclosure, and Resolution Discussions Published by Ontario Ministry of the 
Attorney General, 1993) however it would be naive to assume that videotaping interrogations is the final solution to 
the problem of police abuse. It is true that a camera " ... may never blink", but that does not mean that what it "sees" 
can be considered an unadulterated view of reality. As Marshall McLuhan wrote, the information that media 
conveys is not entirely independent of the method used (Alan D. Gold, "Videotaping Interrogations" June 16,2003, 
A.D. Gold Collection of Criminal Law Articles, ADGN/2003-668 at 2). It is my position that it would be wrong to 
place too much faith in tape recording interrogations as the ultimate tool to ensure the preservation of the truth. The 
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Hence, in situations where the right to counsel has allegedly been waived, it is also 
difficult to determine whether the suspect freely or voluntarily made this waiver. 86 The Courts 
have recourse to the "reasonable person" approach, 87 which permits suspects to waive their 
section 1 0 rights and submit to questioning only if they are capable of making fully informed, 
self-interested decisions. But it is difficult to assess whether suspects have been affected by 
police pressure, particularly since informing suspects of their right to talk to a lawyer does little 
to alleviate such pressures. 88 Simply informing suspects of their right to retain and instruct 
painful fact remains that " ... where there is the will to circumvent the rules, ways will be found" to distort the reality 
that the seeing eye of a camera projects (Fred Kaufman, The Admissibility of Confessions, 3rd Supplement to 3rd Ed. 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986). According to Michael McConville and Phillip Morrell, the Scottish research which was 
conducted by the Social Research Branch of the Scottish Home Office and Health Department in 1983 supports the 
proposition that the police tend to circumvent the use of tapes intended to record interrogations. The conclusions of 
the authors in this regard are quite alarming: "what is recorded, therefore, is what is acceptable to courts and what 
would pass public scrutiny. The rigid, stereotyped and formal questioning procedures they have adopted have 
produced acceptable, if shell-like, products. The police have been able to do this only because they have conducted 
their usual questioning outside the reach of the tape recorder. Interviews have been taped: interrogations have 
continued to take place in secret." (Michael McConville & Phillip Morrell, "Recording the Interrogation: Have the 
Police Got it Taped?" (I 983) Crim. L.R. 158). 
The authors go on to expose other police tactics: "One tactic used has been to engage in preliminary interviewing 
elsewhere. In both Dundee and Falkirk there has been a gradual but steady increase since the experiment began in 
the proportion of suspects who made relevant statements prior to their arrival in the police station. This was 
particularly marked in Falkirk where the incidence of statements prior to arrival at the police station rose from 14 
percent before tape-recording to 44 percent after. The rise in Dundee was less dramatic (from 34 to 43 percent) but 
nevertheless steady. The S.H.H.D. Report also reveals that there was considerable (and, in Dundee increasing) 
delay between the suspect's arrival at the police station and the commencement of the interrogation and that at least 
part of this was attributable to the fact that officers were in the habit of questioning suspects upon their arrival at the 
police station often for lengthy periods of time before the tape-recorder was used to record the encounter. When the 
tape-recorder was activated, the police abandoned their usual interrogation techniques and instead utilized a formal, 
rather rigid style of questioning." (Michael McConville & Phillip Morrell, "Recording the Interrogation: Have the 
Police Got it Taped?" (1983) Crim. L.R. 158 at 161). 
Furthermore the Scottish experience has also shown that when videotaping was first introduced in that country, there 
was a "dramatic increase in "oral" utterances on arrest and in transit to the station." (D. Martin and J. Gemmell, 
Police Beat, October 1984, Newsletter vol. 6, No.2 at 24.) 
86 Alan Young, "Not Waving but Drowning: A Look at Waiver and Collective Constitutional Rights in the Criminal 
Process" (1988) 53 Sask L. Rev. 47 at 112. 
87 Supra note 30 at 313. 
88Timothy Moore & Karina Gagnier, "You can talk ifyou want to": Is the Police Caution on the 'Right to Silence' 
Understandable?" 51 C.R. (6th) 1; Timothy E. Moore & Cindy R. Wasser, "Social Science and Witness Reliability: 
Reliable Science Begets Reliable Evidence", (2006) 33 C.R. (6th) 1. 
Moore & Gagnier point out that even in situations where an arrestee has properly understood the right to silence 
caution (p. 13), " ... the subsequent actions and statements" of police could "easily cause a suspect to doubt their 
initial interpretation of it." Moore &Wasser's research also supports the research of Saul M. Kassin that innocent 
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counsel does not fully ensure that they are aware of the consequences of speaking, nor does it 
guarantee that they will make a rational choice. 89 
Professor Steven Penney suggests that " ... protecting free choice"90 in the way it is 
intended by the Court may require " ... that defence counsel be present during any 
interrogation."91 But, he says, this is "politically untenable,"92 as it would cause a dwindling in 
the number of confessions procured from questioning. 93 The Supreme Court has been unwilling 
to go so far as to permit counsel to attend at police interrogations,94 yet they continue to cling to 
the free choice rationale as the underpinning for section 1 O(b). 95 This is highlighted in the case 
of Sinclair.96 This "doctrinal indeterminacy"97 has made it "more difficult to craft reasonable 
suspects are " ... more likely to waive their right to silence" (Moore and Gagnier p. 5) than guilty ones, because many 
innocent suspects were of the opinion that they could not say anything that would be self-incriminating (Moore and 
Gagnier p. 5). Many in the Moore & Gagnier study disclosed that they waived their right to silence " ... because they 
wanted to appear cooperative" (Moore & Gagnier p. II) and because " ... they believed that their statements could 
later be used in their defence (Moore & Gagnier p. 11). See also: S.M. Kassin & R.J. Norwick, "Why suspects waive 
their Miranda rights: The power of innocence" (2004) 28 L. & H urn Behav 211-221. 
89 The manner of the delivery of the right to counsel could be very important as well. As Skolnick and Leo argue 
"However police routinely deliver the Miranda warnings in a flat, perfunctory tone of voice to communicate that the 
warnings are merely a bureaucratic ritual. Although it might be inevitable that police would deliver Miranda 
warnings unenthusiastically, investigators whom we have interviewed say that they consciously recite the warnings 
in a manner intended to heighten the likelihood of eliciting a waiver. It is thus not surprising that police are so 
generally successful in obtaining waivers." Jerome H. Skolnick and Richard A. Leo, (1992) "The Ethics of 
Deceptive Interrogation" II Crim. Just. Ethics 3 at 5. Also see Otis H. Stephens, JR., The Supreme Court and 
Confessions of Guilt (Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1973). 
90 Supra note 30 at 313. 
91 Ibid. See also Rosenberg and Rosenberg's views about presence of counsel at custodial interrogations. The 
authors claim that "[t]he presence of counsel is often considered an ironclad guarantee against police elicitation of 
any confession, voluntary or coerced. Yet, like other warranties, it is only as good as its maker. To put not too fme 
a point on the matter, the question of ineffective assistance of counsel, even in the interrogation context, cannot be 
easily dismissed. While it may be true that any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect ... to make no statement to 
police under any circumstances, the problem is that some lawyers are not. Indeed, given the stress and time 
pressures of stationhouse questioning, mistakes in judgment, such as erroneous advice to give an exonerating 
statement, are more likely to occur. Affording the right to counsel also would not obviate inquiries with respect to 
waiver once counsel has left the stationhouse. Thus, such a proposal, while extremely helpful, does not eliminate 
litigation of issues, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, that may be peripheral to the question of coercion." 
Irene Rosenberg and Yale Rosenberg, "A Modest Proposal for the Abolition ofCustodial Confessions" (1988) 63 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 955 at 104-105. 
92 Supra note 30 at 313. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid at 314 
96 Sinclair, supra note I5. 
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compromises between competing interests raised in s. 10 cases". 98 In some cases, he argues, it 
has "unduly thwarted the state's interest in convicting the guilty"99 and "[i]n others, it has 
inhibited the development of needed protections against abuse and false confessions". 100 
It may be argued that the American approach of allowing counsel to attend at 
interrogations makes more sense. 101 "Suspects who invoke their right to silence and counsel"102 
find themselves vulnerable. 103 Under pressure to solve serious crimes, the police may find 
themselves tempted to browbeat, manipulate or deceive recalcitrant suspects " ... into making 
inculpatory statements."104 This pressure exists both before and after suspects have consulted 
counsel. 105 A preventative " ... bright-line"106 rule that prohibits the questioning of suspects in the 
absence of counsel, once the right to counsel had been invoked, may reduce the incentive for 
abuse. 107 It would also avoid the need to inquire into the murky question of whether suspects 
were "diligent"108 " •• .in exercising their right to counsel."109 Although the inevitable loss of 
confession evidence available to the state 110 may be lamentable from a crime control perspective, 
I agree with professor Penney's position that the gain in abuse prevention justifies this loss.111 
97 Supra note 30 at 314. 
98 Ibid at 313. 
99 Ibid. at 314. 
100 Ibid 
101 Ibid. at. 319 
102 Ibid. 
103 S. Cohen, "Police Interrogation ofthe Wavering Suspect" (1989) 71 C.R. (3d) 148; Patrick Healy, "The Value of 
Silence" (I 990) 74 C.R. (3d) 176. 







111 Ibid. See also: Ian Bryan, Interrogation and Confession: A Study of Progress, Process and Practice (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1997) at 291. On the other hand there may be no loss of confession evidence at all. 
There is data from England that shows that allowing counsel to attend at a police interrogation may not be as 
beneficial to accused persons as might be thought. Ian Bryan reports that many " .. .legal advisers may be 
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Whatever one thinks of the political tenability of allowing counsel to attend at 
interrogations, the problem is laid bare. If the free choice rationale for the right to counsel is 
compromised by the crime control considerations of police the jurisprudence will be fraught with 
problems. Problems do arise with the jurisprudence on the waiver of the right to counsel. 
One issue has been deciding " ... what level of comprehension"112 of the police caution on 
section 1 O(b) rights is required of the suspect in order for him or her to forego consultation. 113 In 
R. v. Clarkson, 114 "the court employed a definition of waiver close to the reasonable person 
standard."115 In that case," ... an intoxicated murder suspect confessed after police warned her of 
her right to counsel."116 She stated that" ... she had understood the warning ."117 Her sister, who 
was accompanying her, 118" ••• repeatedly advised her to remain silent until a lawyer was 
present."119 But Clarkson took the position120 that " ... there was no point and she did not need a 
lawyer's help."121 The Court held that this did not amount to a valid waiver122 because a waiver 
requires123 "a true appreciation of the consequences of giving up the right."124 
marginalized by the police during interrogations" (p. 291) and " ... others may be inclined to adopt a non-
interventionist or non-adversarial stance" ( p. 291) or may encourage their clients " ... to answer all reasonable 
questions put to them by the police" (p. 291) Despite the allowance of the presence of a legal advisor at 
interrogations under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), Bryan notes that the percentage of confessions 
or damaging admissions in the pre-PACE era was roughly the same as it is in the post-PACE era. "Out of the pre-
PACE sample of 400 cases, 342 (88.1%) of the detainees who were formally interrogated by the police made either 
partial or full confessions of guilt. The number from the research sample of283 post-PACE cases is 248 (87%)." 
<E· 291) 1 2 Supra note 30 at 319. 
113 Ibid. 
114 R. v. Clarkson, [1986] I S.C.R. 383,25 C.C.C. (3d) 207, 50 C.R. (3d) 289. 
115 Supra 30 at 314; Clarkson, Ibid. According to Skolnick and Leo, "An interrogation is presumed to be coercive 
unless a waiver is obtained." The authors go on to argue that "In practice, once a waiver is obtained, most of the 
deceptive tactics deplored by the majority become available to the police." Skolnick, and Leo, Supra note 89 at 4. 






122 Ibid.; According to Professor Young the practice of waiver has its roots in the market-based mentality of trading 
goals for a specific price. Professor Young is of the view that the constitutional rights are the collective property of 
_, 120 _, 
In R. v. Whittle, 125 the court moved away from such a charitable interpretation 126 and 
found on similar facts that the accused understood the caution well enough to have waived his 
IO(b) right. 127 In Whittle, the accused was a " ... schizophrenic murder suspect"128 when 
questioned by police, after he was informed of his section 10 rights. 129 He stated that he 
understood the caution declined to speak to a lawyer. 130 After making a number of incriminating 
utterances, 131 he requested to consult with counsel. 132 At trial, testimony from an expert witness 
indicated that133 the " ... accused was driven to confess by auditory hallucinations that he was 
experiencing. The Court, based on Clarkson, recognized that " ... the waiver of the right to 
all members of society, and therefore, individuals should not be allowed to make personal decisions in either 
exercising or waiving constitutional rights. (See Supra note 86 at 77). 
123 Supra note 30 at 3I4. · 
124 Supra note I14 at para 20. According to Rick Libman, the Supreme Court in Clarkson, in deciding whether or 
not to admit an "intoxicated confession", was caught between two competing views. The Supreme Court had to 
decide whether under the state of drunkenness, the accused had sufficient cognitive capacity to simply understand 
the meaning of her utterances; or the higher standard of requiring the accused to have awareness of the 
consequences of her statement. The Supreme Court chose to apply the latter test to examine Clarkson's waiver of 
her right to counsel. Subsequently on the basis of the test of awareness of the consequences, the Supreme Court 
ruled to exclude the "intoxicated confession". However, the separate judgment delivered by Mcintyre and 
Chovinard JJ. took the position that " ... a non-operating mind would not only be unaware of its utterances but also of 
the consequences thereof. For either of these reasons, the accused's statement would be inadmissible". R. Libman, 
"Waiver of the Right to Retain Counsel While Intoxicated", at 122. Also, Libman had the following comments about 
the importance of the Supreme Court's ruling in Clarkson: 
"The significance ofthe Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in R. v. Clarkson is unmistakable: it clearly 
signals the Courts to closely scrutinize and be ever vigilant at any purported waiver by an intoxicated person of his 
constitutional rights to retain counsel. As Madam Justice Wilson commented at 17 [at 505 D.L.R.] a valid and 
effective waiver of s. 1 O(b) right "must be premised on a true appreciation of the consequences of giving up the 
right" R. Libman, "Waiver of the Right to Retain Counsel While Intoxicated", at I25. However it should be noted 
that "a true appreciation of the consequences" according to K. Jull requires specific knowledge of complex legal 
concepts on the part of the accused person, particularly in relation to the requirement of mens rea. (Jull, Supra note 
83) . Moreover, the Supreme Court in the latter case of R. v. Prosper (Supra note 17) at paragraph 43, stated that" ... 
the courts must ensure that the right to counsel is not "too easily waived." R. Libman "Holding Off' or "Holding 
Out", Who Really Prospers From Prosper? (1994) 7 Journal of Motor Vehicle Law Vol. 7 at 44. Libman also went 
on to assert that the cases of Prosper and Bartle ([1994], 92 C.C.C. (3d) 289) raised the threshold for waiver of 
section 10(b) by setting the standard of valid waiver even "more exacting", then the one set in Clarkson, R. 
Libman,""Holding Off' or "Holding Out", Who Really Prospers From Prosper?" at 55. 
125 R. v. Whittle, [ 1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, 92 C. C. C. (3d) II, 32 C.R. (4th) 1. See also Supra note 30 at 314. 





131 Ibid. at 3I5 
132 Ibid. at 314-315. 
133 Ibid. at 315. 
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counsel required some awareness of the consequences,"134 and the degree of the accused's 
understanding was diminished. 135 The Court held that a suspect only needs to136 "understand 
what he or she is saying and to comprehend that the evidence may be used in the proceedings 
against [him or her]". 137 This requires only138 the "limited cognitive capacity to understand the 
process and communicate with counsel."139 Suspects do not necessarily have to be able to 
engage in "analytical reasoning"140 or to be able to choose a course of action that141 "best serves 
[their] interests". 142 The inner voices that may have motivated the accused to make damaging 
admissions, did not invalidate his waiver, 143 the Court held. 
In both cases, " ... cognitive impairments prevented the defendants from making rational 
judgements"144 about whether or not it was wise to speak to police. 145 They were unable to make 
the decisions that a similarly situated reasonable person would have made. 146 But the court 
treated the taking of statements differently in each case. 
Based on the preceding discussion, it would seem that without a safeguard in place, problems of 
whether an accused was exercising free choice in a specific case are bound to arise147 and these 




137 Supra note 125 at para 45. See also Supra note 30 at 315. 
138 Penney, Ibid. 
139 Supra note 125 at para 32 . See also Ibid. 
140 Penney, Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Supra note 125 at para 32. See also Ibid. 
143 Penney, Ibid. 
144 Ibid. at 316. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 It appears that failure to specifically request to speak to counsel would result in losing that right by default. This 
proposition is supported by the Ontario Court of Appeal's ruling in R. v. Anderson (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 225. The 
Court in Anderson, at paragraph 42 held: "I am of the view that, absent proof of circumstances indicating that the 
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Moreover, the fact that the right to counsel is only available upon being positively invoked by an 
accused person also raises important issues. It is submitted that such approach tends to treat this 
right as a privilege. 149 The right to counsel as a constitutional right should be viewed as an 
obligation that the state is forced to honour regardless of whether or not the detained person 
claims it. However to make its exercise conditional upon request would limit the application of 
this right, especially in cases involving the " .. .inexperience, the poor, the frightened" 150, because 
these are the ones who " ... are likely to be the people who will not positively assert the right to 
counsel". 151 Instead of reaching out for a lawyer's support these people may essentially lose 
their right to counsel by their inability to assert it. Hence creating a problem in the criminal 
process in terms of fairness which " ... dictates that an individual be presumed to have claimed his 
right to counsel barring evidence that he has chosen to waive it". 152 
accused did not understand his right to retain counsel when he was informed of it, the onus has to be on him to prove 
that he asked for the right but it was denied or he was denied any opportunity to even ask for it." The Court of 
Appeal in Anderson, at paragraph I4, also held that compliance with right to counsel involves the following 
requirements: 
"1) Upon arrest or detention there is an obligation upon a peace officer to communicate clearly to the 
accused that he has a right to retain and instruct counsel. In many circumstances, a question as to whether the 
accused understands that right ends the officer's obligation. 
"2) A Peace officer has to go further in explaining the right if there is something in the circumstances 
which suggests hat the accused does not understand, such as a state of shock or drunkenness. 
"3) If the accused in any manner chooses to invoke or exercise his right to retain and instruct counsel, the 
peace officer has two obligations: a) to provide the opportunity without delay, and b) to cease any questioning ofthe 
accused until after that opportunity has been provided. 
"4) If the accused or arrested individual exercises the choice of not requesting an opportunity to retain and 
instruct counsel and speaks to the peace officer, the statement obtained is not inconsistent with the Charter" 
Also, the Supreme Court in R. v. Baig, [I987] 2 S.C.R. 537 at paragraph 6, held that: "In the present case, the 
accused did not put forward, nor does the record reveal, any evidence suggesting that he was denied an opportunity 
to ask for counsel. Absent such circumstances as that referred to by Tomopolsky J.A., once the police have 
complied with s.I 0 (b) by advising the accused without delay of his right to counsel, there are no correlative duties 
triggered and cast upon them until the accused, if he so chooses, has indicated his desire to exercise his right to 
counsel". Also seeR. v. Shannon (1987), 82 C.R.R. 207 (N.W.T.C.A.). 
148 See discussion regarding the decision R. v. Sinclair [20 I 0], (Supra note 15) in an earlier part of this chapter. 
149 R. v. Menzies (1986), 24 C.R.R. 144 (Ont. C.A.). 




Another problem associated with the requirement of claiming the right to counsel is that it could 
encourage the practice of police trickery, as was illustrated in the case ofGreffe. 153 In this case 
the defendant was suspected of importing narcotics into the country. Upon his arrival at the 
airport he was sent for routing custom check, however no contraband was found in his 
belongings, promoting the police to strangely resort to the arrest of the defendant for outstanding 
warrants on traffic violations and then proceed against him by subjecting him to a degrading 
body cavity search. "One can only assume that this strange and strained arrest was made to 
thwart the accused's exercise of his s.l 0 (b) rights, in the sense that most individuals arrested for 
traffic violations would not consider consulting with a lawyer, even after being informed of this 
right, due to the trivial nature of the charge."154 
I should also point out that the requirement that a detainee should be given a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise his/her right to counsel is also problematic. As I stated before, upon the 
assertion of right to counsel the police are then obligated to allow the detained or the accused 
person with a reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel without delay. This 
obligation involves both providing access to telephone and adequate time to retain counsel155, 
provided the situation does not call for emergency action. 156 For examples of urgent situations 
we could cite the breathalyzer cases where time is crucial in determining guilt. 157 However the 
ts3 R. v. Greefe [1990] 3 W.W.R. 577, 73 Alta. L.R. (2d) 97 
1s4 Alan Young "Greefe: A Section 8 Triumph?" (1991) C.R. 75 (3d) 293 at 297. 
tss R. v. Barbon (1986), 55 C.R. (3d) 89 (B.C.C.A.) 
1s6 Urgent situations should not be loosely defined, even in the context of drinking and dri~ing cases. For example 
" ... the 2-hour evidentiary presumption available to the crown pursuant to section 258(1)( c)(ii) ofthe Criminal 
Code does not, by itself, constitute such a compelling or urgent circumstance. Urgency is not created by mere 
investigatory and evidentiary expediency; the detainee's section I O(b) right take precedence over the statutory right 
of the crown to rely on an evidentiary presumption". (Libman, Who Really Prospers from Prosper, Supra note 124 
at 44). 
1s7 Therens, Supra note 31. 
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Supreme Court has also added the qualification of"reasonable diligence"158 in order to compel 
an accused person to either invoke his right to call counsel or be denied the use of that right. 159 
Although one could argue that this restriction on the use of s.l 0 (b) right is necessary in the 
context of breathalyzer cases, since after a two-hour period the breathalyzer tests become less 
useful, however there can hardly be any credible rational for inverting the process by shifting the 
obligation from the police160 to the accused person when dealing with cases that do not call for 
emergency measures. Based on this assertion we can be critical of Supreme Court's ruling in 
Smith 161, in which the court placed the onus on the accused to use his right to counsel with 
reasonable diligence. In this case the defendant, a robbery suspect, was arrested late at night. He 
stated his wish to consult with counsel, but only in the morning when his lawyer would not have 
to be disturbed. However four and a half hours after his arrest the police refusing to respect the 
defendant's wish badgered him into giving an incriminating statement. The Supreme Court by 
stating the need for not constraining police investigation treated this case like the breathalyzer 
cases, however the Supreme Court did not in any way attempt to identify the need for emergency 
measures in the factual context of this case. 162 In other words in Smith the Supreme Court dealt 
with the defendant's confession in this case in the same manner that the highest Court in the 
country traditionally deals with alcohol. 163 The problem with this approach, however, is that "A 
confession, if truly characterized by voluntariness, unlike alcohol in the bloodstream, does not 
158 David Tanovich took a more critical approach towards this requirement in his critic of Supreme Court's ruling in 
R. v. Evans, (Supra note 60). See discussion on critique of section 10 (a). 
159 R. v. Tremblay [1987] 2 S.C.R. 435, 60 C.R. (3d) 59. 
160 Supra note 16. 
161 Smith, supra note 11, affirming 29 B.C.L.R. (2d) 180, 43 C. C. C. (3d) 379. 
162 R. v. Ross, [1989] I S.C.R. 3: For example in this case the results of a line-up was excluded because the S.IO (b) 
had been invoked and there was no urgency involved to justify precipitous line-up. 
163 R. v. Black (1987), 70 C.R. (3d) 97, 50 C.C.C. (3d) I (S.C.C.) [NS.] In this case the accused was charged with 1st 
degree murder and he was also denied contact with his lawyer because the contact would have required several 
hours of waiting. The Supreme Court however in this case held that there was a constitutional violation of S.l 0 (b) 
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disappear or dissipate". 164 Based on this fact we should then ask ourselves this question: what is 
the rationale behind the Supreme Court's decision in Smith? Could it be that the Supreme Court 
is attempting to send out a message to the police that," ... notwithstanding the obligation to 
advise detained suspects of their right to counsel, the police may nevertheless attempt to induce 
them to waive their rights. If this is actually the Court's message, then its strong attempts to 
deter the flagrant and willful disregard of constitutional rights in such cases as Manninen, 
Therens, Collins, have been seriously undermined". 165 
Such an approach by the Supreme Court to the use of right to counsel "with reasonable 
diligence" creates a problem for the adequate use of this right, in a sense that if forces the 
defendants to opt for the first available counsel, rather than utilizing the services of the counsel 
of their choice. 
When one examines the issues associated with the exercise of section I O(b), one wonders 
if doing away with custodial interrogations altogether and replacing them, perhaps, with 
something else166 seems like the most reasonable way to rectify the contradictions that are built 
. th f 1· . . . h Ch 167 Into e nature o po Ice Interrogation In t e arter era. 
Given the shortcomings of s. I O(b) that have already been discussed I hold that this 
section is incapable of providing considerable protection to detained suspects in addition to the 
doctrine of voluntariness. Section I O(b) of the Charter leaves much to be desired in the way of 
providing protections to suspects taken into custody for interrogation. With this in mind, we 
164 Cohen, supra note 103 at 153. 
165 Ibid. at 155. 
166 This thesis argues for a revival of a modified pre-trial magisterial examination procedure. 
167 On this point Professor Hogg raises a question to the effect that, would it not be " ... more logical to simply 
prohibit all statements to the police. Such a rule would be honest and straightforward, and would ensure that all 
suspects, whether or not represented by counsel, were treated equally." Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 
3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell Legal Publications, 1992) at 47-13. 
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now turn to an examination of the principles underlying each of the right to silence and the 
confessions rule: the principle against self-incrimination (or privilege against self-incrimination). 
Much of our criminal law is organized around this ancient right. By discussing its ambiguous 
nature, briefly tracing its history and assessing the rationales for its existence, we can familiarize 
ourselves with its fundamental importance in the criminal law and how it is a foundation upon 
which other rights may be built. We will also discuss how it is under attack, and we will see the 
reasons why many would do away with the privilege. 
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Chapter 3: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
Introduction 
It was recognized and clearly articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Singh 
that both the right to silence and the confessions rule are considered in the post-Charter era to be 
particular manifestations of a deeper principle: the privilege against self-incrimination.1 
Therefore, to reach an accurate understanding of each of the right to silence and the confessions 
rule, and in particular to ensure their correct interpretation, it is necessary to first properly 
understand the privilege. An understanding of where and why it originated, what issues it arose 
to address, and how it has been interpreted by courts throughout the history of the common law, 
is required. It is only after understanding the rationale for the privilege that we can begin to have 
an informed discussion of whether contemporary jurisprudence has built a foundation of 
protections through the right to silence and the confessions rule, which can be expected to have 
lasting integrity. 
The principle against self-incrimination merits our consideration at this stage, since this 
doctrine engages the confessions rule and the right to silence. This Chapter begins by examining 
the link between the privilege and human dignity. It will then move onto explore the ambiguous 
nature of the privilege and the controversy surrounding its existence as a principle of the law. 
The opinions of thinkers on both sides of the debate over the continued existence of a privilege 
against self incrimination are canvassed, and support or criticism of their ideas are provided. 
Following this, a recounting of a brief history of the privilege in early modern England, 
and in Canada in the pre-Charter and post-Charter environments is provided. From this 
discussion we can see how the concept grew and took root in England, and was then transported 
1 R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48, [2007] 3. S.C.R. 405 at para. 21. See also Hamish Stewart, "The Confessions Rule and 
the Charter" (2009) 53 McGill L.J. 517 at 519. 
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to Canada by rulings of our judiciary. We then see the concept augmented after the introduction 
of the Charter and in light of the cases that follow. 
We finally turn to the underlying rationales for the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Again, the insights of both pro- and anti- privilege thinkers are explored and the sufficiency of 
explanations for why there must be a privilege (or why it should be eliminated) are examined. 
It is the position of the author that the privilege against self-incrimination must be preserved. 
The discussion of the rationales will shed light on the underlying reasoning for the existence of a 
privilege against self-incrimination and should demonstrate how important it is to the entire 
criminal process that this right, and its manifestations, like the confessions rule, should be 
preserved. 
The discussion in this chapter will help us understand one of the claims of this thesis: 
that the privilege against self-incrimination defines the nature of the relationship between the 
state and the individual in common law states. As a result, the protections built into this 
privilege should be preserved in order to protect the integrity of our criminal justice system. 
The Privilege and Human Dignity 
The principle against self-incrimination is a well-recognized principle of fundamental 
justice under section 7, 2 and is a vehicle for the promotion of human dignity in our constitutional 
order. According to Professor Hamish Stewart, " ... respect for human dignity has been an 
important organizing principle of constitutional law since the Charter came into force. "3 But 
there is no universal consensus as to the exact definition or the extent to which the state is 
required to respect human dignity. 4 
2 Robert Sharpe & Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 3d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) c. 13. 
3 Stewart, supra note 1 at 520; See also Lorraine E. Weinrib, "Human Dignity as a Rights-Protecting Principle" 
(2005) 17 N.J.C.L. 325 at 520. 
4 Stewart, ibid. 
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The Ouimet Report, issued by the Canadian Committee on Corrections, states "[T]he 
privilege against self-incrimination is deeply involved in the feeling of justice or fairness with 
which contemporary Canadian society reacts to our criminal process. "5 The essence of the 
privilege is the notion that when the state prosecutes an individual, it should do its own 
homework and it should not look to the individual for help in its investigation. 6 
The Supreme Court of Canada has called the principle against self-incrimination 7 
"[p]erhaps the single most important organizing principle in criminallaw."8 The principle has 
been linked to many aspects of criminal procedure, and rules of evidence9, including: " ... the 
express protection against self-incrimination in section 13 of the Charter;"10 " ••• the rule against 
the Crown splitting its case;"11 "the common law confessions rule;" 12 "the Charter right to 
silence;"13 " ••• derivative-use immunity under section 7;"14 " ••• and the line between permissible 
and impermissible uses of the state's power to compel the production of information." 15 "This 
constellation of common law and constitutional rules provides powerful protection against the 
state's use of the testimony of suspects and accused persons against their will in the investigation 
and prosecution of criminal offences."16 The privilege against self-incrimination is engaged by 
the common law confessions rule. 17 
5 Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections (Ouimet J. Chairman 1969) at 54. 
6 Stewart, supra note I at 520-521. 
7 Ibid. at 521. 
8 Ibid. See also R. v. P.(MB.}, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555 at 577, 17 O.R. (3d) 782. 
9 Stewart, ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
••s tewart, supra note 1 at 521. See alsoP. (MB.}, supra note 8. 
12 Stewart, ibid 
13 Stewart, ibid; See also R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64. 
14 Stewart, ibid.; See also R. v. S. (R.J.}, [ 1995] 1 S.C.R. 451, 96 C.C.C. (3d) I. 
IS Stewart, ibid.; See also R. v. Jarvis, 2002 sec 73, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 317 A.R. I. 
16 Stewart, ibid. 
17 For an in-depth discussion on the confessions rule, see chapter I. 
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The Ambiguous Nature of the Privilege 
It is not surprising that the strange features of the privilege against self-incrimination 
have generated scholarly debates both in courts and within academic circles. It is fair to say that 
the substance of these debates have centered on the peculiar nature of this privilege. After all, it 
is much easier to appeal to the society's sense of fair-play and to argue that rights such as the 
right to a jury trial, the right to a trial within a reasonable time, the right to counsel, the right 
against unreasonable search or the right against arbitrary detention are necessary requirements 
for a " ... decent civic existence."18 However, to persuasively argue that one should have the right 
not to respond to prima facie credible state allegations, without suffering any prejudice, is indeed 
very challenging. 19 This supposition is based on the fact that there is a qualitative difference 
between the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination and the other fundamental rights 
that are available to criminal suspects. There is a "natural quality"20 about other fundamental 
rights21 that one can immediately relate to; the same cannot be said about the privilege against 
self-incrimination. 22 This privilege is a different animal and the unusual nature of this right is 
such that it requires special effort to understand it. 
As stated by Amar and Lettow, addressing the privilege in the American context: 
Small wonder ... that the self-incrimination clause - virtually alone among the provisions of the 
bill of rights - has been the target of repeated analytic assault over the course of the twentieth 
century from thoughtful commentators urging constitutional amendment to narrow it or repeal it 
altogether. 23 
Since the inception of the privilege against self-incrimination the proponents of crime-
control values and the supporters of the due-process camp have been engaged in an intense fight 





23 Akhil Reed Amar & Renee Lettow, "Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination clause" (I 995) 93 
Mich. L. Rev. 857 at 895. 
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over its moral and intellectual justification. The battle lines in this debate appear to be drawn 
according to the political orientations of individual scholars. The privilege is constantly under 
attack by conservative commentators, and therefore we need to review the main arguments both 
for and against its continued operation. 
The controversy about the intellectual justifications of the privilege24 against self-
incrimination seems to revolve around its very conceptual foundation. Does the privilege 
represent a "complex of values"25 which defines the nature of the relationship between the state 
and the individual in a liberal democracy?26 Or is the privilege instead a misguided and a 
misunderstood principle that has outlived its historical usefulness?27 
The review of the historical role of the privilege reveals that at some point it " ... became a 
rallying cry in the history of the protection of human liberty, an established feature of the Anglo-
American law, and a point of departure for developing legal systems"28• It also became a 
symbolic tool in the hands of the free-thinking individuals for standing up to religious and 
political tyranny, and as a symbol, this privilege continues to represent " ... our best aspirations 
and our deepest sense of justice."29 Hence, the history of the privilege against self-incrimination 
may justify the claim that, this privilege represents " ... man's struggle to make himself 
civilized"30 or that it "reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations."31 It 
might also be added that these values prevent us from making " ... even the most hardened 
24 John Wigmore, "Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere" (1891-92) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 71 at 71. 
25 C.T. McGormick, "Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions" (1946) 24 Tex. L. 
Rev. 239 at 277. 
26 Steven Penney, "Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View" (1997 -1998) 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 309. 
27 Ibid. 
28 R. H. Helmho1z, "Introduction" in R.H. Helmholz et al., eds., The Privilege against Self-Incrimination: Its Origins 
and Development (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997) at I. 
29 E.N. Griswold, The 51h Amendment Today (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1955) at 53. 
30 This quotation came from Justice Goldberg in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 522 (1964), Infra 
note 31. (Quoting Griswold, ibid at 7). The actual quotation refers to the privilege against self-incrimination as " 
one ofthe great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized" 
31 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 522 (1964). 
-132-
criminal to sign his own death warrant, or dig his own grave, or pull the lever that springs the 
trap on which he stands. "32 
The operation of this privilege in the modem context also helps define the scope of the 
relationship between the state and the individual in common law states, at least in the criminal 
law setting. The nature of this privilege has a built in military logic33 of "non-cooperation"34 with 
your captors.35 The suspected criminals who are caught in the clutches of the state can take 
comfort in the fact that they do not need to assist their "enemy". They can, instead take the 
following position that; all you'll get from me is my "name, rank and serial number"36 and no 
more.
37 This logic of warfare has been articulated by Justice Fortas in the following passage: 
[The Englishman] himself was a sovereign. He had the sovereign right to refuse to 
cooperate; to meet the state on terms as equal as their respective strength would permit ... 
. . . Equals, meeting in battle, owe no [duty to furnish ammunition to the other side], 
regardless of the obligations that they may be under prior to battle .... [The government] has 
no right to compel the sovereign individual to surrender or impair his right of self-
defense. "38 
However this privilege has sustained intense attacks by many important critics. It seems 
that as long as the privilege against self-incrimination remained a noble idea, but with no 
practical use, it did not attract too much intellectual opposition. But when it finally became an 
effective part of the common law, critics from all quarters rushed to launch fierce attacks on its 
perceived evils. The opponents of the privilege are often inspired by the classic statement of 
Jeremy Bentham: 
If all criminals of every class had assembled and framed a system after their own wishes, is not 
this rule the very first they would have established for their security? Innocence never takes 
advantage of it. Innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence.39 
32 Supra note 29 at 7. 
33 Supra note 18 at 97. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. The law requires that the detainee give his name, his date of birth and his address. 
37 Ibid. 
38 A. Fortas, "The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum" (1954) 25 Clev. B.A.J. 91. at 98-99. 
39 A.D.E. Lewis, "Bentham and the Right to Silence" (1988) 12 Bentham Newsletter 37 at 37. 
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Detractors of the privilege invariably rely on Bentham's attack. It was in the early stages 
of the 19th century that Bentham, an intellectual giant of his milieu, established himself as the 
most respected opponent of the privilege. His status as a major philosopher continues to lend 
instant credibility to arguments advanced by the trenchant critics of the privilege. 
Post-Benthamite Criticism of the Privilege 
Since Bentham's scathing criticism of the privilege, the opposition to this principle has 
continued to grow. For example, Justice Benjamin Cardozo stated that: "Justice ... would not 
perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry."40 
The state of constant attack on the privilege has been summarized by the skeptical view 
of Dripps in the following fashion: 
The Privilege against self-incrimination stands in need of convincing justification. To be 
sure, there is no shortage of eloquent testimonials to the hallowed place of the right to remain 
silent in the pantheon of Anglo-American liberties. But defenders of the privilege have yet to 
substantiate the misty rhetoric that cloaks the privilege in a haze of verbal words.',41 
Stephen Schulhofer takes the attack on the privilege to the next level by suggesting that 
the privilege has been so utterly discredited, that no one is left to defend it. He states that, "it is 
hard to find anyone these days who is willing to justify and defend the privilege against self-
incrimination. ,,42 
Despite the relentless attacks on the privilege by thoughtful commentators, I intend to 
pierce the "misty rhetoric that cloaks the privilege", by explaining the important role that the 
privilege plays in the criminal justice system. I wish to defend the privilege and argue that it is 
an indispensable part of our criminal justice system. The privilege fits in perfectly with the inner 
40 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (I 937). 
41 Donald A. Dripps, "Self-Incrimination and Self-preservation: A skeptical view" (1991) 2 Univ. Ill. L. Rev. 329 at 
329. 
42 S. J. Schulhofer, "Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (1991) 26 Valparaiso L. Rev. 
311 at311. 
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"logic"43 of the criminal justice system44 and it should indeed be protected. It is directly tied to 
the presumption of innocence and the burden on the state45 to prove " ... guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt."46 This position is predicated on the assumption that we must take these two closely 
related principles seriously,47 and, as a result, we are justified to argue that an individual should 
be allowed to sit back and through his silence, challenge the state to prove his guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt.48 However, if we go to the extent of arguing that the silence of an accused 
person should be interpreted as a sign of guilt, then we cannot legitimately claim that the 
innocence of an accused person is presumed. 49 
Hence, any attempt to narrow the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination or to 
repeal it all together would do violence to other defining and cherished features of our criminal 
justice system, which includes both the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof being 
placed on the state. John McNaughton offers a useful example to illustrate this point: 
One does not, when he performs the surgery on the part of the body, do it without regard for the 
impact on other parts of the body. The same is true of surgery on an institution integral to the 
legal organism. 50 
The Privilege as an abstract Idea 
The privilege against self-incrimination was first conceived as an abstract idea - a 
remarkable idea, which has played an important role in the development of our criminal justice 
system. The Latin phrase Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum consists of merely a few words, but 







so J. McNaughton, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation, Raison d'Etre and 
Miscillaneous Implications" (1960) 51 J. Crim. L. & Criminology & Police Sci. 138 at 153. 
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these simple words have made immense contributions to the " ... long course of events through 
which we have sought to make ourselves civilized. "51 
The "long course of events" represents a torturous historical 52 journey, through which the 
privilege has managed to grow into its existing form, and prosper. 53 The privilege possesses the 
power of fairness and because of this power it has been able to show a remarkable resilience. In 
the face of every challenge to its continued application the privilege has survived, and it has 
resumed its march forward, transformed by the experience so as to be a more effective shield, 
mitigating the power of the state over individual. 
The privilege does not eliminate the awesome advantage of the state, however. Rather, it 
makes the contest between the two actors a more balanced one. It should never be forgotten that 
the main contours of the privilege against self-incrimination emerged through centuries of tragic 
clashes between religious authorities and free-thinking individuals in courtroom settings. The 
heroic sacrifices of these individuals should be honored by protecting this privilege from 
politically motivated attacks. 54 The privilege has managed to withstand the acid test of intense 
opposition for many years and it has become the connecting link between the admirable defiance 
of the innocent martyrs of the criminal justice system and the liberties we enjoy in free, 
democratic societies. 
51 Supra note 29 at 32. 
52 Supra note. 
53 Please see supra note 5. 
The kind sentiments expressed by the Ouimet Committee about the privilege should be contrasted with another 
Canadian reaction shown by Mr. Justice Haines ofthe Supreme Court of Ontario in 1970: 
I submit that the greatest obstacle to efficient criminal law enforcement in Anglo-American Jurisdictions is 
the right of the accused to remain silent. It is a luxury society can no longer afford. It contributes to the high 
success ratio of crime. It frustrates the police, comforts criminals, and encourages disrespect for the law. 
And with great deference to the legal profession, the abolition of the right to remain silent is necessary to 
save an honourable profession from its own dishonour. (Edson Haines, Studies in Canadian Criminal 
Evidence, R. Salhany and R. Carter ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972), at 322). 
54 R.S. Gerstein, "The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court" ( 1979-1980) 27 
UCLA L. Rev. 343 at 346. 
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It is suggested that the privilege is one of the defining features of the relationship 
between the individual and the state in common law countries that trace their legal systems to the 
Anglo-American tradition. The critics however maintain that this privilege rests on shaky 
conceptual foundation, and whereas historically it may have served a useful function, in modem 
times " ... It has out lived the context that gave it meaning"55 
It appears that the justifications for the privilege are intertwined with its colourful history. 
The ultimate point of reference and justification for its existence seems to always come back to 
its historical development. The critics of the privilege maintain that the privilege, in its existing 
form, no longer serves its historical purpose and it should therefore be limited or abolished 
altogether. The supporters of the privilege, however, use the history of the privilege as a source 
of pride and one of the justifications for its continued operation. 
There can rarely be an adequate understanding of an idea or invention without first 
having some understanding of the human necessity it was devised to address. This requires an 
engagement with history. Given the ongoing controversy about the relevance of the privilege, 
we need to conduct a limited review of its historical origin and development, before we can 
examine the rationales for its existence. Therefore, I will examine the genesis of the privilege. 
History of the Privilege Against Self Incrimination 
Origins Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
England is the origin of our political institutions. In fact, the common law is still the 
origin of most of Canadian criminal law in spite of the Criminal Code. Although the current law 
in Canada relating to the privilege against self-incrimination is rooted in English common law, 
the privilege against self-incrimination has taken on a far different character today than what was 
55 Supra note 25. 
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defined by Lord Goddard in 1942, in the case of Blunt v. Park Lane Hotel. 56 According to 
Goddard, the privilege against self-incrimination lays down "that no one is bound to answer any 
question if the answer thereto would, in the opinion of the judge, have a tendency to expose the 
deponent to any criminal charge, penalty, or forfeiture which the judge regards as reasonably 
likely to be preferred or sued for."57 
According to Chief Justice Warren of the United States Supreme Court, "we sometimes 
forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege against self-incrimination, the sources from , 
which it came and the fervor with which it was defended. Its roots go back into ancient times. "58 
The maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, which means "no one should be required to 
accuse himself,"59 was first recognized in England in the ecclesiastical courts. 60 "The 
"accusation" and a form of "trial" appear together as the first model of criminal procedure in 
England to replace vengeance as a means of dealing with crimes. "61 
The accusation involved a specific charge publicly declared by the offending party to the 
alleged offender. 62 It was a firmly established principle in the early history of English criminal 
law that a public accusation of a specific wrong was necessary before any person could be found 
guilty of an offence. 63 This was the only way in which the criminal process could be set in 
motion.64 Following the accusation, there was a two stage process.65 "The first stage involved a 
56 Blunt v Park Lane Hotel, [1942] 2 K.B. 253 (C.A.) at 257. 
57 G. Mazabow, "The Origin OfThe Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Jewish Law" (1987) 104 S. African L.J. 
680 at 710. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Supra note 29 at 2. 
60 E.M. Morgan, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (1949) 34 Minn L.R. 1 at 2-8. 
61 Ed Ratushny, Self Incrimination in the Canadian Criminal Process (Toronto: Carswell Company Limited, 1979) 
at 159. 
62 Ibid. at 159-160. 
63 Supra note 60 at 9. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Supra note 61 at 160. 
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consideration of the character of the accused"66 and the second stage consisted of an assessment 
of the accused's guilt or innocence. 67 Whether or not the accused proceeded to the second stage 
of the process depended on the outcome of the first stage. 68 
At the first stage, the good character of the accused was established by a number of oath 
helpers summoned by the accused69 to swear to it under oath. 70 If it was determined that the 
accused was of good character, meaning that " ... the accused was considered trustworthy and free 
of previous accusations,"71 he could then prove his innocence by swearing to it under oath and/or 
through others who would also swear under oath to the belief in the accused's innocence. 72 This 
was known as "the defence of compurgation. "73 Simply put, if the accused could establish that 
he was of good character, he could clear himself of all charges by a swearing an oath that he is of 
good character.74 Failing that, he would be ordered to stand trial .75 
The Defence of compurgation was eventually abolished, primarily because it was an 
unsatisfactory method of proof and resulted in too simple and certain a method of an acquittal. 76 




69 Sanjeev Anand, "The Origins, Early History and Evolution of the English Criminal Trial Jury" (2005-2006) 43 
Alm.L.Rev.407.atp.409 
70 Supra note 61 at 160. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Supra note 69 and Ibid. There appears to be a slight disagreement between Ratushny and Anand about the 
procedure that governed the defence of compurgation. Ratushny describes the first smge of the procedure in the 
following manner" 
"At the frrst smge, the character of the accused was established by persons swearing to it on oath."-
Ratushny p. 160 
Whereas Anand smtes that the first stage required ''the accused to swear an oath that he did not commit the offence 
charged." Anand p. 409 According to Anand, the swearing of the others only occurred in the second stage: 
"Second, he was required to produce a certain number of oath-helpers or compurgators to back his denial 
by their oaths" - (Anand p. 409) 
73 Anand, ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Supra note 61 at 160. 
76 Supra note 69 at 410. 
77 Ibid. at 411. 
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primarily left in the discretion of the justices. 78 Upon the abolition of ordeals we see jury trials 
being put in place, which resulted from a search for viable methods of proving an accused's 
guilt. This led the way for the establishment of the adversarial process. 79 
The Ecclesiastical Courts: Inquisitorial Procedure 
Ecclesiastical tribunals differ substantially from those of the adversarial system. 80 One of 
the most significant features of the ecclesiastical courts was the inquisitorial system.81 In the 
inquisitorial procedure, the judges were responsible for leading the investigation. 82 The judges 
also had the power to administer an oath ex officio and compel any person to testify.83 An 
accusation could be made to a judge, even privately and if satisfied that an inquisition was 
required, a judge could grant it.84 Similar to our adversarial process today, even post-
Stinchcombe, 85 judges were to disclose to the accused person86 the '"'articles" containing the 
charge against him. "87 
In the early 1300's, the church was becoming preoccupied in dealing with the problem of 
heresy and received the support of the state in their fervent mission of punishing all actions that 
were considered contrary to Catholic teaching. 88 In 1401, the Statute de Haeretico Comburendo 
was enacted by Parliament under King Henry IV of England89 which granted ''the ecclesiastical 
78 Ibid. at 415. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Supra note 60 at 2-11. 
81 Supra note 61 at 161. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. at 162. 
85 R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. 





courts the authority to burn heretics at the stake. "90 This law was one of the strictest religious 
censorship statutes ever enacted in England.91 
"As the inquisition gained momentum"92 and the impetus for punishing heretical belief 
grew substantially, the initiating process of the accusation, sufficient to notify the accused of the 
specific charges against him, began to disappear.93 Many trials became nothing more than 
" ... secret examinations of the accused under oath"94 where he was confronted with an array of 
" ... surmises and rumors and hearsay against him."95 The inquisitors often demanded the accused 
person's confession.96 The charges were largely fabricated " ... from testimony of secret 
informers, malicious gossipers, self-confessed victims and frightened witnesses"97 who would 
dream up imaginative accounts of whatever they believed the inquisitors wanted to hear.98 
There were many ways of committing the " ... vague offence"99 of heresy, yet those 
accused of committing such an offence were not given the specific details of the offence for 
which to answer the charges. 100 
Morgan has stated that the problematic nature of this new inquisitorial procedure was that 
the accused " ... person who had not been charged by a formal presentment or accusation answer 
under oath all questions put to him by the proper ecclesiastical official."101 There were 
essentially no limits placed on judges under this process which afforded them arbitrary power. 102 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. at 162 -164 
92 Ibid. at 162. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment: The Right Against Self-Incrimination (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968) at 28; also supra note 61 at 162. 
95 Levy, ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid also see supra note 61 at 162. 
99 Ratushny, ibid at163. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Supra note 60 at 1. See also ibid. 
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This arbitrary power was used as an instrumental " ... weapon for religious and political 
suppression." 103 
According to Levy, John Lambert's case in 1532 represents the first recorded case of" ... a 
person charged with heresy objecting to the oath procedure."104 At his trial, Lambert made the 
following statement: 
[T]o make true relation of all that they shall demand him, he not knowing what they will demand, 
neither whether it will be lawful to show them the truth of their demands, or no: for such things, 
there be that are not lawful to be showed ... Yea, moreover, if such judges sometimes, not 
knowing by any due proof that such as have to do before them are culpable, will enforce them, by 
an oath, to detect themselves, in opening before them their hearts; in this so doing, I cannot see 
that men need to condescend to their requests. For it is in the Iaw ... So that, to conclude, I think it 
is lawful, at commandment of a judge, to make an oath to say the truth, especially if the judge 
requireth an oath duly, an in lawful wise ... and that also for purgation of infamy, when an infamy 
is lawfully laid against him.105 
Lambert did not object to being compelled to testify. 106 His issue was that he should only be 
forced to testify if there was already a proper accusation before being compelled to testify. 107 If 
the accusation did not disclose a specific offence, then it would not be lawful to require a person 
to answer. 108 As Ratushny states: 
[J]udges were not entitled to go on a "fishing expedition" for the purpose of uncovering an 
appropriate accusation. There had to be some proper evidence of guilt before a citizen could be 
called to account. He could not be reguired to provide the accusation against himself.109 
The very first rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination is nowhere near as 
wide-sweeping as it is today. The privilege against self-incrimination was not used as a means 
of protecting an accused's right per se, but was meant to prevent fishing expeditions by the 
inquisitors from arbitrarily inquiring into potential offences by forcing accused persons to answer 
all questions put to them in an attempt that they may discover an offence out of the accused's 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
10s Supra note 94 at 4. See also supra note 61 at 163. 
106 Ratushny, ibid. 




own testimony. 110 This rationale still holds true today, however, the reasons for the privilege 
extend far beyond this limited principle. 
At these early stages, lawyer Christopher Saint-German publicly voiced his objection to 
the procedure in which an accused person could stand trial in the absence of a proper 
accusation. 111 He was also in opposition to the fact that an informer could remain anonymous, 112 
since there were many cases in which informers initially planted " ... the suspicion of heresy with 
the judge."113 
Significant changes occurred in 1533 as a result of great public opposition to the 
compelled oath. 114 A new law was passed which provided that the interrogation for heresy must 
be conducted in open court and after the accusation of at least two lawful witnesses. 115 This 
same " ... statute also repealed the Statute de Haeretico Comburendo." 116 The strict laws against 
Heresy in England also began to soften. 117 
In 1554, Mary became Queen and reinstated the harsh laws against heresy that existed 
prior to 1533;118 however, this legacy was short-lived as Queen Elizabeth took the throne in 
1558, passing the Act ofSupremacy119 which repealed Queen Mary's legislation.120 This act also 
transferred the control of the inquisition from the ecclesiastical authorities to the state. 121 
110 Supra note 60 at 1 0-11. 
111 Supra note 61 at 164. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. See also M. Maquire, "Attack on the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio as administered in 
Ecclesiastical Courts in England" in Essays in History and Political Theory in Honour of Charles Howard Mcilwain 
(Cambridge: Russell & Russell, 1964) 199. 
114 Ratushny, ibid 
115 Ibid. at 164-165. 
116 Ibid. at 165. 
117 Statute de Haeretico Comburendo 25 Hen.8, c. 14. Ibid. 
118 Ratushny, ibid. 
119 Act of Supremacy 1 Eliz., c. 1. 
120 Supra note 61 at 165. 
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In 1559, Queen Elizabeth established what is known as the Court of High Commission 
which was composed of clerical and lay members. 122 Just like the ecclesiastical courts, the Court 
of High Commission also had wide powers and was also authorized to administer the oath ex 
officio.123 Again, strong objections to this procedure were raised; 124 however, Queen Elizabeth 
was able to resist all calls for parliamentary reform. 125 
The Common Law Courts and the Star Chamber 
The Star Chamber was an English court of law that sat at the royal Palace of 
Westminster126 until 1641.127 It was made up of Privy Counsellors, as well as common-law 
judges and supplemented the activities of the common-law and equity courts in both civil and 
criminal matters. 128 The court was set up to ensure the fair enforcement of laws against 
prominent people, those so powerful that ordinary courts could never convict them of their 
crimes. 129 Court sessions were held in secret, with no indictments, no right of appeal, no juries, 
and no witnesses. 130 Evidence was presented in writing. 131 Over time it evolved into a political 
weapon, a symbol of the misuse and abuse of power by the English monarchy and courts. 132 The 
Star Chamber was abolished in 1641. 133 
122 Ibid. 
123 Frederick G. Lee, The Church Under Queen Elizabeth An Historical Sketch Part One (Waterloo Place: Kessinger 
Publishing, 1880). See also ibid. 
124 Ratushny, ibid. 
125 Ratushny, ibid. at 166. 
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Publishing Company Limited, 1997) at 29. 
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As in the trial of John Lambert, John Lilburn also objected to the practice of being 
compelled to answer questions. 134 In 1637, Lilburn was arrested for shipping seditious books 
into England. 135 The Star Chamber Court heard his case. 136 In this case, Lilburn refused to take 
the "Star Chamber Oath,"137 which was an oath administered by the Star Chamber Court which 
bound all accused persons to answer all questions put to them on any subject. 138 The questions 
did not even have to pertain to the charges themselves and there were no checks and balances in 
place to prevent the Court from asking unnecessary and arbitrary questions. Lilburn refused to 
swear the oath because he did not receive a proper accusation. 139 He was not presented with 
specific charges to which to answer. 140 
134 Supra note 60 at 16. Lilburn was put on trial for the second time on the charges of treason in 1641 (Supra note 
60 at 1 0). At the second trial, Lilburn said: 
''then sir, thus, by the laws of England, I am not to answer to questions against or concerning myself." 
Lord Keble replied: 
"you shall not be compelled" - (Supra note 60 at 1 0). 
135 Lawrence Herman, "The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination 
and the Involuntary Confessions Rule (Part I)" ( 1992) 53 Ohio St. L.J. I 0 I at 135. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Supra note 130 at 823. 
138 Supra note 60 at 4. 
139 Supra note 130 at 823. 
140 The Trial of John Lilburne And John Wharton, for Printing and Publishing Seditious Books (1637), 3 How. State 
Tr. 1316 at 1318, 1320 and 1332. See also Supra note 61 at 171. 
Lilburne's objection was as follows: 
I am not willing to answer you to any more of these questions because I see you go about by this 
Examination to ensnare me: for seeing the things for which I am imprisoned cannot be proved against me 
you will get other matter out of my examination. 
[T]hey went about to make me betray my own innocence, that so they might ground the bill upon my own 
words ... 
... [I]fl had been proceeded against by a Bill, I would have answered ... 
Ratushny states that: 
It is absolutely c1ear that Lilburn had no objection, whatsoever simply to being compelled to testify. His 
objection was to being subjected to an interrogation in the absence of a specific bill of presentment. He 
specifically states that if he had been presented with a proper accusation, he "would have answered." 
(Supra note 61 at 171 ). 
Lilbume also stated in his defence at trial: 
A.J 145 A.J 
There was no repugnance to the proposition that one was forced to testify in their own 
defence. 141 "The repugnance was found in the procedure whereby a person could be called 
before judges without any specific allegation of wrongdoing on his part and subjected to a broad 
range of questions."142 
Throughout the inquisitorial process and common law courts, there was never any 
objection to the idea of an accused being compelled to testify at trial, rather, the primary 
objection to the inquisitorial procedure was the absence of a specific charge to which the accused 
could give an answer. 143 
What exacerbated the public's abhorrence to the inquisitorial procedure was the fact that 
those who refused to be sworn were subject to very stiff penalties. 144 Lilburn was held in prison 
for contempt of court because he refused to take the oath; however, this punishment only seemed 
to make him a martyr. 145 "In 1641, after Parliament had gained supremacy,"146 it abolished the 
Star Chamber and the ecclesiastical courts147 and from this point forward, no accused person was 
Sir, I know you are not able to prove, and to make that good which you have said. I have testimony of it, 
said he. Then, said I, produce them in the face of the open court, that we may see what they have to accuse 
me of; and I am ready here to answer for myself, and to make my just defense.-With this he was silent; and 
said not one more word to me. (Supra note 130 at 823). 
Riebli states that Lilburn's objection can easily be misunderstood as an objection to giving oral testimony; however, 
this is not the case. According to Riebli, Lilburn's objection was clearly not to speaking in his own defence, but 
rather to defending himself prematurely: 
[I]t was a refusal by Lilburn to assume the burden of defence without frrst being properly accused. The 
accusation was the critical first step in any case, and a proper accusation functioned to shift the burden of 
the defendant to exonerate himself of the offences charged. By refusing to take the oath, Lilburn was 
refusing to permit the Star Chamber to proceed as it that burden had shifted to him when in fact it had not. 
(Supra note 130 at 823). 
141 Supra note 30 at 822; See also supra note 61 at 172. 
142 Ratushny, ibid.; See also Rieb/i, ibid. 
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to be put to answer questions unless a specific accusation was made according to the "old law of 
the land."148 
" .. .In the second half of the I ih century, the rule came to be established,"149 by way of 
judicial decisions, 150 " ••• that a person could not be compelled to be a witness in his trial even 
where a proper accusation was present."151 In the common law courts, an accused was not 
competent as a witness in England until 1898,152 so the protection against being compelled to 
testify had little practical consequence to an accused person at this time, since the accused could 
not even testify if he wanted to. 153 
Hostility towards compelling the accused to say something in relation to his charges is a 
relatively modem concept.154 A defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the presumption of 
innocence until the 19th Century. 155 It was not until the ideas of the presumption of innocence 
and burden of proof developed, 156 " ••• and the number of lawyers increased did the idea of silence 
in the face of accusation evolve."157 
During the inquisitorial process, if a proper accusation was in place against an accused 
person, then the burden of proof was on the accused to establish his innocence. 158 " ••• A proper 
accusation was in itself considered to be proof of guilt"159 and the onus was on the defendant to 
convince the Court that he was innocent. 160 Thus, in the presence of a proper accusation and in 
148 Supra note 61 at 171. 
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the absence of evidence to the contrary, an accused's conviction was certain. 161 For this very 
reason, " ... the accused naturally spoke in his own defence." 162 Simply put, an accused person 
had no choice. 
When the criminal defence bar began to take an active role in the trial process in the 19th 
century, certain strategic imperatives became apparent within a few decades and, consequently, a 
clear logic of adversarial system began to develop. 163 One of the most important imperatives 
from amongst these was the value to be gained by electing as a matter of general practice to 
silence the criminal defendant unless and until such time as there was something to be gained by 
having him speak. 164 Defence lawyers managed to take over the task of defending individual 
accused persons. By assuming a speaking role on their client's behalf, and by advocating 
" ... within the structure of the adversary criminal trial, counsel largely suppressed the defendant's 
testimonial role."165 With a trained advocate, the accused was simply no longer compelled by 
circumstances to speak. 
In putting their strategy into practice, the defence lawyers opportunistically seized upon 
the Latin maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum prodere to get around the requirement that the client 
answer in his own defence.166 
After defence counsel began to enter the courtroom in significant numbers, the expectation 
that an accused person would speak in his own defence in response to any pressure to do so 
emanating from the bench appears, within the span of a few decades, to have vanished. 167 With 
respect to exactly how the transition occurred from the "accused speaks" model to the new 
161 Ibid. 
162Ibid. 
163 John H. Langbein, "The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law" (1994) 
92 Mich. L. Rev. 1047 at 1071. 
164 Ibid. 
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167 Robert P. Burns, "The Rule of Law in the Trial Court" (2006-2007) 56 DePaul L. Rev. 307 at 324-325. 
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theory of the trial, where the case of the prosecution is tested168 (thereby opening the door to the 
elaboration of the privilege by counsels' vigorous advocacy), scholars on of this subject have not 
discovered the exact steps. Nevertheless, a basic sketch is available. 169 
In the milieu of 19th century London, prosecutions would sometimes rely upon the use of 
"reward seekers"170 or "Crown witnesses," 171 who the authorities would employ " ... to 
compensate for the English reluctance to institute professional policing."172 In response to the 
Crown's reliance upon these persons of questionable integrity 173 in pursuit of the proof of its 
cases, the focus of defence counsel began to shift toward " ... casting doubt on the validity of the 
factual case being presented against the defendant, so that the prosecution came increasingly 
under the necessity of proving its assertions." 174 Certain procedural changes, and in some cases, 
procedural burdens incumbent upon either the Crown or the defence began to evolve. 175 
These changes were as follows: First, "party production burdens"176 began "to be 
articulated,"177 where the prosecution would present its entire case, and then the defence would 
respond to every piece of evidence by the prosecution, 178 and that, subject to a "directed 
verdict,"179 the defence would reserve its right to present rebuttal evidence180 only at the end of 
the prosecution's case. 181 "Second, towards the end of the eighteenth century, the presumption 
168 Supra note 163 at 1048. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. at 1069. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid.; see also J.M. Beattie, The First English Detectives: The Bow Street Runners and the Policing of London 
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of innocence"182 was crystalized.183 This factor, "coupled with the prosecutor's production 
burden,"184 " ••• motivated defense counsel to silence the defendant and hence to insist that the 
prosecution case be built from other proofs."185 "Third, the law of criminal evidence formed in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,"186 and the development of the concept of 
admissibility led defence counsel to object to the admission of some types of evidence, and to 
narrow the scope of the case their clients would have to respond to, by their conduct of cross-
examination of witnesses. 187 Fourth, the increasing involvement of defence counsel inspired 
more frequent use of counsel on behalf of the prosecution. 188 "Private associations for the 
prosecution of felons formed in great numbers from the 1770s and 1780s."189 The main purpose 
of these associations was to "defray the victim's costs of investigation and prosecution in certain 
classes of property offenses."190 It has been suggested that these organizations came into 
existence in response to the increased advocacy by defence counsel and the development of the 
''testing the prosecution"191 theory of the trial. 192 "Fifth, the judge declined in importance as 
counsel for the prosecution and defence each took over the job of examining and cross-
examining witnesses."193 A French observer noted in 1820194 that "the judge ... remains almost 
a stranger to what is going on, contenting himself to take notes and summarize them for the jury 
182Ibid. 
183 Barbara J. Shapiro, "Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause: Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-
American Law ofEvidence I-4I (I99I). 
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at the end of the trial." 195 "Finally, changes in the practice of jury control in this period, 
highlighted by Fox's Libel Act of 1792, reflect the decline of judicial influence over the trial 
jury."l96 
Each of these factors are symptoms, that when considered together, indicate a more 
fundamental shift that occurred in 19th century criminal procedure: that is, the abandonment of 
the "accused speaks" theory of the criminal trial in favour of the "testing of the prosecution" 
model. 197 It was not until the defence's role had switched from accommodating a trial model 
where the accused was asked to explain himself, to one where his counsel was permitted to raise 
and potentially exploit weaknesses in the case of the prosecution, that the use of the right to 
silence went from being merely notional to being a legal tool of practical use during 
proceedings. 198 Once the philosophy of the role of the defence had changed, committed 
advocates were empowered to effectuate enormous and far-reaching procedural changes, 
including the encouraging of the privilege against self-incrimination. 199 
The privilege against self-incrimination is premised on the fact that evidence collected by the 
state through its own investigation is inherently more reliable than evidence arising out of an 
accused's own admissions. As Fred E. Inbau puts it: 
I 
I 
The privilege against self-incrimination exists mainly in order to stimulate the police and prosecution into • 
a search for the most dependable evidence procurable by their own efforts. Otherwise there probably 
would be an incentive to rely solely upon the less dependable admissions that might be obtained during 
the course of a compulsory interrogation. 200 
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Having discussed the development of the privilege and the way it became a fundamental 
component of the trial process in England we may now tum our attention to the expansion of the 
privilege on Canadian soil, where it grew from a protection that was applicable in formal 
proceedings to encompass a right to silence available to accused persons at the investigative 
stage of the criminal process. 
The Law of Self-Incrimination: The Pre-Charter Era 
The privilege against self-incrimination has undergone some dramatic changes since the 
patriation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. David M. Paciocco identifies three 
key differences that are incumbent in the law of self-incrimination which did not exist prior to 
the Charter. First, it only applied only to the option of taking the stand by the accused;201 
secondly, its protective mandate was restricted to the evidence provided by witnesses on the 
stand;202 and thirdly, no exclusionary remedy existed when a suspect had wrongfully been forced 
to self-incriminate. 203 
1. Formal Proceedings 
On March 28, 1980 Chief Justice Lamer was appointed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 204 During this time, the privilege against self-incrimination was limited to the accused 
not having to take the stand which meant that the extent of the privilege simply entitled the 
accused the choice as to whether or not to testify at his or her own trial. 205 
201 David M. Paciocco, "Self-Incrimination And The Case To Meet: The Legacy Of Chief Justice Lamer" (2000) 5 
Can. Crim. L. Rev. 63. (W.L.) at 1-2. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. at 1. 
205 Ibid. at 2-3; see also R. v. Marcoux, [1976] I S.C.R. 763. 
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Shortly after his appointment, Justice Lamer was presented with an opportunity to 
reshape the law of self-incrimination in R. v. Rothman?06 Rothman afforded Lamer his first 
opportunity to have an impact on the law of self-incrimination.207 Lamer J stated that:208 
In Canada the right of a suspect not to say anything to the police is not the result of a right of no 
self crimination but is merely the exercise by him of the general right enjoyed in this country by 
anyone to do whatever one pleases, saying what one pleases or choosing not to say certain things, 
unless obliged to do otherwise by law. It is because no law says that a suspect, save in certain 
circumstances, must say anything to the police that we say that he has the right to remain silent: 
which is the positive way of explaining that there is on his part no legal obligation to do 
otherwise. His right to silence rests on the same principle as his right to free speech, but not on a 
right to no self-crimination.209 
Essentially, there was no protection against self-incrimination outside of formal proceedings.210 
Although it may appear so superficially, the right to remain silent, and the privilege against self-
incrimination were not synonymous.211 As Lamer J had stated above, the law does not grant 
individuals a positive right to remain silent.212 Because there is no positive obligation, save in 
certain circumstances, for a suspect to say anything to the police, a person has a de facto right to 
remain silent.213 
2. Testimonial Information 
Although the law provided protection against self-incrimination in "formal 
proceedings,"214 this protection was limited exclusively to testimony?15 Prior to Rothman, the 
Supreme Court had addressed the limits of the pre-Charter protection against self-incrimination 
206 Paciocco, ibid. at 2. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 R. v. Rothman, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 at para. 96; See also Ibid. 
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in R. v. Marcoux.216 The Court had summed up the law regarding the limits on the privilege of 
self-incrimination,217 and that this doctrine is " ... concerned with testimonial compulsion 
specifically and not with compulsion generally."218 
Prior to the Charter, the privilege against self-incrimination was strictly limited to 
evidence provided by " ... witnesses while testifying"219 and had no applicability to other types of 
"self-conscripting evidence."22° For example, Paciocco notes that this privilege " ... did not apply 
to breath samples,"221 " ... blood samples"222 and " ... compelled participation in police line-ups."223 
3. Unfair Self-Incrimination 
The pre-Charter law pertaining to self-incrimination did not deal with unfair 
investigative practices224 which resulted in accused persons taking part (involuntarily) in 
investigations against themselves.225 Although involuntary statements were still subject to 
exclusionary remedy, the predominant notion at the time was that involuntary confessions and 
self-incrimination were two separate and distinct concepts. 226 
In R. v. Wray, 227 the suspect was accused of murdering a service station attendant.228 
The police used questionable means to obtain the gun used in committing the crime.229 They had , 
216 Marcoux, supra note 205; See supra note 201 at 2-3. 
217 Paciocco, ibid. at 2. 
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questioned Wray for about nine hours. The Law Reform Commission of Canada, in its 1973 
report, made reference to the Court's decisions in Wray, stating that the Wray decision has:230 
... denied any discretion in the trial judge to reject any involuntary confession the truth of which 
was confirmed by the finding of subsequent facts; the decision thereby preserved as a single 
rationale for the confession rule the promotion oftrustworthiness?31 
There had been a few references to the connection between voluntariness and the 
privilege against self-incrimination in some of the pre-Charter decisions,232 particularly in the 
dissentingjudgements.233 The references, however, were " ... rather tenuous in nature"234 and 
provided " .. .little authority for the proposition that the voluntariness requirements for the 
admissibility of confessions are [were] based on any policy against self-incrimination."235 In 
Attorney-Genera/for Quebec v. Begin, Mr. Justice Fauteux " ... recognized the separation of the 
policy basis for the voluntariness rule from the scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination. "236 
It is clear that, pre-Charter, the privilege against self-incrimination was " ... an extremely 
narrow concept."237 The privilege was restricted to238 " ••• the non-compellability of the accused 
as a witness at his own trial and the section 5(2) protection of a witness not to have testimony 
used in future proceedings. "239 
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This conclusion is obvious from an analysis of situations " ... where one would have 
expected an overriding principle to manifest itself in concrete results if such a principle 
existed."240 Attempts to breathe life into the privilege like Marcoux and Solomon241 " ••• met with 
negative results,"242 and in fact, there were judicial pronouncements " ... expressly adopting the 
view that there is no such thing as a general privilege against self-incrimination. "243 In Marcoux 
and Solomon, the Court held that the privilege244 was "often incorrectly advanced in favour of a 
much broader proposition"245 than the two protections already mentioned. 246 The Ontario Court 
of Appeal was even more bold in its assertion in R. v. Sweeney247 that "there does not exist in 
this country a general privilege against self-incrimination."248 
Self-Incrimination: Post-Charter 
Today the privilege against self-incrimination no longer suffers from these limitations?49 
There is now a recognized right to silence encompassed in Canadian law,250 and furthermore, the 
principles that apply to self-incrimination are applicable251 " ••• outside of formal proceedings."252 
At common law, the privilege against self-incrimination entitled a witness " ... to refuse to 
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" ... privilege by enacting section 5(1) of the Canada Evidence Acr54 which requires witnesses to 
answer"255 any questions, even if the answers to those questions may be self-incriminating.256 
However, Section 5(2) offers protection for the witness against self-incrimination by preventing 
those very answers from being used against the witness at subsequent proceedings. 257 
According to David M. Paciocco, " ... through the principle of a "case to meet," "self-
incrimination" has undergone the metamorphosis into a broad notion of "self-conscription" that 
is not confined to testimony."258 Paciocco states that the law pertaining to " ... self-incrimination 
in 1980 was a mere shadow of what it now is."259 There is no doubt in Paciocco's mind that the 
adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is responsible for this significant 
change in the law of self-incrimination,260 however, Paciocco believes that Charter only played 
254 CANADA EVIDENCE ACT (Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. I 985, c. C-5, ss. 4-5) 
Incriminating guestions 
4. (6) The failure of the person charged, or of the wife or husband of that person, to testify shall not be 
made the subject of comment by the judge or by counsel for the prosecution. 
5. {I) No witness shall be excused from answering any question on the ground that the answer to the 
question may tend to criminate him, or may tend to establish his liability to a civil proceeding at the 
instance of the Crown or of any person. 




(2) Where with respect to any question a witness objects to answer on the ground that his answer may 
tend to criminate him, or may tend to establish his liability to a civil proceeding at the instance of the 
Crown or of any person, and if but for this Act, or the Act of any provincial legislature, the witness 
would therefore have been excused from answering the question, then although the witness is by 
reason of this Act or the provincial Act compelled to answer, the answer so given shall not be used 
or admissible in evidence against him in any criminal trial or other criminal proceeding against him 
thereafter taking place, other than a prosecution for perjury in the giving of that evidence or for the 
giving of contradictory evidence. 
258 Supra note 20 I at 3. 
259 Ibid. Paciocco wrote this article in 2000-9 years prior to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Grant. 
260 Ibid. 
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an indirect role in influencing the pivotal changes to the law of self-incrimination.261 It is his 
view that although it may have been the Charter that enabled such change, the true cause of the 
change in the law of self-incrimination occurred as a result262 of "the great imagination of the 
judiciary, led primarily by the vision of Antonio Lamer."263 Paciocco goes on to point out that 
Charter was simply an instrument used to breathe life into the law of self-incrimination264 which ' 
prior to the Charter was merely an "empty vessel."265 
According to Steven Penny, " ... Canadian courts have only recently become engaged in 
significant normative theorizing on the nature of self-incrimination. Most of this work has been 
performed by the Supreme Court of Canada (the Court) in the context of its interpretation of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and has resulted in a distinctly Canadian approach to 
self-incrimination theory. "266 
At face value, the Charter267 " ••• says very little about self-incrimination,"268 so it is 
" ... judicial interpretation"269 which gives the law of self-incrimination meaning.270 Although the 
Charter was the tooe71 by which to breathe life into the law of self-incrimination, the actual 
breath came from the judiciary itself. 272 Paciocco points to Antonio Lamer as being 






266 Steven Penney "What's Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the 
Post-Charter Era- Part 1: Justifications for Rules Preventing Self-Incrimination" (2003-2004) 48 Crim L.Q. 249 at 
249. 
267 Supra note 20 I at I. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid. at 1 and 3-4. 
271 Ibid. at 3. 
272 Ibid. at 3-4. 
273 Ibid. at 4. 
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has conducted an extensive review of the case law pertaining to the law of self-incrimination 
during Lamer's 20 year term in the Supreme Court of Canada from 1980 - 2000.274 
The Charter does not explicitly grant a right to silence, however the courts have 
determined that the right to silence has been derived from Sections 4 & 5 of the Canada 
Evidence Act as well as sections 11 & 13 of the Charter and through the voluntary confession 
rule. 275 The right to silence is constitutionally supported by Canada's Charter principles, as 
developed in our Supreme Court jurisprudence, with R. v. Hebert being a particularly important 
case.276 
Even prior to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Hebert, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal recognized in R. v. Esposito,211 that the right to silence does not simply apply at the trial 
stage, but also at the investigative stage, however, the law pertaining to self-incrimination is 
separate from the law pertaining to a right to silence. Just as the Court in Rothman had held, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal similarly confirmed that: 
The right of a suspect or an accused to remain silent is deeply rooted in our legal tradition. The 
right operates both at the investigative stage of the criminal process and at the trial stage. In 
Canada, save in certain circumstances, a suspect is free to answer or not to answer questions by 
the police. We say that he has a right to remain silent because there is no legal obligation upon 
him to speak ... 278 
274 Ibid. at 3-5. 
275 CHARTER (Charter of Rights and Freedoms, R.S.C. I985 Appendix II, No. 44, ss. II & I3). 
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right 
(c) not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect of the offence; 
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal; 
13. A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any incriminating evidence so 
given used to incriminate that witness in any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for petjury or 
for the giving of contradictory evidence. 
See also Penney III p. 475-478 
276 Supra note I3. 
2
n R. v. Esposito (1985), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88, 53 O.R. (2d) 356 (C.A.). 
278 Ibid. at para. 14. 
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I am of the view that s. ll(c) of the Charter has no ap~lication to the admissibility of the 
appellant's answers in response to police questioning. 79 
In 1985, while the Ontario Court of Appeal had heard the case of Esposito, the Charter 
was still in its infancy. Only sections 11 (c) and 13 explicitly deal with the privilege against self-
incrimination and both of these provisions " ... relate solely to testimonial evidence at formal 
proceedings. "280 Thus, as Paciocco articulates it, "[ o ]n their face, these sections constitutionalize 
no more than the miserly conception of self-incrimination described in Marcoux."281 Paciooco's 
chief argument is that " .. .it was primarily Justice Lamer using purposive and principled 
interpretation" 282 who broadened the inert provisions of the Charter pertaining to self-
incrimination into one encompassing a lively283 " ••• affirmative right to remain silent, the 
principle of a case to meet and the conception of "choice'"'284 which is now incumbenr85 in the 
law of self-incrimination.286 
In Rothman, the accused had made it clear to the police that he was not interested in 
talking to them.287 While detained, the police had subsequently placed an undercover officer into 
his cell who had gained the accused's trust.288 The accused had made a number of inculpatory 
statements. 289 
When Rothman was decided, the law stated290 "that self-incrimination protection exists 
"qua witness"291 and "not qua accused.""292 Since Rothman spoke to an undercover police 
279 Ibid at para. 24. 
280 Supra note 20 I at 3. 
281 Ibid. at 3-4. 
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officer, he had no right against self-incrimination.293 Paciocco states that Justice Lamer 
nevertheless " ... found a way"294 to circumvent this limitation on the right295 " ••• by weaving 
"conscription" theory and self-incrimination principles indirectly into the fabric of the law 
relating to pretrial statements, in the process recognizing a principle of "choice" that has come to 
guide the development of the law of self-incrimination."296 
When Rothman was decided, the Charter did not exist, however Lamer's reasons, which 
emphasized the importance of the accused's choice to speak to authorities, 297 paved the way for 
the Supreme Court's ruling in R. v. Hebert. The facts in this case were very " ... similar to 
Rothman"298 pertaining to how the police obtained inculpatory admissions from the accused. 299 
The Supreme Court's decision reversed the former case of Rothman which allowed for the police 
to use trickery on people in order to obtain confessions.300 The ruling in Hebert may have put a 
temporary halt to this. 
The issue in Hebert was whether or not the statements the accused made to the 
undercover officer should be admissible. The Crown relied on Rothman in seeking to admit the 
statements of the accused. 
It was held that the Hebert's statement was obtained in violation of the right to silence 












In Hebert, the Supreme Court held that the combination of sections 7 and 13 along with 
common law dictates that there is a pre-trial right to silence which arises upon detention. A 
person is entitled to silence in the face of questioning. If the accused voluntarily chose to 
confess to the undercover officer without being questioned by him, the admission would be 
allowed, but since the undercover police elicited the confession from accused, the admission was 
void.301 
According to Paciocco, Lamer became influential in forming the privilege against self-
incrimination " ... by employing two techniques:" 
I. By creating " ... a rule to grevent the Crown from indirectly accomplishing what it 
could not do directly; "3 and 
2. By utilizing" ... the Court's responsibility to protect fundamental values to justify 
excluding evidence, as the way to give a measure of protection to the freedom of 
accused persons to choose whether to provide self-incriminatory information."303 
Choice Theory 
As Paciocco notes, the Court's ruling in Hebert acknowledged " ... the importance of the 
accused's "choice" whether to speak to authorities. 304 He also notes that this right is not based305 
on " ... any principles about self-incrimination,"306 rather, they are based " ... on the principle of 
free speech"307 and the principle that a person has no positive obligation in la~08 " ••• to cooperate 
with the authorities. "309 This enabled the Court " ... to accomplish what was tantamount to self-
incrimination protection."310 Although" ... self-incrimination principles are not engaged prior to 
301 See also the discussion of Rothman and Hebert in Chapter I. 
302 Supra note 201 at 4. 
303 Ibid. 








trial,"311 this in no way vitiates312 " ••• an arrested person's choice to remain silent"313 in the face 
of questioning by authorities.314 
Hebert also stated how police conduct can,315 " ••• as a practical matter, indirectly defeat 
the right of the accused to exercise a real choice about whether to testify at his trial. "316 
Paciooco notes that what is significant about this ruling is that Justice Lamer's basis for 
excluding the statements was absent of any notion pertaining to pre-trial right to silence. 317 In 
fact, " ... there was no right to silence"318 by operation of the law at that time Rothman was 
decided. "Rather, the out of court statements were excluded"319 to prevent the Crown from 
accomplishing indirectly320 what it could not do directly.321 By excluding the out of court 
statements in Hebert, the Court had prevented322 " ••• an indirect breach of the accused's right not 
to be compelled to testify at his trial. "323 This line of reasoning was presented by Lamer in 
Rothman prior to the enactment of the Charter, which paved the way for the Court's decision in 














The first rationale for the confession rule is the repression of conduct on the part of the 
authorities that indirectly frustrates an accused's right not to testify; the test that corresponds to 
this first rationale is whether the authorities did anything in eliciting those statements that might 
affect its reliability. 324 
324 Supra note 209; See also ibid. at 5. 
-- 163--
According to Steven Penney, the free choice rationale is inadequate and the courts have 
failed to explain why the right against self-incrimination " ... should exist"325 based on this 
rationale and have failed to answer the question "What is wrong with self-incrimination?"326 
Penny argues that ''there is in fact nothing inherently wrong with compelling self-incrimination 
and that the Court's preoccupation with preserving free choice has produced a self-incrimination 
jurisprudence that too often elides the legitimate interests at stake in the criminal justice 
process. "327 
Penny's position is that" ... there is nothing wrong with denying criminal suspects the 
right to choose whether to respond to criminal accusations, "328 provided that three pre-conditions 
are met:329 
1. "the state has sufficient grounds for suspicion;"330 
2. the state "avoids cruel methods of inducing cooperation; and"331 
3. "ensures that compelled evidence is reasonably reliable"332 
Penny agrees that there are valid reasons which justify the legal protections against self-
incrimination, such as the "reliability" and "abuse prevention" rationales. 333 According to 
Penny, these rationales make good sense and are non-controversial, however, " ... the "free 
choice" rationale"334 is "controversial and perplexing."335 The crux of Penny's position is that 
the "free choice" rationale for providing a protection against self-incrimination is circular in that 
it basically reasons that an accused should not be compelled to testify simply because the 
325 Supra note 266 at 250. 
326 Ibid. 
321/bid. at 249. 






334 Ibid. at 251. 
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accused should not be compelled to testify. Penny states that in some cases, "the Court's 
devotion to preserving free choice has denied courts access to reliable evidence in defiance of 
sound criminal justice policy. "336 
The Section 7337Right to Silence: 
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the principle against self-incrimination is 
contained in section 7 of the Charter.338 This provides a measure of protection to those people 
who are questioned by the police.339 The " ... Court has interpreted section 7 to protect a "right to 
silence"340 giving detainees a right to choose whether to speak to authorities."341 
According to Penney, Rondinelli, and Stribopolous, the right to silence is contained in the 
confessions rule and its only engaged when " ... a detainee makes a statement to a person in 
authority."342 However, if the Court finds that a statement was voluntary, and the circumstances 
surrounding the obtaining of the statement would not shock the community, then the Court will 
find that there has been no section 7 violation. 343 Pennney, Rondinelli and Stribopoulos explain 
the Rationale for this. Essentially, " ... any protection that section 7 provides is already provided 
for by the confessions rule."344 Moreover, Penney, Rondinelli and Stribopoulous also point out 
that it is far less onerous345 " ••• for the defence to raise a reasonable doubt on the voluntariness"346 
of an accused's statement than to prove that the statement was obtained in violation of the 
336 Ibid. at 250. 
337 CHARTER (Charter of Rights and Freedoms, R.S.C. 1985 Appendix II, No. 44, ss. 7). 
Section 7 of the Charter provides that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person and the right not 
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." 
338 Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli, & James Stribopoulos. Criminal Procedure in Canada, 1st. ed. (Markham: 
LexisNexis, 2011) at 324. 
339 Ibid. The authors cite R. v. Jarvis, (2002] 3 S.C.R. 757 (S.C.C.) as one example fonn the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
340 Ibid. citing Hebert, supra note 13 at para. 77. 
341 Ibid. citing Hebert, ibid at para. 78; Singh, supra note I at para. 35. 
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Charter/47 and then subsequently show that any " ... evidence obtained as a result should be 
excluded under section 24(2)."348 For these reasons, the authors state that "an independent 
section 7 application will rarely be warranted in these circumstances. "349 
Conclusion: 
The privilege against self-incrimination has a long history within the Canadian law. 
Historically, there was nothing distasteful about being compelled to provide evidence against 
oneself. 350 The privilege against self-incrimination historically existed to prevent the state from 
engaging in fishing expeditions and bringing charges against individuals without cause.351 
Before the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the common law 
privilege against self-incrimination was very narrow.352 However, after the advent of the 
Charter, the Supreme Court, led by the guidance of Antonio Lamer, managed to breathe life into 
the law of self-incrimination353 by recognizing and intertwining the important principles of free 
choice, a case to meet and the right to silence. 354 
During the same year of Lamer's departure, the substantive principles pertaining to the 
law of self-incrimination has began to somewhat wither. Under the guidance of Lamer, the law 
of self-incrimination was given a vibrant application that was not merely superficial. Beginning 
in 2000 with Oickle, and continuing throughout the decade with Singh and Sinclair, the Supreme 
Court seems to have undermined some of the recognized principles pertaining to the law of self-




350 Supra note 130 at 822; See also supra note 61 at 172. 
172. 
351 Supra note 60 at 10-11. 
352 Supra note 61 at 92. 
353 Supra note 20 1 at 3. 
354 Ibid. at 4. 
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whether the direction the Court took in Oickle, Singh, and Sinclair will take a turn for the better, 
or for the worse. 
The Rationales for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination 
Having reviewed the treatment of the privilege against self-incrimination in Canadian 
law, we should conduct a brief examination of its underlying rationales. A critical analysis of the 
justifications for the privilege will assist in shedding light on its contemporary relevance by 
showing the many reasons why this privilege is beneficial to our system of justice and how the 
justice system would suffer in the absence of such a rule. The privilege has been made central 
to the common law confessions rule and the right to silence by the courts, such that an attack 
against the privilege is an attack against the protections afforded by these rules. 
An Overview of the Rationales for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination 
We may break down the rationales for the privilege into two main categories. 355 
"Systemic rationales"356 that justify the operation of the privilege in relation to other aspects of 
the criminal justice system; and "individual rationales"357 that attempt to frame the importance of 
the privilege in terms of respect for individuals. 358 
The arguments for systematic rationales highlight the need for allowing witnesses to 
safely testify without the danger of incriminating themselves. 359 Moreover, these rationales 
suggest that this privilege also preserves the integrity of the criminal justice system by forcing 
the state to meet its burden of proof, without using the accused as a testimonial source. 360 




358 See ibid. 
359 Supra note 50 at 143; also see ibid. at 1066. 
360 Robert B. McKay, "Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy" (1967) Sup. Ct. Rev. I 93 at 209. 
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On the other hand individual rationales tend to focus on the inherent cruelty of 
compelling an individual to incriminate himself, the need to combat the invasion of privacy that 
this entails and the need to show respect for the individual and their autonomy.361 
The underlying rationales for the privilege are tied to a normative question and the 
resolution of this question involves the balancing of the requirement of fairness to an accused 
person against the state's need to investigate crimes. 
According to Justice Goldberg in the American case Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 
the privilege represents our fundamental values and most noble aspirations. Mr. Justice Goldberg 
articulates these values in the following fashion: 
Our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel dilemma of self-accusation, 
perjury or contempt; Our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of 
criminal justice; Our fear that self-incrimination statements will be elicited by inhumane 
treatment and abuses; Our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by 
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing 
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire 
load"; Our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each 
1 
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life"; Our distrust of self-
deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the 
guilty" is often "a protection to the innocenf62 
The above articulation by Justice Goldberg reveals that the privilege protects both systemic 
and individual values. The reference to a cruel dilemma contained in the first principle provides 
an example of the prejudicial dilemma involved in testimonial compulsion. The second principle 
refers to the norms that are part of the adversarial system and these norms are intertwined with 
individual values, which are meant to be protected by the privilege. The third principle raises 
concerns about potential unreliability of self-incriminating confessions. Principle number four is 
a declaration of the need to strike a fair balance between the state and the individual, by placing 
the requirements of probable cause and the burden of proof on the state. The fifth principle is a 
361 R. Kent Greenawalt, "Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right" (1981-82) 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 71; Also 
see supra note 355 at 1066. 
362 Supra note 31. 
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protective shield for human dignity, moral autonomy and the privacy of the individual. The sixth 
principle highlights the suspicious nature of the self-incriminating statements. And the last 
principle is about the need to protect the innocent against the excessive abuse of power by the 
state. 
The Core Values of the Privilege 
The focus on the core values of the privilege seems to suggest that testimonial 
compulsion is highly problematic because it takes away the individual's ability to have control 
over his own private thoughts; instead testimonial compulsion forces the individual to relinquish 
such control to the state, and therefore allows the state access to potentially incriminating 
information that can be used to convict him. 
The arguments in favour of these core values involve broad appeals to the goals of the 
criminal justice system363 and the basic notions of individual rights. The dispute over the 
legitimacy of the privilege largely stems from the differing interpretations of these ideals. 
Mr. Justice Friendly argued that the privilege defies our sense of ordinary morality364 and 
it runs counter to how relationships between individuals are structured. He takes aim at the 
absurdity of the notion that one should be permitted to exercise silence, in the face of the state 
accusation, when in society an individual is constantly being held accountable for his actions to 
his employer, teacher, parent, etc. 
While the other [evidentiary] privileges accord with notions of decent conduct generally accepted 1 
in life outside of the courtroom, the privilege against self-incrimination defies them. No parent 
would teach such a doctrine to his children; the lesson parents preach is that while a misdeed, i 
even a serious one, will generally be forgiven, a failure to make a clear breast of it will not be. ' 
Every hour of the day people are being asked to explain their conduct to parents, employers and 
363 Supra note 355 at I I47. 
364 W. Schaeferi, The Suspect and Society (Evanstan: Northwestern University Press, I 967) at 59; See also ibid. at 
1068. 
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teachers. Those who are questioned consider themselves to be moraiiy bound to respond, and the 
questioners believe it proper to take action if they do not.365 
What seems to have fallen outside of Justice Friendly's field of vision is the simple fact that 
in a liberal democracy one cannot equate social interactions between private individuals with the 
relationship between the state and the individual. The relationship between an individual and his 
teacher or parent is often close and personal; or in the case of an employer the relationship may 
be based on need. But the state's machinery is huge and is represented by many different layers 
of bureaucracy. It does not relate to an individual in the same way that a teacher, a parent or even 
an employer does. The state is an impersonal entity which stands separate and apart from an 
individual. 366 
The state is devoid of emotions and interacts with individuals in accordance with certain 
pre-defined standards, and therefore it lacks the personal and emotional dimensions that are 
usually contained in private relationships. It is imperative for the state in a liberal democracy to 
behave in a routine and an impersonal manner367 towards individuals in order to enforce equality 
and ensure similar treatment. 
The notion that one could compare the relationship between the individual and the state 
with that of a parent, a teacher or an employer has no place in liberal democracy. Such analogy 
may only find support in totalitarian societies368 where dictatorial states are identified as the one 
and the same with individual. The claim by communist states that they have created classless 
societies invokes the organic image369 which demands total subservience on the part of the 
365 Henry J. Friendly, "The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change" (1968) 37 U. Cinn. 
L. REV. 671 at 680. 
366 Supra note 355 at 1070. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Ibid. 
369 C. Cohen, Communism, Fascism and DEMOCRACY: The Theoretical Foundation (New York: Random House, 
1962) at 404; See also ibid. 
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individual towards the all powerful state. 370 And as such this privilege " ... would never be 
allowed by communists, and thus it may well be regarded as one of the signs which sets us off 
from communism."371 
It is only in these states that the needs of individuals are traded for the greater good of the 
community. 
The totalitarian mind accepts all the means which promise the achievement of its ends. A political 
democrat is ready to compromise some of his ideal ends for the sake of renouncing means which 
would involve the sacrifice of human lives or freedom. This is the major moral issue dividing any 
totalitarian be he communist or fascist, from a genuine democrat.372 
The other difficulty with Justice Friendly's argument lies in the fact that "in close adult 
relationships, trust is a characteristic and central element"373 However, in a liberal democracy, 
there is no expectation that the. relationship between the individual and the state should be 
predicated on that kind of trust. Contractual obligations or personal relationships between 
private citizens involve voluntary undertakings and a certain amount of trust. However in the 
context of criminal law the relationship between individual and state is strictly involuntary. The 
state decides to invoke the machinery of the criminal justice system against an individual, 
without his consent or any input from the individual. 
The involuntary nature of the criminal law process creates an ideological dilemma for 
anyone who wishes to characterize the relationship between the individual and the state as a 
close personal one. This notion is further reinforced by the five basic tenets of liberal ideology. 
The principles of" ... free-trade, individualism, rule of law, freedom of contract and laissez-
faire"374 are the cornerstones of the ideological foundation of a liberal state. 375 These principles 
370 Dolinko, ibid. 
371 Supra note 29 at 81. 
372 W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Regime (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1954). 
373 Supra note 361 at 20. 
374 Robert Albritton, A Japanese Approach to Stages of Capitalist Development (MacMillan: London, 1991) at 174. 
375 Ibid. 
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clearly recognize an individual as an independent entity from the state;376 in fact the most basic 
element of the liberal ideology is a sharp separation between the state and individual. 377 
The Aims of Criminal Law and the Privilege 
The criminal law as a child of political and moral philosophy is constantly pre-occupied 
with the question of78 " ••• justifying the use of state's coercive power against"379 individuals.380 
This question assumes central importance, when one considers the massive implications 
that flow from criminal prosecutions. The loss of liberty, the stigma of criminal conviction, the 
compromised ability of a convicted person to earn a living because of a prior conviction, to name 
only a few of the implications, may be listed as some of these consequences. Hence, given the 
potentially severe consequences of criminal sanctions, procedural fairness to an accused person 
should be a moral imperative in the operation of the criminal law. 
The question that we face is the following: in what way does the privilege against self-
incrimination help to promote procedural fairness? In other words, does the protective mandate 
of this privilege have any application in achieving the goals of protecting the innocent, 
restraining the abuse of power by state and ensuring the fairness of the criminal process? We 
shall examine each of these goals separately, by reviewing the systemic and individual rationales 
for the privilege. 
Systemic Rationales 
Accusatorial System v. Inquisitorial System 
The debate about the superiority of one of the two systems, accusatorial or inquisitorial, 
over the other is very large and it falls outside of the scope of this project. However, the issue at 
376 Ibid. at 39. 
377 Ibid. 




hand is whether the privilege against self-incrimination is a necessary element of the adversarial 
system of justice. 
The adversarial system, which is part of the common law, operates on the assumption that 
the parties in criminal proceedings are contestants. The emphasis in this system is for each party 
to assert its respective position, while the judiciary acts as a disinterested arbitrator, refereeing 
the dispute between the two parties. 
The inquisitorial system, however, follows a different path to the discovery of the ''truth". 
The judge in this system becomes directly involved in the trial process by questioning witnesses, 
reviewing evidence and demanding explanations from the accused person. Hence, the judge 
assumes both investigative and adjudicative roles and the context between the two opposing 
parties is much more limited. 
Justice Goldberg, in the case of Murphy v. Waterfront Commission381 seems to suggest that, 
the privilege against self-incrimination gives expression to the important features of our 
preferred system of criminal justice, which is the adversarial system. 382 These important features 
include the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, various rules of evidence, the 
adversarial roles of the contesting parties and the fact that the privilege could have a role in 
safeguarding these features. 
The inquisitorial system is viewed as being more efficiene83 for the simple reason that there 
is a positive obligation on the part of the accused to co-operate with the state.384 However, such 
compelled co-operation by necessity involves " ... an immediate imposition on the will, intellect 
381 Supra note 31. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Law Commission ofNew Zealand, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" in Preliminary Paper 25, (1996) 
at 21. 
384 R.S. Gerstein, "Punishment and Self-Incrimination" (1971) 16 Am. J. Juris. 84 at 92 
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and conscience of the individual, pressing them into patterns created by the prosecution,"385 
leaving no room for the individual to freely choose whether or not he wishes to share his guilt or 
innocence with the rest of the world. The adversarial system, however, provides an accused 
person with such an option. It therefore may be argued that the privacy and the personal dignity 
of the individual is better protected in a system where there is no compelled testimony. In other 
words it is only in the context of the adversarial system that an individual can reaffirm his moral 
autonomy by relying on the privilege to establish his right to decide whether he will personally 
participate in the trial process. "Once the freedom to make this choice has been established, the 
accused is able to assert himself as autonomous and equal adversary, and can decide to mount 
his defence entirely on the basis of technical considerations. "386 
The operation of the privilege within the adversarial system allows for the recognition of the 
accused person as an autonomous agent, capable of making decisions as to the manner in which 
he wishes to defend himself. 387 The freedom to make such decisions is instrumental in allowing 
the accused to govern himself according to his own internal moral consciousness, as opposed to 
I 
I 
being forced by the state to take the stand. The accused person is then permitted to independently 
come to terms with his guilt, at the time of his own choosing, while avoiding the degrading 
invasion of the state upon his moral autonomy388 In other words, in the context of the 
adversarial system an accused person is able to express remorse in a private setting and the state 
385 Ibid. 
386 Supra note 54 at 3 52. 
387 Ibid. 
388 According to Schrock, Welsh and Collins: 
The fifth amendment, standing for the high value placed on personal responsibility, rebukes government 
when, by omission or commission, it inhibits, stultifies, or interrupts the process by which the accused 
decides what to do about whatever criminal responsibility rests at his doorstep." 
See Thomas S. Schrock, Robert C. Welsh & Ronald Collins, "Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. 
Arizona" (1978) 52 S. CAL. L. Rev. I. at 49. 
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is not able to force such expression through compelled testimony. Such luxury is not available to 
an accused person in an inquisitorial system. 
The Eliciting of Statements by Inhumane Treatment 
The privilege helps to force the state to mount its case independently of the accused. This 
is due to the fact that the availability of the privilege empowers accused persons and other 
witnesses to refuse to respond to state questioning, and this fact may encourage officials to 
conduct a more thorough investigation, rather than taking shortcuts and using abusive techniques 
to pressure the accused for answers. 
Therefore once an accused person invokes his privilege against self-incrimination, the 
officials, in the U.S. at least, are expected to hold back their pressure tactics which may include 
oppression, psychological pressure, procedural abuses, and the like. This is also important for 
safeguarding the integrity of the system. As Wigmore stated: 
Fair Play 
Any system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory 
self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination 
develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete 
investigation of the other sources .... If there is a right to answers, there soon seems to be a 
right to the expected answers that is to a confession of guilt thus the legitimate use grows into • 
unjust abuse; ultimately, the innocent are jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad system. 
Such seems to have been the course of experience in those legal systems where the privilege 
was not recognized.389 
The need for maintaining a fair balance in the contest between the individual and the 
state raises two important issues that are directly connected to the application of the privilege. 
The first of these issues is the need to protect the individual from intrusive fishing-expeditions 
by the state. The privilege provides the necessary means to an individual to resist unjustified 
389 Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 3 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970) at 296, n. I. 
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demands by state agents for incriminating information; unless the state can show good cause for 
its inquiries. 390 
The second issue, which it has already been raised, pertains to compelling the state to 
gather their evidence from other sources, rather than getting it from the accused. This is an 
important consideration in terms of fairness of the proceedings. Given the vastly superior 
resources of the state, the privilege can serve as an equalizer between the individual and the 
state. This can be achieved by allowing the accused to keep his cards close to his chest, and 
challenge the state to obtain its evidence independently of his compelled participation. 
The Privilege and Abuse of Power by State 
There is a relationship between the abuse of power and the privilege in a sense that one could 
argue that the privilege is a necessary bulwark against undue state intrusion into the lives of 
people. The privilege achieves that goal by forcing the state to meet its burden of proof, and by 
making it more difficult for the state to conduct politically motivated fishing expeditions against 
certain group of individuals. 391 In other words, the privilege may assist in undermining the 
effectiveness of laws that infringe freedom of expression and freedom of belief. 
The anti-communist McCarthy hearings provides a good example of the need for the 
protective ability of the privilege against state tyranny.392 A more recent example is the 
questioning of individuals for possible links with international terrorism. 393 The privilege could 
390 The Reflections of an experienced British civil officer in colonial India on the need to use torture by investigators 
in order to extract information is particularly relevant to our discussion: "It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the 
shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence."- J.F. Stephen, A 
History OfThe Criminal Law of England (London: Macmillan, 1883) at 442. 
391 Supra note 355 at 1080. 
392 Supra note 61 at 5. 
393 See: Re: Application Under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, 2004 SCC 42, 184 C.C.C. (3d) 449,240 D.L.R. (4th) 
81. Investigative hearings (section 83.28 of the Criminal Code) are aimed at preventing and investigating terrorist 
offences. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of this provision while stating that 
investigative hearings should generally be held in open court. However, the power was subject to a sunset clause and 
expired after the House of Commons voted against extending its application in February 2007. In its decision Re: 
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prove useful in combating the more contemporary form of such possible abuse of power by the 
state. This is because the existence of the privilege could serve as a shield against the state's 
efforts for belief-probing. However, the absence of the privilege makes it easier for the state to 
engage in fishing-expeditions against individuals who are suspected of deviating from political 
or moral status quo.394 For example, a person suspected of being a communist or an Islamic 
fundamentalist could be arrested for security reasons and be brought before a Judge to be 
compelled to explain his associations. As Ratner puts it: 
Without the protection of the privilege a person, simply upon accusation of crime, could be forced to 
submit to an inquisition, under oath, concerning his actions395 
This is exactly what section 83.28 of the Criminal Code allowed for, and our Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the section. 
Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] S.C.R. 242, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that 
the investigative hearing was constitutional. 
Pursuant to s. 83.28(5), the judge may (a) order the examination, under oath or not, of the person named in the order 
(the "named person"); (b) order the named person to attend for the examination and to remain in attendance until 
excused by the presiding judge; (c) order the named person to bring to the examination anything in their possession 
or control and produce it to the presiding judge; (d) designate another judge as the judge to preside over the 
examination; and (e) include any other terms or conditions considered desirable, including those for the protection of 
the named person, third parties, and an ongoing investigation. Under s. 83.28(7), the terms of the order may be 
varied. 
For a view in support of the authorities' "limited powers to compel testimony from persons believed to have 
terrorism-related information" -Supra note 253 at 488-489 (Footnote #45) 
394 Alan Donagan, "The Right Not to Incriminate Oneself' (1984) 137 Soc. Phil. & Poly 98. Alan Donagan holds 
that the privilege has a role in frustrating undemocratic laws in the areas of politics and morality. He describes his 
position in the following manner: 
"In most political societies there are movements to impose penalties on propagating unpopular opinions ... When 
those movements are successful, in order to avoid odium and other non-legal sanctions, some will conceal that they 
hold the opinions it is forbidden to propagate ... Now, when a defendant has been discreet, the only way in which he 
can be proved even to sympathize with the opinions in question may be out of his own mouth. [The privilege] will 
not only be a defense against some of the abuses of laws against the propagation of opinions, it may even blunt the 
zeal of those who advocate such laws, whose intention is often to harass any who even passively sympathize with 
opinions they hate. One may generalize: many kinds of legal offence that will often be provable only by compelling 
self-incriminating evidence ought not, morally speaking, be legal offences at all; and most offences for which there 
ought to be legal sanctions can be proved , if at all, without recourse to such evidence. This appears to be a moral 
reason of some weight why it should be illegal to compel self-incrimination." (pg. 143-144). 
395 Leonard G. Ratner, "Consequences of Exercising the Privilege against Self-Incrimination" (1956-57) 24 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 472 at 482. 
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Unreliability of Compelled Statements 
An individual who is confronted with potentially self-incriminating questions by state agents 
has to make some very difficult choices. He may find himself in a situation where he has to 
perjure himself by telling self-protecting lies or he may choose to tell the truth and hence expose 
himself to the possibility of self-incrimination. However the privilege against self-incrimination 
provides a third alternative: that is to remain silent, and therefore avoid making such difficult 
choices. Hence, in certain circumstances the privilege removes the need to lie to avoid self-
incrimination and it also prevents unreliable statements as a result of aggressive interrogation 
techniques, at least in the American context. 396 
The Individual Rationales 
The Cruel Trilemma 
The reference to cruel trilemma provides an example of the prejudicial dilemma involved 
in testimonial compulsion. This principle highlights the inherent cruelty of compelling an 
accused person to admit to his own guilt in a public forum. As Mr. Justice Field in his minority 
decision in Brown v. Walker397 stated: "A sense of personal degradation in being compelled to 
incriminate one's self must create a feeling of abhorrence in the community at its attempted 
enforcement. "398 
The obviousness of the cruelty in compelled testimony lies in the fact that it creates a 
lose/lose situation for an accused person. This is because the accused is compelled to either 
admit his guilt, contrary to his natural sense of self-preservation, 399 or to lie and, hence, expose 
himself to the possibility of additional prosecution for perjury or to remain silent and face 
396 The issue of unreliable statements will be explored in greater depth in the next chapter. 
397 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1986). 
398 Ibid. at 63 7. 
399 L. V. Sunderland, "Self-Incrimination and Constitutional Principle; Miranda v. Arizona and Beyond" (1979) 15 
Wakeforest L. Rev. 171, 179-180. 
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contempt charges. By any objective standard of measurement, being caught in such situation is 
simply too cruel and this cruelty has received judicial recognition by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
in the following manner: 
... answer truly and you have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of federal 
law, answer falsely and you will be convicted of perjury; refuse to answer and you will be found 
guilty of criminal contempt and punished by fine and imprisonment. In our humble judgement, to 
place a person not even on trial for a specific crime in such predicament is not only a 
manifestation of fair play, but is in direct violation of the Fifth Amendment to our national 
Constitution. 400 
The intensity of pressure that the state is capable of bringing on an individual defendant 
in forcing him to break his will to remain silent or quite possibly expose him to perjury or 
contempt represents the crushing power of the state for degrading an individual. The state uses 
the power of law to extort information out of the individual and the "moral justification" for this 
is the need to combat crime. The context in which the state attempts to acquire information is the 
"need" to secure a conviction against that individual. Criminal conviction is among the most 
serious punitive measures the state can invoke against a defendant, and hence this is the most 
appropriate place to impose limits on the power of the state. A system that compels individuals 
to seal their own fate is inherently cruel.401 
Protecting the Innocent Against Wrongful Conviction 
The prevention of wrongful convictions should be the ultimate goal of every criminal 
justice system. Wrongful convictions are an evil that strikes at the heart and the soul of any 
civilized criminal justice system. The system derives its legitimacy from the argument that it 
operates fairly against an accused person, and it constantly needs to foster an image of fairness in 
order to maintain that legitimacy.402 Therefore, the organizing principle in every legitimate 
400 Aiuppa v. United States, 201 F. 2d 287 at 300 (6th Cir. 1952). 
401 According to Knight: "Even short of outright torture, a judicial process that centers its attention on producing 
confessions has a threatening, authoritarian cast that is alien to our way of justice." (Supra note 18 at 98). 
402 Supra note 355 at 1074. 
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system should be an unwavering commitment to fairness. The absence of such commitment will 
only lead to " ... widespread cynicism,"403 and that in tum leads to erosion of respect and desire 
" ... to obey criminallaws',404 by general public. Such a state of affairs will only serve to 
undermine the social stigma of criminal conviction 405 and its overall effectiveness. 406 The issue 
of fairness lies at the heart of criminal justice system for the simple reason that criminal law is 
capable of inflicting massive destruction on the lives of individual suspects. Totalitarian states 
routinely use the sanctions of criminal law as a convenient tool to eliminate political dissent. The 
mass executions of political prisoners under the pretext of drug importing, offences against 
morality, and other crimes are clear proof of the terroristic potential of the criminal law. The 
brutal use of criminal sanctions by states such as Iran, Syria, China, North Korea is only possible 
because of total indifference in these states for basic political values of freedom, liberty and 
justice. These states are content to merely pay symbolic lip-service to important civilizing 
values. However the situation in democratic societies is different, in the sense that, to some 
extent we are prepared to commit certain resources to uphold the values that set us apart from 
dictatorial states. Griswold raises a similar point in relation to the use of the privilege against 
self-incrimination in democratic states as opposed to totalitarian states in the following fashion: 
As such it is [The Fifth Amendment] a clear and eloquent expression of our basic opposition to 
collectivism, to the unlimited power of the state. It would never be allowed by communists, and 
thus it may well be regarded as one of the signs which sets us off from communism407 
The comparative analysis of constitutional guarantees provided in democratic and non-
democratic states will reveal the stunning fact that most states have constitutions that are 
strikingly similar to one another. For example, the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
403 Ibid. at I 073. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Ibid. 
406 Peter ArenelJa, "Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts Competing 
Ideologies" ( 1983-1984) 72 Geo. L.J. 185 at 200. Also see ibid. 
407 Supra note 29 at 81. 
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contains certain provisions that look shockingly similar to the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. The constitution of the Iranian state specifically prohibits arbitrary detention, the 
imposition of curfews and the detention of anyone for more than 24 hours without just cause. It 
also guarantees the right to counsel, a right against unreasonable search and seizure, freedom of 
expression, freedom of the press, the right against physical abuse, the rejection of involuntary 
confessions, and other fundamental freedoms that, at least formally reflect due process values.408 
The difference between the Iranian state and the Canadian state, then, lies in how much 
practical value each state attaches to the observance of the codified procedural rights. As Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter states in McNab v. United States: "The history of liberty has largely been the 
history of observance of procedural safeguards". 409 This is due to the fact that our most 
cherished fundamental rights find expression in procedural compliance by the state, and these 
procedural rules " ... provide the most perfected inclusive safeguard against oppression 
available,"410 and therefore criminal processes should serve as a bulwark against oppression. 
It is beyond dispute that the reasonable use of criminal sanctions is necessary in maintaining 
the operation of the market economy. However, it should also be stated that "criminal procedure 
must be designed to prevent abuse ofpower."411 Therefore, the most effective method of 
combating abuses of power by the state authorities is to devise a system that properly and 
meaningfully administers the procedural rights of individual suspects. This is extremely 
important because the fair administration of these rights make " ... all the difference between a 
reign of terror and one oflaw"412 
408 See: Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Articles 19-42, The Rights of the People, available online: < 
http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-3.html >. 
409 McNab v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 at 347 (1943). 
410 Jerome Hall, "Objectives ofFederal Criminal Procedural Revision" (1942) 51 Yale L.J. 723 at 728. 
411 John Griffiths, "Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or A Third Model of Criminal Process" (1970) 79 Yale L.J. 359 
at 380-81 n. 81. 
412 Shaughnessy v. United States ex. Rei. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 at 226 (1953) (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
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Criminal sanctions in democratic societies represent the highest degree of the coercive 
power of the state and precisely for that reason, the observance of procedural rights should act as 
a check on the ability of the state to mobilize its massive resources to convict the innocent. It 
may be impossible to devise a system that totally eliminates the possibility of wrongful 
convictions; however, efforts should be made to reduce the occurrence of such phenomenon. The 
quest to combat wrongful convictions is essential for the preservation of democracy, because the 
awesome power of criminal sanctions makes occurrences of such mistakes very costly. The 
terrifying prospects of spending a lifetime behind bars for a crime that one is actually innocent 
of, is a personal and a social catastrophe, equal in magnitude to a Shakespearean tragedy. It can 
safely be claimed, without any degree of exaggeration, that every wrongful conviction leaves a 
dark stain on the soul of the society. 
The question before us is whether the privilege against self-incrimination can play a 
meaningful role in protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction. This question may compel 
us to go beyond academic papers and to look for answers in the practical realities of courtrooms 
and police stations. 
An innocent person may wish to exercise his right against self-incrimination, because he may 
be intimidated by his interrogators, or simply because of his ignorance of the underlying 
circumstances of the investigation against him, he may choose to follow the advice of his 
counsel to remain silent. The role that the privilege plays in providing this protection is 
extremely important and it makes the preservation of this privilege indispensable to the 
administration of justice. It is beyond dispute that the privilege may also assist the guilty to 
,_ 182 ,_ 
escape justice.413 However, the protection of the innocent is a much greater consideration than 
the possible exploitation of the privilege by the guilty. 
It might be argued that we could set up an open and non-threatening system that compels 
both the guilty and the innocent to speak and thereby maximizes the chances of truthful 
statements from each and, in so doing, increases the chances of discovering the truth.414 But it is 
impossible to introduce compulsion and at the same time have true voluntariness exist. And 
without voluntariness, we have unreliability. Having an adverse inference that silence indicates 
guilt, for example, would compel an accused person to speak; however, it would also be a threat 
to anyone not already wishing to speak. This would make any statement given, an involuntary 
one. Moreover, compelling the accused to speak would not necessarily increase the proportion 
of truthful statements. A guilty person compelled to speak might be inclined to lie about his 
guilt and proclaim innocence; whereas an innocent person compelled to speak, might do such an 1 
unconvincing job in his defence that he would be wrongfully convicted. There is no way to 
ensure the reliability of statements when they are required to be given under compulsion. 
Any system of testimonial compulsion also violates the presumption of innocence and 
reverses the burden of proof. It is a principle of our justice system that the Crown introduce the 
case to be met, and that unless and until the Crown can show that the accused is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the accused will remain legally not guilty. Requiring the accused to explain 
his innocence upon questioning cannot be done without also presuming guilt and shifting the 
burden of proving innocence on to the accused. This would create a system of justice that is 
fundamentally unfair to accused persons, where, up against the enormous resources of the state, 
413 Supra note 31. 
414 According to Wigmore" ... any system of administration which permita the prosecution to trust habitually to 
compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby"- J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials 
at Common Law 2281, at 296 n.i. 
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they have to disprove the evidence presented against them by in some way commenting on it to 
alleviate the presumption of guilt. 
The stresses of contested trial, the overwhelming effects of courtroom settings, the 
demeanour of trial judges and prosecutors, and the coercive potential of aggressive cross-
examination are among some of the practical realities that may not be captured in academic 
papers. It does not take too much imagination to conceive of a situation where a nervous and 
frightened but nevertheless innocent defendant415 may be made to look guilty through the 
process of a rigorous cross-examination.416 It is my position that a skillful cross-examiner may 
be able to make a truthful witness look like a liar. The art of cross-examination,417 with its well 
defined techniques can serve as a valuable tool to manipulate the truth for the specific purpose of 
exposing the "self-serving lies" of a defendant.418 A confused defendant who is too nervous or 
ill equipped to cope with the stresses of cross-examination is easy prey for a veteran lawyer. A 
nervous defendant, due to his/her inexperience on the stand may give off false impressions as to 
415 E.g. Ellis, "Vax Populi v. Supreme Lex: A comment on the Testimonial Privilege of the fifth Amendment" 
(1970) 55 Iowa L. Rev. 829 at 846. 
416 Ibid. 
417 L. Pomer & R. Dodd, Cross-Examination: Science and Techniques (Charlottesville: The Michie Company Law 
Publishers, 1993) at 3-4. Pomer & Dodd are of the view that cross-examination is a science and not an art. 
418 I make this assertion while I am aware of Wigmore's claim that cross-examination is " ... beyond any doubt the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." (Ibid. at 2.). 
See also: Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice, (Princeton: New Jersey, 1949) at 
82. Franks writes: "[A]n experienced lawyer uses all sorts of stratagems to minimize the effect on the judge or jury 
of testimony disadvantageous to his client, even when the lawyer has no doubt of the accuracy and honesty of that 
testimony. The lawyer considers it his duty to create a false impression, if he can, of any witness who gives such 
testimony." He goes on to cite examples, such as how rapid cross-examination may ruin the testimony of a 
"truthful, honest" but "over-cautious witness." Lawyers may also "try to prod an irritable but honest 'adverse' 
witness into displaying his undesirable characteristics in their most unpleasant, in order to discredit him with the 
judge or jury." (Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (Princeton: New Jersey, 
1949) at 82). If a witness has an inflated ego, the lawyer "will deftly tempt the witness to indulge in his propensity 
for exaggeration, so as to make him "hang himself"' ( Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in 
American Justice (New Jersey: Princeton, 1949) at 82). 
See also: Murray Schwartz, "On Making the True look False and the False Look True" (1988) 41 SW. L.J. 1135. 
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his/her credibility. It is a well-known fact that nervous demeanour reflects on the credibility of a 
witness.419 Moreover, the defendants who are uneducated or those who suffer from some form 
of mental disability may be more prone to perform poorly under cross-examination. They may 
have a harder time to explain apparent inconsistencies or memory lapses. They may not be 
sufficiently articulate, or they may show poor demeanour on the stand. 420 
The language difficulties are not restricted to the uneducated but it also extends to first 
generation immigrants who may not have adequate facility with the English language. The poor 
quality of interpretation, or when interpreters are not used, and the inability to understand certain 
questions may increase the exposure of immigrant defendants to damaging responses.421 
All of these factors422 may contribute to the wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant.423 
Moreover, an innocent defendant may get convicted by being cross-examined on his prior 
record. 424 The existence of a criminal record is a poor reflection on the character of a defendant 
419 E.J. Levy, Examination of Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thompson & Carswell, 2004) at 207-
27. 
420 Ibid. 
421 Supra note 128 at 30. 
422 A certain number of defendants may also be motivated by tactical considerations not to testify, in order to reserve I 
the right to have the final closing address to the Jury. 
423 Surprisingly, even an opponent of the privilege like Professor Steven Penney seems to recognize the possibility 
that some innocent defendant may be wrongfuily convicted, if they are forced to testify at their trial. 
"Some innocent defendants may elect not to testify because they would make bad witnesses. Many criminal 
defendants are inarticulate. Some have mental health problems or personality traits that could alienate the trier of 
fact. Others may have difficulty recalling the details of key events. And defendants whose race, culture or 
communicative styles differ from those of jurors may be misunderstood or be subjected to negative stereotyping. 
Prosecutors can exploit any of these characteristics in cross-examination or argument and lead jurors to make 
improper inferences." (Supra note 253 at 520.) 
However, Professor Penney quickly qualifies these concerns by suggesting that such dangers only exist in relation to 
a smaii number of defendants: "But it is likely that triers of fact wi11 occasionally misuse this testimony and in a 
small number of cases this could lead to wrongful convictions". (Supra note 253 at 520.) 
It is my position that even if one innocent defendant can be spared the terrifying prospects of wrongful conviction, 
than it is worth preserving the privilege. However Penney does not seem to think that is a good enough reason for 
keeping the privilege. He goes on to say: 
"Failing to testify is sometimes probative, reliable evidence of guilt. The law should recognize this and expressly 
authorize what triers of fact are likely to do in any case- draw an adverse inference against defendants who fail to 
respond to a prima facie case against them." (Supra note 253 at 523.) 
424 Supra note 355 at 1075. 
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and the effective use of one's record on cross-examination may serve to impeach the 
credibility425 of the defendant.426 
The protection against the compulsion to reveal one's character flaws and personal 
limitations before the trier of fact militates strongly in favour of maintaining the privilege against 
self-incrimination. As has already been stated, the decision to testify involves tactical 
considerations such as the general credibility of the accused person and the potential acceptance 
or rejection of his story by the jury. The combination of poor performance and prior record 
could create a fatal recipe for wrongful conviction and hence a clear miscarriage of justice. The 
privilege however provides the only real safeguard against such occurrence. This is because the 
operation of the privilege will protect an innocent defendant from his own shortcomings, and his 
prior criminal record. 
Innocence & Circumstantial Case 
An innocent defendant may expose himself to criminal liability by answering incriminating 
questions even though he may not be guilty of the specific crime charged. Therefore, it may be 
argued that, among other factors, there may also be another nexus between innocence and 
invoking the privilege. The importance of such nexus becomes even more apparent when the 
state has mounted a circumstantial case against an accused person, as opposed to a time when a 
person is expected to respond to a case that involves direct evidence. The absence of direct 
evidence usually forces the state to constantly look for additional pieces of suspicious 
circumstantial evidence in order to fill in the evidentiary gap in their case. Hence, the 
compulsion to respond to intrusive questions by state agents could prove to be a valuable tool for 
adding to the strength of the state's prosecution. Thus responses by an accused person to each 
425 Ibid. 
426 Professor Steven Penney had this to say about the use of the defendant's criminal record:" ... defendants may 
fear that triers of fact will be unduly influenced by their criminal past in determining guilt". (Supra note 253 at 521.) 
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suspicious circumstance may contribute to creating an accumulative effect that would enable the 
state to persuade the trier of fact to convict the accused on the basis of the "totality of the 
evidence". 
It is not difficult to conceive of a situation whereby the prosecution may start off with a weak 
circumstantial case against a defendant, however, by forcing that defendant on the stand they 
may obtain sufficient incriminating responses that they can then manipulate in order to secure a 
conviction. In other words, each answer by the defendant could become another evidentiary link 
in a chain of proof against him. Such important considerations were initially recognized by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, as far back as in the 19th century, in the case of Wilson: 
It is not everyone who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent on the charge 
against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain 
transactions of a suspicious character, and offences charged against him, will often confuse and 
embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudice against him. It is not 
every one, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness stand.427 
A Private Enclave 
The invoking of this privilege can safeguard privacy and it may serve as a protective 
shield for human dignity and moral autonomy. This is due to the fact that the privilege prevents 
the state from obtaining personal information, which the state can then in turn use in an 
incriminating fashion against an accused person. As Justice Field in his minority decision stated 
in Brown v. Walker: "The common law privilege was intended to reflect the values inherent in 
individual sovereignty. These values are autonomy, dignity and privacy".428 
Compelled self-incrimination impedes the ability of the individuals to prevent state 
intrusion into certain zones of privacy.429 It helps to protect, to a limited extend, the invasion of 
427 Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60,600 (1893). 
428Supra note 397 at 637. 
429 W.A. Parent, "Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy" (1983) 20(4) Am. Phil. Qtly. 341 at 346. Privacy is 
defined by Parent as being " ... the condition of a person's not having undocumented personal information about 
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state on the sanctity of a defendant's private thoughts. The ability to exercise control over 
disseminating or withholding information about ourselves involves issues of personal dignity. 
The privilege empowers the individual in a substantial way to withhold or share information 
about himself as he chooses, in the critical area of criminal prosecution, and thus the privilege 
becomes a tool for shielding the dignity of the individual defendant. Wasserstrom captures the 
essence of this argument in the following fashion: 
Because of the significance of exclusive control over our own thoughts and feelings, the privilege 
against self-incrimination can be seen to rest ultimately, upon a concern that confessions never be 
coerced or required by the state. The point of the privilege is not primarily that the state must be 
induced not to torture individuals in order to extract information from them. Nor is the point even 
essentially that the topics of confession will necessarily (or even typically) be of the type that we 
are most unwilling to disclose because of the unfavourable nature of what this would reveal about 
us. Rather, the fundamental point is that required disclosure of one's thoughts by itself diminishes I 
the concept of individual personhood within the society. For this reason, all immunity statutes 
that require persons to reveal what they think and believe-provided only that they will not be 
subsequently prosecuted for what they disclose- are beside the point and properly subject to 
criticism. 430 
Moreover it has been argued that the concept of privacy has " ... psychological, social and 
political dimensions which reach far beyond its analysis in the legal context,',431 because 
invasion of privacy involves an" ... assault on individual personality and dignity,"432 and hence 
compelled testimony is a form of" ... injury to individual freedom and dignity."433 The 
himselfknown by others": or alternatively Parent says " ... privacy is the absence of undocumented personal 
know ledge about a person." 
S.D. Warren & L.D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy", (1980) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 at 199. Warren and Brandeis in 
their cJassic paper on Privacy asserted that " ... the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be 
given to public." 
Peter AreneHa refers to compelled self-incrimination as a practice which undermines " ... the individual's capacity to 
control the State's access to his private thoughts, feelings and beliefs". (Pwter Amelia, "Schmerber and the Privilege 
against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal" ( 1982-83) 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 31 at 41-42). 
430 R.A. Wasserstrom, "Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions" in Richard Bronaugh, ed., Philosophical Law 
(Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978) at 322-23. 
431 E.J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Digniy (New York: New York University Law Review, 1964) at 
157. 
432 Ibid. at 179. 
433 Ibid. at 185. 
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damaging aspect of compelled testimony is not restricted to confessing the details of one's 
criminal conduct, but rather the " ... mea culpa, the public admission of the private judgement of 
self-condemnation, that seems to be of real concern. "434 
The Medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas describes forced confession as a sin and as 
the greatest suffering which can be endured. 435 The Catholic Church was clearly sensitive to 
such suffering, as it devised a system for the "sinful" to secretly confess to priests and thus 
maintain the private nature of confessions436• 
Although private and voluntary confession may be good for the soul, the profound sense 
of personal violation involved in compulsory self-incrimination will produce the opposite 
effect.437 The act of forcing an individual to publicly bear his soul will cause him pain, shame 
and embarrassment. 438 
434 Supra note 384 at 91. 
435 Ibid. at 92. 
436 
" ••• In its origins, confession was indeed the spontaneous act of the individual, and was thought to be valueless 
unless inspired solely by love of God and the detestation of sin as an offensive to Him. Gradually, and in the face of 
strong opposition, the desire to open the benefits of confession to greater numbers of people led the Church to make 
it compulsory, and to regard it as effective even if it inspired by the fear of punishment. The understanding of the 
Church fathers that this sort of"coerced" confession could not run itselfto do the work of regenerating the soul is 
shown by the fact that Divine Grace is seen as necessary to fill the gap. It is Divine Grace that can transform a 
confession motivated by mere servile attrition-fear of temporal disgrace-into one motivated by contrition-love of 
God-and thereby give it the significance for the soul of the sinner that it would otherwise lack". (Supra note 384 at 
90.). 
437 Thomas Cartwright a prominent Puritan leader in the 16th century in attacking compelled testimony wrote: 
"Much more is it equall that a mans owne private faults should remayne private to God and him selfe till the lord 
discover them. (Supra note 54 at 34 7). And in regard of this righte consider howe the lord ordained witnesses 
whereby magistrate should seeke into the offenses of his subjects and not by oathe to rifle the secrets of theare 
hearts." 
The context in which Cartwright was writing was with regards to his imprisonment for refusing to take the ex-
officio oath. He was of the view that one's indiscretions are a matter between him and his God. Cartwright 
maintained that private or even public confession was good for the soul, however, confession has to be voluntary, 
otherwise to place one's consciences at the command of the court is degrading and unhealthy. 
"So that to hold the conscience in such a general suspense and not to rest in itself until it pleased another man ... [is] 
to putt the conscience upon the racke and theare to leave it." (Supra note 54 at 348.) 
438 Gerstein says: 
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It should be pointed out that Gerstein argues that the open admission of one's guilt is the 
" ... first step"439 towards rehabilitation. He asserts that verbalization of guilt is the first stage in 
the long process in which the culprit comes to understand the damaging nature of his act, 440 and 
thus by verbalizing his guilt,441 he can then begin to take control of himself and start his 
regeneration.442 A voluntary confession is indeed good for the soul, precisely because it 1 
represents the triumph of the good over the dark side of the offender.443 However, "A confession I 
brought about by physical compulsion or fear is likelier to falsify or distort this process 
[rehabilitation] then to form its culmination. ,,444 
Conclusion 
When his Roman interrogators confronted Christ, he refused to answer, and instead 
through his silence, he demanded his accusers prove the charges against him without his help.445 
However, centuries later his respected follower, Pope Innocent III in 1215 instituted a brutally 
efficient machinery of death called the Inquisition which ended up claiming many innocent 
lives.446 The horrifying prospect of being clutched in the crushing grasp of an inquisition, 
"I would argue that compelled is fundamentally wrong because it interferes with the opportunity for autonomous 
moral development involved in coming to terms with our own wrongdoing, and denies our right to exclusive control 
of that development". (Supra note 54 at 348-49). 
Moreover Dolinko states that compelled self-incrimination may subject an individual to" ... community 
condemnation and ridicule and consequent loss of self-esteem. All of these consequences are likely to inflict a 
substantial degree of pain, suffering, and unhappiness on most people who experience them. (Supra note 349 at 
1103.). It should be pointed out that Dolinko argues that such suffering does not justify the preservation of the 
privilege. His principle argument is that in the interest of the discovering the truth, the privilege against self-
incrimination should be abolished. 
439 Supra note 3 84 at 89. 
440 Ibid. at 90 
441 Ibid. 
442 Ibid. 
443 Ibid. at 89-90. 
444 Ibid. at 90. 
445 Supra note 18 at 94. 
446 Ibid. at 95. 
_, 190 _, 
deprived of the right to challenge your captors or the illegitimacy of your predicament, was 
indeed the height of injustice.447 
The victims of the Inquisition were often caught in the deadly situation of having to 
respond to intense interrogation by a priest. 448 The silence of the accused was equivalent to 
" ... an admission of guilt."449 An admission of heresy was subject to grave punishment;450 yet 
denial involved a serious risk of perjury followed by a deadly disposition.451 It was a no-win 
situation for anyone caught in this unfair predicament. The only recourse of the accused was to 
submit to the will of the Church and beg for mercy. 452 
There was, however, one ray of hope that could potentially provide some form of 
psychological relief for a suspect. 453 This was the proposition that no one shall be " ... compelled 
to accuse himself.',454 This principle did not insulate suspects from aggressive interrogations,455 
but what it meant was that the officials could not simply arrest a person without sufficient 
grounds on the hope that if they shake the tree for long enough, something useful is bound to fall 1 
from it.456 This proposition compelled the officials to refrain from going on a " ... fishing-
expedition',457 in order to force an individual to "originate an accusation against himself.',458 
Thus, the genesis of the privilege against self-incrimination was rooted in imposing an important i 
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Fortunately, we live in a different historical era and we have come a long way from those 
bad old days. Defendants caught up in the criminal process now possess a number of important 
rights that did not exist during the era of the Inquisition, however, I contend that the substance of 
the privilege is still relevant. 
The cruel trilemma of conviction, perjury or contempt still creates a situation where the 
accused person is inserted " .. .in a bottle,"460 like a bug " ... with no place to hide, and no place to 
go."461 The inherent cruelty of putting anyone in such a situation justifies the continued 
existence of the privilege. 
It is my position that any criminal justice system that is built around securing confessions 
contains the potential for abuse and violence, and the privilege can play a meaningful role in 
containing such threatening potential. This is because a suspect could use the privilege to 
demand that the state agents do their own homework, rather than look to him for evidence. 
Despite the intense attacks upon it, the privilege is " ... neither irrational"462 nor 
irrelevant. 463 The essence of the privilege is that it allows an accused person to say to the state 
that: you may have all the resources, you may have the power to tap my phone or to bug my car 
or my home; you may have the power to investigate almost every detail of my life; but while you 
may have all those powers, you cannot force me to assist you to convict me; you will not force 
me to seal my own fate. It is a small concession that seems "reasonable enough,"464 considering 
that we live in a civilized society. 
Having discussed the history and rationales for the privilege against self-incrimination, as 
well as why this ancient right should be preserved, we now turn to the methods of interrogation 
460 Ibid. 
461 Ibid. 
462 Ibid. at 99. 
463 Ibid. 
464 Ibid. 
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used by the police to obtain confessions and incriminating statements. This is an important 
discussion because the review of current police interrogation techniques will graphically show 
that the police may sometimes procure false confessions and involuntary statements. This reality 
ties in directly to the central claim of the thesis advanced in this dissertation, that all police 
interrogations should be abolished in order to protect individual detainees and our criminal 
justice system from false and involuntary confessions. We begin with a discussion of the Reid 
Technique, the most widely used method of interrogation in Canada. 
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Chapter 4: Introduction: The "Art" of Interrogation 
The Persuasiveness of Confession Evidence and the Risk of False Confessions: 
With the exception of DNA evidence, a confession is perhaps the most powerful type of 
evidence that a prosecutor can adduce in furtherance of securing a conviction. In Madam Justice 
Arbour's dissenting opinion in the landmark confessions case R. v. Oickle, she referred to 
confessions as being "the highest and most satisfactory proof of guilt."1 
The question of whether or not a confession will be allowed to enter into evidence may 
be virtually determinative of the outcome of a criminal trial - the exclusion from evidence of a 
full-confession, or an incriminating statement, may turn a losing case for the defence into one 
which enjoys brighter prospects. Moreover, confessions, in their own right, not only provide 
damning evidence of guilt to a jury, but they have also been found to impact upon " ... the 
evaluation of other evidence. "2 A study conducted by Hasel and Kassin concluded that 
confession evidence has an effect upon the perception of eyewitness identifications in the context 
of police line-ups.3 This finding suggests that convincing confession evidence may taint a jury's 
perception of other evidence presented in the courtroom to the detriment of an accused person4 -
a finding which is particularly troubling if we consider the possibility that the confession 
adduced as evidence was a false one. 
1 R. v. Oickle (2000), I4I C.C.C. (3d) 32I (S.C.C.) at para. I4I (dissent). Furthermore, in Wigmore on Evidence 
(Chadbourn rev. I970), vol. 3, 820b at 303, Wigmore writes that this is because "[t]he confession of a crime is 
usually as much against a man's permanent interests as anything well can be ... no innocent man can be supposed 
ordinarily to be willing to risk life, liberty, or property by a false confession. Assuming the confession as an 
undoubted fact, it carries a persuasion which nothing else does, because a fundamental instinct of human nature 
teaches each one of us its significance." 
2 Lisa E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, "On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence: Can Confessions Corrupt 
Eyewitness Identifications?" (2009) 3(2) Psychological Science I at 4. 
3 Ibid. In that study, the researchers found that 6I% of eyewitnesses to a staged crime " ... changed their 
identifications" after having been told that that a different member of a police lineup had confessed. 50% of 
" ... participants who had not made an identification," " ... went on to select the confessor when his identity was 
known." (Ibid. at I). 
4 Ibid. at I. 
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In light of the persuasive effect that confessions and incriminating statements may have 
upon ajury,5 as well as their utility in assisting further investigative efforts,6 police scientists 
have been particularly concerned to develop and refine the art and science of interviewing and 
interrogation. 7 The principles derived from their research have been mastered and skillfully 
applied by interrogators in order to achieve the desired result: to provoke suspects to confess to 
crimes. 
A battery of criticisms can be directed against contemporary North American 
interrogation methods. They're psychologically manipulative through trickery, deceit and 
coercion;8 they're inhumanely taxing of a resistant suspect's mental and physical endurance; and 
they're an affront to human dignity that civilized societies ought not to countenance. Yet these 
criticisms alone, many find less-than sufficient to compel any serious reform to the law (or 
lawfulness) of interrogation techniques. 
But even those who are tolerant of hard interrogation as a means to elicit truthful 
statements from accused persons cannot tolerate a situation where a significant proportion of the 
confessions that are elicited from suspects to support criminal prosecutions are false ones. It is 
debatable whether the goal of effective crime-control is enough to legitimize harsh methods of 
interrogation; however it is beyond debate that crime-control does not legitimize sending 
significant numbers of innocents to prison for crimes that were committed by others. Thus, in 
evaluating interrogation methods, the principal questions that must be considered are whether the 
methods under evaluation cause or contribute to false confessions; if they do, then to what extent 
do they do so; and, finally, what is the effect of any false confession that may have resulted upon 
5 Ibid. 
6 Confessions and incriminating statements procured through interrogation may also be used by investigators to 
develop leads that wi11 enable them to elicit additional evidence for use against the suspect. 
7 Saul M. Kassin, "The Psychology of Confession Evidence" (1997) 52(3) American Psychologist 221 at 221. 
8 Ibid. 
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trial outcomes - that is, do false confessions cause innocent people to go to prison? Setting aside 
the perennial crime-control versus due-process values debate, most reasonable people can agree 
that innocent people should not be jailed, and that the jailing of significant numbers of innocent 
people would be too high a price to pay for catching wrongdoers. If we investigate the 
relationship between contemporary North American interrogation techniques and false 
confessions, and we are uncomfortable with the answers that we find to the three broad questions 
just posed, then it behooves us to consider ways in which to reform our interrogation methods so 
as to remedy the problem of interrogation-induced false confessions. Any other criticisms in our 
salvo, such as those regarding the honesty, civility and human dignity of the methodology itself, 
while worthy of discussion, are ancillary to the primary debate: do the interrogation techniques 
that our law enforcement agencies use cause or contribute to false confessions? 
This thesis claims that the answer to that question is yes. The prevalent present police 
interrogation techniques have a propensity to produce false confessions. This is not a situation 
that can be tolerated in a justice system that strives for fairness. The discussion that will follow 
in this chapter will shed light on how these techniques, as best exemplified by the Reid 
Technique, can cause false confessions. This will assist us to support one of the central claims of 
this thesis, that the Reid Technique of interrogation should no longer be used. 
Contemporary Interrogation Models: 
The high-value of inculpatory evidence coming straight from the suspect has prompted 
police scientists to design an arsenal of psychological interrogation techniques aimed at 
extracting confessions from their subjects. Saul M. Kassin, a leading forensic psychologist who 
works in the area of interrogation and confessions, writes: 
Gone are the days when the police would shine a bright light on suspects, grill them for 24 hours 
at a time, or beat them with a rubber hose, but observational studies have shown that the use of 
physical force has given way to more psychologically oriented techniques, such as feigned 
"' 196 "' 
sympathy and friendship, appeals to God and religion, the use of informants, the presentation of 
false evidence, and other forms of trickery and deception.9 
We need not rely solely on "observational studies" like Professor Kassin's to arrive at the 
judgment that physical coercion has been replaced by psychological manipulation, either. 
Advocates of the Reid Technique, the PEACE model, and other interview and interrogation 
methods have developed and systematized specific strategies and tactics for getting recalcitrant 
suspects to make confessions, and these advocates are quite open about their methods.10 
The most widespread method of interrogation used by North American law enforcement 
personnel is the Reid Technique. Most police officers in Canada are trained in the Reid 
technique. 11 The Reid Technique was first introduced in 1962 and has since then been widely 
disseminated. 12 "Reid consists of two main phases: The behavioural analysis interview (BAI), 
and the nine-step interrogation."13 Reid will be explained in greater depth later in this chapter. 
A recently-published study by King and Snook, in which the researchers analyzed 44 
video-recorded interrogations of criminal suspects in Canadian interrogation rooms, showed that, 
"on average, interrogators used 34% of the components composing the nine-step Reid model"14 
in any given interview. 15 The data, therefore, suggest that while the entirety of the Reid 
Technique16 is not typically used from start-to-finish, about one-third of its tactics will be used in 
9 Ibid. 
10 See, for example: Brian C. Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley, The Investigator Anthology: A Compilation of Articles 
and Essays about The Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation (Chicago: John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., 
2008); and Mary Schollum, Investigative Interviewing: The Literature (We11ington: The Office of the Commissioner 
of Police, 2005). 
11 Brent Snook et al. "Reforming Investigative Interviewing in Canada" (20 I 0) 52 Canadian J. Criminology & Crim. 
Just. 215 at 217. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. at 2 I 7-218. 
14 Lesley King & Brent Snook, "Peering Inside a Canadian Interrogation Room: An Examination of the Reid Model 
of Interrogation, Influence Tactics, and Coercive Strategies" (2009) 36 Criminal Justice and Behaviour 674 at 674. 
See also pg. 690. 
IS Ibid. 
16 The Reid Technique consists of nine-steps. These steps will be explained later. 
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the average Canadian interrogation. The Reid Technique, thus, affects many of the persons who 
are detained by the state's law enforcement agents. In light of the weight that confession 
evidence is typically accorded at trial, the rate of success or failure of the Reid tactics to prompt 
confessions undoubtedly has an appreciable impact upon trial outcomes, and ultimately on rates 
of conviction. 17 Furthermore, the propensity, or lack thereof, of the Reid tactics to induce false 
confessions will, likewise, have an appreciable impact upon the percentage of convictions which 
are wrongful ones. On account of its potential influence upon trial outcomes, the Reid 
Technique should be given consideration in the discussion that follows. Specific attention will 
be paid to the ramifications of using modern-day psychological police interrogation. 
The Reid Technique and other psychological interrogation methods have been the subject 
of controversy, mostly around issues of fairness to the accused and because it is unclear to what 
extent the techniques jeopardize suspects by potentially railroading them into false confessions. 
Debates surrounding the Reid Technique, and surrounding interrogation generally, are thus 
focused upon a number of disagreements about what the substance of appropriate police 
interrogation practices ought to be, with a view to finding the technique that extracts reliable and 
voluntary confessions and not involuntary false ones. The answer to the question of which is the 
best tactical approach to interrogation may be motivated by considerations that include: personal 
political orientation, views about human nature, opinions about the appropriate level of 
interference by the state with an individual's right to privacy, whether there should be a right to 
silence and how expansive should it be if there should be one, views about whether or not 
specific acts in the context of interrogation are humane or inhumane, the extent of tolerable 
pressure or manipulation of a suspect in the interrogation context, opinions about the sanctity of 
17 A more in-depth discussion ofthe apprehension of confession evidence by judges and juries, in their roles as triers 
of fact, will appear below. In this discussion I will provide thoroughgoing explanation of why trial outcomes are 
affected by false confession evidence, based on current scientific research. 
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the presumption of innocence and the Crown's burden of proof, and conclusions about the 
current evidence of forensic psychology and its effects. 
Putting all of these discussions to one side for a moment, we should instead hone in on 
the most crucial question that ought to instruct which particular practices should comprise part of 
a legally-sanctioned police interrogation: let us focus upon what the likelihood is that the use of 
any given interrogation technique or combination of techniques upon a detained suspect will 
result in that suspect making a false confession. 
Unlike the other considerations stated above, the question of the likelihood of inducing 
false confessions from innocents is not in any significant way coloured by ideological 
persuasion18 or individual political proclivities; it is an empirical question. 19 The sole criteria 
required to accept the relevance of this issue to the interrogation and confessions debate is that 
we first accept the following premises: (1) that confession evidence carries a great deal of weight 
at trial;20 (2) that it is difficult to show that confessions give and later recanted were initially 
given involuntarily; (3) and that it therefore follows that a confession extracted upon 
interrogation creates a substantial likelihood of conviction.21 This conclusion forms the content 
of the first premise. 
The second premise is that regardless of your political or ideological persuasion, you 
accept the idea that sending an innocent person to jail for a crime he did not commit is abhorrent 
to the very concept of justice, and instances of this should be minimized to as great an extent as 
possible without unduly compromising other values that are of equal or greater importance. The 
18 Supra note 7 at 224. 
19 Ibid at 230. 
20 Ibid. at 221. 
21 Ibid. 
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idea that innocents should not be incarcerated is as close to the notion of natural justice as a 
concept can get, and as an axiom, does not require debate. 22 
Ideological considerations are important; however they must only enter into the debate 
after a satisfactory answer to the empirical question23 - which interrogation tactics provoke false 
confessions - is found, and we have the correct information at our disposal. 
The ideological considerations, requiring values-judgments as they do, are more-or-less 
reducible to the struggle between Herbert Packer's crime-control versus due-process models in 
the political sphere of criminal justice. The answer to the query, how much or how little due-
process shall be given to suspects and accused persons, requires the balancing of due-process 
imperatives with other societal imperatives, and in particular, with crime-control imperatives. 
Thus, even after the empirical question is answered, the ideological debate will persist on the 
basis of an optimization problem:24 there is no self-evidently correct answer to how much due-
process or how much crime-control our society should strive for. It depends on what we decide 
we want. 
The optimization problem,25 as it pertains specifically to the interrogation and confession 
debate, is this: how many false-confession driven wrongful convictions can society tolerate in 
22 Re: B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [ 1985] 2 S.C.R. 486. The Supreme Court recognized the principle that the innocent 
should not be punished as a principle of fundamental justice in the Motor Vehicle Reference. "It has from time 
immemorial been part of our system of laws that the innocent not be punished. This principle has long been 
recognized as an essential element of a system for the administration of justice which is founded upon a belief in the 
dignity and worth of the human person and on the rule of law. It is so old that its first enunciation was in Latin actus 
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea." (paragraph 67) 
23 Supra note 7 at 222. 
24 Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, "The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and 
Classification of True and False Confessions" in Studies in Law Politics & Society vol. 16 (JAI Press, 1997) at 16. 
See also Gisli H. Gudjonsson. The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook (West Sussex: John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2003) at 325 and Richard A. Leo, "False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions" in 
Saudra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey, eds. Wrongly Convicted: Perspectives on Failed Justice (Piscataway: 
Rutgers University Press, 2001) 36 at 38. 
25 Ofshe & Leo, Ibid. at I 0; Gudjonsson, Ibid.; Leo, Ibid.; Miron Zuckerman, Bella M. DePaulo & Robert Rosenthal, 
"Verbal and nonverbal communication of deception" ( 1981) 14 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology I at 
34; Eric Y. Drogin, Mark E. Howard & John Williams, "Restorative Justice: The Influence of Psychology from a 
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view of the flip-side of the coin, which is that reducing the intensity or degree of manipulation of 
police interrogations may allow suspects who would otherwise be charged and convicted to 
escape justice. What is the appropriate balance to be struck between the two values - that we 
must bring wrongdoers to justice, yet not persecute innocents in doing so, in light of the 
empirical data? 
Unfortunately, while we can make efforts to resolve outstanding empirical questions 
relating to police interrogation methods, we have not yet had the opportunity to test, in the same 
society, what the effect of limiting the intensity or manipulative character of interrogations or 
doing-away with them altogether would be upon crime-control values, and specifically upon 
bringing culpable persons to justice. As a purely empirical question (again), the question of what 
the effect of eliminating the interrogation of suspects or accused person would be cannot be 
answered because it has never been tried. 26 
Furthermore, if we merely reduce the pressure and degree of manipulation of 
interrogations, we will still be permitting some number of false confessions; if we ratchet-up the 
pressure and degree of manipulation then the number of false confessions will increase along 
with the number of involuntary true ones. The debate will then arise whether and to what extent 
society can tolerate involuntary true confessions. And so on. 
Outside the optimization problem and the debate between due-process proponents and 
crime-control proponents (on the picayune details as well as the big questions), there is a 
principled position that says that in our adversarial system of criminal procedure, an accused 
person should never be made to cause harm to his own interests or even be invited to do so 
voluntarily by the state. If an accused person is truly presumed innocent, and the Crown truly 
Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective" in David Carson & Ray Bull, eds. Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts, 
2nd ed. (Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2003) 423 at 424. 
26 Supra note 7 at 222. 
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bears the burden of proof to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence, then a 
suspect or accused person should never even be asked whether he committed the crime, or 
requested to explain-away other evidence collected by investigators as though his innocence 
depended on his ability to do so. The state bears the burden of proof, so let them collect their 
own evidence showing guilt of their allegation against him without consulting the accused; the 
accused enjoys the presumption of innocence, so let the accused sit-back and make the state 
prove its allegation(s) against him, without coaxing, persuading, badgering or browbeating him 
to say something (which itself may or may not be incriminating) in his defence. Without court-
tested proof showing otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt, he is an innocent man and need not 
utter a word in his defence to the unproven allegations, this view would contend. 
Notwithstanding this principled viewpoint, the realization of an outright ban on police 
interrogation, at least without replacing it with something else to satisfy the proponents of 
stringent crime-control, is a pipe-dream. Thus, after having canvassed in this chapter the 
existing body of forensic psychology literature and other research informing this debate, we must 
develop a defensible position within the context of the optimization problem and the due-process 
versus crime-control debate that will be an improvement upon the current law of interrogation in 
that it more adequately minimizes the risk of false confessions, yet does not completely 
undermine the capability of law enforcement to solve crimes in so doing. 
It behooves us, on account of the foregoing discussion, to give the Reid Technique 
ample consideration in our discussion about the ramifications of using modem-day psychological 
police interrogation; we must determine whether the Reid Technique and other interview and 
interrogation models are causing innocent persons to make false confessions, as many detractors 
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and reformists argue that they are, and then allow the perennial ideological debate to be driven 
by the best data available. 
Different Methodological Approaches to the Extraction of Confessions: Interview versus 
Interrogation 
Within the framework of the optimization debate we will find a distinction made. 
Proponents of respective interrogation methods have published training manuals for the purpose 
of disseminating their techniques to law enforcement personnel. 27 The various training programs 
have been understood to contain many points of agreement.28 However, there is a basic 
distinction between the concepts of "interview", on the one hand, and "interrogation" on the 
other.29 Both have as their objective, the extraction from the accused of incriminating evidence; 
either a confession, or an incriminating statement that falls short of a full confession, or a 
statement against interest that assists in the investigation and the gathering of evidence. The 
difference between the two approaches is methodological, and each category may have a 
significant amount of variety within it, as well: both are ostensibly motivated by a desire to 
increase voluntary-true confessions while decreasing false confessions, whether voluntary or 
involuntary, to the greatest extent possible. 
If we consider the methods by which confessions can be obtained on a spectrum of 
coerciveness with truly voluntary ones at the least coercive end of the spectrum, and brutal, 
protracted torture at the most coercive end, then modem day techniques of interview and 
psychological interrogation will appear somewhere between these two extremes, with interviews 
seemingly falling closer to voluntary confessions and interrogations falling closer to the torture 
27 As discussed, the Reid Technique is the most widely-used interrogation method in North American interrogation 
rooms. 
28 J.P. Blair, "What do We Know About Interrogation in the United States?" (2006) 20(2) Journal of Police and 
Criminal Psychology 44 at 44. 
29 Ibid. at 45. 
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end of the spectrum, relative to each other, in terms of the level of coerciveness present. Each 
type may be distinguished from other possible classifications along the spectrum by the presence 
or absence of certain tactics (each of which we shall discuss).30 Thus, a truly voluntary 
confession is unprompted and does not require the use of any interrogation tactics; an interview 
will have fewer coercive and overtly manipulative techniques than an interrogation; and an 
interrogation, while more coercive than an interview, does not enter into the realm of physical 
brutality. 
However, the same distribution of techniques does not necessarily hold true when we 
consider (as opposed to coercion) the spectrum of deceit and trickery. We can say without 
controversy that at the essence of it, a truly voluntary confession or one that was coerced by 
torture, is not deceitful or treacherous. Some deceit may have been at play in any scenario 
considered, but it was not the deceit that prompted the confession; rather, in the case of a truly 
voluntary confession, it was the subject's free-will, and in the case of a confession obtained by 
torture, it was the physical coercion applied. On the other hand, the question of which one, 
between psychological interrogation, or alternatively, PEACE-inspired investigative 
interviewing, is the more deceitful, is an open question. It is one that shall be explored below. 
Crucially, both coercion and deception are ways in which the free-choice of the suspect 
to confess or refrain from doing so, whether through invocation of the right to silence where it 
applies, or by lying, may be defeated by the interrogator. Thus, in order to extract a confession 
from an unwilling suspect in subversion of his choice not to confess, deception must change his 
understood perception of the situation he finds himself in, coercion must compel him through 
pressure to confess, or both strategies must be used together. 
30 See the discussion in this chapter. 
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But with this reductionist view in mind of the two principal forces at work in the 
interrogation room setting, as well as the object that they act upon, the free will of a particular 
individual, we have surmised an understanding of what any particular tactic may be aimed at 
achieving. We can make reference to these forces and the relationship between them as we seek 
to describe in more detail what is actually occurring in the interrogation room, and discuss how it 
is regulated or ought to be regulated, respectively, through law or policy initiatives. 
The Dangers of Trving to Coax a Confession from a Suspect - the False Confession: 
Certain scholars have concluded that the criminal justice system provides inadequate 
protection for persons who have been branded as suspects.31 Saul M. Kassin has identified three 
specific problems associated with confession evidence obtained from interrogations. These are 
that: "(a) the police routinely use deception, trickery, and psychologically coercive methods of 
interrogation; (b) these methods may, at times, cause innocent people to confess to crimes they 
did not commit; and (c) when coerced self-incriminating statements are presented in the 
courtroom, juries do not sufficiently discount such evidence in reaching a verdict."32 We can 
recast Kassin's three problems somewhat more broadly, as research questions, for they are, in 
fact his conclusions in relation to the following broad questions. The three problems that Kassin 
raises are, respectively, answers to the following more general questions: (1) how do police 
conduct an interrogation33 and what are their intentions and motivations in making the 
methodological choices that they make?; (2) in which ways do suspects react to the methods that 
interrogators confront them with, and why?34; and (3) when confessions are introduced as 
evidence, how does the trier of fact view them and what challenges are associated with 
31 Supra note 7. 




accurately evaluating them?35 Rather then taking Kassin's conclusions at face value, I shall 
survey the existing literature and seek both to answer these questions, and to gain a nuanced 
understanding of the processes that are at play. 
In addition to Kassin's three problems, there is a fourth problem that requires exploration. 
Contemporary jurisprudence allows for the admissibility of confessions obtained through the use 
of modern psychological interrogation techniques because these techniques are thought not to 
interfere, under regular circumstances, with the voluntariness of the statement. Recasting this 
problem as a question, we must ask: (4) how has contemporary jurisprudence created and 
defined the boundaries of permissible interrogation in Canada, and what changes to law or policy 
would improve the criminal justice process with respect to this issue? We must understand how 
the existing legal environment influences the scope of modern-day interrogation techniques and 
improve accordingly. 
To gain a richer understanding of the subject of interrogation and confessions it will be 
helpful to discuss these four questions in considerable detail. I shall try to provide answers to 
them. 
Additionally, research conducted recently has provided new insights with respect to 
Kassin's three problems. This research will form an integral component of the analysis that 
follows. Brandon Garrett published a 2010 article in the Stanford Law Review wherein he 
endeavoured to take an alternative approach to the one taken in earlier studies. Whereas earlier 
research had been focused principally on discovering the techniques of psychological coercion 
and manipulation that police use that may tend to promote false confessions, Garrett attacked the 
problem of false confessions from the perspective of the wrongfully convicted. Garrett's article 
took " ... a different approach by examining the substance of false confessions, including what 
35 Ibid. 
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was said during interrogations and how confessions were litigated at trial. "36 He examined the 
existing record of persons who had been wrongfully convicted of criminal offenses in the United 
States, and then subsequently exonerated by DNA testing. 37 Of the 252 exonerations in this 
category, he found that 42 had given false confessions.38 Of these 42 cases, pretrial and trial 
transcripts, as well as the confessions themselves, were available for 38 of the cases.39 He 
investigated the confessions themselves as well as the post-confession narratives, the court 
transcripts of the proceedings against the accused confessors, and the post-conviction accounts of 
the wrongfully-convicted, in an effort to gain a richer understanding of the phenomenon of the 
false confession.40 Thus, Garrett's intended research agenda fit within the framework of 
Kassin's second and third problems: that is, what causes interrogated-persons to falsely confess; 
and how is (the false) confession evidence treated in the courtroom? 
Through his research, and by drawing a necessary implication from the post-conviction 
narratives and trial transcripts, Garrett made a startling discovery. Garrett found that the 
wrongfully-convicted did not simply capitulate to police-pressure or trickery and provide an 
unelaborated admission of guilt. He found that they not only confessed; but they provided 
detailed accounts of the specifics of the alleged crime: 
In the cases studied here, innocent people not only falsely confessed, but they also offered 
surprisingly rich, detailed, and accurate information. Exonerees told police much more than just 
'I did it.' In all cases but two (ninety-seven percent- or thirty-six of the thirty eight- of the 
exonerees for whom trial or pretrial records could be obtained), police reported that suspects 
confessed to a series of specific details concerning how the crime occurred.41 
36 Brandon L. Garrett, "The Substance of False Confessions" (20 1 0) 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1051 at 1053. 
37 This sample totaled 250 individuals. There were 2 individuals who Garrett did not include in his sample because 
their exonerations came after his work had been submitted for publication, but prior to actual publication. 
38 In other words, 16% of wrongfully convicted persons had provided false confessions. Though Garrett's research 
can provide us with no data about the percentage of convicted-persons who have been wrongfully convicted, it does 
tell us that a substantial portion of the wrongful convictions that do occur, may be caused by false confessions. This 
conclusion flies in the face of the assertions of pro-interrogation advocates like the Reid Institute, who claim that 
false confessions are something that virtually never occurs. 
39 Supra note 36 at I 060-61. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. at 1054. 
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Of the thirty-six exonerees who had provided details, many42 provided "nonpublic facts", 
that is, facts that had not been made the subject of public knowledge during the course of police 
investigations, which ostensibly, only the person who had committed the crime43 and the 
investigators could possibly know.44 These facts included ones that matched the crime scene 
evidence or scientific evidence or the accounts of the victim.45 Moreover, Garrett informs us, 
"Detectives sometimes specifically testified that they had assiduously avoided contaminating the 
confessions by not asking leading questions, but rather allowing the suspects to volunteer crucial 
facts."46 Evidently, someone was lying at trial, and the DNA tests show that that person was not 
the accused. 47 
As stated in the introduction, according to Garrett, false confessions " ... are carefully 
constructed during an interrogation and then reconstructed during the criminal trial that 
follows. ,,4s 
On the basis of this discovery, Garrett has inadvertently made an additional important 
contribution to providing further clarification on Kassin's first problem; that of how the police 
42 In 27 cases of the thirty-eight, or 71 percent. Ibid. at 1057. 
43 Ibid. at 1078. 
44 Ibid at 1053. 
Garrett further tells us that "Only two of the thirty-eight exonerees [for whom pretrial and trial documents were 
available], Travis Hayes and Freddie Peacock, relayed no specific information concerning the crime. Hayes was still 
convicted, although DNA testing conducted before trial excluded him and his co-defendant. Peacock was mentally 
disabled and all he could say to the police about the crime was 'I did it, I did it.' The other thirty-six exonerees each 
reportedly volunteered key details about the crime, including facts that matched the crime scene evidence or 
scientific evidence or accounts by the victim. Detectives further emphasized in twenty-seven cases - or seventy-one 
percent of the thirty eight cases with transcripts obtained- that the details confessed were nonpublic or corroborated 
facts." (Ibid at 1 057). 
45 Ibid. at 1 057. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Police lying at trial may be taken as yet another reason in favour of videotaping confessions. Although it is 
argued here that videotaping is not a foolproof solution, since it captures only the final product in the sense of 
"lights, camera, action", and it does not show the events that preceded the accused being put before the camera and 
recorded. For further discussion of police perjury, see also the following: Michael Goldsmith, "Reforming the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871: The Problem of Police Perjury" (2004-2005) 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1259; Gabriel Chin and 
Scott Wells, "Blue Wall of Silence as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury" 
(1997-1998) 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 233. 
48 Supra note 36 at 1056. 
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procure confessions. It appears that it may be proper not only to refer to the "police-induced 
false confessions"49 where psychological pressures and leading questions cause an accused to 
falsely confess to a crime he did not commit; but it may also be accurate to speak of the "police-
engineered" false confession. 
A. How do Police Conduct Interrogations: The Uses and Abuses of Trickery, Deception and 
Psychological Coercion in the Interrogation Room 
Without physical coercion being legally permissible in the interrogation setting, trickery, 
deception and psychological coercion have increased to compensate. David Simon, spent a year 
with the Baltimore homicide detectives, 50 formed strong opinions about the personality traits that 
police interrogators seem to display. He stated that: 
... a salesman, a huckster as thieving and silver-tongued as any man who ever moved 
used cars or aluminum siding, more so, in fact, when you consider that he's selling long 
prison terms to customers who have no genuine need for the product. 51 
A 1996 observational study of interrogations conducted by psychologist Richard Leo 
indicates that American interrogators used a mean of 5.62 different tactics of psychological 
manipulation per interrogation with the range from amongst the entire sample of 182 
interrogations being from "0 to 15 tactics"52 used. 53 A similar 2009 Canadian study by King and 
Snook produced similar data, indicating a mean use of 5.0 tactics per interview across a sample-
size of 44-interrogations. 54 As previously noted, approximately one-third of the components of 
49 Ibid. at 1065. 
50 Supra note 7. 
51 David Simon, Homicide: A year on the killing streets (New York: Ivy Books, 1991) at 213. 
52 Supra note 28 at 49. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Supra note 14 at 691. 
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the Reid Technique's nine-step model are used in the average Canadian interrogation. 55 
Conversely (and thankfully) neither study reported any significant degree of physical coercion. 56 
The Basic Interrogation Tactics: 
Before giving specific consideration to the Reid Technique as an ideal-type (i.e. what the 
Reid Institute teaches as its method) and before comparing it to the PEACE model 57, let us look 
at data indicating what is actually happening and take inventory of the full range of tactics that 
appear to be used by modern police interrogators in North America. 
In his important article "Inside the Interrogation Room", 58 Professor Richard Leo 
conducted research using a data-set of 182 interrogations59 (122live interrogations60 and 60 
video recorded ones).61 As part of this research, Leo recorded the frequency with which 
interrogators deployed 25 discrete influence tactics advocated by interrogation training manuals, 
as well as 10 identifiable coercive strategies in American interrogation rooms. King and Snook's 
similar 2009 study analyzed, in a contemporary Canadian context, the use of23 of Leo's 25 
influence tactics and 10 coercive strategies;62 as well, King and Snook made observations on the 
specific use of Reid model components and Reid guidelines and suggestions. 63 Because the 
Reid Technique is the most influential interrogation model in North America, King and Snook's 
55 Supra note 14. 
56 Ibid.; and Richard A. Leo, "Inside the Interrogation Room" (1996) 86(2) J. Crim. L. & Criminology 266. 
57 The PEACE model is an alternative interrogation model to the Reid Technique. This model, its history, and its 
implications for false confessions are discussed thoroughly in Chapter 6. 
58 Leo, supra note 56. 
59 Ibid. at 269. 
60 Ibid. at 268. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Supra note 14 at 679. 
63 Ibid at 680. King and Snook ask the following three additional important questions, which we will turn to 
elsewhere: First: "Is interrogation outcome related to the proportion of the nine-step model used or the number of 
additional guidelines and suggestions, influence tactics, or coercive strategies used?"; second: is it true, as the Reid 
model assumes, that "preventing denials leads to more confessions?"; and third: is it true, as the Reid model 
assumes, that "providing an alternative question leads to more confessions?" 
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observational data provides a valued contribution to the current body of research on police uses 
and abuses of interview and interrogation methods. 64 
Without yet having had regard to the quantitative aspects of the two studies, we may rely 
upon them as authorities informing us of the types of deceptive interrogation techniques and 
coercive strategies that are potentially available to interrogators. We shall return to the 
quantitative data later. The 1996 Leo study and the 2009 King and Snook study provide us, at 
the very least, with a 'laundry list' of the tactics and strategies that police interrogators use in the 
practice of their craft. 
The 25 influence tactics that Richard Leo identified through the observation of 182 police 
interrogations are as follows:65 
( 1) "appeal to the suspect's self interest; 
(2) confront the suspect with existing evidence of guilt; 
(3) undermine the suspect's confidence in denial of guilt; 
(4) identify contradictions in the suspect's story; 
( 5) Any behavioural analysis interview questions; 
( 6) appeal to the importance of cooperation; 
(7) offer moral justifications/psychological excuses for the offence; 
(8) confront the suspect with false evidence of guilt; 
(9) use praise or flattery; 
(1 0) appeal to the detective's expertise or authority; 
(11) appeal to the suspect's conscience; 
(12) minimize the moral seriousness of the offence; 
64 Ibid. at 692. 
65 Leo, supra note 56 at 278. 
-211-
(13) touch the suspect in a friendly manner; 
(14) invoke metaphors of guilt; 
( 15) minimize the facts or nature of the offence; 
(16) refer to physical symptoms of guilt; 
(17) exaggerate the facts/ nature of the offence; 
( 18) yell at the suspect; 
( 19) exaggerate the nature/purpose of the questioning; 
(20) exaggerate the moral seriousness of the offence; 
(21) accuse the suspect of other crimes; 
(22) attempt to confuse the suspect; 
(23) minimize the nature/purpose of the questioning; 
(24) good cop/bad cop routine; and 
(25) touch the suspect in an unfriendly manner."66 
The 10 coercive strategies drawn from Leo's work are as follows: 
(1) "suspect was not read rights to silence and legal counsel; 
(2) interrogator threatened suspect with psychological pain; 
(3) interrogator touched the suspect in an unfriendly manner;67 
(4) interrogator's questioning manner was unrelenting, badgering or hostile; 
( 5) interrogator promised the suspect leniency in exchange for an admission of guilt; 
(6) suspect is not permitted to invoke his or her rights to silence or legal counsel; 
(7) suspect was in obvious physical pain; 
(8) interrogator deprived the suspect of an essential necessity; 
66 Ibid. 
67 Same as item 25 of the interrogation tactics. 
,.., 212,.., 
(9) suspect was in obvious psychological pain; and 
(10) interrogation lasted longer than 6 hours."68 
These coercive strategies are such that if visible in a video-recorded interrogation they 
will be fertile ground for a defence lawyer to argue, on a voir dire, that any confession which 
resulted should be excluded from evidence as involuntarily given. This makes the coercive 
strategies distinguishable from the influence tactics69, which will not so easily be seen by courts 
to engage the issue of voluntariness. 
The data between the 1996 Leo study and the 2009 King and Snook study on the 
percentage of interrogations containing the use of a coercive strategy was inconsistent, leading to 
some difficulty in determining the pervasiveness of psychological coercion in the interrogation 
room. 
70 Whereas the study by Leo identified the use of coercive strategies in only 2% of 
interrogations, 71 the King and Snook study identified them in 25% of interrogations, 72 if one 
included the failure to caution suspects on their rights to silence and counsel on camera, and in 
9% of interrogations if one assumed that the rights to silence and counsel were administered off-
camera prior to the interrogation. 73 There appear to be many possible variations for this 
explanation. Possibilities that may account for it include: that Leo's data set was gathered from 
interrogations conducted in the United States, whereas King and Snook's data was gathered from 
interrogations in Canada and Canada's interrogators are more abusive;74 that Leo's data was 
collected thirteen years prior to King and Snook's 75 and police interrogations have changed since 
that time; that Leo's data-set (i.e. the interrogation videos) was more scrupulously vetted for 
68 Supra note 14 at 689. 
69 Please see footnote 56 at 281; See also supra note 14 at 674. 
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74 This reason, if it were to be true, suggests no convincing explanation. 
15 Supra note 14 at 679. 
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abuses by the police before giving him tapes of the data76 (although about one-third of the 
interrogations that Leo observed were 'live' interrogations); King and Snook's relatively smaller 
sample skewed the data 77 and that Leo's is a more accurate representation; or that there were 
differences in the perception 78 of the researchers in the respective studies. 79 No doubt, additional 
studies need to be conducted to discover an average of the data across many sample-sets and to 
get a more accurate picture of exactly what is transpiring in interrogation rooms. 80 
King and Snook went a step further in their 2009 study than Leo did in his 1996 study, by 
analyzing the use of both specific Reid techniques in police interrogations, and classifying them 
according to type of tactic (i.e. maximization or minimization) and type of"theme" (i.e. 
emotional or non-emotional). 81 Again, for the purpose of ascertaining the entire scope of tactics 
available to police interrogators, the Reid techniques observed, as well as their characterization 
by type of tactic and by theme type (as classified by King and Snook) are as follows: 82 
(1) "Appeal to suspect's pride with flattery (minimization tactic/emotional theme); 
(2) Play one offender against the other (maximization tactic/non-emotional theme); 
(3) Minimize the moral seriousness of the offence (minimization tactic/emotional theme); 
( 4) Point out the futility of resisting telling the truth (maximization tactic/non-emotional theme); 
(5) Sympathize with suspect by condemning others (minimization tactic/emotional theme); 
(6) Use third person theme (minimization tactic/emotional theme); 
(7) Anyone else under similar circumstances might have done the same (minimization 
tactic/emotional theme); 
76 Ibid. at 692. 
n Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. That is, that King and Snook are far more vigilant against or sensitive to coercive abuses than Richard Leo. 
80 Ibid. at 691. 
81 Ibid. at 679-680. 
82 Ibid at 686. 
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(8) Suggest non-criminal intent for the offense (minimization tactic/non-emotional theme); 
(9) Point out the possibility of exaggeration on the part of the accuser or victim (minimization 
tactic/emotional theme); 
(I 0) Point out the consequences and futility of continuation of criminal behaviour (maximization 
tactic/emotional theme); and 
(II) Exaggerate the nature and seriousness of the offence (maximization tactic/emotional 
theme). "83 
The Reid 'suggestions and guidelines' that King and Snook observed police interrogators 
being mindful of are as follows: 
(I) "Did not pace room; 
(2) Suspect not handcuffed/shackled during interrogation; 
(3) Has evidence folder in hand upon entry/beginning of the interrogation; 
(4) No telephone in room; 
(5) No small loose objects within the suspect's reach; 
(6) No handshake between the suspect and the interrogator upon meeting; 
(7) Suspect alone in interrogation room prior to entry of interrogator; 
(8) Straight-back chairs; 
(9) No decorative ornaments in the room; 
(I 0) Interrogator and suspect seated to directly face each other; 
(II) Polygraph offer made to suspect; 
(12) Police caution given by someone other than primary interrogator."84 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. at 687. 
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King and Snook additionally took note of the use of the core components of the Reid 
Technique in the interrogations they observed. 85 These components are: 
(1) "changed theme if the suspect continued to reject theme; 
(2) Allowed suspect to voice objections 
(3) Returned to the beginning of the crime when the suspect made a partial admission of guilt 
(4) Proposed at least one theme for the crime's commission 
( 5) Gave transition statement 
( 6) Looked through evidence folder 
(7) Provided sympathy if the suspected cried 
(8) Used alternative questioning 
(9) Did not allow repetition of denial 
(10) Started the interrogation with direct statement indicating certainty in guilt 
( 11) Moved closer to the suspect throughout interrogation 
(12) Used visual aids to procure suspect's attention 
(13) Reconfirmed belief in guilt after the suspect denials 
( 14) reiterated a moral excuse/theme after suspect denials 
(15) Reiterated theme after suspect objection 
(16) Made statement of reinforcement after suspect alternative acceptances 
(17) Behavioural pause after initial direct statement indicating certainty in suspect guilt."86 
With a bird's-eye view of the range of tactics known to be used in North American 
interrogation rooms, let us now turn to an analysis of the most popular interrogation 
methodology, the Reid Technique, and discuss its nine-step framework in detail. This discussion 
85 Ibid. at 683. 
86 Ibid. 
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is important for our purposes, because of the prevalent use of the Reid method in North America. 
We need to undertake an in-depth analysis of it in order to substantiate our claim that it should be 
prohibited from use. 
The Reid Technique of Interrogation: 
The 2009 study by King and Snook found that "most interrogations followed the 
guidelines, suggestions and themes endorsed by Inbau, Reid, Buckley, and Jayne."87 These 
techniques have been " ... taught to more than 300,000 investigators around the world."88 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that these techniques are effective at producing 
incriminating statements89 (irrespective of the important question of whether they are true or 
false ones, of course). However, this data necessarily succumbs to the criticism of the 
measurement problem; there is just no way of knowing what percentage of the confessions 
wrung out of the suspects were false ones, 90 and therefore there is not an accurate way to 
measure the success of specific Reid tactics or other interrogation tactics. 
The tactics fit into a broader framework of custodial interrogation that consists of three 
phases. Respectively: (1) factual analysis;91 (2) behavioural analysis;92 and (3) the 9-step 
interrogation. 93 Let us discuss the content of each of the phases, in turn, as well as issues raised 
by each. 
87 Ibid. at 674. 
88 Ibid at 675. 
89 Ibid. at 690. 
90 Ibid. at 692. 
91 Jayne & Buckley, supra note I 0 at 2. 
92 Ibid. at 3. 
93 Ibid. at 11. 
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Factual Analysis: 
Factual analysis is defined by Reid proponents as "estimating the probability of a 
suspect's guilt or innocence based on investigative findings. "94 Investigators use the factual 
analysis to cross-off from their list of suspects those whom they deem to be innocent, and to 
eventually zero-in on the persons they evaluate as most likely to have committed the offence 
under investigation.95 Many investigators consider factual analysis to be a "sixth sense"96 and so 
it is not typically" ... taught in a structured format."97 
The key problem with factual analysis is, precisely, the over-reliance on "sixth-sense" 
intuitions in evaluating key elements of suspect behaviour and other evidence. The Reid 
technicians appear to be very fond of promulgating so-called investigators' "rules of thumb", 
which consist, broadly speaking, of judgments relating to a suspect's likely guilt or innocence, 
based on common indications of the various types of evidence that an investigator may 
encounter. While there is probably some merit to these rules of thumb, they undoubtedly require 
investigators to rely on certain tacit assumptions about human behaviour98 or about the way the 
world operates, which may or may not apply, in actual fact, to the case under investigation. The 
danger, naturally, with an over-reliance on these rules of thumb, is that the investigators will fail 
to give consideration to the full range of possibilities, and will fail to perform the proper due-
diligence in respect of the available evidence before arriving at the conclusion at the prima facie 
determination of a suspect's guilt. This presumptive-guilt99 prejudices the suspect in every 




98 Timothy E. Moore & Cind~ R. Wasser, "Social Science and Witness Reliability: Reliable Science Begets ReJiabJe 
Evidence" (2006) 33 C.R. (6 ) at 13. 
99 Ibid. 
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. d fi . b' 100 • interaction with the investigator that follows because It has create a con Irmatlon- Ias In 
favour of perceiving what the suspect says and how the suspect behaves as being confirmatory of 
the presumed-guilt. While a sixth-sense is important, and is also an unavoidable aspect of 
investigation, it should be secondary to the rigorous application of logical reasoning to facts from 
a starting point of presumed-innocence. When making an evaluation of the likelihood of guilt of 
a suspect, an investigator should seek to be objective, and clear his or her mind of prejudices and 
preconceived notions. The rules of thumb are dangerous, because they are essentially the 
codification ofprejudice. 101 
The factual analysis is divided, according to the Reid Technique, into five constituent 
parts: "Opportunity/Access; Attitude; Motivation; Biographical Information; and Evidence."102 
Moreover, "factual analysis requires two different types of comparisons: intra-suspect 
comparisons (between different suspects) and heuristic comparisons (between what is commonly 
observed or expected)."103 Let us discuss the components of the factual analysis phase. 
100 Ibid. 
101 The term prejudice can have unpleasant connotations associated with unfairness, stereotyping and improper 
discrimination. I don't intend to moralize here about whether pre-judgments are always reprehensible or whether 
they can be a useful shortcut to making decisions in some situations. It would appear that most people succumb, in 
their personal lives to some degree of prejudice, for better or, more often perhaps, for worse. Where such 
preconceived notions become problematic is when they corrupt a process which is supposed to be fair and impartial 
and is supposed to accord an accused the presumption of innocence. When this prejudice results in the unfair 
targeting of some classes of person, the cause of justice is undermined. 
It may be argued that given the adversarial nature of the system, the responsibility of fairness is one that should be 
left to the courts, and that the crown should remain free to conduct its investigations in its own interests in an 
aggressive way and without safeguards of fairness for the suspect or accused. But this is not consistent with the 
duties of the Crown in the trial process, so why should it be considered to be so during the pre-trial process? The 
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized this reality and held that the police are not immune from liability under the 
law of negligence, and owe a duty of care in negligence to suspects who they are investigating (Hill v. Hamilton-
Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129 at 3). Their conduct during the course of an 
investigation is measured against the standard of how a reasonable officer in like circumstances would have acted. 
(Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129). 
102 Jayne & Buckley, supra note I 0 at 23. 
103 Ibid. 
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The Behaviour Analysis Interview, 'Indicators of Guilt' and Guilt-Presumptive 
Interrogation: 
In the Reid Technique, and in North American interrogations generally, following the 
factual analysis, the confrontational interrogation process that eventually ensues will be preceded 
by an " .. .information gathering pre-interrogation interview,"104 again with the purpose of 
determining whether a suspect is likely to be guilty or innocent. 105 The proponents of the Reid 
. h f b 1 h . d . "I 06 t techniques recommend " ... t e use o non-ver a cues, sue as gaze aversion an anxiety, o 
serve as "markers of deception". 107 When investigators make the determination for themselves 
that the suspect displays so-called "markers of deception", then they will assume that the suspect 
is guilty and commence a guilt presumptive interrogation that is designed to extract a confession 
from the suspect. 108 
The determination of presumptive-guilt may be coloured by the detective's assessments 
from the factual analysis; thus, the detective's perception of the behavioural cues may be 
influenced strongly or weakly by factual analysis. 
The Reid Institute's technicians have developed a "science" of behavioural analysis. The 
inception of behavioural analysis began with John E. Reid's observation of behavioural 
differences between polygraph subjects that he deemed to be truthful or deceptive. 109 In 1953, 
John E. Reid and Richard Arther published the results of a five-year study of the behaviours of 
809 polygraph subjects with an "impressionistic" interpretation of the data. 110 This study was 
followed-up upon by a 1972 study conducted by one of John Reid's associates, Frank Horvath. 





109 Jayne & Buckley, supra note I 0 at 66. 
110 Ibid. 
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Horvath studied subjects' " ... behavioural responses to a structured series of questions"111 of 
" ... 50 verified truthful and 50 verified deceptive subjects." 112 Horvath observed major 
d.ffi . th . " h d . " 113 1 erences In e1r responses ... to t e structure questions. 
In Canada Reid training and Reid-inspired training also makes use of the techniques that 
were developed by John E. Reid and Associates. The Law Enforcement Handbook, 114 a 
Canadian resource manual, cites 17 non-verbal signals of deception, including: "breaks in eye 
contact;"115 "inability to sit still in the chair;"116 "nervous manipulation of jewelry, small 
change,"117 etc.; "pallid skin colour;"118 and "arms crossed in front of the body."119 The same 
manual cites 8 non-verbal signals of truthfulness that include: "no hesitation"120 in the suspect's 
replies; "detailed answers;"121 "arms on armrests"122 of chair; and "hands clasped behind head 
while answering."123 The content of this resource manual is similar to what one encounters in 
the Reid literature. 
"So-caiied "experts" at interrogations have identified suspect symptoms and behaviours 
which they have deemed to be 'indicators of guilt'. Fred lnbau, one of the chief architects of the 
Reid techniques, has identified teiltale verbal and non-verbal clues, which he and his compatriots 
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because he has no fear of being trapped"124 and will "sit upright, but not rigid, directly positioned 
in front of the interrogator"; 125 and that the guilty suspect does not make eye contact126 and will 
be overly polite.127 
Criticisms of Behavioural Analysis 
The behavioural analysis concept has come under much frre. Research indicates that the 
important differences between guilty and innocent suspects are not reflected in their contrasting 
demeanours, 128 and cannot easily or accurately be ascertained by observing suspects' non-verbal 
cues. 129 'Tells', 130 betraying a suspect's internal perceptions, cognitions about their immediate 
situation,131 memories (including the presence or absence of memories about committing a 
crime) and their ongoing mental activities and decisions, are capable of being reliably read, only 
after a confessional statement has been given -that is, by analyzing the contents of the 
respective statements of persons who are truly guilty versus those who are truly innocent. 132 
The research, contrary to the views of lnbau and other proponents of the Reid techniques, 
indicates that people are poor intuitive judges of truth and deception. 133 Even experts, who make 
these judgments for a living such as law enforcement professionals and judges, have been shown 
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whether an individual is being deceptive are "confidently made but biased and frequently in 
error. "
135 
Research by Kassin, Meissner and Norwick has demonstrated that both police 
investigators and college students who viewed videotaped confessions of inmates' admissions of 
guilt for crimes, had no better likelihood of recognizing a false confession than the odds of pure 
chance, 136 although the professional investigators had more confidence in their ability to make 
these judgments than college students did. 137 
Kassin et al. point out, following Inbau et al., that "An interrogation is conducted only 
when the investigator is reasonably certain of the suspect's guilt."138 However, whereas Inbau et 
al. see this as an adequate justification for unleashing a battery of Reid tactics and strategies 
against a detained suspect, Kassin et al. raise the important concern that the basis upon which 
that 'reasonable certainty' was arrived at, is fundamentally flawed. People, in general, are no 
better at determining guilt or innocence on the basis of behavioural cues then pure chance would 
predict;139 yet this initial determination is intended to form the basis for a highly manipulative, 
deceitful and potentially psychologically coercive guilt-presumptive interrogation that is 
designed to extract a confession from a resistant suspect. 140 
It is the initial interview wherein investigators analyze the suspect's verbal and non-
verbal behaviour to determine whether he or she is being deceptive, and hence, guilty that 
(Anne P. Hubbell, Monique Mitchell & Jennifer C. Gee, "The Relative Effects ofTiming of Suspicion and Outcome 
Involvement on Biased Message Processing" (2001) 68 Communication Monographs 115. 
135 Saul M. Kassin. "On the psychology of confessions: Does Innocence put innocents at risk?" (2005) 60 American 
Psychologist 215 at 217. 
136 Saul M. Kassin, Christian A. Meissner, & Rebecca J. Norwick, '"'I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw One": A 
Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators" (2005) 29 Law and Human Behaviour 211 at 212. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogations and Confession, 4th ed. (Gaithersburg: Aspen Publishers, 2001) cited 
in Saul M. Kassin, Christine Goldstein, and Kenneth Savitsky, "Behavioural Confirmation in the Interrogation 
Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt" (2003) 27 Law and Human Behaviour 2 at 188. 
139 Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, Ibid. 
140 Ibid. at 189. 
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motivates them to proceed with a heavy-handed guilt-presumptive interrogation or else 
completely abandon investigation of the suspect. 141 There " .. .is no empirical evidence to 
suggest that police can distinguish between the denials made by guilty and innocent suspects at 
high levels of accuracy,"142 and moreover, studies show " ... that people are poor intuitive judges 
of truth and deception."143 "Some professionals do outperform the average person"144 at 
detecting deception, but even those professionals barely outperform college students at this. 145 
Moreover, "It is normatively clear ... that police hold many false beliefs about the behavioural 
indicators of deception,"146 and, further, that professionals, including "psychiatrists, police 
investigators, judges, customs inspectors, and polygraphers for the FBI, CIA and military - are 
highly prone to error."147 "Trained law enforcement investigators,"148 specifically, "are not 
reliably more accurate than the average person - and often fail to exceed chance level 
performance despite high levels of confidence."149 Thus, the decision to proceed with a hard 
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interrogation is made based150 on "prejudgments of guilt confidently made but frequently in 
error."151 
Moreover, additional research conducted by Kassin and Fong indicates that persons 
having been instructed in the Reid approach to behavioural and nonverbal cue identification were 
no better than pure chance at distinguishing truth from deception, yet they " ... cited more 
reasons "
152 for making the judgments that they made.153 Research conducted by Mann, Vrij, 
and Bull in 2004 found that those officers who cited the highest number of these supposed cues 
were, in fact, the poorest lie/truth detectors. 154 Thus, rigorous Reid training, and a hyper-vigilant 
approach to behaviour analysis would actually be more prejudicial to innocent suspects then 
interrogation with no Reid training at all. 
As Professor Timothy Moore notes, the consequence of this is that interrogations that are 
designed to extract confessions are conducted with "a non-trivial number of innocent 
persons."155 Moore makes the related criticism that the Reid method is "self-reinforcing."156 He 
notes that from the outset, "there's a smorgasbord of signs of deception to rely on, any one of 
which might be enough to arouse suspicion."157 Once suspicion is aroused the guilt-presumptive 
interrogation that follows may produce (or induce) a confession, and, if it does, the fact that the 
interrogation was proceeded-with on the justification that the indicators of deception were 
present, will then reinforce the validity of relying on those indicators as a reason to 
ISO Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, supra note 137 at 199. 
lSI Ibid. 
152 Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, "I'm Innocent!" Effects of Training on Truth and Deception in the 
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interrogate; 158 by the same token, the necessity of resorting to the manipulative 159 tactics is also 
affirmed by the fact a presumption of guilt led to a confession of it. If there is a conviction, the 
credibility of the process is bolstered even further. Moore writes: "Confessions are compelling 
to jurors. A false confession may well be followed by a false conviction. So you have double 
confirmation." 160 
Moreover, the very verbal and non-verbal cues that lnbau et al. associate with guilt are 
also symptoms of stress and nervousness. As Simon puts it: 
Nervousness, fear, confusion, hostility, a story that changes or contradicts itself- all are signs 
that the man in an interrogation room is lying, particularly in the eyes of someone as naturally 
suspicious as the detective. Unfortunately, these are also signs of a human being in a state of high 
stress.161 
Therefore, the rationale which an interrogator relies upon to make his decision to press 
the interrogation of a suspect further and potentially either apply increased direct coercive 
pressure or increased psychological manipulation, has a significant chance of being based upon 
the misattribution of non-verbal cues indicating a stressed state of mind, to guilt,162 when in fact 
the reason the suspect is betraying stress, is because of the stressful circumstances that are 
inherent in any interrogation. 163 The risk is that because the initial determination by the 
investigator of whether a suspect is innocent or guilty is flawed, " ... innocent people will be 
included in the subsequent interrogation exercise which is psychologically coercive, 
manipulative, and guilt presumptive."164 
The difficulty with using 'indicators of guilt' as a reason to press harder upon or 
manipulate a suspect, is that the greater the degree of persistent coercion or manipulation that is 
158 Supra note 98 at 12. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Supra note 156. 
161 Supra note 51 at219. 
162 Supra note 98 at 12. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
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applied and the longer the time it is applied for, the more probable that an innocent suspect will 
make a false confession. 165 False confessions have been widely recognized as one of the major 
causes of wrongful convictions. 166 
Kassin, Goldstein and Savitsky provide an additional criticism of the reliance of police 
upon so-called indicators of guilt collected during the pre-interrogation phase: suspects tend to 
" ... behaviourally confirm the prior beliefs of interrogators"167 when confronted with the guilt-
presumptive behaviour of an interrogator. 168 This is referred to as the "confirmation bias". 169 
Kassin, Goldstein and Savitsky showed through their research " ... that interrogator 
expectations"170 (of guilt or innocence) before an interrogation171 tends to " ... trigger a range of 
behavioural confirmation effects,"172 ultimately serving to further173 bias " ... perceptions of 
guilt."174 It has been found that interrogators who had " ... guilty expectations chose more guilt-
presumptive questions, used more techniques in their interrogation (including the presentation of 
false evidence and promises ofleniency);"175 as well, they " ... were more likely to see suspects in 
incriminating terms"176 following the interview, " ... exhibiting a 23% increase in guilty 
judgments relative to those with innocent expectations."177 Furthermore, a particularly 
disturbing phenomenon was observed. Innocent suspects who interrogators were made to 
believe were guilty by researchers prior to the interrogation, had more pressure exerted upon 
165 Ibid. 
166 C. Ronald Huff, "Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy: The American Society of Criminology 2001 
Presidential Address" (2002) 40 Criminology I at 5. 
167 Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, supra note 137 at 200. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. at 189. 









them during the ensuing interrogation than suspects who interrogators believed were guilty, who 
were actually guilty.178 The research suggests that "erroneous prior expectations ... blind 
interrogators to contradictory evidence in the form of forceful and plausible assertions of 
innocence", 179 and that, interrogators" ... interpreted the [innocent person's] denials as proof of a 
guilty person's resistance- and redoubled their efforts to elicit a confession."180 A more recent 
study by Kassin shows that, depending on how they are interrogated, actual innocence may put 
innocent people at risk. 181 
This feature of guilt-presumptiveness, coupled with the fact that law enforcement 
professionals have difficulty correctly 'reading' so-called indicators of guilt (yet confidently 
persist with the practice of behavioural analysis) creates a distinct and highly regrettable risk of 
innocent suspects being railroaded into false confessions by overzealous interrogators afflicted 
with tunnel-vision. 
According to Kassin, Goldstein, and Savitsky's research, the behavioural confirmation 
bias also impacts upon suspects. 182 They write: 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
Paralleling Snyder and Swann's observation that a confinnatory approach to questioning 
constrains a target's response options, suspects in the guilty expectations condition became 
noticeably more defensive. It is not clear what aspects of their behaviour gave rise to this 
impression. But it is not hard to imagine, as our results suggest, that people trapped in coercive 
interrogations may well look away, slouch, sigh in despair, or exhibit other cues that trained 
police regard as indicators of guilt."183 
Furthennore, " ... whatever suspects did to be perceived as defensive, those who were presumed 
guilty by interrogators later tended to be judged as such by neutral observers. By neglecting to 
account sufficiently for the way in which the suspect's behaviour was shaped by the interrogative 
situation, observers thus committed the fundamental attribution error, or correspondence bias.184 
180 Ibid. at 200. 
181 Supra note 136. 
182 Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, supra note 137 at 199. 
183 Ibid. citing lnbau eta/., supra note 137. 
184 Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, Ibid. citing Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, "The Correspondence Bias" 
(1995) 117(1) Psychological Bulletin at 21 and others. 
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One promising aspect of the Kassin, Goldstein and Savitsky study was that non-party 
observers of the interrogations could both " ... distinguish interrogators with guilty and innocent 
expectations and detect differences in their behaviour;"185 and could identify innocent suspects 
on the basis of the plausibility of their denial stories 186, picking up successfully on " ... narrative 
cues"187 of guilt and innocence that the interrogators themselves (who entered the interrogation 
with a bias) missed. 188 If this research is accurate, then it is cause for some optimism in relation 
to the evaluation of the voluntariness of confessions for potential exclusion at the voir dire. 
However, under the law currently, guilt-presumptiveness at the interview and interrogation 
stages of the criminal process does not appear in the courts' view to violate the presumption of 
innocence, as R. v. Sinclair, among other cases, instruct. 189 
The Nine Reid Steps of Interrogation: 
Following the conclusion of the factual analysis and the behavioural analysis, and upon 
an interrogator's determination of presumptive-guilt, the Reid technician will commence a nine-
step interrogation. 190 Inbau, in the 2004 version of Criminal Interrogation and Confession191 
prescribes nine core steps and a variety of general suggestions and guidelines that underlie the 
Reid method. 192 The sequence of the steps is flexible, according to Inbau et al., despite being 
presented numerically. 193 The interrogation commences when the behavioural analysis portion 
has been completed and the interrogation has made the determination of presumptive-guilt that 
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justifies the interrogation that will follow. 194 The nine steps are briefly canvassed here to provide 
the reader with a sketch of the process; there is no substitute in conveying an understanding of 
Reid to having the opportunity to watch a sample-set of video-taped Reid-style interrogations. 
Armed with an understanding of the psychological tactics at play and benefiting by a real-life 
illustration of the tactics at work, viewers will be struck by just how manipulative this 
methodology actually is. 
(i) Step 1 - The Positive Confrontation 
"The initial step in Reid involves directly confronting suspects with a statement 
indicating the interrogator's belief in their guilt, which is then followed by a behavioural 
pause."195 The interrogator may " .. .look through the evidence folder" to convey the idea that the 
interrogator has an accumulation of evidence showing the suspect's guilt. 196 
At some point during Step I, the interrogator provides a "transition statement,"197 which 
is a statement in which the interrogator subtly introduces 198 a "perceived benefit for telling the 
truth."199 The idea is for the suspect to be left with the impression that the investigators already 
know with certainty that he is guilty200 and that there is some reason other than a confession201 
for " .. .initiating an interrogation."202 King and Snook cite the example: "The only thing we have 
left to figure out is why you started the fire"203 as how an interrogator might convey certainty-of-
guilt to a suspect. 204 
194 Jayne & Buckley, supra note I 0 at 11. 
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(ii) Step 2 - Theme Development 
In the second step, the Reid instructors " ... recommend developing a theme, or 
explanation, of why the crime" 205 happened. To do this, it is first necessary to establish whether 
the suspect is an "emotional offender,"206 who expresses remorse for his crime,207 or a "non-
emotional offender,"208 who does not express any remorse.209 The development of the theme 
will depend upon whether the suspect is identified as being an emotional or a non-emotional 
offender. 
For emotional offenders, the theme should present a "moral excuse"210 for offensive 
behaviour.211 Furthermore, it is suggested that the theme that is chosen should reinforce the 
suspect's212 " ••• rationalizations for committing the crime."213 This will make it easier to 
overcome the problem of denials.214 
For non-emotional offenders, lnbau et al. suggest using themes that appeal to suspect's 
reasoning and systematically work them towards confessing.215 This may require a process of 
trial and error, until a theme that works with " ... the suspect's identity" 216 'sticks.' 
(iii) Step 3 - Handling Denials 
This step " .. .involves handling denials."217 Reid instructors operate on the assumption 
that offenders almost never confess upon being confronted with their crime, and they usually 
205 Ibid. at 675. 
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deny committing the offence.218 The Reid instructors take the view that the219 denial stage is 
critical. 220 The prevailing view is that denials, if left unchallenged will make it more difficult to 
persuade someone to confess later in the process.221 Therefore, the interrogator is advised to 
" ... prevent or discourage"222 denials by the suspect by ardently maintaining his belief in the 
suspect's guilt, and then by returning to the theme that is being worked on following the 
denials. 223 
(iv) Step 4 - Overcoming Objections 
This step is designed to deal with objections raised by suspects as to why they are not 
guilty of the offence.224 Objections are classified as being either: emotional, factual, or moral.225 
According to Reid instructors, objections are signs of guilt and "a movement from denials to 
objections is argued to be a good indication of deception."226 
Objections can be useful " ... because they can be used to further the development of a 
theme."227 The interrogator can " ... reverse the significance of the suspect's objection"228 in order 
to " ... match the proposed theme, or to develop a new one. "229 The Reid instructors therefore 
suggest "returning to the interrogation theme without delay. "230 
218 Ibid. 
219 lnbau et. a/., supra note 137 at 304. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Supra note 14 at 676. 
223 Ibid. 
224 lnbau et. a/., supra note 137 at 330. 
225 Supra note 14 at 676. King and Snook tell us the difference between the three types: "Objections can be 
emotional (e.g., "I'd be too nervous to do something like that"), factual (e.g., "I don't even own a gun"), or moral 
(e.g., "I wasn't brought up that way"). 
226 Ibid and see also Inbau et. a/., supra note 137 at 334-335. 
227 Ibid 
228 Inbau et. a/., supra note 137 at 335. 
229 Ibid. 
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(v) Step 5 - Keeping the Subject's Attention 
Step 5 is aimed at the "procurement and retention of the suspect's attention."231 The 
concept here is that discouraging denials, and after having their objections reversed232 " ••• to 
support the development of the interrogator's proposed theme,"233 guilty suspects may 
"psychologically withdraw"234 and "ignore"235 the interrogator's theme.236 Techniques are then 
used by the interrogator to "maintain the suspect's attention."237 
(vi) Step 6 - Handling Subject's Passive Mood 
Step 6 is designed to exploit suspect's "defeatist posture."238 After the suspect's attention 
has been captured (in Step 5),239 he should be more willing to listen, however he may by this 
point appear to be " ... downcast and depressed. "240 The interrogator counters this by 
concentrating on241 " ••• the central core of the selected theme, "242 while demonstrating 
" ... understanding and sympathy, and urge the individual to tell the truth."243 The Reid instructors 
say that these techniques244 ".should continue until the suspect shows signs of mentally 
considering whether to tell the truth"245 
231 Supra note 14 at 676. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Inbau et. a/., supra note 137 at 338. 
235 Supra note 14 at 676. 
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(vii) Step 7 - Presenting the Alternative Question 
Step 7 is the point at which theme development culminates in the presentation of 
alternative questions.246 This approach involves presenting the suspect with247 " ••• a choice 
between two explanations for possible commission of the crime. "248 One explanation is 
somewhat honourable whereas the other one is relatively immoral.249 Crucially, both will 
" .. .involve an admission of guilt."250 They allow the suspect to "save-face"251 while at the same 
time he makes an inculpatory statement from a legal standpoint. 252 When the suspect selects 
one of the two alternatives, then, it is suggested, that interrogators should provide positive 
reinforcement for their choice. 253 
(viii) Step 8 - Subject Orally Relates Confession 
Step 8 is to persuade the suspect to verbally develop the confession obtained in the 
previous step254 "into a legally acceptable and substantiated confession that discloses the 
circumstances and details of the act. "255 This is achieved by going back to the original offence to 
obtain confession evidence256 " ••• that can be corroborated. "257 
(ix) Step 9 - Converting Oral Confession to Writing 
In the ninth step, the interrogator converts258 " ••• the oral confession into a written one.259 
The ninth step is designed to prevent the suspect from changing his mind about his confession 
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Inbau et. a/., supra note 137 at 353. 
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later,260 and to "ensure"261 that the confession will survive legal challenge in court.262 When the 
written confession is done, " .. .it should be read aloud, corrected for any errors, and then signed 
by the suspect. "263 
Moreover, the Reid instructors also recommend that interrogators follow certain 
guidelines.264 These guidelines include: (i) "demonstrate high confidence and knowledge of the 
case details and avoid an evidence-based interrogation;"265 (ii) "avoiding the use of legal terms to 
describe the crime;"266 (iii) "Using a plain room;"267 and (v) "using straight backed chairs,"268 for 
example. 
Criticisms of the Nine-Step Reid Interrogation Model: 
Professors Ofshe and Leo divide modem interrogations into two phases/69 for heuristic 
purposes. The first phase of the interrogation, " ... the pre-admission phase is organized to 
change the suspect's decision to deny responsibility and elicit the statement saying "I did it."''270 
The objective of the second phase of the interrogation " ... is to obtain from the suspect a post-
admission narrative of the crime that proves the suspect's guilt."271 The pre-admission phase 
corresponds to Reid steps 1 to 7, and post-admission narrative corresponds to steps 8 and 9 of the 
Reid model of interrogation. 
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Criticisms of the Pre-Admission Phase - Steps One to Seven: 
In their 2004 review, Kassin and Gudjonsson described the Reid approach as being 
essentially " ... an interplay between three processes:"272 "custody and isolation"273 (cutting the 
accused off from outside influence and the ability to leave); "confrontation"274 (that is, involving 
the accused in the accusations and rejecting his denials); "and minimization"275 (presenting the 
interrogator as a sympathetic and helpful person who, by providing moral justification for the 
crime, implies that the accused may be "treated leniently" when he cooperates).276 
There are multiple steps involved in persuading a suspect to shift from a state of denial to 
confession.277 Investigators must first persuade the suspect to waive the right to silence by 
creating the perception that they would be better off by talking. 278 "The initial structure of the 
interrogation,"279 therefore, is set" ... to create the impression"280 " ••• that the questioning will be 
relatively risk-free"281 and that the interrogator is a "benign"282 figure, yet one who has real 
power to determine the course283 of" ... the suspect's life,"284 in light of the circumstances.285 
The second step in the interrogation is for the investigator to convince the suspect that the 
situation is hopeless286 for him and that the only thing " ... his future holds"287 is the certainty288 
272 Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson. "The Psychology of Confessions: A review ofthe literature and issues" 
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of" ... arrest, trial, conviction, and punishment."289 Following the brief"information 
gathering"290 phase of the Behavioural Analysis Interview, the investigator will begin the 
"accusatory phase" 291 of the interrogation,292 wherein he will point out "contradictions,"293 
confront the suspect with evidence oF94 " ••• flaws in his story,"295 he will reveal the evidence that 
he has, sparingly, so as to counter each move that the suspect makes with a move of his own, and 
to give the impression that he is in possession of a limitless296 " ••• supply of information."297 
Once a feeling of "hopelessness"298 has been created, the interrogator will direct his 
efforts towards convincing the suspect to make an admission of guilt. 299 The proper time in the 
interrogation for the investigator to 'go for' the confession300 is " ... when the suspect's 
subjective"301 belief in the probability that he will leave the interrogation room without charges 
approaches302 "zero."303 When hopelessness has taken root, and the interrogator senses that the 
suspect's resistance has been lowered, then he will become more forceful.304 For example, he 
may indicate to the suspect that " ... he is no longer interested in wasting time debating whether or 
not the suspect committed the crime;"305 or he " ... may summarize the evidence supporting his 
position yet again and say "all I'm really interested in is why you did it."306 Moral inducements 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid. 
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may be given (along the lines of 'do the right thing', 'be a man' or 'be a good Christian');307 as 
well as assurances " ... that there are systemic benefits to confessing and systemic punishments 
for a failing to confess"308 (such as sentencing benefits, or how the prosecutor or judge's 
sympathies will be engaged by a pre-trial confession309 - both of which tread "dangerously 
close"31 0 to fear of harm and hope of advantage). 311 
More likely to attract issues ofvoluntariness (but sometimes still used, nevertheless) are 
the following techniques: the investigator " ... may emphasize that he wants to "help" the 
suspect"312 in some way, but on the condition that " ... the suspect"313 tell " ... his side of the 
story;"314 the investigator may threaten315 or imply " ... direct physical harm,"316 a long jail 
term317 or" ... directly promise that a confession will result in prosecutorialleniency;"318 
investigators may use maximization and minimization techniques, such as the "accident 
scenario"319, where the investigator offers a version of the facts that, if true, would drastically 
lower the severity of the charge320 for the suspect, or the moral culpability of his actions.321 
The accident scenario functions to " ... persuade a suspect that the beneficial 
consequences of confessing outweigh the harmful consequences."322 But proponents of this 
307 Ibid. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid. at 29. 
310 Ibid. at 28. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid. at 30. 
313 Ibid. 
314Ibid. 





320 Ibid. at 31-32. 
321 Ibid. at 30-32. 
322 Ibid. at 34. See also Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, "Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating 
Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication" (1991) 15(3) Law and Human Behaviour 233. 
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technique fail to recognize how coercive it is,323 rationalizing and defending ie24 "as 
permissible325 so long as the interrogator alters only the suspect's perception, but not reality."326 
What these proponents" ... fail to appreciate"327 is that "the suspect's will to resist and whether it 
is overborne by the conduct of the interrogator,"328 is " ... what is at issue,"329 and not "whether in 
the interrogator's mind his threat or promise is sincere."33° From the point of view of the 
suspect, there is no difference between creating the perception about some kind of" ... anticipated 
punishment"331 through deception, and an intention to follow through on that threat of 
punishment.332 For the suspect, an identical reality has been created in either case.333 
Research shows that some suspects are more vulnerable to interrogation-room 
manipulation than others. In a 2003 study of personality traits, Gudjonsson found that 
individuals scoring " ... high on a self-report measure of compliance in social situations are 
especially vulnerable"334 to making false confessions " ... because of their eagerness to please 
others and a desire to avoid confrontation, particularly with those in authority."335 Additionally, 
those who suffer from " ... poor memories, high levels of anxiety, low self-esteem and a lack of 
assertiveness"336 relative to average levels have been found to be susceptible to suggestions and 
alterations in their memories. 337 
323 Ofshe & Leo, ibid. at 33. 









333 Ibid. at 35. 
334 Kassin, Appleby & Perillo, supra note 147 at 43. See also Gudjonsson, supra note 24 at 370-375. 
335 Kassin, Appleby & Perillo, Ibid. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid. 
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As previously discussed, King and Snook conducted a 2009 study, in which they 
analyzed 44 video-recorded interrogations, and showed that,338 "on average, interrogators used 
34% of the components composing the nine-step Reid model."339 This data raises the question: 
why are interrogators only using around one-third of the techniques in any given interrogation? 
King and Snook suggest four possible explanations:340 (i) time limitations upon the 
interrogation-length may have foreclosed the opportunity to be thoroughgoing and use all of the 
techniques;341 (ii) "the officers may have forgotten to"342 use the other two-thirds of the 
techniques343 due to " ... the sheer number"344 of techniques available and the difficulty in 
remembering them all;345 (iii) the officers may have received only partial Reid training which did 
not teach them all of the techniques;346 or (iv) the officers may have certain views347 " ••• about 
the efficacy of'348 particular techniques and only used the ones they thought would work. 349 We 
cannot express any certainty with respect to any of the explanations for why interrogators are 
only utilizing a portion of the Reid Techniques. It may indicate a fundamental inadequacy with 
the model itself, whether this is related to the believed-efficacy of the techniques,350 on the one 
hand, or is related to the substantial volume and complexity of the method in relation to officers' 
capacities to absorb it. 
While there is an outside chance that the technique doesn't actually work to induce 
confessions, a more convincing criticism holds that it is not that the Reid technique doesn't get 
338 Supra note 14 at 674. 
339 Ibid. 
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because it risks inducing confessions from the innocent.353 This concern has been decisively 
confirmed by Brandon Garrett's recent work on false confessions and wrongful convictions.354 
Additionally, King and Snook's 2009 research is supportive of the contention that the 
Reid Technique elicits incriminating statements (irrespective of the question of their truth or 
falsity). In that study, the authors make an observation in favour of Reid. That is, that 
"interrogations ending in partial and full confessions contained a greater proportion of core Reid 
component use than those ending in no comment or denial. Similarly, interrogations ending in 
partial and full confessions contained more influence tactics and more coercive strategies than 
did those ending without a confession."355 This leads to the conclusion, as King and Snook point 
out, that "the increased application of Reid and other influence and coercive strategies are 
effective in obtaining confessions,"356 and they suggest that "only through true experimental 
research can the relationship between the use of more Reid components, influence tactics or 
coercive strategies and confessions (proportion of true and false) be determined. "357 The same 
study by King and Snook found that confessions were negatively " ... associated with the number 
of discouraged denials but were positively associated with the number of alternative questions 
provided,"358 suggesting that some techniques may be more likely to provoke a confession than 
others. By the same token, some techniques may be more likely to provoke a false confession 
than others. 
351 Supra note 156. 
352 Ibid. 
353Ibid. 
354 Supra note 36. 
355 Supra note 14 at 690. 
356 Ibid. 
357 Ibid. 
358 Ibid.at 674. 
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One of the difficulties with this line of research, as King and Snook later note, is the fact 
that the relationship between the " ... amount of strategy used and confession outcome"359 may be 
"spurious,"360 as Richard Leo originally pointed out.361 "First, the ability to obtain a confession 
may simply be due to the amount of effort put into the interrogation"362 - a longer interrogation 
will mean more techniques are tried, and the likelihood that the interrogator finds one that works 
increases.363 According to this view, it would not only be the psychologically manipulative 
tactics per se that influenced the suspect to give the confession; rather it would be the duration 
and persistence of the interrogation. 364 Second, " ... is that more components, influence tactics, 
and coercive strategies are employed in those interrogations that are perceived to have a 
promising outcome (e.g. where guilt appears certain, where there is strong evidence, or where a 
confession is fully or partially made early into the interrogation)."365 When interrogators identify 
the prospect of a more promising chance of getting a confession out of the suspect, they will 
expend greater effort (and more tactics) to make sure that they get one. 366 So the interrogator 
may have used more psychologically manipulative tactics, but it is not clear whether the use of 
those tactics really caused the confession to be given, since the "preinterrogation variables"367 
were rather suggestive of guilt anyway. This seems to amount to saying that the likelihood of 
getting a confession is strongly influenced by the strength of the case against the suspect. 




363 Ibid. A "post-hoc analysis" of the data garnered in this experiment showed that there is" ... a positive relationship 
between the length of an interrogation ("a crude estimate of effort") and "interrogation outcome"" (Ibid) (i.e. 
whether a confession, whether true or false, was made). 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. 
366 Ibid. King and Snook write at 690-91: "This ... is supported by research showing the tactics employed by 
interrogators have little effect on interrogation outcome (Baldwin 1993; Mosten & Stephenson, 1993). Future 
investigation should examine the possibility of using pre interrogation variables to predict interrogation outcome". 
367 Ibid. at 691. 
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The explanation put forward would be that tactics employed by interrogators have little 
effect on interrogation outcome and that "preinterrogation variables" 368 may be the factor having 
the greatest impact on whether a confession is ultimately made. 
While the research potentially allows for the conclusion that the degree to which 
psychologically manipulative techniques are used is proportional to the likelihood of inducing a 
suspect to give a confession (though this is not a certainty, as Professor Leo's research reveals), 
there is simply no way of knowing whether any confession given was a true or a false one unless 
post-conviction DNA testing is available. As discussed previously, the ratio of true to false 
confessions is not an object that is capable of reliable measurement. Therefore, I am extremely 
skeptical of King and Snook's claim that "true experimentation"369 will be able to establish the 
" ... relationship between the use of'370 particular psychologically manipulative interrogation 
techniques and strategies, and the true or false confessions (respectively) that result from their 
use.
371 A much more promising avenue is, in the first instance, to pay close attention to the 
narratives that have been provided by those convicted because a confession that was proven false . 
by DNA testing. Looking closely at the interrogations that led to false confessions in these cases 
provides the most insight into the extent of the danger. In this way, researchers can access the 
subjective experiences of the interrogated detainees and link them to the techniques that were 
being used. It may even be appropriate to similarly consult the post-exoneration narratives of the 
interrogating officers to determine their subjective intent at various points during the 
interrogation, though this approach is debatable. It may be helpful to review the tapes alongside 
368 Ibid. 
369 See King and Snook, whereby reference is made "true experimental research" (Ibid. at 690) as key to discovering 





the interrogator and the exonerated detainee, respectively, and stop the tape at key junctures in 
the interview to query the subject about what they were thinking and feeling. Once this data has 
been collected and the pool of research subjects (i.e. officers and exonerees) has been exhausted, 
researchers will have to carefully compare the data that has been collected and try to identify 
patterns that can lead to statistical tendencies about which techniques and approaches achieve 
what kind of results, and to what degree the personal temperaments and disposition of the 
interrogating officers and detainees influenced the outcome in the situation. Such an approach 
would be very sloppy science, at best, however it may be the most scientifically rigorous 
approach that is available to researchers under the circumstances, and it may have to do. 
King and Snook's proposal for true experimentation suffers from an even greater amount 
of uncertainty and lends itself to drawing unreliable (inadequately testable) conclusions. Let us 
suppose that some ingenious method of measuring the ratio between true and false confessions 
prompted by the use of a particular technique could be devised just from watching interrogation 
videos. This would allow us to find the answer to a very important question that the current 
research leads us to ask. It is established that using a greater number of psychologically 
manipulative tactics correlates (whether causatively or spuriously) to an increased propensity on 
the part of a suspect to make a confession. We cannot quantify the degree of manipulation of 
any given tactic used or the degree of manipulation perceived by a suspect, although if we could 
do so, it would assist us to establish the claim that the more manipulation used, the greater the 
likelihood that a confession will be given (as suggested, in my view, by King and Snook's 
research). The question that arises if we accept the premise that more manipulation means a 
greater propensity to confess is this: Does a greater degree of psychological manipulation also 
increase the propensity to give afalse confession? That is, what proportion of the increase in the 
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likelihood of suspects to make a confession in response to psychologically manipulative 
interrogation techniques is attributable to those suspects being in some way incentivized to make 
a false confession or actually becoming (mistakenly) convinced that they committed the offence? 
As I have suggested, without a method to accurately measure the relationship between 
true and false confessions, there is no way (that I can see) of reliably answering this question. 
However, it is not difficult, on the basis of forensic psychologists' valuable work on the reasons 
that false confession are given, to hypothesize (without the capability to verify or disprove one's 
hypotheses according to the rig ours of scientific proof), how it is that an increase in manipulation 
could incentivize a suspect to make a confession of some kind, indicating guilt, regardless of 
whether he was, in actual fact, guilty. 
Criticisms of the Post-Admission Narrative: Steps Eight and Nine 
The post-admission narrative will include a detailed narrative of how the offence 
occurred372 and that includes373 "his motive, his planning, the circumstances leading up to the 
crime, how he executed it, facts about the crime scene and the location of evidence unknown to 
the police. "374 
Notwithstanding the fact that investigators " ... are not trained to recognize"375 it, a 
" ... post-admission narrative can also provide"376 evidence that would assist " ... to prove a 
suspect's innocence"377 in false confession cases.378 According to Ofshe and Leo, while a post-
admission narrative that is consistent with guilt can provide almost irrefutable evidence that a 
372 Ofshe & Leo, supra note 24 at 18. 
373 Ibid 
374 Ibid 





suspect committed the crime/79 a confession that is inconsistent with guilt can "generate 
persuasive evidence showing that he has no actual knowledge of the crime"380, if investigators 
'' h h d . . . ~ . h . . ,381 carry out ... at oroug post-a miSSIOn Intormatton gat enng exercise. 
Ofshe and Leo further argue that "A post-admission narrative that is riddled with errors, 
demonstrating the suspect's inability to correctly describe significant facts, inability to provide 
corroboration (e.g. correct information regarding the missing murder weapon, loot, etc.) and 
inability to contribute a host of specific details the perpetrator should know must lead to the 
conclusion that the suspect is ignorant of the crime. "382 
The fit between the suspect's post-admission narrative and the evidence that the police 
have already obtained outlining the factual circumstances of the crime, will provide strong 
evidence, Professors Ofshe and Leo contend, about whether the suspect possesses actual 
knowledge of the crime or is ignorant of information that would only be known by the 
perpetrator. 383 
But Professor Garrett's research shows why the intuitive assumptions of Professors Ofshe 
and Leo are, in reality, problematic. 
In addition to the criticism that follows from Professor Garrett's research conclusions, the 
argument is susceptible to critique from a pre-interrogation perspective, as well. It may be that 
in cases where there is no independent evidence corroborating the details described in the post-
admission narrative, or the external evidence conflicts with the accused's post-admission 
account, the suspect is almost certainly innocent. However Ofshe and Leo appear not to have 
considered the first retort that comes to mind, and undoubtedly one that the proponents of 
379 Ibid. at 18. 
380 Ibid. at 19. 
381 Ibid. at 18-19. 
382 Ibid at 19. 
383 Ibid. 
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psychological interrogation will rely upon. They will say that even though the interrogators 
managed to "persuade" the suspect to admit to committing the crime, the guilty suspect then 
provided false information about the details on purpose to improve his chances of beating the 
charge at trial. It would not require a great deal of sophistication on the part of a guilty suspect 
to determine that such a strategy would be better than the alternative, which would be to provide 
a true story that essentially sealed his fate at trial. By fabricating false details about the crime, 
the suspect may believe he is giving his lawyer something to work with in the courtroom, and 
therefore he has a reason to do it, particularly when the alternative is to have nothing to work 
with. Therefore, it is very difficult to determine with certainty from the degree of the accuracy 
of the details provided in a post-admission narrative, whether the suspect is innocent or guilty. 
Inaccurate details could indicate either an innocent suspect, or a guilty one who is trying 
to 'outsmart the system'. As Ofshe and Leo note "A guilty suspect may be thought of as 
engaging in a game with the interrogator in which each has as his goal manipulating and 
deceiving the opponent. "384 If, for whatever reason, the guilty suspect ends up confessing to the 
crime, then how can we be certain that his capitulation in the face of pressure is complete? He 
may continue trying to deceive and manipulate investigators to his perceived advantage. 
But the argument against over-reliance upon post-confession details that comes to us 
through Professor Garrett's research is the more compelling of the two. Even if the details are 
accurate, the confession may still be a false one, because it was engineered by the police and the 
suspect was fed facts (deliberately or even inadvertently) which were then repeated back later. 
Hence, in view of the fact that manipulation can include the purposeful or unintentional 
feeding of investigative facts to a suspect, relying on the post-confession narrative to bolster the 
credibility of the confession may be a misguided approach. 
384 Ibid. 
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The Strategies and Tactics of the Reid Technique: 
Of the 25 identified manipulative and coercive interrogation techniques, Reid advocates 
heavy reliance upon a few in particular, to be used in conjunction with some general 
interrogation concepts. The general concepts fit within the nine-step Reid interrogation 
framework. But the interrogation tactics are also intended to fit-together in a particular way. 
Developing a theme and then posing an alternative question is the main technique that is relied 
upon.385 This is done by the investigator engaging in a monologue386 of which the investigator 
must be particularly attentive to the delivery, because posing an alternative question after the 
delivery of a monologue that was either too short or otherwise unconvincing will likely result in 
a suspect's denial of guilt.387 The Reid Institute recommends that during a theme-development 
monologue the interviewer (i) talk slowly and convey sincerity and understanding with each 
statement and action;388 (ii) use " ... a third person theme"389 to prevent the suspect from denial;390 
or (iii) use a "personal story."391 
The route to get to an alternative question and eventually to a confession is through 
theme-development.392 It is thought that suspects will rely upon " ... defence mechanisms"393 
during an interrogation. The three most commonly relied-upon are "projection, rationalization, 
and minimization (RPMs ). "394 Rationalization re-describes the intent behind a behaviour to 
385 Jayne & Buckley, supra note I 0 at 191. 
386 Ibid. at 13. 
387 Ibid. at 165. 
388 Ibid. 
389 Ibid. 
390 Ibid. at 166; That is, discuss a situation which is removed from the suspect's case. This may be a fictitious case. 
391 Ibid. at 168; That is, when the interrogator tells the suspect that he has done something similar to what the 
suspect is accused of. 
392 Ibid. at 15. 
393 Ibid. at 146. 
394 Ibid. 
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present it in a more acceptable light. 395 Commission of the crime for "honourable reasons"396 or 
unintentionally397 are " ... two common rationalizations. "398 Projection is when the suspect places 
the blame for his actions onto other people or events. 399 "Minimization is a two-part defence 
mechanism,"400 where the suspect first assumes that others share his " ... attitudes or behaviour 
(identification)"401 and second, that in comparison to these other people, the suspect's behaviour 
" .. .is not nearly as bad."402 Usually one defence mechanism will be predominately relied-
upon, 403 and it is useful for the interrogator to identify which one it is, so that he may tailor a 
theme around that defence mechanism. 404 
The Reid Institute theory behind defence mechanisms is as follows: 
At the time of committing a criminal act, most suspects utilize a defence mechanism to help 
reduce the guilt associated with the offence. The defence mechanism continues to be effective 
during the Behaviour Analysis Interview up until the direct positive confrontation of the 
interrogation. At the outset of the interrogation, the suspect suppresses the previously held 
defence mechanism and is psychologically focused on the consequences associated with his act. 
During theme development, therefore, the investigator reintroduces and reinforces the latent 
defence mechanism, which was in force at the time the crime was committed. By reinforcing the 
suspect's own defence mechanism during theme development, the investigator allows the suspect 
to cognitively reduce the perceived consequences of his act.405 
It is thought to be important to the outcome of an interrogation to select the right theme 
for the right suspect. Thus, "If the investigator can identify which defence mechanism the 











405 Ibid. The authors further note in a footnote that: "It should be made clear that at no time should the investigator 
make promises ofleniency, or imply to the suspect that if he committed the crime for what he believed to be an 
acceptable reason that the consequences will be less. This, however, does not preclude the suspect, through wishful 
thinking, to form these beliefs of his own accord." 
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will be most productive in eliciting a confession."406 " ••• A shotgun approach,',4°7 where all of 
the defence mechanism themes are used should be avoided, it is thought, because each time an 
investigator selects the incorrect one, he will lose credibility- "an absolutely essential"408 quality 
.c. • • d 409 to convey 10r an Interrogation to succee . 
The Ethics of the Reid Technique: 
An additional issue that deserves critical consideration is the question of whether or not it 
is ethically justifiable to use the Reid interrogation technique at all? Whereas most of the 
foregoing discussion has centered on false confessions and the broader issue of reliability, we 
should give some consideration to the issue of whether these interrogations are sufficiently 
humane. 
Psychologically manipulative interrogation engages issues of privacy, autonomy and 
human dignity. 410 
406 Ibid. at 148. The authors contend that "to hold an Behavioural Analysis Interview before the interrogation will 
assist the interrogator to " ... identify which defence mechanism" was used " .. .in association with the crime," as well 
as assessing truthfulness. Defence mechanisms can be identified, it is argued, when the accused makes 
"introspective statements" during the non-accusatory interview, that is, when they editorialize answers to yes or no 
questions, they often betray one of the defence mechanisms. "Behaviour provoking questions" can also be used to 
elicit responses that may betray defence mechanisms. 
407 Ibid. at 153. 
408 Ibid. 
409 Ibid. 
410 Supra note 156 at 4. The following confession was given by a Hamilton man who was a retired school teacher. 
He described his own interrogation which induced a confession to sexual touching that was ultimately excluded at 
trial. This individual who experienced an interrogation reports: 
I had never been in any kind of trouble in my life and always respected authority. This was the worst day of 
my life. I trusted the officer who was going to interview me. I decided I would answer all his questions. He 
started out being very friendly but then he got into a badgering mode and he was getting angry. I am not 
comfortable with confrontations and never have been. I often give in to arguments easily. He kept 
badgering me. He assumed I did it. I was finally manipulated into saying "I'm sorry for it" but I meant 
sorry for what had happened and he assumed I was saying I did it. I was totally frustrated with his 
badgering and putting words in my mouth. I started to go along with some of his statements about me. I 
felt beaten down. He kept saying things about me and then getting angry if I denied them. I felt totally 
helpless. My denials were thrown back at me in anger. I felt I had no other options because all my life I 
have respected authority. It was a long interview and I was totally exhausted by it and I wanted it to end. I 
actually did not say that I had touched that girl. In essence, he did all the talking and expected me to agree 
with him. I simply agreed with authority to get it over with after an exasperating 2 hours. I tried to be 
vague with my answers and humor him. I simply made up a lot of stuff. (Ibid at 5.) 
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Jerome H. Skolnick and Richard A. Leo observe that: "Although we share a common 
moral sense in the West that police torture of criminal suspects is so offensive as to be 
impermissible - a sentiment ... reaffirmed by the violent images of the Rodney King beating -
the propriety of deception by police is not nearly so clear. The law reflects this ambiguity by 
being inconsistent, even confusing. "411 
False confessions negatively impact the other dimensions of a criminal investigation.412 
"Once a suspect confesses, investigators may ignore other leads and focus only on finding 
evidence that further implicates the suspect."413 When ambiguous evidence is discovered, it 
"will be interpreted as indicative of guilt,"414 whereas exculpatory evidence" ... will be ignored 
or discredited."415 "Witnesses and alibis may also be affected by the false confession,"416 as they 
may change their recollections " ... based on the suspect's confession. "417 
B. How do Suspects React to Police Interrogation Tactics: The Causes of False Confessions 
Two types of police induced false confessions418 are recognized in the literature on the 
subject:419 those in which the suspect falsely comes to believe that his is guilty of the offence he 
confess and those in which he does not. 420 When a suspect, through interrogation process, is 
actually falsely persuaded that he has committed the crime, the confession he gives is called an 
411 Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard H. Leo, "The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation" (1992) II Crim. Just. Ethics 3 at 
3. For example, the authors note that " ... the police are permitted to pose as drug dealers but not to use deceptive 
tactics to gain entry without a search warrant, nor are they permitted to falsify an affidavit to obtain a search 
warrant. "(pg. 1) Additionally, the permissibility of deception varies at different stages " ... of the criminal process." 
(pg. I) Police can (and do) lie " ... during the investigation of crime," (pg. 1) especially in undercover operations, 
they may be permitted to lie or not during custodial interrogations depending upon the circumstances and how they 
go about it (pg. I), and they are unequivocally prohibited from lying in the courtroom (pg. 1 ). 
412 Steven Smith, Veronica Stinson and Marc Patry, "Confession Evidence in Canada: Psychological Issues and 






418 Gudjonsson, Supra note 24 at I65. 
419 J.P. Blair, "A Test of the Unusual False Confession Perspective" (2005) 4I(2) Criminal Law Bulletin I27 at 127 
and 128. 
420 Ibid. at 127-128; and Ofshe & Leo, supra note 24 at 35-39. 
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"internalized false confession."',421 When the false confessor is not actually persuaded that he 
committed the crime, but confesses anyway in response to interrogation, the confession he gives 
is referred to as a "compliant false confession".422 In addition to a confession being either 
internalized or compliant, it may also be classified as being either "voluntary" or "coerced", 
depending upon how it was obtained.423 Hence, a confession may be a voluntary-true-
confession, a voluntary-false-confession (which, it is believed, is a rare occurrence), a coerced-
internalized-confession, or a coerced-compliant-confession.424 The research in which King and 
Snook analyzed 44 videotaped interrogations, shows that "Approximately 27% of the 
interrogations met Leo's criteria for a coercive interrogation. "425 
A voluntary false confession happens " ... when someone voluntarily confesses to a crime that 
he or she did not commit without any elicitation from the police. "426 People may make a 
voluntary false confession for a number of reasons,427 including: (i) the "desire for notoriety;',428 
(ii) an inability " ... to distinguish fact from fantasy;',429 (iii) a" ... need to make up for feelings of 
guilt',430 (for something unrelated to the offence) and receive punishment; or (iv) " ... a desire to 
protect somebody else from harm."431 
It may seem unlikely to those lacking familiarity with the scholarship on false 
confessions that anyone would voluntarily confess to a crime that they did not commit, due to the 
421 Blair, Ibid. 
422 Ibid 
423 Ofshe & Leo, supra note 24 at 35. 
424 Ibid. 
425 Supra note 14 at 674. 
426 Joanna Pozzulo, Craig Bennell & Adelle Forth, "False Confessions" in Chapter Four "The Psychology of Police 
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apparent irrationality of such an admission. However, there are a significant number of 
documented cases of voluntary false confessions. 432 
A coerced-internalized false confession is thought to follow a three-step process.433 First, 
the interrogator "attacks the suspect's confidence',434 " •• .in his memory.',435 Next the 
interrogator will suggest that the suspect committed the crime but does not remember having 
committed it due to some kind of"amnesia,"436 blackout or other failing ofmemory.437 Finally, 
after the accused accepts that " ... he must have committed the crime,"438 the interrogator and the 
accused "work together" to produce a detailed confession. 439 As in the case of voluntary false 
confessions, the notion may sound outlandish, to a reader who is unfamiliar with the body of 
research surrounding confessions, that an innocent person, in the absence of some kind of mental 
handicap or psychiatric illness, could actually be made to believe that they are guilty of 
committing a crime. Research indicates that it does happen, however. 
In a 1996 study, Kassin and Kiechel "accused subjects of causing a desktop computer to 
crash by hitting a key that they were specifically told not to push. All subjects were innocent. 
Yet among those who were forced to type quickly (a procedure which rendered them vulnerable 
to manipulation) and who were presented with false incriminating evidence (in the form of a 
confederate-eyewitness), I 00% signed a confession, 65% internalized a belief in their own guilt, I 
and 35% confabulated details to fit that newly created belief."440 Professor Timothy Moore tells 
us that "false beliefs can be cultivated by the interrogator's use of pseudo-technical explanations 
432 See Professor Garrett's article, supra note 36. 
433 Leo, supra note 24 at 43; Gudjonsson, supra note 24. 





439 Ibid at 43-44. 
44
° Kassin, Goldstein, and Savitsky, supra note 137. 
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of how the crime could have occurred without the culprit's conscious awareness."441 He 
recounts, as an example, the case of Michael Crowe. Crowe confessed to killing his sister, 
maintaining that he must have " ... somehow blocked the event from his memory."442 This was 
" ... after three lengthy interrogation sessions during which incriminating (but false) evidence was 
presented to him."443 Resear~h by Kassin and Keichel shows the power of false evidence to 
both induce false confessions and to contribute to "internalized guilt"444 and the confabulation of 
"concocted supportive details. "445 
The causes of the third type of false confession, coerced-compliant false confessions, are 
a matter of some debate. One perspective, termed in the literature, the "unusual perspective, "446 
is that the use of" ... legally coercive interrogation tactics may overwhelm the rational restraints 
that would normally keep innocent suspects from confessing falsely."447 Examples of the types 
of tactics believed to induce coerced-compliant false confessions according to the "unusual 
perspective"448 include: " ... physical force; denial of food, sleep or bathroom; explicit threats of 
punishment; explicit promises of leniency; and extremely lengthy interrogations."449 This 
perspective also contemplates the likelihood450 " ••• that false confessions may occur when 
cognitively sub-normal individuals are exposed to normal, legally permissible interrogation 
441 Supra note 98 at 12. 
442 1bid. 
443 Ibid.; S.A. Drizin & B.A.Colgan, "Tales from the Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard Police 
Interrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile Suspects:, in G. Daniel Lassiter 
(Ed.), Interrogations, confessions, and entrapment (pp. 127-162) (New York: Plenum, 2004). Michael Crowe and 
his two co-accused Joshua Treadway and Aaron Houser were later exonerated as the DNA of the victim and her 
blood were found on the clothing of a homeless transient suspect, Richard Raymond Tuite. See: Mark Sauer, 
"Michael Crowe found 'factually innocent' in sister's murder" KPBS News (22 May, 2012), online: KPBS News< 
htto:/ /www .kpbs.orglnews/20 12/may/22/michael-crowe-found-factually- innocent-sisters-mur/>. 
444 Supra note 272 at 54. 
445 Ibid. See also Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Keichel. "The social psychology of false confessions: Compliance, 
internalization, and confabulation", (I 996) 7 Psycho logical Science 125. 
446 Supra note 419 at 129. 
4411bid. 
448 Ibid. 
4491bid at 128-129. 
450 Ibid. at 129. 
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tactics."451 The two recognized categories of susceptible persons452 are " ... the mentally 
handicapped"453 (i.e. those with a mental illness or low intelligence); and ''juveniles. "454 
Professor Timothy Moore notes that persons with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder (F ASD) are 
at particularly high risk for giving false confessions under interrogation due to their cognitive 
deficits,455 and that this is particularly troubling since "critical aspects ofF ASD,"456 including 
"organic brain damage and the concomitant cognitive shortfalls - are invisible to the naive 
observer, thus allowing the police, counsel and the courts to 'miss' the underlying pathology."457 
Notably, the presence of one or more of the three factors (youth, low intelligence or other 
mental handicap and the presence of fairly explicit coercion) is thought to create a necessary but 
not sufficient condition-precedent for a confession - that is to say, that just because a factor was 
present does not necessarily mean that it caused the confession that was given, but that it may 
have done so. 
The "ordinary perspective"458 on false confessions, which is the perspective I adhere to, 
does not reject the claims that the youth and the mentally challenged may be particularly 
susceptible to coercive interrogation techniques.459 Rather, proponents of the ordinary 
perspective widen the scope,460 and take the view that "contemporary methods of psychological 





455 Timothy E. Moore & Melvyn Green, "Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder (F ASD): A Need for Closer 
Examination by the Criminal Justice System" (2004) 19 C.R. (6th) 99 at 1-2. 
456 Ibid. 
457 Ibid. at 1-2. 
458 Supra note 419 at 131. 
459 Ibid. at 129. 
460 Ibid. 
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give false confessions to serious crimes of which they are entirely innocent. "461 According to 
this view, compliant confessions462 are " .. .induced through a two-step process,',463 which may 
cause either true or false confessions. 464 The first step requires that the interrogator creates a 
helpless situation for the accused.465 The second step involves the interrogator offering promises 
to the accused to make him believe that confession is the only way for him to improve his 
otherwise helpless situation.466 
The creation of a perception on the part of a suspect that it may be better to confess may 
be motivated by either or both of two techniques:467 the "hard sell,"468 where the interrogator 
engages in "maximization,',469 so as " ... to increase the subject's perceptions of the negative 
consequences of continuing to deny having committed the crime;"470 and the "soft-sell", where 
I 
the interrogator seeks to minimize the accused's471 " ••• perception of the negative consequences of i 
I 
confessing."472 These techniques are alternatively referred to simply as "maximization" and 
"minimization. ,,473 The minimization and maximization techniques may not amount to 
" ... explicit threats or promises,"474 but from the perspective of the ordinary false confession, the 
use ofthese techniques may475 " ••• communicate promises of leniency and threats of punishment 
to suspects that are similar to the explicit threats of punishment and promises of leniency that are 
461 Leo, Supra note 24 at 37. 
462 Supra note 4 I 9 at I 30. 
463 Ibid 
464 Ibid. 
465 Ibid. see also Leo, supra note 24 at 38. 
466 Blair, Ibid; See also Leo, Ibid. at 39. 
467 Blair, Ibid. 
468 Blair, Ibid. at I 3 I . 
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prohibited by law."476 Those who take the position, as I do, that modern psychological 
techniques of interrogation create a significant risk of provoking a false confession recognize 
that a person may perceive threats or negative consequences from speech-acts that fall short of 
explicit threats, and may perceive benefits and advantages to be gained from speech-acts that fall 
short of a quid pro quo inducement. Interrogators may use subtle techniques of psychological 
manipulation to produce in their subjects the perception of threats and inducements which may 
have a very similar effect upon the subject as explicit threats or inducements. The contemporary 
jurisprudence on the voluntariness of confessions (reviewed in Chapter 1 ), by providing 
insufficient protection to suspects and too much leeway for police interrogators, has created a 
gray-area where there are loopholes to be found, which police interrogators have developed 
tested-techniques to exploit. The courts have prohibited the use of the "third degree" to beat 
incriminating statements from detained suspects. They have also, to their credit, prohibited the 
conversational blunt-instrument of the explicit threat or inducement from use. But brute force 
and overt threats are not the only way to extract a confession. , What "police-scientists" have 
developed in response to the law's clumsy constraints are more surgical psychological methods 
of extracting confessions, requiring a delicate management of suspects' perceptions in the 
interrogation room. 
The questions, respectively, of whether a suspect's confession is true or false, and 
whether, if false, his belief in the truth of the confession's contents has been internalized,477 or 
alternatively he is merely complying in order to gain a perceived benefit in the circumstances, 
are ones that cannot be accurately answered by watching the behaviour of suspects caught on 
video. The answer to the question of whether a suspect's confession is true or false may, 
476 Ibid. 
477 Kassin, Appleby & Perillo, supra note 147 at 45. 
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according to the limitations oftoday's technology, only be determined by having recourse to 
DNA testing (where available). It is through this method that false confessions that were once 
believed to be true may be proven false, with almost absolute certainty. I explore some recent 
research on post-conviction DNA exonerations, as they relate to false confessions, in the next 
chapter. 4 78 
The question of whether a false confession was internalized by the suspect or was given 
to comply with the perceived wishes of the investigating officer, and thereby hope to procure 
some advantage or minimize culpability with respect to the prosecution of the charged offence, 
may best be answered with sufficient credibility by a DNA-validated exoneree through his or her 
provision of some kind of post-exoneration narrative. Asking persons who were wrongfully 
convicted on the basis of confession evidence, and then subsequently exonerated, to describe 
how they came to make a false confession is the most accurate way to gain insight into the 
respective frequencies of internalized versus compliant false confessions. 
All of this is to say that watching videotapes of interrogations and attempting to discern 
whether coercive, manipulative or deceitful techniques have been deployed by the interrogator, 
while valuable to some extent, will only take us so far. It can only tell us whether it appears that 
the officer coerced a confession from the suspect, by watching the words and actions and 
reactions of the officer and the suspect. 
But to know definitively whether the resulting confession was false, and if it was, why it 
was given, we must consult the victims of wrongful convictions and give them an opportunity to 
tell their side of the story. It is from such narratives that penetrating insights about the dangers 
of modern-day custodial interrogation may be drawn, and prospective avenues for reform may be . 
I 
more confidently discussed. In these endeavours we shall be greatly assisted by Professor I 
478 Supra note 36. 
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Garrett, whose recent article "The Substance of False Confessions", published in the Stanford 
Law Review, provides much needed research in this crucial area, and whose insights future 
researchers in this area, no doubt, will owe a debt of gratitude. 
Conclusion: 
The Reid Technique creates a substantial risk of railroading innocent suspects into false 
confessions and should be eliminated from use. Although, when the technique is correctly 
applied, it is within the permissible boundaries of Canadian confession law, it nevertheless 
operates to create an enormous risk that an involuntary statement will be given and that a 
wrongful conviction may result. 
There are several problems with the Reid interrogation method. First, it promotes tunnel 
vision and is over-reliant upon stereotyping and reductionism. During the factual analysis, 
incorrect conclusions about likely guilt may be drawn from suspicious characteristics, attributes, 
or happenstance relating to the suspect. Whereas these indicators could be consistent with 
factual guilt, they may also be explained by other reasons. By mentally treating every fact as 
being on one side or the other of a ledger of probable guilt, interrogators run the risk of unfairly 
entering into an interrogation room with a litany of strikes against the accused weighing in 
favour of guilt, and many details with which to trip him up - even if he is innocent. The factual 
analysis may, in this way, give rise to an early "confirmation bias,',479 towards a suspect's guilt. 
Tunnel vision is further promoted by use of the behavioural analysis interview. Tainted 
by an analysis of the evidence which suggests relying on "rules of thumb" (which are little more 
than untested assumptions and stereotypes) to ascertain the likelihood of factual guilt, the 
interrogator enters the austere environs of the interrogation room to find a suspect who has been 
isolated from all contact with others, save a brief discussion with his counsel where that right has 
479 Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, supra note 137 at 189. 
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been exercised, who is left with the unmistakable impression that he may be in serious trouble 
and that his liberty is at stake. His nerves are likely wracked by his uncertainty and lack of a 
nuanced understanding of the situation he finds himself in. A person in custodial interrogation is 
unmistakably under state control, and wants what any human in such a situation wants: to be 
free. As a result, in all likelihood, he is nervous. 
The Reid Institute has provided a list of behavioural indicators which it sees as indicating 
guilt. Underlying these "telltale" signs of guilt, there is a cause, it is believed. For the Reid 
Institute, the presence of these indicators means that a person is trying to hide their guilt.480 Of 
course, there are other explanations for why someone might display the kind of shifty body-
language that would appear to indicate a guilty demeanour. Chief among these reasons is the 
sheer fear and apprehension that is created in the psyche of the suspect due to his isolation and 
the fact of his control by the state. The situation, understandably, makes him nervous. Another 
reason may simply be that the suspect is someone who has weird mannerisms. The data 
indicates that people are remarkably poor detectors of deception by non-verbal cues alone.481 
Thus, teaching interrogators to rely upon these indicators creates a tendency for interrogators to 
see suspects in guilty terms and this affects the character of the interrogation phase that follows. 
It is guilt presumptive, and the goal is to extract a confession or incriminating statements, not to 
have any kind of neutral dialogue, and not to clear up misunderstandings. In other words, the 
object is to get a confession; not to get at the truth. 
With the bias confirmed, Reid Interrogators have a number of tactics that they use to 
create the perception by the suspect of pressures and inducements whilst evading the quid pro 
quo that may lead to a confession being excluded from evidence at trial. The kinds of questions 
480 Supra note 154 at 25. 
481 Ibid. at 3-25. 
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that interrogators ask are confirmatory of guilt, they place suspects on the defensive, and they are 
tactically designed to incentivize a response. In some significant number of instances, the 
atmosphere in combination with the questioning tactics can lead to a feeling of such hopelessness 
that an innocent suspect may be led to make a false admission just to tell the interrogator what he 
thinks the interrogator wants to hear, because he thinks he will assist himself by being compliant, . 
and because of the certainty in his guilt that will be expressed by the interrogator verbally or 
through the untested evidence that the suspect is confronted with. 
Reid provides not only tactics to use, but a systematic approach to interrogation. Themes 
are developed which are asserted confidently to the suspect, making it seem like the interrogator 
has already made his mind up about the suspect's guilt and will not entertain indications to the 
contrary. The theme culminates in an alternative question: both possible answers will suffice to 
create legal guilt, however one answer will seem less morally reprehensible to the suspect. A 
mentally defeated and demoralized suspect, even if innocent, may capitulate and just tell the 
interrogator what he thinks he wants to hear. 
For an innocent suspect he may give an admission of guilt for something he didn't do, 
just to make the interrogation stop, just to please his captor, because it appears to him that he will 
be found guilty anyway, and he hopes that by confessing he will get favourable consideration, or 
because he thinks that he can agree with the police interrogator now to make the interrogation 
end, and then fix the record later in court, trusting that justice will prevail and abhor sending an 
innocent man to prison for a crime he did not commit. 
Evidence is now available about the nature of false confessions, and in particular about 
the fact that they are not merely given, but are elaborated upon in considerable detail, sometimes 
by giving incorrect facts and other times by repeating for the interrogators, facts that have been 
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deliberately or inadvertently communicated to the suspect.482 Persons under the control of an 
interrogator in custodial detention will not necessarily only make damaging admissions or accept 
an alternative question without providing any elaboration; in some cases, they may go so far as 
to cooperate with their interrogator to such a great extent that they offer facts that lend credibility 
to the notion that the factually false confession is true, and cause significant harm to both their 
interests and to the discovery of the truth. 
The power of this technique to cause unjust outcomes and damage to innocent people is 
difficult to overstate. It may be correct to say that the Reid Technique is effective at getting 
confessions from suspects. However, it is also correct to say that there is no effective method for 
screening for the false ones, and that as a method, it lends itself in significant ways to producing 
false confessions which will be convincing evidence of guilt before a jury. If we are concerned 
with reducing the number of wrongful convictions, the Reid Technique should be abandoned, 
and replaced by a system of questioning that takes precautions to avoid miscarriages of justice. 
We have now discussed the Reid Technique and have discovered some of the coercive 
and manipulative tactics that characterize this method. This discussion of Reid has demonstrated 
where some of the gaps are in the confessions rule and how these gaps can be exploited to get 
confessions from unwilling or innocent suspects. 
Having discussed the actual method of the Reid Technique we will now turn our attention 
to the way confessions evidence procured by these tactics is treated by judges and juries. While 
it has been shown that the Reid method is capable of exploiting weaknesses and shortcomings in 
the confessions rule, the next chapter will show the dangers of this and how it can lead innocent 
suspects to make false confessions. 
482 See Garrett (Supra note 36). 
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Chapter 5: How are Confessions Regarded in Court: Judges, Juries and 
the Evaluation of Confession Evidence 
Introduction: 
In the previous chapter we discussed in some depth how the use of Reid Techniques 
create a substantial risk of compelling detained individuals to make false or involuntary 
confessions. We now need to examine the judicial treatment of confessions that have been 
procured by the use of the Reid method. In this chapter, I intend to demonstrate the powerful 
effect that confession evidence has on the minds of judges and juries and how the trier of fact is 
unlikely to accept that an individual who made a confession may be innocent. I wish to illustrate 
this point by offering some examples of how false confessions have been procured from innocent 
suspects in Canada and the United States, and how these confessions have resulted in wrongful 
convictions. 
Moreover, I will also discuss the judicial attitude in Canada towards the use of Reid 
Techniques. It will be shown in this chapter that the wide latitude given to police by the appellate 
courts in order to conduct their interrogations, has contributed to the coercive nature of custodial 
interrogations. 
It is hoped that the discussions in this chapter will help substantiate one of the main 
arguments of this thesis: that the use of the Reid method of interrogation should be prohibited. 
This argument is most strongly supported by evidence that will be provided here, indicating that 
detained individuals may be railroaded by the use of the Reid interrogation techniques, into 
giving false or involuntary confessions. Once they do so, their conviction is a virtual certainty. 
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The Problem of False Confessions: 1 
The problem of false confessions resulting in the wrongful conviction of accused persons has 
been demonstrated to be a serious problem in North American courts. Juries who are confronted 
with confession evidence seem extremely reluctant to entertain the possibility that a confession is 
false.2 A 1998 study by Leo and Ofshe, for example, found that 73% of defendants were 
convicted at trial in cases that contained evidence of confessions later proved to be false. 3 
Scheck, Neufeld and Dwyer found that 23% of all DNA exoneration cases contained confessions 
(which DNA evidence later showed almost certainly had to be false). 4 Professor Garrett, in his 
research, found that 16% of all DNA exonerations cases involved false confessions. 5 
Since confessions are inculpatory statements,6 sometimes, " ... even defence counsel,"7 are 
"predisposed to infer guilt from a confession. "8 
Jurors may not be able to properly assess confession evidence,9 including those obtained by 
coercive means, because of something known as the "fundamental attribution error."10 The 
1 
"The presence of vivid details is not the only reason that false confessions are so often credible. Based on a content 
analysis of20 known false confessions, Appleby, Hasel, Shlosberg, and Kassin (2009) found that most of the 
statements contained a full narrative description of what and how, complete with vivid details pertaining to the 
crime, the scene, and the victim. All twenty confessions referenced the victim's appearance and behaviour, the time 
of day, the location, and various visual and auditory details. Eighty-five per cent of false confessors 'reflected' on 
their own thoughts and feelings, 80% provided a motive statement to explain why they committed the crime, 
65% sought to minimize or excuse their involvement, 40% expressed remorse, and 25% outright apologized. 
Importantly, half of all innocent confessors made a point to assert that their statement was voluntary. Taken 
together, these findings are important because the more elaborate a confession is, the more credible it is and the 
greater its potential for impact is on the jury."- Saul M. Kassin, Sara C. Appleby & Jennifer T. Perillo, 
"Interviewing Suspects: Practice, Science, and Future Directions" (20 I 0) I5 Legal and Criminological Psychology 
39 at49. 
2 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) at 488. The United States Supreme Court highlighted the importance of 
confessions by holding that even the best lawyers cannot save their client from the prejudicial implications of a 
confession. 
3 Leo, R.A. & Ofshe, R.J., "The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of 
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation" (1998) 88 The Journal of Law and Criminology 429 at 484. 
4 B. Scheck, P. Neufeld, & J. Dwyer. Actual Innocence: Five days to execution and other dispatches from the 
wrongly convicted (New York: Doubleday, 2000). 
s Brandon L. Garrett, "The Substance of False Confessions" (20 I 0) 62 Stanford Law Rev. I 05I. 
6 Timothy E. Moore and C. Lindsay Fitzsimmons, "Justice Imperiled: False Confessions and the Reid Technique" 




fundamental attribution error holds that " ... when people seek to explain another's behaviour, 
they are predisposed to overlook or underestimate the social circumstances that are operating, 
and tend to attribute the causes of behaviours or decisions to internal motives, if not 'character 
flaws' ."11 As Bradford and Goodman, the fundamental attribution error "leads people to expect 
self-serving behaviour in others- and, hence, to trust confessions."12 Social circumstances 
which may be overlooked in favour of an explanation attributing the confession to internal 
causes (for example, actual guilt), 13 may include: the use by the police of coercion 14 (in cases of 
coerced-compliant or coerced-internalized false confessions); the " ... desire for notoriety" 15 on 
the part of the suspect (in cases of voluntary false confessions, later retracted); and the goal of 
the suspect to protect " ... the real perpetrator"16 of the offence from criminal liability (again, in 
the cases of voluntary false confessions, later retracted). 17 
Most important from amongst the often overlooked social factors that may lead to a 
confession, is the fact that jurors may be insufficiently cognizant of the power imbalance 
inherent to the interrogation-room setting that may motivate a suspect to confess or to make an 
incriminating statement; jurors may instead attribute such a decision to the operation of the 
suspect's "free will". 
There are additional reasons, other than the fundamental attribution error, that have been 
offered to explain why judges or jurors are unlikely to believe that an accused who confessed 
9 Timothy Moore, Peter Copeland & Regina A. Schuller, "Deceit, Betrayal and the search for truth: Legal and 




• Deborah Bradford & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, "Detecting Deception in Police Investigations: Implications for 
False Confessions" (2008) 15 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 105 at 114. 
13 Eugene R. Milhizer, "Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding Unreliable 






could be innocent. First, " ... because confessing appears to conflict with a defendant's self-
interest, jurors assume that the defendant would not falsely confess absent of police 
misconduct,"18 unless he was actually guilty. 19 If no such misconduct can be clearly 
demonstrated then establishing that the confession was a false one may be difficult. 
Second, " ... jurors tend to attach greater credibility to testimony based on personal 
knowledge, and a defendant's confession, more than any other type of evidence, ostensibly 
exhibits first-hand knowledge,"20 jurors will likely attach great weight to confession evidence.21 
Third, the empirical evidence that researchers have accumulated,22 thus far, suggests that" ... 
observers are not very proficient at distinguishing truthful and deceptive messages via 
behavioural cues", 23 and that this may affect not only the judgments of law enforcement officers 
in the interrogation room,24 as will be discussed, but ultimately, the judgment of judges and 
Junes. 
Fourth, a review of false confessions that were extracted during real-life interrogations, 
confirms that such statements may display a number of features that would normally be seen as 
signs oftruthfulness.25 For example, the statements that are eventually extracted from suspects 
are often highly detailed, 26 and include not only details about the offence, but also include 












remorse. 28 These supposed markers of truthfulness and reliability may result in jury members 
perceiving a false confession to be, without reasonable doubt, a truthful recounting of criminal 
events that transpired. 29 
Whatever the ultimate causes may be, studies have also shown that among mock jurors, ''the 
insertion of a confession into evidence increases the conviction rate even among mock jurors 
who believe that the confession was coerced,"30 and they claim that knowing it was coerced 
" ... did not influence their decision-making."31 
Research by Kassin, Meissner and Norwick has demonstrated that both police 
investigators and college students who viewed videotaped confessions of inmates' admissions of 
guilt of crimes, had no better likelihood of recognizing a false confession than the odds of pure 
chance (i.e. half of the time), 32 although the professional investigators had more confidence in 
their ability to make these judgments than the college students did.33 
Fifth, interrogations, as presently employed by North American investigators, are designed to 
be "relentless,"34 focused on "moving the suspect to confess"35 and are "insensitive to denials or 
protestations ofinnocence."36 The tactics that are used are designed to overcome " ... the 
resistance of a person who has no reason to confess and is"37 " •• .initially, unwilling to do so."38 
28 Saul M. Kassin, "True or false: "I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw One."" in P .A. Granhag & L.A. Strom wall 
eds., Deception Detection in Forensic Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 183. See also 
Saul M. Kassin, C.A. Meissner, & R.J. Norwick, ""I'd know a false confession if I saw one": A comparative study 
of college students and police investigators" (2005) 29 Law and Human Behaviour 211 and supra note 12. 
29 Bradford and Goodman-Delahunty, Ibid. 
30 Saul M. Kassin, Christine Goldstein, & Kenneth Savitsky, "Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: 
On the Dangers ofPresuming Guilt" (2003) 27(2) Law and Human Behaviour 187 at 187. 
31
• Ibid. 
32 Kassin, Meissner and Norwick, supra note 28 at 211. 
33 Ibid at 211-227. 
34 Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, "The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and 






Juries, however, may be unaware or insufficiently apprised of these salient issues and a judge's 
instructions, if they do address this possibility, will often fall short in elucidating the dangers. 
Examples of False Confessions: 
Recent research carried out in the United States has demonstrated that a significant number 
of false confessions have occurred. 39 Canadian research of a similar character has not been 
carried out, and it would appear that there have been fewer post-conviction exonerations of false 
confessions cases in Canada than in the United States, although in light of the facts that Canada 
and the United States police forces share similar interrogation methods and a reasonably similar 
law of confessions exists in each country, there is no reason to suppose that the actual rate of 
false confessions is markedly different. Moreover, unlike in the United States where there have 
been a significant number of convictions involving confessions that were later overturned 
through DNA evidence, the Canadian examples of false confession exonerations have been 
based on the reevaluation of other evidence. 
Canadian Examples: 
Far fewer examples of Canadian wrongful convictions due to false confessions exist than 
American ones; however where narratives exist they lend some insight into how such 
miscarriages of justice can occur. 
39 Supra note 5. It should be pointed out that the Miranda rule in the U.S. (John J. Donohue, "Did Miranda Diminish 
Police Effectiveness" (1998) 50(4) Stan. L. Rev. 1147.) affords greater rights to accused individuals than the rights 
that are available to suspects in Canada. The Miranda Rule obligates state agents to issue warnings and obtain a 
waiver to consult counsel before proceeding with an interrogation. Also, unlike in Canada, the suspects in the U.S. 
have the right to have counsel present at the interrogation room (Moore & Fitzsimmons, infra note 93 at 524). The 
suspect can also stop the interrogation by asserting his/her right to silence (Moore & Fitzsimmons, infra note 93). 
Despite the fact that the accused individuals in the U.S. enjoy greater rights, the overwhelming majority of cases of 
false confessions are produced in the U.S. This may be due to the significantly greater population base in the U.S. 
(about 10 times the population of Canada). Alternatively, the police in the U.S. may be more effective in getting 
suspects to waive their rights to consult counsel (Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, "Police Interrogation in the 
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda" (1996) 43 UCLA L. Rev. 839 at 860). It may also mean that 
the occurrence of false confessions in Canada is much more prevalent than the few known examples may suggest. 
This may mean that the problem of false confessions in Canada may be much deeper than we may think, and it is 
possible that the true extent of it is yet to be discovered. 
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The Case of Kyle Unger: 
Kyle Unger was convicted of murder and sexual assault and he was sentenced to life 
following a confession that was later demonstrated false. 40 The confession that contributed to 
securing his conviction was procured during an undercover police operation.41 There was 
additionally a piece of hair that was consistent with being Mr. Unger's, and the testimony of a 
jailhouse informant that was adduced against him.42 The jailhouse informant came forward after 
the preliminary inquiry43 arid claimed that Unger had come back into their cell, and stated, "I 
killed her and I got away with it".44 Though the informant testified that he did not ask for or 
receive any kind of consideration from the Crown in exchange for his testimony, shortly before 
trial the informant, who was in custody, through his counsel, did make overtures toward 
receiving some benefit.45 The hair comparison evidence was ultimately found invalid upon 
review, due to advances in hair examination technologies between 1993 and the time ofthe 
review.46 
On review, the Crown said that "[t]here is no doubt that without Mr. Unger's confession to 
the undercover officers this matter would never have gone to trial."47 The undercover operation 
was a Mr. Big sting48, where the undercover members of a fake gang (in fact undercover police 
officers) " ... approach the suspect with the suggestion that he be considered to join their gang,"49 
and they "impress him with expensive meals, flashy cars, large rolls of money and fancy hotel 
40 Steven Smith, Veronica Stinson & Marc Patry, "Confession Evidence in Canada: Psychological Issues and Legal 
Landscapes" (20 I 0) 18(3) Psychology, Crime and Law 317 at 317. 
41 Crown Submissions: R. v. Kyle Wayne UNGER. at 3. 
42 R. v. Unger, 2005 MBQB 238 at para. 2. 
43 Unger's chargers proceeded to preliminary hearing. However, at the end of the preliminary hearing, the crown 




47 Ibid. at 7. 
48 Mr. Big is an undercover operation conducted by police in select cases. See Supra note 9. 
49 Supra note 42 at para. 16. 
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rooms. The only catch is that he has to admit to them to having committed a serious crime"50 the 
one that the undercover police officers are investigating. 51 
At his trial, Unger maintained his confession was false, 52 he denied any involvement in the 
murder, and that he had made it " ... to impress the gang members,"53 "in order to " ... obtain 
employment with them, to earn a lot of money and to join their group."54 
Unger's counsel argued that there had been inducements, all of which stemmed from a 
"grand inducement" given by Corporal Forbes who was posing as the leader of the criminal 
gang. 55 Forbes and Unger had a meeting at56 which Forbes said to Unger: "Larry tells me you 
whacked somebody. That's fine with me. That's fucking excellent. It's the kind of thing that, 
uh, I know that I'm dealing with somebody that's on my fuckin'- somebody that I can trust ... 
That's the kind of person I'm looking for."57 Counsel argued that the impression left with Unger 
when Forbes approved of his "whacking" somebody was that this criminal group was looking for 
a murderer.58 
When he made admissions, 59 untrue details that Mr. Unger provided to the police included 
" ... that he had committed the murder alone; that he had disposed of the sticks from the murder by 
throwing them into a creek;60 and that he had killed the victim by a bridge (and he took one of 
the police officers to the bridge to show him the location)".61 The Crown did not accept the 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. at para 17. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Supra note 41. 
56 Ibid 
57 Ibid 
58 Supra note 42 at para 23. 
59 When asked by the media why he confessed to a crime he did not commit, Unger said: 
When you're young, naive and desperate for money, they hold a lot of promises to you, so you say and do 
what you have to do to survive, just like in prison.- Globe and Mail, October 23, 2009. 
60 The sticks were used to murder the victim. 
61 Supra note 42 at para. 18. 
-270 ,_ 
notion that Mr. Unger had acted alone and proceeded to trial against his co-accused, Mr. 
Houlihan;62 the sticks that he said he threw in the creek were in fact found and recovered by 
police "protruding from the victim's body;"63 and the bridge that he said he had killed the victim 
near had not even been built at the time of the murder. 64 Unger had not limited his false 
statements to those concerning the murder either; the statements that he made that were 
additionally found to be untrue were "that he had gone to Rio de Janeiro for a rock festival; that 
he raced cars and snowmobiles with his father and he had a souped up snow mobile; that he 
attended college for a year; that he had taken a demolitions course; that he had worked in 
demolitions in Alberta; that he had broken his neck in a motorcycle accident, been in traction for 
three months, and spent a year and a half in a wheel chair; that he had been engaged; that he had 
a class 1 driver's license; and that he took a course in forensic science. "65 Each of these 
statements had been fabricated according to several of his friends and his mother.66 Unger was 
nevertheless convicted at trial because notwithstanding his reputation as a "bullshitter,"67 
according to his friends, " ... the reliability of his confession was supported by the two other 
pieces of evidence, the hair and the confession to the jailhouse informant."68 These pieces of 
evidence were withdrawn by the Crown upon a post-conviction review, and the reliability of 
Unger's confession under the circumstances came back into question.69 
When the case had been considered before the Manitoba Court of Appeal the court 
conceded that: "While Unger, during the extensive conversations with various undercover 
officers which took place between June 23rd and June 25th, got a number of the details of the 
62 Ibid. at para 19. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid at para. 20. 
66 Ibid at para. 21. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid at para 22. 
69 Ibid at para. 48. 
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murder wrong, the essential features of the murder as he described them continued to be 
consistent with the physical evidence. That some specific descriptions were inconsistent or 
simply wrong is not significant in the totality of his confessions." 70 
At the retrial of Mr. Unger, the Crown called no evidence,71 and said that advances in DNA 
testing in the intervening 17 years since the initial trial allowed for a more through testing of the 
physical evidence, and that the " ... testing did not find any trace of Unger's DNA on any of the 
exhibits."72 In fact the new DNA tests in 2005 showed that a hair found on the victim's sweater 
did not even belong to Unger. 73 Thus, without any physical evidence and without a credible 
statement from a jailhouse informant, all that was left was the Mr. Big-obtained confession. The 
Crown concluded that under the circumstances it would be "unsafe to retry Unger on the 
available evidence." 74 
The Case of Romeo Phillion: 
On January 11, 1972, Romeo Phillion was arrested in relation to an armed robbery 
charge. While conversing with the officer in charge of his robbery case, he admitted to the 
murder of an Ottawa fireman which had occurred in 1967.75 His confession to police came four 
days after he had confessed to his lover, Neil Miller.76 Later on January 11, 1972, he recanted his 
confession. 77 Despite his recantation, he was convicted by a jury of non-capital murder78 and 
70 Ibid. at para 60. 
71 Supra note 41 at 8. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Steve Lambert, "Kyle Unger aquitted of murder, tries to 'let it all absorb"' The Globe & Mail (23 October, 2009), 
online: Globe & Mail< http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/nationaVkyle-unger-acquitted-of-murder-tries-to-
let-it-all-absorb/article4256691 />. 
74 Supra note 41. at 8. 
75 R. v. Phi/lion, [2009] O.J. No. 849 (Ont.C.A.) at paras 1-5. 
76 Ibid. at paras 16-19. 
77 Ibid. at para 21. 
78 Ibid. at paras 7-8. 
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was sentenced to life imprisonment. 79 He continued to maintain his innocence following his 
conviction for 31 years, until his conviction was ultimately overturned. 80 
Romeo Philion was another Canadian who was found to have been wrongfully convicted 
as a result of a false confession. Mr. Philion had appealed his conviction in the mid-1970s to the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario and then the Supreme Court of Canada, and in each venue, his 
appeals were dismissed.81 Following his failed appeals, Mr. Phillion began to write the Minister 
of Justice asking to re-open his case. 82 Upon requesting the original Ottawa Police files on his 
case, 83 he received a heavily edited copy with large portions blacked out. 84 In 1996, the 
Criminal Conviction Review Group and the Department of Justice prepared a draft investigation 
brief in response to his application. 85 
In 1998, Mr. Phillion obtained a report from his Corrections Canada security file that had 
been prepared by the officer in charge of his case, that the investigation had established that Mr. 
Phillion had been in Trenton, Ontario, less than two hours before the murder, such that it was 
impossible for him to have been the man who murdered the victim (which was committed in 
Ottawa). 86 Upon, further inquiries about this new information, the Archives of Ontario 
confirmed that it was in the possession of the "Crown Investigative File" on the Roy murder. 87 It 
was subsequently confirmed that there were over 700 pages of other documents that had also 
gone undisclosed. 88 
79 Ibid. at para 8. 
80 Ibid. at paras 44 and 182. 
81 Ibid. at paras 8 and 33-37. 
82 Ibid. at para 38 
83 Bail Factum of Romeo Philion, Memorandum of Argument, in the Superior Court of Justice, online at AIDWYC 
< http://www.aidwvc.org/public html/index.html> at para. 5. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid 
86 Ibid. at para 40. 
87 Supra note 83 at para 10. 
88 Ibid. 
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Mr. Phillion then hired Dr. Gudjohnsson, an expert on false confessions, and a psychologist, 
Dr. Turrall, to conduct a review of his case.89 In the conclusion of their report the following was 
stated: "The confession, without good independent corroboration is inherently unreliable due to 
Mr. Phillion's psychological problems and psychopathology at that time."90 A similar finding 
was made with respect to his confession to his lover.91 
The Case of Joel Labadie: 
Joel Labadie, Douglas Firemoon and a 17 -year old youth falsely confessed to the 1996 
murder of Darelle Exner in Saskatchewan after having been arrested and interrogated for over 15 
hours.92 During the interrogation the police convinced Labadie that he had blacked out the 
murder.93 Afterwards, Labade had this to say: 
All I know is for hours on end I said "No, I had nothing to do with it." The next this I know, I'm 
sitting here going "sure, why not. I did it." More or less, it's like they kill your spirit or 
something.94 
After spending four months in jail, all three men were eventually released by the Crown due 
to a lack of evidence.95 Later, DNA evidence led to the arrest and the conviction of another 
individual. 96 
The Case of Simon Marshall: 
In 1997, Simon Marshall, a person with borderline personality disorder and an intellectual 
disability confessed to 15 counts ofrape.97 He was released in 2003, and then subsequently 
89 Supra note 75 at paras 42, 209 and 202. 
90 Supra note 83 at para. 11; See also, Ibid. at para 207. 
91 Philion, Ibid. at 183. 
92 Supra note 40. 
93 Timothy E. Moore & C. Lindsay Fitzsimmons, "Justice Imperiled: False Confessions and the Reid Technique" 
(2011) 57(4) C. L. Qtly 509 at 514. 
94 CBC News, "Widely used police interrogation technique can result in false confession: disclosure" CBC News (28 
January, 2003), online: CBC News< http://www.cbc.ca/news/canadalstory/2003/01/27/interrogation030127.html>. 
95 Supra note 40. 
96 Supra note 94. 
97 Supra note 40. 
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arrested for 3 more counts of sexual assault, to which he also falsely confessed.98 At the 
sentencing for his second set of charges, the Crown brought a dangerous offender application. 
However, the presiding Judge, ordered a DNA test to ensure there was a solid basis for the 
convictions.99 Subsequent DNA analysis showed that he was not guilty of the 2003 crimes, and 
a further investigation demonstrated that he was innocent of the earlier offences as well.100 
According to Marshall's lawyer, while incarcerated, Marshall" ... was the victim of sexual, 
physical and verbal abuse from fellow inmates."101 After being released Marshall was 
hospitalized for psychosis. 102 
American Examples: 
Brandon Garrett, who has reviewed numerous cases of false confessions has provided 
ample data which suggest features of investigation or interrogation that can be found in false 
confessions cases. 103 These features may cause or contribute to false confessions. The 
categories that he identifies are: the police fed facts to the suspect or leaked facts to the 
community; 104 the police insisted that the facts provided by the suspect were both corroborated 
by other evidence and by non-public facts; the police specifically denied disclosing the facts to 
the accused when they testified under oath at trial; 105 in cases of recorded confessions there were 
unrecorded portions for which there was no record, including initial interviews before the 
recorders had been switched on;106 mistaken facts suggested to suspects due to incomplete or 
98 Ibid. 
99 Canwest News Service, "Wrongfully convicted man awarded $2.3 million" Montreal Gazette (22 December 




103 Supra note 5. 
104 Ibid. at I 056. 
lOS Ibid. 
106 Ibid. at I 058. 
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inaccurate crime scene evidence; 107 crime scene visits may have reinforced or rehearsed with the 
suspect fed facts; investigations were stopped after the confession was obtained, 108 and police 
failed to substantiate the confession and failed to investigate glaring inconsistencies between the 
confession and the crime scene evidence. 109 
When litigating these cases, even unreliable confessions were admitted into evidence 
even in circumstances where there was some element of coercion (attributable, Garrett says, to 
U.S. Constitutional rules of admissibility); 110 there was often some corroboration of the 
confession although it may have been " ... thin corroboration;"111 and in one third of the cases the 
defendant's counsel had argued that the confessions had been contaminated112 (however "[t]hey 
typically had little evidence to support an allegation that facts had been disclosed"). 113 
The Case of Jeffery Deskovic: 
Jeffrey Deskovic, a seventeen year-old, was convicted of rape and murder. 114 He 
" ... was a classmate of the fifteen-year old victim, had attended her wake and was eager to help 
solve the crime."115 Deskovic was interrogated a number oftimes.116 During one ofthe 
sessions, the police had a tape recorder, but selectively recorded only 35 minutes of the 
encounter.117 During one of the interviews he "supposedly drew an accurate diagram"118 
" ... which depicted details concerning "three discrete crime scenes" which were not ever made 
107 Ibid. at 1083. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Supra note 5. 
110 Ibid. at 1090. 
111 Ibid. at 1 091. 
112 Ibid. at 1 092. 
113 Ibid 
114 Ibid. at 1054. 
115 Ibid 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. at 1055. 
118 Ibid. 
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public."119 Although he never admitted to any murder, he provided important information that 
supported a strong inference that he had done so, including: "that the victim suffered a blow to 
the temple, that he tore her clothes, that he struggled with her, that he held his hand over her 
mouth,"120 and that he "may have left it there a little too long."121 He also told police122 that he 
had "hit her in the back of the head with a Gaitoraid [sic] bottle that was lying on the path."123 
By the end of this statement Jeffrey Deskovic was curled up in the "fetal position"124 sobbing 
uncontrollably. 125 
Deskovic's confession was crucial to the State's case. 126 DNA tests conducted by the 
FBI laboratory had actually excluded Deskovic as a perpetrator, 127 but the " ... district attorney 
asked the jury to ignore that DNA evidence speculating that perhaps the victim was "sexually 
active" and "romantically linked to somebody else" who she had sexual relations with shortly 
before her rape and murder."128 The prosecution, in his closing arguments, stressed the 
reliability ofDeskovic's statements, pointing out " ... that after he told police about the Gatorade 
bottle "it was found there,"129 and that detectives "did not disclose any of their observations or 
any of the evidence they recovered from Jeffrey nor, for that matter, to anyone else they 
interviewed." 130 Moreover the prosecution emphasized with the jury that Deskovic was never 













131 Ibid. at I 056. 
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Deskovic was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years to life. 132 He was eventually exonerated 
by further DNA testing in 2006. 133 The new testing matched the profile of a convicted murderer, 
"who subsequently confessed and pleaded guilty."134 The District Attorney's post exoneration 
inquiry stated that the fact that Deskovic' s statements referenced intimate details that only the 
killer could have known, and that there were only two possible explanations for this: "either the 
police (deliberately or inadvertently) communicated this information directly to Deskovic or 
their questioning at the high school and elsewhere caused this supposedly secret information to 
be widely known throughout the community."135 Thus, " ... the confession was contaminated 
either by police leaking facts or feeding them."136 However, at the trial, the police and the 
prosecutor denied having told Deskovic the facts and insisted that they did not leak them " ... to 
the media or to anyone else."137 Deskovic himself commented in the following way: 
"[b ]elieving in the criminal justice system and being fearful for myself, I told them what they 
wanted to hear."138 In a lawsuit against the police, Deskovic alleges the " ... police disclosed 
facts to him." 139 
The Case of Douglas Warney: 
Douglas Warney's case also involved a confession that included facts that could have 
only been known to the killer. Warney's confession contained the following detealis: 140 "that the 




135 Leslie Crocker Snyder et aJ., Westchester County Dist. Attorney, (2007) Report on the Conviction of Jeff 
Deskovic 2, at 6. See also Ibid. 
136 Garrett, Ibid 
137 Ibid 
138 Ibid. citing Fernanda Santos, "DNA Evidence Frees Man Imprisoned for Half His Life" N.Y. Times (21 
September 2006) B I. 
139 Garrett, Ibid 
140 Ibid. at I 07 I. 
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missing money from his wallet; that the murder weapon was a knife about twelve inches with a 
serrated blade, kept in the kitchen; that the victim was stabbed multiple times; that the victim 
owned a pinky ring and a particular necklace; that a tissue used as a bandage was covered with 
blood; that there was a pornographic tape in the victim's television."141 At trial, the interrogating 
officer denied feeding any facts to Wamey. 142 
At the closing address to the jury, the prosecutor pointed out that Wamey's confession 
was true, because it contained detailed, non-public facts. 143 For example, the prosecutor said: 
The Defendant says he's cooking dinner, and he's particular about it, cooking chicken ... Now, 
who could possibly know these things if hadn't been inside that house, inside the kitchen? You 
heard the Defendant say that he took money ... You know the wallet was found upstairs, empty, 
near the closet ... You will see photographs of it ... You heard the Defendant say that he stabbed 
[the victim] with a knife taken from the kitchen. Do you recall Mr. Lee's testimony? ... 
Regarding the murder weapon, he said that was the knife that they kept in the house. Where did 
they keep it? They kept it in a drawer under the crockpot where the chicken was cooking. Now, 
who would know the chicken was cooking? A person who got that knife and used it against [the 
victim], the killer. The Defendant described the knife as being twelve inches, with ridges. I think 
Technician Edgett said it was thirteen inches with the serrated blade.144 
W amey had experience a number of delusions. He had very minimal education, having 
only completed grade 8, and had "advanced AIDS."145 Wamey had been exonerated many years 
later. 146 Through DNA testing, it was revealed the DNA matched that of another man who had 
later confessed to the killing. 147 Wamey continued to maintain the fact that the sergeant had told 
him the details found in his confession, such as, for example, "what was cooking in the hot 
pot.,, 148 
141 Ibid. at 1071 - 1072. 
142 Ibid. at 1 072. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. citing 3 Trial Transcript at 570-71, People v. Warney, No. 96-0088 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 11, 1997). 





The Case of Anton McCray: 
The famous Central Park Jogger case also saw the prosecutor pointing out to the jury that 
Anton McCray's confession contained non-public facts that could have only been known by the 
perpetrator: 149 
You heard in that video Antron McCray was asked about what she was wearing, and he describes 
she was wearing a white shirt. This is the shirt that [the victim] was wearing. You saw the 
photograph of what that shirt looked like. There is no way that you knew that that shirt was white 
unless you saw it before it became soaked with blood and mud. I submit to you that Antron 
McCray describes details and describes them in a way that make you know beyond any doubt, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was present, that he helped other people rape her and that he 
helped other people beat her and that he left her there to die.150 
The Central Park Jogger case involved an assault and a sexual assault that took place in 
New York City's Central Park, in 1989. 151 The accused in the case were Anton McCray, Yusef 
Salaam, Kevin Richardson, Kharey Wise, and Raymond Santana.152 All five were teenage 
persons of colour. The investigation revealed that gangs of teenagers were assaulting strangers 
in Central Park in large numbers. Although there were many persons who were identified as 
participating in the assaults that night, only five were brought forward as having perpetrated the 
attack on the central parkjogger. 153 All five were convicted, and four of the five confessed.154 
Following interrogation, they admitted being involved in the attack against the victim and 
provided the police interrogators with details about their respective roles, and the roles of the 
149 Ibid. at 1 077 
150 Ibid. at 1078, citing Trial Transcript at 591-92, People v. McCray, No. 4762/89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 1990). 
Also See Ibid. 
151 Sharon L. Davies, "The Reality ofFa1se Confessions- The Lessons of the Central Park Jogger Case" (2005-
2006) 30 N.Y.U. Rev. L. and Soc. Change 209- When the victim was found she had suffered internal bleeding and a 
skull fracture of such seriousness it removed her eye from its socket. As a result of the severe trauma, she had no 
memory of the attack or of any of the events up to an hour preceding the assault (pgs. 214 and 215). 
152 Ibid. at 215-16. 
153 Timothy Sullivan, Unequal Verdicts: The Central Park Jogger Trials (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992) at 
50. 
154 Ibid. 
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other accused. 155 At the outset of the interrogations, they were all given their rights and156 " ••• yet 
each agreed to speak to the police and the prosecutor without counsel present."157 
Each of the teenage-accused stated specifically on videotape " ... that the police had not 
abused them;"158 in fact, several of the accused " ... were accompanied by adult family members 
when they waived their rights to remain silent and have counsel present during questioning. 159 
This made it exceptionally difficult for the defence to argue that police pressure had produced 
five detailed false confessions. 160 
The confessors retracted their statements within weeks, claiming they had been 
intimidated, lied to and coerced into making false confessions. 161 While the confessions 
themselves were videotaped, the hours of interrogation that had preceded them were not. 162 
In January 2002 another individual by the name of Matias Reyes provided a detailed and 
accurate confession of the assault at the Central Park. 163 As a result of Reyes' confession, DNA 
testing was ordered. The tests showed that the semen and pubic hair found at the scene belonged 
to Reyes. On December 5, 2012, the convictions of all five accused were vacated. 164 
The Case of Earl Washington Jr: 
Earl Washington Jr., a "mentally retarded farmhand,"165 gave a false confession to a rape and 
murder. 166 He was sentenced to death. After eighteen years in prison, and only nine days prior 
155 Supra note 151 at 216. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. at 218. 
159 Ibid 
160 Ibid at 224. 
161 N. Jeremi Durn, "The Central Park Five, The Scotsboro Boys, And the Myth of the Bestial Black Man" (2003-
2004) 25 Cardozo Law Review 1317 at 1317. 
162 New York City Police Department- Executive Summary, online: p.l7 
<http://tll.findlaw .com/news. findJaw.com/cnn/docs/cpjgr/nypd 12703 jgrmt.pdf.> 
163 Ibid. at 30. 
164 Supra note 161 at 1317-1357. 
165 Supra note 5 at I 077. 
166 Ibid. at 1075. 
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to his scheduled execution, DNA testing exonerated him of the crime .. 167 Washington had tried 
to appeal his conviction to several state and federal courts, 168 which cited " ... the reliability of his 
confession"169 in denying his appeals. 170 Washington was " ... borderline mentally retarded,"171 
but was found by the Fourth Circuit to have "supplied without prompting details of the crime that 
were corroborated by evidence taken from the scene and by the observations of those 
investigating the [victim's] apartment."172 
Washington reportedly told police that he had left a shirt at the crime scene, and that that 
shirt had an identifying characteristic, a torn-off patch, making it unusual. 173 He knew with 
precision that the shirt had been left in the dresser drawer of the bedroom, 174 and he told police 
" ... that he had left it there because it had blood on it"175 (even though the stains on the shirt that 
officers later showed Washington had been cut from the shirt for forensic analysis). 176 
Every time Washington was asked non-leading questions177 in the initial stages of his 
interrogation, he gave the wrong answer. 178 For example, he got the race, the height, and the 
number of times the victim got stabbed wrong. 179 He also said " ... he didn't see anyone else in 






172 Ibid., citing Washington v. Murray, 4 F. 3d 1285, 1292 (4th Cir. 1993). 
173 Garrett, Ibid. at 1076. 
114/bid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. at 1077. 





inconsistencies, the prosecutor stressed with the jury that Washington reportedly volunteered 
information that he left his shirt at the crime scene. 181 
The prosecutor defended the police by telling the jury that the police did not feed facts about 
the crime to Washington 182, but that Washington " ... knew exactly how the crime had been 
committed."183 He noted that he knew the patch was missing, 184 and he stated: "Now, how does 
somebody make all that up, unless they were actually there and actually did it? I would submit 
to you that there can't be any question in your mind about it, the fact that this happened and the 
fact that Earl Washington Junior did it."185 
Garrett comments on the significance of this: 
Now that we know Earl Washington, Jr. did not commit the crime, but rather another man later 
identified through a DNA database who has now pleaded guilty, there are limited explanations for 
how Washington could have uttered those remarks concerning the shirt, together with other details 
concerning how the crime was committed. Either the police offered those facts to him, or the police 
had actually leaked all of that information to the public and somehow Washington, a mentally 
retarded farmhand living in the next county, heard it all and carefully incorporated it into his 
confession.186 
The fact that the exonerees videotaped confessions showed that they knew key non-
public facts about the crimes they were charged with shows that the police must have fed them 
facts during their interrogations, either directly or by asking leading questions. In the cases 
detailed above, we have also seen how prosecutors use this confession evidence in their 
submissions to persuasively establish a case for guilt. Now we turn to what the effect of this 
kind of information is upon triers of fact, both judges and jurors, as well as their receptivity to 
the interrogation techniques that ostensibly draw out the confessions. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. at 1076. 
183 Ibid 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid. citing Trial Transcript at 527-37, 540, 566, Commonwealth v. Washington (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 1984). 
186 Garrett, Ibid. at 1077. 
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The Treatment at Law of Confession Evidence Obtained by Interrogation: 
Methods of psychological interrogation, and specifically the methods embodied in the 
Reid Technique, are not of a particularly recent vintage and are not unknown to the courts. The 
Reid Technique was referenced numerous times by Chief Justice Warren, of the United States 
Supreme Court, in his influential and widely disseminated majority reasons for the Court in its 
now famous decision in Miranda v. Arizona.181 Although no Supreme Court of Canada case has 
explicitly considered the Reid Technique, in the landmark case of R. v. Dickie, the Court gave 
consideration to (and approval of) certain specific strategies and tactics of interrogation that are 
advocated by the Reid Institute (notwithstanding that they did not identify these strategies and 
tactics as being Reid methods and tactics per se - in fact, the name "Reid" does not appear in the 
judgment at al1). 188 
Dickie appears to signify a retreat from the Court's earlier decision in R. v. Hebert, 
wherein the Court was critical of police trickery in the context of undercover operations carried-
187 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Interrogation manuals, including Inbau & Reid's Criminal 
Interrogation and Confessions, are referred to, explained in some detail, and cited liberally, by the Chief Justice 
Warren. The works ofinbau & Reid, the chief architects ofthe Reid Technique, are cited in II separate footnotes 
throughout this landmark judgment (which contains a total of7I footnote citations). 
One of the key Reid Technique concepts, for example, is referred to (with a citation to Inbau & Reid, I962) at 451: 
that is, the concept of minimization. Chief Justice Warren writes at 45I: "To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar 
surroundings, the manuals instruct the police to display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt and, from outward 
appearance, to maintain only an interest in confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to be positioned as 
a fact. The interrogator should direct his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather 
than court failure by asking the subject whether he did it. Like other men, perhaps the subject has had a bad family 
life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited desire for women. The officers are 
instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or on society. These tactics 
are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police 
purport to know already- that he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and discouraged." 
188 R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3. In R. v. Oickle at paragraph 65, Mr. Justice Iacobucci, writing for the majority, 
reaffirmed the test for police trickery and deception that will defeat voluntariness, taken from Mr. Justice Lamer's 
reasons in R. v. Rothman, [I981] I S.C.R. 640. In that case, Lamer J. wrote, at 69I, that additional to concerns 
about the reliability of involuntary statements, a trier of fact must be concerned about " ... whether the authorities 
have done or said anything that could have induced the accused to make a statement which was or might be untrue. 
It is of the utmost importance to keep in mind that the inquiry is not concerned with reliability but with the 
authorities' conduct in regards to reliability." 
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out while the suspect is in police custody. In that judgment, Madam Justice McLachlin links the 
scope of the informed choice to exercise or waive the constitutional right to silence to the 
problem of police trickery. She says the right to silence" ... must extend to exclude tricks which 
would effectively deprive the suspect of this choice. To permit the authorities to trick the 
suspect into making a confession to them after he or she has exercised the right of conferring 
with counsel and declined to make a statement, is to permit the authorities to do indirectly what 
the Charter does not permit them to do directly. This cannot be in accordance with the purpose 
ofthe Charter."189 
Nevertheless, the Court's decision in R v. Rennie (1981), 74 Cr. App. 207 (C.A.) at 212, 
was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oickle at para. 57 (in support of 
the "necessity" in the "vast majority of cases" for the police to "somehow convince the suspect it 
is in his or her best interests to confess"). The Rennie Court was quoted as saying: 
Very few confessions are inspired solely by remorse. Often the motives of an accused include a 
hope that an early admission may lead to an earlier release or a lighter sentence. If it were the 
law that the mere presence of such a motive, even if prompted by something said or done by a 
person in authority, led inexorably to the exclusion of a confession, nearly every confession 
would be rendered inadmissible. This is not the law. In some cases the hope may be self-
generated. If so, it is irrelevant, even if it provides the dominant motive for making the 
confession. In such a case the confession will not have been obtained by anything said or done 
by a person in authority. More commonly the presence of such a hope will, in part at least, owe 
its origin to something said or done by such a person. There can be few prisoners who are being 
firmly questioned in a police station to whom it does not occur that they might be able to bring 
both their interrogation and their detention to an earlier end by confession.190 
The Ontario Court of Appeal has given the Reid Technique explicit consideration 
(and approval). In Regina v. Barrett, Arbour J.A., as she then was, (with Tarnopolsky, J.A. 
concurring), wrote: 
Trained police investigators understand the psychology of criminal behaviour and recognize the 
symptoms of guilt or innocence. They have methods of questioning to reveal one or the other, 
and to draw confessions from the guilty. These tactics and techniques are described in full in 
189 R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 at para. 66. 
190 Oickle, Supra note 188 at para. 57. 
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Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 3rd ed., Ingrau (sic), Reid and Buckley. So far as I can 
see there is nothing offensive in these techniques, but the fact that I have never seen them 
outlined in viva voce evidence on a voir dire suggests that the police may be reticent in 
publicizing their methods. They need not be. 191 
Madame Justice Arbour's intimation that trained investigators can "understand the 
psychology of criminal behaviour and recognize symptoms of guilt or innocence" is troubling. It 
is troubling because she seems to be lending undeserved credibility to the refuted notion that 
behavioural cues can betray a person's guilt, and there are methods (i.e. trickery, deception, and 
psychological coercion) to draw confessions from "the guilty" (as determined by the behavioural 
cues, presumably). One hopes that Madame Justice Arbour did not determine the guilt or 
innocence of any accused persons or whether that person was lying or telling the truth on the sole 
basis of behavioural cues during her tenure as a trial judge. It is perplexing why she feels that the 
procedural protections safeguarding adverse findings of credibility may be dispensed-with in the 
interrogation room. 192 
Should the demeanour of a suspect or a charged person not be accorded the same, limited 
significance during pre-trial questioning as it is accorded at trial?193 And should a person found 
191 R. v. Barrett (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 587, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 266 (C.A.). There was a further appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada, but it did not address the appropriateness ofthe Reid Technique. SeeR. v. Barrett, [1995] I 
S.C.R. 752,21 O.R. (3d) 736.). 
192 It may be the case that Madame Justice Arbour is acting on what was found in the text she referenced, which 
supports the fiction surrounding the efficacy of behavioural analysis to determine reliable symptoms of guilt. 
Perhaps she was writing without the benefit of the scholarship that casts serious doubt on the assumption that police 
are skilled at distinguishing truth from lies, the guilty from the innocent, on the basis of verbal and non-verbal cues. 
193 There are numerous cases wherein it is emphasized that demeanour evidence is unreliable. In Law Society of 
Upper Canada v. Neinstein (2010), 99 O.R. (3d) 1 at para. 66 (C.A.) "while demeanour is a relevant factor in a 
credibility assessment, demeanour alone is a notoriously unreliable predictor of the accuracy of evidence given by a 
witness". In R. v. G. G. (1997), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 14, 42, it was held that the trial judge 
committed reversible error in finding an accused guilty based, "almost exclusively upon his favourable assessment 
of the complainant's demeanour without embarking upon any critical assessment of her testimony in the light of the 
evidence as a whole" which included "significant contradictory evidence and inconsistencies". R. v. P-P (S.H.) 
(2003), 176 C.C.C. (3d) 281 at 291-92 (N.S.C.A.): "Appearances alone may be very deceptive. A most 
reprehensible witness may well be telling the truth. A polished, well-mannered individual may prove to be a 
consummate liar. 
Reasons of intelligence, upbringing, education, race, culture, social status and a host of other factors may adversely 
affect a witness's demeanour and yet may have little bearing on that person's truthfulness. Consequently, quite 
apart from that witness's appearance or mood, his or her testimony must be carefully considered for its consistency 
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"~ilty" by the application of such a poorly founded method of making determinations of guilt or 
innocence be condemned to face the punishment of the guilt-presumptive coercive interrogation? 
In my view, given the significant risk of generating a police induced false confession and 
subsequent wrongful conviction posed by the use of these tactics, so-called "guilt", as 
determined by non-verbal cues' behavioural analysis, ought not to suffice to condemn a suspect 
to these unfair and coercive interrogation tactics which expose the person affected to the risk of 
making a false confession. If it is inappropriate to rely solely on behavioural analysis in the 
assessment of trial testimonial evidence, then what compelling reason is there that is not trumped 
by considerations of fairness, for permitting such wide latitude at pre-trial in the interrogation 
room?194 
If the Ontario Court of Appeal has demonstrated a generally pro-Reid orientation, then 
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has historically taken the opposite view. This is evidenced by 
that court's treatment of police trickery in Oickle, when it dealt with that case before it ultimately 
made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada. In its decision, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
suggested that the interrogator's understanding of demeanour in questioning the suspect 
or inconsistency with all of the other evidence presented at trial before any decision can be made concerning its 
acceptance, in whole or in part, or the weight to be attached to it." See also: R. v. Norman (1993), 87 C.C.C. (3d) 
153 at para. 55 (Ont. C.A.): "I do not think that an assessment of credibility based on demeanour alone is good 
enough in a case where there are so many significant inconsistencies." In R. v. S.(W.) (1994}, 90 C.C.C. (3d) 242 at 
para. 19 (Ont. C.A.): "Demeanour alone should not suffice to found a conviction where there are significant 
inconsistencies and conflicting evidence on the record." 
194 It might be argued that the investigative role of police is a different one from the adjudicative role played by 
judges and juries. Without being able to rely on indicators of guilt, the police would have to ignore their 
investigative hunches.· It is impossible to regulate the very thoughts of the police so that they are unable to take non-
verbal behavioural cues into consideration. 
However, the impossibility of stopping the police from relying on behavioural cues is not a reason in favour of 
allowing them to rely on them; it is a reason to do away with police interrogations. We ail rely on dubious 
behavioural indicators in making judgments in our personal lives. Such judgments can be prejudicial. It is 
important, therefore, that such prejudices not be given an opportunity to influence the outcome of criminal 
proceedings. This is important at the investigative stage as weii as at the adjudicative stage of the process. 
,..., 287,..., 
amounted to an improper abuse of the suspect's trust. The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed 
with this view, stating that: 
In essence, the [lower] court criticizes the police for questioning the respondent in such a gentle, 
reassuring manner that they gained his trust. This does not render a confession inadmissible. To 
hold otherwise would send the perverse message to police that they should engage in adversarial, 
aggressive questioning to ensure they never gain the suspect's trust, lest an ensuing confession be 
excluded.195 
In its decision in Oickle, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal had also concluded that the 
police improperly made an offer of leniency to the accused by minimizing the seriousness of his 
offence. The Supreme Court of Canada again disagreed, stating: "Insofar as the police simply 
downplayed the moral culpability of the offence, their actions were not problematic."196 
In Dickie the Supreme Court made reference to Mr. Justice Lamer's reasons in Rothman, 
wherein he wrote: "The investigation of crime and the detection of criminals is not a game to be 
governed by the Marquis of Queensbury rules. The authorities in dealing with shrewd and often 
sophisticated criminals, must sometimes of necessity resort to tricks or other forms of deceit and 
should not through rules be hampered in their work. What should be repressed vigorously is 
conduct on their part that shocks the community."197 
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal expressed concern that the use of"alternative 
questions" implied a threat or a promise of leniency. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this 
argument and offered a different test of whether or not an implied threat or promise crosses the 
line when it wrote: "The most important consideration in all cases is to look for a quid pro quo 
offer by interrogators, regardless of whether it comes in the form of a threat or a promise."198 
195 Oickle, supra note 188. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Rothman, supra note 188, cited in Oickle, supra note 188. 
198 Oickle, supra note 188. 
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While the Supreme Court of Canada has avoided assessment of the appropriateness or 
legal permissibility of the Reid Technique directly, by name, it has given tacit approval to this 
method by permitting the use of police trickery. 
Nevertheless, lower courts have given explicit consideration to the Reid Technique in 
several cases. There have been a number of decisions from the Ontario Superior Court, for 
example. 199 For instance, in R. v. Amos, many of the Reid techniques met with judicial approval 
and resulted in the admission of an accused's confession to police. 200 
Amos is consistent with the Oickle ruling, insofar as it indicates that courts are directed to 
accord the police a great deal of latitude in resorting to tricks on the view that such tricks will not 
severely interfere with a suspect's exercise of informed free-choice. For example, when 
discussing the interrogator's efforts to minimize the suspect's moral responsibility, the court 
stated: 
There is nothing problematic or objectionable about police, when questioning suspects, in 
downplaying or minimizing the moral culpability of their alleged criminal activity. I find there 
was nothing improper in these and other similar transcript examples where [the detective] 
minimized [the accused's] moral responsibility. At no time did he suggest that a confession by 
the subject would result in reduced or minimal legal consequences. Those questions did not 
minimize the offence anywhere close to the extent of oppression within the meaning of Oickle 
and other authorities. In using the words "this is your opportunity" to tell your story, and 
statements to the effect that "your credibility is at its highest now", and in asserting to the accused 
that he would not be as credible ten months down the road at trial when he had "spoken to 
lawyers", and the like, the detective was making an approach to the accused's intellect and 
conscience?01 
But the positive reception of the technique has not been unanimous across the courts in 
every province. The Reid Technique has been considered in cases heard in other Canadian 
199 See: R. v. Amos (2009), CarswellOnt 7126,202 C.R.R (2d) 106; R. v. Vicioso (2006), CanLII 27311,70 W.C.B. 
(2d) 592 (ON S.C.). 
200 John E. Reid & Associates, correspondence by email to me, May 3, 201 0; Amos, ibid. 
201 Amos, ibid. 
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jurisdictions,202 and some lower courts appear to have responded to the methodology with 
greater skepticism. In R. v. MJ.S.,203 Ketchum Prov. Ct. J., wrote: 
It is only by watching these interrogations that one can experience the full flavour of the intensity 
of the questioning, and the psychological suggestions and manipulation of the accused through 
the use of themes. This is an investigative technique pioneered by John E. Reid and Associates, 
Inc. of Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. The Reid Technique involves a skillful development of 'themes' 
and suggestions put to the suspect in a rapid-fire and high intensity manner where the interrogator 
stays in complete control of the situation. On the rare occasions when there is an opportunity for 
the accused to respond, any disagreement is immediately ignored or overridden and, in particular, 
any denial is countered with a shift to another theme, or a cutoff remark such as 'we are beyond 
that point, we know you did it'. This technique is used over 40 times.204 
The MJ.S. court found that a confession was inadmissible, in part, because the 
investigators used an "alternative question" that contrasted a situation in which, if the suspect 
confessed he could continue to raise his children and keep his family together; and if he refused 
to confess, on the other hand, he would never see his children again and they would be raised by 
foster parents?05 Because the alternative question was clearly directed at real potential 
consequences, and it was a lie for the interrogator to suggest he had any real pull in the matter, it 
was decided to have been improper by the court. The Court held that this technique raised doubt 
about the voluntariness of the resulting statement. On the Reid Technique itself, Mr. Justice 
Ketchum provided the following valuable commentary: 
I have also come to the conclusion that the technique employed in interrogating this accused by 
all three interrogators was oppressive. More specifically, I find that the accused wrote this 
confession in order to escape the oppressive atmosphere created by these interrogations all of 
which followed the Reid Technique almost to the letter.206 
202 R. v. MJ.S., [2000] A.J. No. 391; R. v. Minde, 2003 ABQB 797,343 A.R. 371, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 188; R. v. Cruz, 
2008 ABPC 155 (CanLII), 455 A.R. 10. 
203 M.J.S., ibid. 
204 Ibid. at paras 18 and 19. 
205 Ibid. at para28. 
206 Ibid. at para. 39. 
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In another Alberta case, R. v. Minde,201 Madam Justice Moreau, after outlining the point 
of contention, went on to decide that the evidence obtained by virtue of a Reid-inspired 
interrogation should be excluded. Moreau J., at paragraph 87, writes: 
In all of the circumstances, the combined effect of: 
the deceit perpetrated by the officers, 
their powerful moral and spiritual inducements, 
the minimization techniques used, 
the absence of any offer of food or refreshment for a number of hours, 
created an atmosphere in which the accused had to trade admissions in order to extract himself 
from the more serious consequences of a murder charge. Minde having admitted to having been 
drinking on the evening in question and to having memory problems, there was a further risk 
created by the conduct of the officers, that he felt obliged to provide an explanation for the death, 
whether or not the explanation was true. . .. [T]he comments of police in my view carried the ... 
implication that the officers would assist [Minde] to avoid being prosecuted for murder if he told 
his side of the story. I am left in a state of reasonable doubt as to whether as a result of the 
conduct of the police, the accused's incriminating admissions were obtained through fear of 
prejudice or hope of advantage held out to the accused.208 (emphasis mine) 
In a recent Alberta case, R. v. Chapple,209 the Alberta Provincial Court was sharply 
critical of the Reid Technique and reiterated the earlier criticisms in R. v. MJ.S. The Court 
wrote: 
Twelve years after Judge Ketchum warned of the dangers of the use of the Reid Technique in 
MJ.S., it continues to be criticized by a number of courts. I now add my voice to the chorus. 
Like Judge Ketchum, I denounce the use of this technique in the strongest terms possible and find 
that its use can lead to overwhelmingly oppressive situations that can render false confessions and 
cause innocent people to be wrongfully imprisoned. In this case the police were convinced of the 
accused's guilt even though there was medical evidence available that was consistent with the 
accused's version of events. They pushed ahead with the interview with one goal in mind: a 
confession. And that confession had to fit their theory of the case?10 
207 Minde, supra note 202. 
208 Ibid at para. 87. 
209 R. v. Chapple, 2012 ABPC 229. 
210 Ibid at para. 122. 
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The current jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada considering the use by police of the 
modem techniques of psychological interrogation, and in particular, the Reid Technique as well 
as other Reid-inspired interrogation methods, indicates a general acceptance of the strategies and 
tactics espoused by these schools of interrogation. The written judgments of lower court judges, 
notably the Alberta Queen's Bench, have articulated valuable reservations about the uses of the 
Reid techniques showing that the opinion of the judiciary generally on the appropriateness of 
these techniques has been far from unanimous. But the different rulings in the courts below do 
not necessarily indicate inconsistency with those of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has 
not mentioned the Reid Technique explicitly in its reasons and has indicated that determinations 
of voluntariness are to be made contextually taking all the factors into account by the trial 
judge.211 For the Supreme Court this is arguably an issue of deference to the trier of fact, and it 
could be argued that the circumstances in cases like Minde and MJ.S. reflect sufficiently 
different facts from Oickle and Spencer, for example, that there was no inconsistency between 
the rulings at all - merely deference in the latter cases. 
The lower court judgments appear to indicate deeper consideration of some of the key 
issues at play, however, whereas the Supreme Court's consideration of the atmosphere created 
by Reid interrogation and its impact upon the suspect appears to have been more limited. 
Decades of research in "social psychology"212 tells us that a social situation has great power to 
influence a person's behaviour.213 At issue is the question of whether a given trick will rob a 
suspect of his ability to make a free choice. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice have given very wide latitude to the amount of permissible trickery in 
211 Oickle, Supra note 1 88. 
212 Timothy Moore & Karina Gagnier, ""You Can Talk if you want to": Is the Police Caution on the 'Right to 
Silence' Understandable?" (2008) 51 C.R. (6th) 1 at 21. 
213 Ibid. According to the authors, our tendency to overestimate the significance of dispositional characteristics and 
underestimate the impact of situational circumstances has been labeled "the fundamental attribution error'' (Ibid.). 
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the custodial interrogation setting. Other courts have demonstrated a more considered 
understanding of how the psychology of pressure and persuasion can alter a detainee's 
perception so as to interfere with rational choice, and arguably, by extension, with informed free-
choice, as well. 
Courts usually exclude confessions if they determine that statements were made in 
response to clear threat (inducement), or if the use of police trickery was sufficiently egregious 
that would be shocking to the conscience of the community.214 Neither Rothman, nor any case 
which followed this decision, has215 "prohibited use of police trickery (e.g. exaggerating the 
strength or amount of evidence against a suspect) - it is still an allowable interrogation 
technique."216 
The Reid Technique is the most widespread training regimen for police officers in North 
America; however, Reid-style interrogations are not the only means of procuring incriminating 
statements. We now turn our attention to a method of gathering confessions evidence that is 
thought to be more humane than the Reid Technique. That method is the PEACE model of 
investigative interviewing. 
214 Supra note 40 at 323. 
215 Ibid. at 322. 
216 Ibid at 322-323. 
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Chapter 6: The Peace Model 
Introduction: 1 
As has been discussed, the Reid technique of interrogation has been roundly criticized for 
the manipulative character of the tactics it trains interrogators to employ. Many believe, based 
on the evidence earlier discussed, that the tactics advocated by the Reid Institute and its 
proponents create a substantial risk of inducing suspects to make false confessions. 2 
Many opponents of the Reid Technique support the implementation of a purported ethical 
alternative:3 the PEACE method of investigative interviewing. It is to this method that we now 
turn our attention. 
It is argued that proponents of PEACE may be overly optimistic in their assessment that 
this method will eliminate or substantially reduce false or involuntary confessions. Whereas the 
Reid technique appears to have a tendency to induce false confessions due to its heavy reliance 
upon fear-tactics, PEACE seems to rely more on creating false hope of advantage. It appears 
that in situations where a suspect can be compelled to speak by an external legal threat, like an 
adverse inference for a refusal to make a statement, PEACE may induce false confessions 
through its reliance on creating in the mind of a suspect the hope that there is an advantage to be 
gained by cooperating with police interviewers. In the absence of such an external legal threat, 
with the right to silence in place, PEACE may be ineffective. In such circumstances it is 
suggested that the elimination of the right to silence may become a necessary component of 
successful PEACE method implementation. Thus, it is proposed that where PEACE is adopted 
1 
"Over the years, the English police have not had much in the way of manuals about questioning. They have relied 
on American manuals and are now trying to move very far away from the typical style we are familiar with from 
television programs."- Michael Zander, "You Have no Right to Remain Silent: Abolition of the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination in England" ( 1995) 40 St. Louis U. L.J. 659 at 663. 
2 See chapter 4. 
3 See the discussion in this chapter. 
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as an interviewing technique, the elimination of the right to silence may follow, whether it is 
intended by policy-makers that that should happen, or it occurs as a consequence of PEACE 
implementation. 
Further to this point, as we shall see, in the United Kingdom, the adoption of the PEACE 
style of investigative interviewing was only two years before the government's effective 
elimination of the right to silence by legislative enactment. It is further suggested that the 
historical circumstances that permitted sweeping reforms to police procedure to be made in the 
1980s and 1990s enabled the Conservative government of the United Kingdom to carry out a 
plan for the elimination of the right to silence that it had been unsuccessfully trying to implement 
since the 1970s. It is suggested that the pretext for comprehensive criminal justice reform was 
created by a number of high-profile miscarriages of justice that caused public outrage. It is 
further suggested that the government then seized this opportunity to enact reforms that were in 
keeping with its ideologically-driven agenda. The elimination of the right to silence was of 
paramount importance, and the PEACE method is the most suitable means of obtaining a 
statement, in an environment where there is no right to silence. I contend that it is possible that in 
the British case, PEACE may have been designed with the future elimination of the right to 
silence in mind, or as a policy instrument that may have assisted in the elimination of that right. 
In this chapter I will illustrate the underlying principles of PEACE, its history and its 
methods. Upon the review of the PEACE method of interrogation I intend to argue that PEACE 
is not a suitable ethical alternative to Reid. This is important for our purposes as this thesis calls 
for the abolition of all custodial questioning. Hence, it is argued here that PEACE is not the 
solution to the problem of coercive custodial interrogations. This argument is predicated on a 
number of factors. Among these factors is the possibility that the implementation of PEACE 
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could pose a threat to the future of the right to silence in Canada. Moreover, the PEACE method 
of interrogation has a strong tendency to obscure the adversarial relationship that exists between 
a state agent and an accused person. 
Keeping these introductory remarks in mind, let us begin this chapter by examining the 
PEACE model of interviewing. 
The PEACE Model of Investigative Interviewing 
Professor H. Richard Uvillar has observed that although police frequently obtain 
evidence from the mind of an accused person 4 by "direct interrogation, "5 more subtle variations 
of interrogation techniques, or even "casual conversation" may be just as effective or more so.6 
Some agree with this proposition, and some reject it out of hand; nevertheless, it is an idea that 
merits our attention as we discuss our next topic, the PEACE 7 model of investigative 
interviewing. 
The highly persuasion-oriented Reid Technique may be compared, and where appropriate, 
contrasted with the PEACE model. When comparing the two models, we should ask whether the 
claims of the PEACE advocates in favour of their approach can be supported by the research 
data. The specific claims that we must consider include, at least, the following:8 
4 H. Richard Uvillar, "Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of 
Access and Restraint" (1987) 87 Columbia L. Rev. 1137 at 1137. 
5 Ibid. at 1142. 
6 Ibid. and Ibid. n. 14. Uvillar writes at footnote 14: "One of the more notable examples occurred in New York, 
where, after fruitless hours of interrogation (and a conference with his lawyer), the prime suspect in a brutal double 
murder finally opened up in response to an offhand remark from a cop he knew: "Rick, did you ever think it would 
wind up like this?", citing People v. Robles, 27 N.Y. 2d 155, 158, 263 N.E. 2d 304, 305, 314 N.Y.S. 2d 794 (1970), 
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971). 
7 PEACE is an acronym which stands for Planning & Preparation, Engage & Explain, Account, Closure, and 
Evaluation. These components provide a structure that can be used for all types of investigative interviewing. 
8 I don't propose this list as an exhaustive one; these four claims are simply ones which appear relevant and are 
readily apparent to me. 
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(1) That PEACE is equally or more effective at eliciting confessions from suspects than 
(2) That PEACE lowers the risk of false confessions; 10 
(3) That PEACE is less manipulative and coercive than Reid, and therefore more humane; 11 
and 
(4) That if interviewers are properly trained in PEACE, this will cause them to adequately 
absorb the training program and successfully apply the methodology in their practice, 
thus realizing positive dividends in the above three areas. 12 
I am not prepared, at this time, to propose any definitive answers to these questions. All of 
these claims may be true, and may be subject to ultimate proof as being true, in time, or they may 
be untrue or not susceptible to proof. As far as I can tell, the data that is available is not yet 
extensive enough to reach hard conclusions on these questions, nor have the studies which have 
been done adequately addressed the high number of variables that are at play, even when they 
are aggregated and synthesized. 
Advocates for PEACE uphold a distinction between the concepts of interrogating, on the 
one hand, and interviewing, on the other. They are proponents of the latter, and purport to offer 
a more humane way of searching for the truth than the advocates of the Reid technique. PEACE 
9 Brent Snook et al., "Reforming Investigative Interviewing in Canada" (2010) 52 Canadian J. Criminology and 
Crim. Just. 215 at 222. 
10 Ibid at 223. 
11 Ibid.; Rebecca Milne & Ray Bull, Investigative Interviewing Psychology and Practice (Chichester: Wiley, 1999) 
at 5. 
12 Brent Snook et al., "Police Witness Interview Training, Supervision and Feedback: A Survey of Canadian Police 
Officers" (2012) Canadian J. Criminology and Crim. Just. 363 at 367-370; Brent Snook & Kathy Keating, "A Field 
Study of Adult Witness Interviewing Practices in a Canadian Police Organization" (2010) 16 Legal and Criminal 
Psychology 160; Snook, et a/., Ibid; Allison M. Wright & Laurence Allison, "Questioning Sequences in Canadian 
Police Interviews: Constructing and Confirming the Course of Events" (2004) 10(2) Psychology, Crime and Law 
137. 
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interrogators " ... reject the term "interrogation" completely" 13 and take the position that "all 
interviews, whether with victims, witnesses or suspects, are 'investigative interviews' ."14 
The PEACE model of investigative interviewing originated in the United Kingdom. The 
history shows that, up until towards the end ofthe 18th century, justices ofthe peace in England 
and Wales were responsible for conducting an "inquisition" of an accused person. However, 
when they no longer had that obligation, the police stepped-in and assumed control of the task of 
questioning. 15 Williamson writes: 
As the new constabularies began to proliferate across England and Wales police officers began to 
question suspects prior to the judicial hearing. Some judges would allow reports of such 
conversations to be given in evidence whereas this was anathema to others. The Home Secretary 
referred the matter to the Judges and in 1906 the Judges Rules were published.16 
The option to question suspects may clearly have fallen to English and Welsh police after 
1906, however there was very " .. .little guidance"17 on how the questioning should be done! 8 
until literature on that subject began to be more widely published in the 1980s.19 During that 
decade, "concerns over the perceived ineffectiveness of the Judges' Rules"20 and many other 
deficiencies in police procedure that were identified by the Phillips Royal Commission on 
Criminal Procedure led to the passing of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE 
1984").21 The Act introduced ostensibly " ... stricter controls over police questioning, including 
13 Mary Schollum, Investigative Interviewing: The Literature (Wellington: Officer of the Commissioner of Police, 
2005) at 13. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. at 43. 
16 T. Williamson, "Review and Prospect" in Eric Shepherd, ed., "Aspects of Police Interviewing" (1993) 18 Issues 
in Criminological and Legal Psychiatry 57 at 57. 
17 Supra note 13 at 43. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Milne & Bull, supra note 11. 
20 Supra note 13 at 43. 
21 See: Michael Zander, "The Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989" (1989) 40 N. Ir. Legal 
Q. 319. 
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the tape-recording of interviews with suspects. "22 These measures highlighted the fact that the 
interview and interrogation techniques currently in vogue in England had not, in the main, been 
made the subject of any rigorous scientific testing.23 Thus, research on interview and 
interrogation began to proliferate, particularly from the field of forensic psychology, following 
the emergence of the increased scrutiny of that decade. 24 
In 1991, the British Home Office created a " ... steering group on "investigative 
interviewing, comprising members of the police service, the Home Office, and the Crown 
Prosecution Service"25 to create and implement an interview methodology and a training 
program to disseminate it.26 What they came up with was the PEACE model,27 the aim of which 
was to move away from "persuasive interviewing"28, and replace it with an "ethical 
alternative".29 As early as 1992, two handbooks were dispatched to officers:30 "A Guide to 
Interviewing"31 and "The Interviewer's Rule Book". 32 "These were accompanied by a 
workbook33 and guidance on the core principles of police interviewing."34 
22 Supra note I3 at. 43. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Supra note 13. The exonerations of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four and the MacGuire Seven also 
exposed interviewing and interrogation methods to greater scrutiny. These high-profile miscarriages of justice led to 
the creation of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (The Runciman Commission) (Stewart Field & Phillip A. 
Thomas, "Justice and Efficiency? The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice" (I994) 2I The Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice I at 1). 




27 Supra note I3 at 43 
28 I use this euphemism loosely, as we have already discussed at some length what so-called "persuasion" often 
entails as evidenced by the Reid Technique. 
29 Supra note I3. 
30 Milne & Bull, supra note II at I 58. 
31 
"A Guide to Interviewing" (CPTU, I992a) 
32 
"The Interviewer's Rule Book" (CPTU, I992b). 
33 CPTU, I992c 
34 Supra note I3 at 43. 
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The PEACE method consists of the use of investigative techniques that its proponents claim 
follow higher ethical standards for custodial interrogation than are found in the Reid techniques. 
The PEACE conception of ethical interviewing includes the following ideas:35 
1. "Interviews should be conducted with integrity, common sense and sound judgment. "36 
2. "Using unfair means to get a confession (i.e. noble cause corruption) is never justified."37 
3. "Interviewers must avoid unethical behaviours such as making threats or promises or using 
coercive or oppressive tactics."38 
4. "Suspects must be treated by the interviewer with respect, an open-mind, tolerance and 
impartiality. "39 
5. "An awareness of why some people will make false confessions, including dispositional 
factors ( eg: age, personality characteristics, intellectual impairment, etc.) and situational ( eg: 
isolation, confrontation and minimization)."40 
6. "If offenders believe they have been treated well they are less likely to form a negative view 
of police or to communicate a negative view of police to others."41 
7. "Many miscarriages of justice have resulted from police malpractice."42 
The seven principles of investigative interviewing were developed in 1992 by the Home 
Office for use in England and Wales, and have since been adopted in other jurisdictions.43 Home 
Office Circular 2211992 provides the following seven principles of investigative interviewing:44 









44 Home Office Circular 2211992 p. 90 (Practice Advice on Core Investigative Doctrine 2005, produced on behalf of 
Chief Police Officers by National Center for Policy Excellence) 
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1. "The role of investigative interviewing is to obtain accurate and reliable information from 
suspects, witnesses or victims in order to discover the truth about matters under police 
investigation." 
2. "Investigative interviewing should be approached with an open mind. Information 
obtained from the person who is being interviewed should always be tested against what the 
interviewing officer already knows or what can be reasonably established." 
3. "When questioning anyone a police officer must act fairly in the circumstances of each 
individual case." 
4. "The police interviewer is not bound to accept the first answer given. Questioning is not 
unfair merely because it is persistent." 
5. "Even when the right to silence is exercised by a suspect the police still have a right to put 
questions." 
6. "When conducting an interview, police officers are free to ask questions in order to 
establish the truth; except for interviews with child victims of sexual or violent abuse which 
are to be used in criminal proceedings, they are not constrained by the rules applied to 
lawyers in court." 
7. "Vulnerable people, whether victims, witnesses or suspects, must be treated with 
particular consideration at all times." 
These principles seem to represent a commitment to fairness towards suspects that are to be 
interviewed. They are designed to take a more ethical approach to the practice of police 
interviewing. In other words, according to these principles, the search for the truth must be 
combined with a concern for fairness. 
Lofty pronouncements of ethical aims are well-and-good, however some attention should be 
paid to the details of the method, and how it is applied, lest so-called investigative interviewing 
be reducible to nothing more than a public relations exercise on behalf of police. At its essence, 
what distinguishes PEACE from Reid? 
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The Stages of PEACE: 
(a) Planning and Preparation: 
The PEACE approach takes the view that there are very few interviewers who have the 
capability to carry-out a top-notch interviews45 without putting in sufficient planning and 
preparation beforehand. 46 Planning, according to the CPTU (1992a) is ''the mental process of 
getting ready to interview"47 and preparation is "considering what needs to be made ready prior 
to the interview [including] such things as the location, the environment and the 
administration. ,,4s 
(b) Engage and Explain: 
The Engage and Explain stage requires that police interviewers realize how "nerve-
wracking"49 an experience being interviewed by police is for most people, and how beneficial it 
can be to the investigative aims of interviewing to "warm-up"50 a suspect by engaging them in a 
cooperative and relaxed manner. 51 
Building rapport during the Engage and Explain stage has been identified by multiple 
commentators " ... as the most influential factor in ensuring the success of a interview."52 The 
crucial components of Engage and Explain rapport-building have been identified as follows:53 
(i) "creating a good impression from the outset;"54 (ii) "treating the interviewee as an 
45 Supra note 13 at 44. 
46 P. Hodgson, A Practical Guide to Successful Interviewing (Maidenhead: McGraw-Hili, 1987); B. Ord, G. Shaw, 
& T. Green, Investigative Interviewing Explained (Australia: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004). 
47 Supra note 31 at I. 
48 Joanna R. Adler & Jacqueline M. Gray. The Interviewer's Rule Book (New York: Wi llan Publishing, 1992). at I. 




53 Ord, Shaw, & Green, Supra note 46 at 15. 
54 Ord. et al, remind us of the old adage that: "you catch more flies with sugar than you do with vinegar" and that 
"Courtesy, politeness and understanding cost nothing but can greatly contribute to a successful interview." Ibid. at 
16. 
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individual;"55 (iii) "understanding the feelings of the person being interviewed;"56 (iv) 
"explaining the reason for the interview;"57 (v) "giving an outline of the procedures and the 
reason for them;"58 and (vi) "describing the format of the interview."59 
(c) Accounting: 
During this stage, " ... the interviewer obtains the interviewee's full account of events."60 The 
three core components of the Accounting stage are to:61 
(I) Obtain the suspect's uninterrupted, original version;62 
(2) Develop and clarify the original version;63 and 
(3) If needed, challenge the suspect's version of events.64 
Interview skills are necessary for the final product " ... to be both accurate and reliable,"65 and 
interviewers must be aware that suspects " ... can move from being cooperative to 
uncooperative,"66 and adjust their approach accordingly.67 
During the Accounting stage, there are different approaches that ought to be taken with 
cooperative witnesses as opposed to uncooperative ones.68 For cooperative witnesses, the 
55 This involves listening and accommodating the needs and concerns of the interviewees (Ibid. at 17). 
56 To use empathy. "[U]nderstand how the other person feels while maintaining an objective stance." Ibid. at 18. 
57 Ibid. at 18. "The importance of the interviewee's knowledge in assisting the investigation should be emphasized, 
in order for interviewees to identify their crucial role in the investigation and appreciate what is required of them." 
58 The idea here is to convey to the interviewee that "there are good reasons for the routines" (Ibid at 18) that are in 
place, and to convince the interviewee to accept that those routines be followed "to make the best use of their 
information so" (Ibid. at 18) that they can contribute to "information of a higher quality" (Ibid. at 18.). 
59 Ord et al suggest telling the interviewee that: " ... the interviewee will be invited to give an account in their own 
words of the matter under investigation; the interviewer will then seek to clarify the account by asking 
supplementary questions; the interviewee will next be asked to comment on individual matters which have not been 
covered or adequately explained; the interviewer will verbally summarise what has been said at regular intervals to 
check for correct interpretation" Ibid. at 19. 
60 Supra note 13 at 46. 
61 NCF, Investigative Interviewing: A Practical Guide (England: Bramshill Training and Development Unit: 
National Crime Faculty, 1996). See also ibid. 





67 Centre for Investigative Skills, Practical Guide to Investigative Interviewing, (England: Central Police Training 
and Development Authority: England). See also ibid. 
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interviewer will use "free recall" for "lower level interviews,"69 and "enhanced cognitive 
interviewing techniques" for advanced ones. 7° For uncooperative witnesses, the interviewer 
should use the "conversation management techniques."71 
After the account has been given, the interviewing officer may wish to expand the 
witness's story or question the suspect's version.72 The challenge phase of PEACE has been 
controversial, and some commentators73 maintain that the " ... actual practice of PEACE 
interviewing does not reflect the ethical philosophy of the PEACE model."74 On the other hand, 
other forensic psychological research/5 has not found much evidence of the use of objectionable 
tactics during the challenge phase of PEACE. 76 Courts in England and Wales continue to rule 
some statements obtained through PEACE interrogation techniques inadmissible, thus 
suggesting, that sometimes Reid-like manipulation and coercion may continue to occur during 
the challenge phase of PEACE interviewing. 77 
(d) Closure: 
It is believed that the closing phase of the interview is as important as any other phase. 78 The 
objectives of an adequate closure should be: 79 (i) "ensure there is mutual understanding about 
what has taken place (by reviewing and summarizing the account);80" (ii) "verify that all aspects 
have been sufficiently covered (by checking that interviewees have given all the information 





73 See: R. Ede & E. Shepherd, Active Defence (London: Law Society Publishing, 2000). 
74 Supra note 13 at 47. 
75 Milne & Bull, Supra note 11; and C. Clarke & L. Milne, National Evaluation of the PEACE Investigative 
Interviewing Course (UK: Home Office, 200 1 ). 
76 Supra note 13 at 47. 
77 Ibid 
78 Clarke & Milne, Supra note 75; Also see Ibid. 
79 Schollum, ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
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they are able and willing to provide); "81 (iii) "explain what will happen in the future (by giving 
the interviewee appropriate information on the next stages of the process);"82 and (iv) "facilitate 
a positive attitude towards providing accurate and reliable information in the future. "83 
(e) Evaluation: 
During the evaluation phase, the PEACE interviewer:84 (i) "examines whether the aims and 
objectives for the interview have been achieved;"85 (ii) "reviews the investigation in the light of 
information obtained during the interview;"86 and (iii) "reflects upon how well he or she 
conducted the interview and considers"87 areas for future improvement. 88 
The Tactics, Strategies and Techniques of PEACE: 
The PEACE method takes a more restricted approach than the Reid technique on the 
influence of psychology in the interviewing process. PEACE proponents take the position that 
body language and non-verbal cues do send messages89 that " ... may confirm, obscure or 
contradict what is being said,"90 however officers are cautioned against " ... developing an over-
confidence in their ability to 'read"'91 these signs.92 According to the PEACCE model, there is 
no such thing as a typical deceptive body language.93 PEACE therefore holds that "conclusions 




84 NCF, Investigative Interviewing: A Practical Guide, Supra note 61; Centre for Investigative Skills, Supra note 67. 
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PEACE recognizes that suspects may be susceptible to suggestive techniques that can alter the 
accuracy of what they say.95 
PEACE uses four major interviewing techniques: "cognitive interviewing (CI);"96 
"enhanced cognitive interviewing (ECI);"97 "free recall (FR);"98 and "conversation management 
(CM)."99 In addition to the four major techniques, PEACE allows for many minor tactics to fit 
into its framework, the application of which may vary according to the circumstances. A non-
exhaustive list is as follows: creating a "good first impression; personalise the interview; 
establish rapport; explain the aims and purposes of the interview;"100 using "open-ended and 
probing closed-questions; not interrupting the interviewee; initiate a free rapport; focused 
retrieval; activation and probing of an image; systematic probing of topics; active listening; 
mirroring/synchrony; challenging; clarification of inconsistencies;"101 attentiveness to "seating 
arrangements; note-taking; mutual gaze and eye contact; friendliness, patience and support; 
change the temporal order; change perspectives; taking breaks"102 and praising the interviewee's 
efforts. 103 
PEACE specifically avoids certain techniques, including hypnosis; the polygraph; 
rationalizing, projecting and minimizing (RPMs); and other tactics, due to the fact that these 
techniques are unreliable, and in some cases "manipulative and oppressive."104 
PEACE recognizes that good interviewers possess certain qualities, with key goals of 
training in this method being that the interviewing officer should make himself or herself 
95 Ibid. 






102 Ibid. at 5-6. 
103 Ibid. at 36. 
104 Ibid. at 6. 
-306-
approachable by showing appropriate emotional responses to the changing dynamics of an 
interview105 "Much of the literature describes the ideal interviewer as someone who can convey 
a range of emotions as well as empathy and sincerity at various times and as needed."106 
The attitude of the interviewing officer should show "self-awareness, confidence, 
purpose, vision, dedication and commitment to the highest professional standards." 107 
During the challenge stage of the interview, it is instructed that this demeanour may 
change slightly; PEACE trainers recommend " ... a confident, persistent demeanour, a firm tone of 
voice (but not aggressive or angry), the use of hand gestures when talking (palms up, arms open), 
looking away when the suspect gives denials,"108 and modulation of the voice to make positive 
and negative points, respectively. 109 
According to the PEACE model, a good interviewer should always keep an open mind 
and he/she should have a keen interest in learing about human behavior in order to make more 
reliable observations during interviews 110 
PEACE interviewers put as high a degree of importance on interviewing witnesses, 
complainants and victims as they do on interviews conducted with suspects. 111 There are 
differences between the two; "there is a huge body of rules and rights that apply to suspect 
interviews but not to witness interviews."112 
105 C.R. Swanson, N.C. Chamelin & L. Territo, Criminal Investigation (United States: McGraw Hill Higher 
Education, 2002). See also Ibid. at 16. 
106 Schollum, Ibid at 17. 
107 Ibid. at 16. 
108 D.E. Wicklander & D. E. Zulawski, Interview and Interrogation Techniques- a Training Course (Illinois: 
Wicklander-Zulawski and Associates, 2003); See also Ibid. 
109 Wicklander & Zulawski, Ibid; See also Schollum, Ibid 
110 J.W. Williams, "Interrogating Justice: A Critical Analysis of Police Interrogation and its Role in the Criminal 
Justice Process" (2000) 42(2) Can. J.Crim. 209; and G. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions 
and Testimony (Chichester: Wiley, 1992). 
111 Supra note I 08. 
112 Supra note 13 at 17. 
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Many interviewers focus on the more ethically defensible aspects of PEACE in 
comparison to other interview and interrogation models at the disposal of police. "Early 
American literature points"113 out that without safeguards and protections for the suspect 
explicitly enforced by the courts, the risk of abuses of power by the police increase. 114 
It is widely recognized that whereas suspects facing custodial interrogation may no 
longer have to contend with the flagrant physical abuse used by state agents of the past, there are 
nevertheless a significant number of unethical tactics that can be used in today's 
psychologically-based interrogation room. Notable examples cited by PEACE advocates 
include: "using interrogation instead of interviewing; treating each interviewee as though 
culpable, making threats; making illegal promises; using coercion, using duress; using force or 
the threat of force; employing ruthless methods; falsely imprisoning the interviewee; not 
respecting the interviewee; and not maintaining the interviewee's dignity."115 These unethical 
tactics are "often based on expedience; the 'end justifies the means' argument" PEACE 
advocates assert. 116 
PEACE avoids these aggressive and unethical tactics and relies on subtlety, active 
listening and the development of rapport between interviewer and interviewee to coax a 
confession from the suspect. While in both instances, the result, that is an inculpatory statement 
or confession, is detrimental to the interests of the suspect, the credit that the PEACE model 
claims is that it is less likely to result in false and unreliable confessions than more aggressive 
113 Ibid at 20. 
114 Ibid 
115 Charles L. Yeshke, The Art of Investigative Interviewing- A Human Approach to Testimonial Evidence (Boston: 
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2003) at 12. 
116 D. Morgan & G. Stephenson, Suspicion and Silence: the Right to Silence in Criminal Investigations (London: 
Blackstone, 1994). See also supra note 13 at 20. 
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approaches. This proposition will need to be carefully analyzed at such time as sufficient 
research data has been collected and made available. 
The Major Interview Techniques: 
The factors which have been shown to best contribute to procuring complete and accurate 
accounts from interviewees (victims, witnesses and suspects) 117 are: rules-based questioning; 118 
"enhanced cognitive interviewing;"119 "free recall interviewing;"120 and "conversation 
management" interviewing. 121 
Effects of PEACE Training: 
Soukara et al.'s 2009 study on the use of investigative interview (and interrogation) 
tactics in the United Kingdom, a jurisdiction where officers undergo PEACE training, revealed 
interesting results. Researchers analyzed 80 videotaped interrogations122 for the presence of 17 
tactics: "disclosure of evidence;"123 "maximization;"124 "minimization;"125 emphasizing 
contradictions; positive confrontation; gentle prods; [showing] concern; interruptions; silence; 
repetitive questioning; leading questions; open questions; intimidation; suggest scenario; 
handling [changes in a] suspect's mood; challenging suspect's account; and [emphasizing] 
situational futility." 126 
Research showed that the most frequently used tactics in U.K. interviews are (i) 
"disclosure of evidence (99%); (ii) open questions (99%); (iii) leading questions (91 %); and (iv) 
117 Supra note 13 at 46. 
118 Ibid. at 54. 
119 Ibid. at 5. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 S. Soukara et al., "What Rea11y Happens in Police Interviews of Suspects? Tactics and Confessions" (2009) 15(6) 
Psychology, Crime & Law 493 at 497 





repetitive questioning (84%)."127 "Other tactics used in at least half of the sampled interviews 
were: (i) emphasizing contradictions [in the suspect's account] (75%);"128 (ii) "positive 
confrontations (74%);" 129 and (iii) "challenging the suspect's account(71 %)."130 " ••• Tactics that 
were used in fewer than half of the interviews were: (i) gentle probes(43%); (ii) handling the 
suspect's mood (33%); (iii) suggesting scenarios (29%); (iv) interruptions (19%); (v) showing 
concern (19%); and (vi) silence(15%)."131 "The tactics that were almost never used were (i) 
maximization (1 %); (ii) minimization (0 %); (iii) intimidation (0%); and (iv) situational 
futility,(0%)" 132 the hallmarks of Reid. 133 
Soukara et al. report: 
The tactics deemed by several psychologists to be the most problematic (i.e. intimidation, 
minimisation, situational futility, and maximisation) never or almost never occurred. On the other 
hand, the tactics emphasised in the 'new' British ethos and training were often used; that is, those 
designed (i) to obtain information from the suspect (e.g. open questions, repetitive questions 
although the frequent use of leading questions is not in line with the training) and (ii) then to test 
this information (e.g. emphasising contradictions, challenging the suspect's account, positive 
confrontation, disclosure of evidence ).134 
Suspects, in the Soukara et al. study, "confessed in 31 out of these 80 interviews."135 
Five of the confessions were given during the first 136 fifteen of the confessions during the middle 
and eleven of the confessions were obtained137 " •• .in the final third"138 of the interview. 139 This 







134 Ibid at 502. 
135 Ibid. at. 500. 
136 Ibid. at 499-500. 




point is important, because as Soukara et al. indicate: "Future research should try to establish 
when during typical interviews with suspects various tactics are used."140 
The tactics that were used in the highest number of interviews resulting in confessions 
were: 141 (i) "disclosure of evidence and open questions (used in all 31 confession interviews); (ii) 
leading questions (used in 30); (iii) positive confrontation (used in 28); (iv) challenging the 
suspect's account (used in 26); and (v) emphasising contradictions and repetitive questioning 
(used in 25)."142 
Soukara et al. report: 
... the emphasis in the British PEACE training model on developing these particular tactics/skills 
seems well placed 143 
But any enthusiasm in favour of the position that milder interview techniques might 
replace the Reid Technique and enjoy comparable rates of success in facilitating the making of 
incriminating statements by accused persons (independent of the question of reliability), should 
be taken with a grain of salt due to the fact that data between jurisdictions is not presently 
susceptible to accurate comparison because of the different legal environments involved. In 
North America, the Reid Technique reigns supreme as the most pervasive method of 
interrogation, whereas in the United Kingdom, the PEACE method of interview has been 
adopted since 1992. The operation of the right to silence between the two jurisdictions is 
distinguishable. 
Suspects in Canada and the United States enjoy a right to silence144 in the face of police 
questioning without an adverse in-court presumption for exercising the right. In the United 
140 Ibid. at 502. 
141 Ibid. at. 501 
142 Ibid. at 501-502. 
143 Ibid at 503. 
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Kingdom, where the PEACE method has been widely disseminated and officers have been 
instructed in its methods, there is no comparable right to silence. Although the right to silence 
historically emerged in the early-modern English common law, it has, in recent years, been 
effectively repealed by statutory enactments in that country. 145 Now, an accused person who 
refuses to answer questions during pre-trial custodial detention (as well as during other phases of 
the pre-trial and trial processes) will face a potential adverse presumption of guilt for his refusal 
to answer. Thus, with such a powerful incentive for a suspect to answer questions built-into 
English criminal procedure, the English legal-environment in this domain is not accurately 
comparable with the North American (or specifically the Canadian) one. If the Reid Technique 
used in North America has similar confession rates to the PEACE method used in the United 
144 Though in Canada, it would appear that this right has been hollowed-out relative to the American version of the 
right by the trilogy of Supreme Court of Canada cases R. v. Dickie, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48, 
[2007] 3 S.C.R. 405, and R. v. Sinclair, [2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310. 
145 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 C. 60, Code C, s. 10.1 0. "When a suspect interviewed at a police station 
or authorised place of detention after arrest fails or refuses to answer certain questions, or to answer satisfactorily, 
after due warning ... a court or jury may draw such inferences as appear proper under the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act (U.K.), Part III, 1994, sections 36 and 37. Such inferences may only be drawn when: 
(a) the restriction on drawing inferences from silence, see Annex C, does not apply; and 
(b) the suspect is arrested by a constable and fails or refuses to account for any objects, marks or 
substances, or marks on such objects found: on their person; in or on their clothing or footwear; otherwise 
in their possession; or in the place they were arrested; 
(c) the arrested suspect was found by a constable at a place at or about the time of the offence for which 
that officer has arrested them is alleged to have been committed, and the suspect fails or refuses to account 
for their presence there." 
And, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, (U.K.), Part III, 1994 ,C. 33, s. 34 
"(I) Where, in any proceedings against a person for an offence, evidence is given that the accused 
(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on being questioned under caution by a constable 
trying to discover whether or by whom the offence had been committed, failed to mention any fact relied 
on in his defence in those proceedings; or 
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be prosecuted for it, failed to 
mention any such fact, 
being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time the accused could reasonably have been expected to 
mention when so questioned, charged or informed, as the case may be, subsection (2) below applies. 
(2) Where this subsection applies-
( a) a magistrates' court inquiring into the offence as examining justices; 
(b) a judge, in deciding whether to grant an application made by the accused under paragraph 2 of Schedule 
3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; (c) the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer; and (d) the 
court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, may draw such inferences from 
the failure as appear proper." 
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Kingdom, we cannot say that it is on account of the efficacy of the techniques themselves. It 
may be the case that the Reid Technique is more effective at inducing someone to confess than 
the PEACE method, but that the gap is compensated for by the fact that there is an adverse 
presumption at trial in the United Kingdom against accused persons who refuse to respond to 
allegations during their pre-trial custodial interviews. 
Criticisms of the PEACE Model, and Responses: 
Critics claim that PEACE is the same as Reid's Behavioural Analysis Interview (BAI) 
technique. 146 PEACE proponents reject this characterization and contend that beyond the fact 
that the two are each "non-accusatorial", they are not similar.147 "The BAI involves a series of 
questions and subsequent observations designed to differentiate between innocence and guilt in 
possible suspects."148 PEACE interviewing does not rely upon non-verbal cues as a method of 
determining the likelihood of a given suspect's guilt. 149 Furthermore, they cite recent research 
that shows that the BAI is an unreliable method of spotting deception. 150 
PEACE proponents say that unlike the BAI, the goal of the PEACE model is " ... to collect 
as much reliable and accurate information as possible"151 from interviewees " ... using 
scientifically-based interview procedures"152 rather than using questionable techniques to 
identify deception. 153 
146 The Reid Institute, Untitled, The Reid Institute (retrieved August 12, 2013) online: The Reid Institute 
<http://www.reid.com/pdfs/peacearticle.pdt>. 
147 Brent Snook et al., "Dispeiiing Myths and Moving Forward with PEACE" (2010) Blueline Magazine, online: 
<http://www.cbc.c.afthenational/includes/pdf/snook-blueline.pdt> at 23. 
148 Ibid.; Supra note 146. 
149 Snook et a/., Ibid. 
150 Ibid.; J Masip, C. Herrero, E. Garrido, & A. Barba. "Is the behavioural analysis interview just common sense?" 
(2010) Applied Cognitive Psychology, published online, Wiley & Sons Ltd <wileyonlinelibrary.com> at 2-8. 




Critics argue that PEACE limits investigators' abilities to obtain confessions. 154 But 
proponents of PEACE defend against this claim by noting that unlike with the Reid Technique, 
PEACE interviewers do not stoop to the "lower moral plane"155 that Reid interrogators do. 156 
Whereas Reid advocates will argue that because PEACE does not resort to the use of 
interrogation, investigators are unable to obtain confessions. 157 Snook, Eastwood, House and 
Barron point out, first, that neither model has been empirically tested, but that confession rates 
are about 50% across countries regardless of whether they use the Reid model of interrogation or 
the PEACE model; 158 second that research supports the view that the proportion of the 
confessions obtained by way of"information-gathering approaches"159 are fewer than the 
proportion obtained by "an accusatorial approach"160 and that the use of coercive techniques 
coupled with an inability to accurately determine likely guilt of the suspect through the use of the 
BAI creates a significant danger for Reid to produce false confessions; 161 and third, that the 
measure of a successful interview " ... ought to be whether it results in a full and accurate account 
of the event, not whether or not a confession has been elicited."162 
Opponents of PEACE point out that the method will not work in North America because 
our laws are different. 163 Suspects in the United Kingdom do not have a meaningful right to 
154 Supra note 146 at 1. 
ISS Supra note 14 7. 
1
s
6 Fred E. lnbaun et al., Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 4th ed. (Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 
2004) at xvi. See also supra note 14 7 where the authors cite Inbau, Reid, Buckley and Jayne at xvi. Snook et al, 
citing Inbau et al, write: "investigators must deal with criminal suspects on a somewhat lower moral plane than that 
upon which ethical law abiding citizens are expected to conduct their everyday affairs." (Supra note 132 citing note 
156). 
157 Supra note 146 at 1. 
158 Supra note 14 7. See also supra note 11. 






remain silent. 164 PEACE advocates respond to this criticism by pointing out that " ... no empirical 
research has been conducted to see whether these difference in legal rights has impacted the 
percentage of individuals who speak with police,"165 and it suggests that despite the difference, 
" ... the overwhelming majority of suspects and accused persons in Canada (around 90%) choose 
not to invoke their right to silence."166 
Finally, the critics of PEACE characterize the method as a "soft" one. 167 The defenders 
of PEACE say that even though the method " ... makes no overt attempt to persuade a non-
compliant suspect whom the interviewer thinks is guilty to confess,"168 the method is quite 
effective by virtue of the fact that it allows the detective to take the "initial free-narrative" 169 and 
test it " ... using evidence-based challenges,"170 and that the cognitively demanding task of 
defending ones account can trip-up the suspect and reveal guilt or innocence. 171 In this sense, 
notwithstanding the absence of psychologically manipulative tactics, PEACE may be just as 
effective at getting an incriminating confession as Reid, with a lower risk of producing a false 
confession. 
164 Supra note 146 at 5. 
165 Supra note 147 at 24. 
166 Ibid 
167 Ibid; See: Chapter 6 "Custodial Interrogations: What We Know, What We Do, and What We Can Learn from 
Law Enforcement Experiences" by Ariel Neuman & Daniel Salinas-Serano, National Defence Intelligence College, 
Educing Information: Interrogation Science and Art (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Defence College, 
2006) at 221-22. The authors report that Detective Superintendent Colin Sturgeon of the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland Police informed them of the following in conversation in reference to PACE and its Codes of Conduct while 
he was visiting Harvard Law School in 2005: " ... these legal restrictions on interrogation have made it impossible to 
secure a confession or incriminating admission from a suspect. In fact, he went so far as to say that he cannot recall 
ever obtaining a confession as a product of interrogation. Even though British law has attempted to bridge this gap 
by eliminating the right of a suspect to remain quiet during interrogation by allowing a judge to infer guilt from the 
suspect's silence, Sturgeon noted that judges rarely, if ever, exercise this discretion against suspects." (The 
quotation is from the Neuman and Salinas-Serano text, and not a direct quotation of Sturgeon). 





Apart from the aforementioned considerations of whether PEACE is, in fact, 
methodologically significantly less manipulative than Reid, and whether, if implemented to the 
letter it will be of much assistance in eliciting confessions in environments that continue to enjoy 
a robust right to silence, there is a third critical issue raised by PEACE: namely, that it appears to 
be difficult to successfully implement by way of training and instruction. In studies conducted 
around the turn of the millennium, researchers generally agreed that the principles of PEACE-
style investigative interviewing were sound ones, but that there was still "widespread evidence of 
poor questioning techniques, deficient interpersonal skills, inadequate support for trainers, poor 
quality control of interviews, and so on."172 Accordingly, attempts to revise and improve-upon 
the training program were undertaken. 173 But notwithstanding these efforts, later studies showed 
that the training that most officers received was " ... quite limited"174 and that in many 
jurisdictions, younger trainee officers " ... were expected to learn by watching" 175 and emulating 
the approaches used by more seasoned veterans, who, themselves, were not always especially 
skilled interviewers. 176 Specific to the interviewing of suspects, a 2001 study by Milne & 
Clarke 177 made the following findings: (i) that with respect to Planning and Preparation, officers 
were mostly not knowledgeable about the details of the allegations and were often ignorant of 
the important information needed to prove the essential elements of the offence, 178 and 
frequently officers would read from prepared written statements in the middle of their 
interviews; 179 (ii) that in relation to Engage and Explain, the interviewers basically followed the 





177 Supra note 75. The study assessed 177 taped suspect interviews concerning "both bulk and serious crime." It 
was collected from six police forces in urban and rural areas across England and Wales. (P. 29) 
178 Ibid. at 34. 
179 Ibid. 
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legal requirements of interviewing suspects, but that issues with ensuring understanding of the 
caution and providing information about the purpose of the interview persisted and undermined 
the development ofrapport; 180 (iii) that during the Account stage police used the techniques of 
"open or closed questions"181 competently and confidently, but made poor use of summarizing, 
linking and challenging;182 and (iv) that only 16.4%183 of interviews provided "clear and 
professional closure" 184 and that few interviewees gave good summaries of what had been 
said. 185 The evaluation stage was not measured by the researchers. 186 The researchers rated only 
13% of interviewers studied as being "skilled" in the use of the PEACE model. 187 When the 
videotaped suspect interviews were assessed for oppressive behaviour, ten percent of the sample 
interviews were identified as " ... possibly breaching"188 the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
Another critical consideration is the question of whether it is appropriate, wise or 
practical to assign a "quasi-inquisitorial neutral role" to "investigating officers."190 Eric 
Shepherd writes: 
180 Ibid. at 36. 
181 Ibid. at 39. 
182 Ibidat 37. 




187 Ibid at 1 05 & 106. 
188 Ibid. at 40. 
189 Ibid at 39-40. The PACE 1984, ss. 76-78 contemplate confessions and the exclusion of unfairly obtained 
evidence. 
s. 76 provides for the exclusion from evidence of confessions procured under oppression or Jikely to have been 
rendered unreJiable as a consequence of anything said or done during the interview. 
s. 77 provides for special jury instructions in cases that rely principa11y on confession evidence where the court is 
satisfied that the suspect was menta11y handicapped and the statement was not made in the presence of an 
independent person. 
s. 78 provides a residual discretionary power to exclude evidence. It says that: "the court may refuse to allow 
evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the 
circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence 
would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it." 
190 E. Shepherd, "The Trouble with PEACE" (26 July, 1996) PoJice Review 14 at 14 . 
...... 317 ...... 
... the Director of Police Training and official research have informed police management of 
facts unknown to the general public- investigative ability throughout the service is alarmingly 
low; unsystematic behaviour and poor time management are commonplace; basic systems are 
lacking to ensure professional standards of information gathering, evaluation and dissemination 
by officers . 
... Actions by attending officers highlight embarrassing levels of ignorance in respect of securing 
scenes, searching, and in identifying and preserving evidence. 191 
It may be inferred from Shepherd's criticism that PEACE training has contributed very 
little to the development of competent, investigatively sound policing. 192 A critic like 
Shepherd, from a law-and-order stance, would like to retain a more blatantly adversarial policing 
role. But this criticism may be misplaced. If PEACE training is not working, then this may 
point to an inadequacy in the training program and not necessarily the method itself. It may also 
be that Sheppard is suggesting that the police are especially incapable and ill-suited for 
employing the type of nuance and sophistication PEACE depends upon. 
Some English and Welsh criminal defence lawyers agree with Shepherd's position, but 
for different reasons. Ed Cape, a solicitor, produced a 1995 manual to guide other lawyers on 
how to represent clients under the PEACE regime. 193 He suggested that lawyers, present in the 
interview room, should step in in situations where the interviewer appears to be attempting to 
" ... buil,d rapport with the suspect"194 by asking personal questions. 195 Cape advised lawyers to 
remind the officer that "Code C, paragraph 11.1 A says that the interview is for the purpose of 
questioning a suspect about an offence."196 "Should the officer continue to use such tactics"197 
"the solicitor advise their clients not to answer questions.198 Cape's concern appears to be that 
191 Ibid. at 14. 
192 Ibid. 
193 E. Cape, Defending Suspects at Police Stations (London: Legal Action Group, 1995). 




198 Ibid. This advice would be given notwithstanding the adverse presumption for a refusal to answer questions, 
discussed above. 
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the PEACE methodology is simply a different, and perhaps more subtle or sneaky, way of 
tricking the suspect into giving a confession. 
Peace Model: The Trojan Horse? 
The Reid Institute's criticism of the PEACE model, that its lack of effectiveness at 
extracting confessions has required English legislators to supplement incentivization within the 
interrogation proper (i.e. maximization and minimization, for example) with incentives to 
confess that have been imposed extemally. 199 This may be correct, though there is some 
uncertainty due to a lack of opportunity to collect data on the effectiveness of PEACE at getting 
confessions with an existing right to silence. The concern here is it may be that investigative 
interviewing techniques, like the PEACE method, will not enable officers to get confessions so 
long as the right to silence is in place, and once it is adopted, the elimination of the right to 
silence may follow. 
On how the right to silence might be eliminated in Canada, should PEACE be introduced 
here, we have to briefly re-visit the state of law in Canada. 
The Canadian common law, following Hebert and as reinforced by Singh effectively 
holds that a person has the right to assert a right to silence, but does not in fact have an automatic 
right to silence upon having made that assertion. A suspect must be resilient and resist police 
imposed pressures to make a statement. In Singh, the Court held that the police did not violate 
the right to silence even though they persisted in questioning the accused after he indicated, on 
18 separate occasions, that he did not want to make a statement. 200 
199 Supra note I 46 at 2. 
200 the Law Times quoted a source who reported that some police officers reacted to the decision by indicating that 
they would not stop questioning a suspect even he asserted the right 1,000 times! Right to silence the 'next 
battleground', Law Times, available at: httn:/ /www .lawtimesnews.com/20050808142/Headline-News/Right-to-
si1ence-the-39next-batt1eground-39 
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In Canada, there is a residual exclusionary discretion held by judges but it is 
comparatively rarely resorted to in light of the test on admissibility that is already provided at 
voir dire. Judges have the authority to exclude evidence under section 7 of the Charter where it 
is found that the admission of that evidence would compromise the fairness of a trial, or if the 
probative value of the evidence would be outweighed by its prejudicial effect.201 In England, the 
exclusionary remedy that exists for misconduct is much narrower.202 In Canada there are Charter 
considerations that must be adhered to relating to fairness and the doctrine of oppression as well. 
Nevertheless, Reid tactics and the necessity of police interrogators to 'play-it-close-to-the-line' 
in order to get suspects to waive the right to silence or to confess or make an inculpatory 
statement, leads to a number of statements being excluded, and frustrates convictions, that, from 
a police point of view, should have been obtainable. I contend that from a policing perspective 
the police surely realize that these tactics make their detainees susceptible to the making of false 
confessions and there are good reasons to tone down police trickery and move away from Reid 
tactics. Though there may be exceptions, police do not likely take any great delight in having to 
resort to trickery and deceit to get confessions; rather they do so out of the perception that it is an 
investigative necessity. 
Already police in some Canadian jurisdictions have expressed receptiveness to 
investigative interviewing. The Memorial University Faculty of Science, in Newfoundland, 
partnered with the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (RNC) in 2010 to introduce the method, 
and Dr. Brent Snook has trained six police trainers in its use.203 Dr. Snook, "has continued to 
build his relationship with the RNC since, and has recently worked with his students and with 
201 See: R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562; R. v. Terry, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207; R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1991. 
202 Ryo Ogiso, "The Exclusionary Rule in Criminal Procedure. A comparative study of the English, American and 
Japanese approaches." 37 Amicus Curiae Sep/Oct 2001 28 at 32. 
203 
"MUN teaches PEACE to RNC", Memorial University Gazette, available at: 
http://www .mun.ca/gazette/issues/vol41 no9/mun.php. 
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Inspector John House to do research on the agency's interviewing styles."204 Moreover, the 
method was introduced to listeners on CBC' s morning radio program The Current on April 7, 
2010, wherein it was portrayed by its proponents as more humane, and by its opponents as 
insufficiently effective.205 The move in Newfoundland to implement PEACE training was 
prompted by the findings of the Lamer Inquiry that there was a culture of ''tunnel vision" 
amongst the Province's police that had contributed to the wrongful convictions of Gregory 
Parsons and Randy Druken. 206 
The difficulty with introducing PEACE as an ethical alternative to Reid in response to 
humanitarian concerns about what transpires in an interview room, and even as a safeguard 
against wrongful convictions, is that once it has been implemented it will be demonstrated to be 
inadequate in short-order when the police fail to get the number of confessions that they were 
previously able to. On the other hand, returning to the 'bad old days' of Reid and police 
deception and trickery will not be possible from a political perspective. Reid will be associated 
with false confessions, wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice - it is difficult to move 
from a state of greater human rights to a state of lesser human rights without someone sounding 
the alarm and creating a political liability for legislators. 
When confronted with this problem, it will be natural for criminal justice professionals to 
look once again to the United Kingdom, and ask why the PEACE model is getting a similar 
number of confessions there as the Reid Technique is getting in North America. At this point, 
someone will realize that shortly after introducing PEACE, the right to silence was legislatively 
204 Ibid. and accompanying text. 
205 The Current, April 7, 20 I 0, available at: http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/episode/20 1 0/04/07/april-07-20 10/ 
206 CBC News, "N.L. Police Revise Interviewing Style", Apri120, 2010, available at: 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/20 1 0/04/20/nl-rnc-peace-420.html ; The Lamer Commission 
of Inquiry Pertaining to the Cases of Ronald Dalton, Gregory Parsons, Randy Druken (St. Johns, Office of the 
Queen's Printer, 2006). 
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gutted by adding the adverse inference. The next step may be to proceed in a similar fashion in 
North America. Thus, the PEACE method, though it may sound appealing for its ethical 
considerations and its appeal to greater humanity, may in fact pose a substantial threat to the 
integrity of our criminal justice system. It may serve to further erode the already precarious right 
to silence in Canada. Critics may argue that this concern is misplaced because it would not be 
constitutional to dismantle the right to silence, and doing so would require the Supreme Court to 
overturn its previous rulings in R. v. Chambers201 and R. v. Noble.208 
I wish to respond to this anticipated criticism by stating that although the right to silence 
in Canada is constitutionalized in section 7ofthe Charter, the government could legislate a 
change in section 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act,209 to the effect that an adverse inference may 
be drawn from an accused's silence. This approach would insulate the government from the 
argument that there has been a constitutional violation of the right to silence, because the 
constitutional right will still remain in effect. However, for all practical purposes it is rendered 
meaningless. 
If such a change happens, there may be a Charter challenge to the new legislative change 
to the Canada Evidence Act. If confronted with such Charter challenge to this hypothetical 
legislation, the Court may very well draw a distinction between the right to silence and the use 
that may be made of the exercise of that right. Given Chambers, Noble/ 10 Mills,211 0 'Connor,212 
and other cases, it is not always easy to predict the outcome of balancing Charter rights and 
competing policy interests. 
207 R. v. Chambers, [1990] 2 S.C.R. I293. 
208 R. v. Noble, [I997] I S.C.R. 874, II4 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 6 C.R. (5th) I. 
209 Canada Evidence Act, R.S. I985, C-5. 
210 Supra note 208 at para. 53. 
211 R. v. Mills (1999), 139 C.C.C. (3d) 32I, 248 N.R. IOI, 28 C.R. (5th) 207. 
212 R. v. O'Connor,[I996] 2 W.W.R. I 53, [I995] 4 S.C.R. 4II, 44 C.R. (4th). 
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For a more recent example of such unpredictability, one may look at the Supreme Court's 
ruling in R. v. Nedelcu.213 In Nedelcu the Supreme Court, for all practical purposes, limited the 
applicability of section 13 of the Charter. The issue in Nedelcu was whether the accused could 
be cross-examined at his criminal trial on a prior inconsistent statement he made during a 
discovery examination for a civil proceeding flowing from the same incident. At his criminal 
trial, Nedelcu provided detailed testimony on events leading up to the accident which was the 
subject matter of both the criminal and civil proceedings against him. However, prior to that, at 
his discovery, he had stated that he had no recollection of the events pertaining to the accident. 
The trial judge permitted the Crown to cross-examine Nedelcu on the flagrant 
inconsistencies in his evidence. He was convicted. The Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the 
conviction and the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court, held in an earlier ruling, R. v. Henry,214 that section 13 of the 
Charter forbids the use of all compelled prior testimony in subsequent proceedings. However, in 
Nedelcu, the majority made a distinction between incriminating and non-incriminating evidence. 
The Court held that compelled testimonial evidence used to incriminate the accused is still not 
admissible (as per Henry). Therefore, as per section 13 of the Charter, the use of prior 
incriminating testimony is still inadmissible. However, the Court in Nedelcu took the position 
that this restriction does not necessarily apply to non-incriminating prior testimony. It is my 
position that the Supreme Court's distinction between incriminating and "non-incriminating" 
evidence amounts to a superficial distinction between self-incrimination and credibility and such 
a distinction becomes even more troublesome when one considers the fact that at trial the Crown 
213 R. v. Nedelcu,2012 SCC 59, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 311. 
214 R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609. 
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urged the Judge to consider the flagrant inconsistencies in the two testimonies as positive 
evidence of the defendant's guilt.215 
The case of R. v. Nedelcu is alarming, not only because it limits the scope of section 13 of 
the Charter, but also because it is conceivable that in the future, the Supreme Court may apply 
the same approach to the right to silence and hold that there is a distinction between the right to 
remain silent and any permissible adverse inferences that the trier of fact may draw from such 
silence. This would not be consistent with the Supreme Court's own rulings in Chambers and 
Noble; however, when one looks at how the Supreme Court resiled from its own ruling in Henry, 
it would not be too far-fetched to suggest the possibility that the Court may similarly distinguish 
positions established in earlier right to silence rulings with and reduce the ambit of the protection 
provided by that right. 
With an awareness that avenues may exist to gut the right to silence, it is possible that the 
PEACE method of investigative interviewing could be a vehicle by which such a result might be 
arrived at. In other words, should the PEACE method be introduced in Canada, and if this 
results in a reduction in the number of confessions secured, then to remedy this problem, the 
government may move to emulate the British government's 1994 decision to undermine the right 
to silence through legislation.216 Such a possible development in Canada may be a natural 
progression of the introduction of PEACE. Alternatively, it is an interesting conjecture that 
opponents of the right to silence could use PEACE as a pretext to eliminate the right to silence in 
Canada. The proximity in time between the introduction ofPEACE in the U.K. in 1992 and the 
215 Frank Addario, case comment on R. v. Nedelcu, (2012) sec 59, (2012) The Twelve-Minute CIVIL LITIGATOR 
2012 at 9-3. 
216 The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, supra note 145, ss. 27-31. See also: Gregory O'Reilly, "England 
Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Towards and Inquisitorial System of Justice"(l994) 85 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 402 at 404, where O'Reilly states: "The new law purports to control crime by curtailing the right to 
silence, forcing suspects to confess, and thereby increasing convictions". 
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abolition of the right to silence a mere two-years later may give encouragement to the opponents 
of the right to silence that such a result could be achieved in Canada. In this sense, PEACE may 
in fact be a Trojan Horse.217 
Is the sort of investigative interviewing contemplated by PEACE a kind of Trojan Horse? 
We can see from the English experience how proponents of crime control, and in particular, the 
Conservative Party and law enforcement associations had been trying to eliminate the right to 
silence for two decades before it was finally achieved.218 
On how the right to silence might be eliminated in Canada, should PEACE be introduced 
here, the experience in England, the birthplace of PEACE, is at least partly instructive. Going 
back to the nineteen-seventies, reports commissioned by the British government indicate that 
there was already, at that time, a debate over the existence of the right to silence, with a 
contingent of opponents, including certain politicians and police, calling for the elimination of 
the right.219 There was a report published by the Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC) in 
1972 suggesting that adverse inferences be drawn from an accused person's refusal to answer 
217 One may recall the story ofthe Trojan Horse. After unsuccessfully laying a10-year siege on Troy, Greek forces 
build a wooden horse in order to pay ''tribute" to the admirable resistance of the defenders of the city. The people of 
Troy, despite warnings by some, brought the horse into the city to celebrate their "triumph" over the Greeks. But at 
night fall, when the Trojans were in a deep, drunken sleep, 30 Greek soldiers emerged out of the belly of the horse 
and they opened the gates of the city for the Greek forces who were hiding under the cover of the night to enter and 
ransack the city.- Homer, The Odyssey trans. by Samuel Butler (Cambridge, Mass.: Orange Street Press Classics, 
1998); Virgil, The Aenidtrans. by J.W. McKaiJ (London: MacMi11an & Co., 1885). The story ofthe Trojan Horse is 
recounted briefly in The Odyssey by the Greek writer Homer, and centuries later in greater detail in The A enid by the 
Latin writer Virgil. 
218 0 'Reilly, supra note 216 at 423. 
219 Ibid. at 403 & n. 9 & 423. 
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questions under police interrogation or to testify at trial. 220 This report was commissioned under 
C . p 221 a onservattve arty. 
The main reason for the recommendation that an adverse inference be drawn from silence 
was the idea that the right to silence " ... unduly favoured the defence, and in particular, favoured 
the guilty."222 As a person who is innocent, it was thought, " ... would certainly want to say 
something to exculpate him or herself."223 
The CLRC report was effectively 'shelved' temporarily in England;224 however the 
Republic of Singapore, an authoritarian, de facto one-party state, adopted the recommendations 
of the CLRC in 1976225 and "curtailed the right"226 that it had inherited from the English 
common law by way of its colonial status.227 It is noteworthy to mention that shortly after the 
1972 publication of the CLRC's report, the U.K. Parliament shifted to Labour (from 1974 until 
1979), after which the Thatcher government came into office. 228 
Whereas Lee Kuan Yew's government of Singapore may have enthusiastically embraced 
the crime control initiatives of the CLRC, there was resistance to adopting the proposed changes 
in democratic England;229 the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (The Phillips 
Commission) did not accept the proposals made nine-years earlier by the CLRC in a 1981 
220 Ibid. at 424; Ed Ratushny, Self-Incrimination in the Canadian Criminal Process (Toronto: Carswell, I979) at 
265. "While the accused might still refuse to answer to police questioning, evidence of his refusal could be 
introduced into evidence at his trial. Adverse inferences could then be drawn against the accused for his failure to 
mention, at the earlier stage, any fact which he subsequently relies upon at his trial. The drawing of inferences 
would be permitted not only on the question of guilt but also in "determining whether there is a case to answer." 
221 O'R 'l/ 'b'd e1 y, I I . 
222 Supra note I at 665. 
223 Ibid. As Zander reports: "The Committee asked rhetorically, "why would an innocent person want to be 
silent?"" 
224 Ibid. 
225 O'Reilly, supra note 2I6 at 424. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Supra note I at 665. 
229 0 'Reilly, supra note 2I6 at 424. 
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report. 230 The Phillips Commission Report noted that eliminating the right to silence would 
increase the number of" .. .innocent people making inculpatory statements,"231 whereas the guilty 
would still in a substantial number of cases remain silent because doing so and risking the 
adverse inference would be more advantageous than making a statement.232 Furthermore, using 
" ... a suspect's silence as evidence against him or her"233 is against the " ... central element of the 
accusatorial system:"234 that the onus of proof rests with the prosecution and is meant " ... to be 
discharged without any assistance from the accused. 235 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE) introduced a number of reforms 
that constrained the behaviour of police during investigations.236 The recommendations of the 
1981 Commission provided the foundation for the Conservative government's legislative 
reforms in PACE (they were adopted by the Conservative government); accordingly neither the 
PACE Act nor its Codes interfered with the existing right to silence. 237 The PEACE 
investigative interviewing model, though it came along much later, is necessarily the child of the 
legal constraints imposed on interrogators as a result of the PACE legislation, although the 
genesis of PEACE has its own story which we shall touch on momentarily. Following the PACE 
reforms, the status of the right to silence was incorporated in the police caution, 238 which was 
230 Ibid. 




235 Ibid at 666; See also the following rulings from the Supreme Court of Canada on this issue: R. v. Chambers 
(Supra note I9I ).; R. v. Lifchus, [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 320; R. v. Noble (Supra note 2I 0). 
236 The PACE reforms consisted of giving suspects a right to free legal advice at interview, that interviews should be 
recorded and suspects should be cautioned before questioned. See sections 53 (1), 60 (1) and 6I (6)(b) of The 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act I984 (PACE) (Supra note I45). 
237 Supra note I at 666. 
238 Ibid. 
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codified in PACE Code C, and remained true to the historical position239 that "the suspect need 
not say anything at all, but anything said will be taken into account."240 
Three years after the enactment of PACE, in 1987, the Home Secretary under Margaret 
Thatcher's Conservative Government, " ... Douglas Hurd, revived the debate when he argued in 
his Police Foundation lecture that the right to silence did not protect the innocent, whose interests 
were best served by answering police questions. "241 He pointed out that there is a need for a 
" ... public debate about the right to silence,"242 notwithstanding its effective settlement a few 
years prior with the 1981 Phillips Commission report and the 1984 enactment of PACE wherein 
the traditional position was confinned.243 According to O'Reilly, the general feeling among 
commentators was that the Home Secretary's proposals were made "in response to police 
pressures to make interrogation easier."244 Thus, with PACE in place, and a concession towards 
humane treatment given, it was now possible to argue that the legal protection of accused 
persons as exemplified by the pretrial and trial rights to silence should be eliminated. Things did 
not change immediately however. 
Parliament initially imposed restrictions on the right to silence in Northern Ireland in 
1988,245 " ••• nearly two years after Hurd's remarks. "246 The elimination of an effective right was 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. It is noteworthy that in the United Kingdom, the judicial approach to the exclusion of evidence has been far 
more limited than in Canadian courts. In R. v. Sang, [1980] A.C. 402 (H.L.), Lord Diplock stated: "It is no part of a 
judge's function to exercise disciplinary powers over the police or prosecution as respects the way in which 
evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by them. If it was obtained illegally there will be a remedy in civil law; if 
it was obtained legally but in breach of the rules of conduct for the police, this is a matter for the appropriate 
disciplinary authority to deal with." R. v. Kuruma, [ 1955] A. C. 197 (P.C.), Lord Goddard C.J. stated: ''No doubt in a 
criminal case the judge always has a discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate 
unfairly against the accused ... If, for instance, some admission of some piece of evidence, e.g., a document had 
been obtained from a defendant by a trick, no doubt the judge might properly rule it out." The interpretation of these 
holdings by the English courts, has been to provide only an extremely narrow judicial discretion to exclude. 
241 0 'Reilly, supra note 216 at 424 -425. 
242 Supra note I at 666. 
243 Ibid 
244 0 'Reilly, supra note 216 at 425. 
245 Ibid. 
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made, nominally, in response to terrorist attacks, but was in fact made to apply uniformly across 
all criminal offences. 247 It was a necessary measure, the Government argued, 248 because "the 
right to silence was seriously hindering the government's ability to convict terrorists."249 
Moreover, in the same year Hurd stated that he also intends to limit the right to silence in 
England and Wales, 250 hence, he commissioned the Home Office Working Group to devise a 
plan for restricting their right to silence?51 The Group issued its report in July 1989 
supporting252 " ••• the use of adverse inferences"253 for a refusal to speak.254 
Very soon after the 1989 report was released, however, there were several high-profile 
miscarriages of justice including the wrongful convictions of the Guildford Four, and the 
Birmingham Six, which led to the creation of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (The 
Runciman Commission).255 The plan to eliminate the right to silence in England and Wales was 
made impossible due to public opinion following those exonerations, cases in which coerced 
"confessions" figured prominently. 256 
The Commission was tasked with " ... fundamental reappraisal of the structures of criminal 
justice in England and Wales,"257 with a particular focus on minimizing convictions of 
innocents.258 One of the "major problems"259 to be addressed by the Commission was "false 
246 Ibid. at 403 & 423. 
247 Ibid. at 425. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid. 











confessions."260 There was only one academic on the commission: Professor Michael Zander.261 
A cynical view of the Commission's work in the wake of the exonerations of the aforementioned 
wrongfully convicted has been expressed as follows: "Whatever the parties' intentions, the 
Government effectively defused a political crisis about the imprisonment of the innocent by 
setting up a Royal Commission that was only in part directed at that issue - nifty footwork 
indeed. "262 Some pressure groups, such as the Legal Action Group charged that "the 
Commission was being directed by the Home Office away from the issue of miscarriages 
towards questions of 'administrative expediency,"'263 and "there was talk of capture by a Home 
Office and legal profession agenda. "264 
The Runciman Commission canvassed issues that had come to the forefront in the media 
as a result of the recent exonerations, such as the video-recording of confessions as a requirement 
for admissibility and a requirement that confession evidence be corroborated.265 On the specific 
issue of the right to silence, the Commission reached the same conclusion as the 1981 
Commission: 
260 Ibid. 
No change was recommended to limitations of prosecution and judicial comment on a suspect's 
failure to answer questions during interrogation (right to silence). The Commission's basic 
judgement was that 'the safeguards under PACE are comprehensive and, while not foolproof, are 
substantially sound.' The implicit assumption seems to have been that problems revealed by the 
miscarriages of justice cases had been largely addressed by PACE and that only minor adjustment 
was required. 266 
261 Ibid. at 2. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid.: For example, the authors note, that "Key figures in the legal establishment were already prefiguring some 
of the principal recommendations of the Commission: the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor, Barbara Mills, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), and the Director of the Serious Fraud Office were recommending greater 
pre-trial defence disclosure evidence to the prosecution; the DPP and the Attorney-General were arguing for the 
abolition of the defendant's right to a jury trial in cases triable either way. None of these key measures is aimed at 
avoiding false convictions; they were not widely anticipated or discussed in the media when the Commission was set 
up. The agenda had shifted decisively." 
265 Ibid. at 5. 
266 Ibid. 
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The Runciman Commission voted 9-2 in favour of retaining the right to silence,267 
however, unlike the 1981 Commission, they advanced only the argument that more innocents 
would be found guilty under the pressure of having to make a statement to avoid an adverse 
inference, 268 and in the conclusion they steered clear of the argument that the right to silence is 
fundamental to the accusatorial system. 269 
When the Runciman Commission report was received, it was met with public controversy 
and academic debate.270 The Director of Public Prosecutions,271 " ••• the Attorney-General, and 
the Director of Serious Fraud Office were most supportive of the report, favouring the 
restrictions on jury trial, greater defence disclosure, and less automatic prosecution disclosure as 
well as the plea-bargaining proposals."272 "The Association of Police Officers (ACPO) and the 
Police Federation issued statements supporting the main lines of the Commission's 
recommendations, with one Senior Scotland Yard officer saying 'at least the playing field is a 
little more level,"'273 and "[t]he President of ACPO, John Burrows, said that the police felt that 
many of their points had been taken up, particularly on the value of genetic testing, though he 
regretted the retention of the right to silence". 274 Thus, the police continued their push, in line 
with the agenda of the governing Conservatives, for the elimination of the right to silence. 
In 1991, in response to high profile miscarriages of justice, including the exoneration of 
the wrongfully convicted Guildford Four,275 the Home Office and the Association of Chief 
267 Supra note I at 667. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid; U.K., The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report (London: HMSO, 1991) at 54 (Chair: Viscount 
Runciman of Doxford). 
27° Field & Thomas, supra note 24 at 5. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid. at 5-6. 
274 Ibid. at 6. The emphasis denoted by an italic font in this sentence is mine. 
275 Supra note 13 at 23. 
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Police Officers had created a Working Group276 with key stakeholders on "investigative 
interviewing,"277 to create and implement an interview methodology and a training program that 
was consistent with PACE and would guard against false confessions?78 The Association of 
Chief Police Officers developed an officer training course and the Home Office published a 
study of an evaluation of that training, that was largely favourable, as early as 1993.279 Thus, 
there was a move towards a less aggressive style of interrogation at the instigation of the police 
and the government. In the evaluation report, it was noted that "officers were frequently 
nonplussed when faced by a suspect who persisted in exercising the right to silence,"280 and that 1 
officers often appeared "unsure about what behaviour was appropriate under the provisions of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984."281 
The dilemma of the early nineties appears to have been that if objectionable police 
interrogation tactics were allowed (or resorted to notwithstanding their prohibition), then false 
confessions and wrongful convictions were a danger - in light of the high profile exonerations of 
the wrongfully convicted that happened in the late eighties, and the public backlash that 
followed,282 it is reasonable to assume that the police and the government could not permit such 
an approach to continue.283 A PEACE training program would provide an ethical alternative 
276 Barry J. McGurk, Michael J. Carr & Debra McGurk, "Investigative Interviewing Course for Police Officers: An 
Evaluation" (1993) Police Research Series: Paper No. 4, London: Home Office Police Department at iii. See also 
Supra note 25. 
277 McGurk, Carr &McGurk, ibid. at iii and v. 
278 Baldwin,Ibid; and McGurk, Carr & McGurk, ibid. 
279 McGurk, Carr & McGurk, Ibid. 
280 Ibid. at 4. 
281 Ibid. 
282 The Campaign to Free the Birmingham Six, for example, was spearheaded by then-Labour MP Chris Mullin, 
who raised issues related to the case in the House of Commons from 1987 onwards: U.K., House of Commons, 
House of Commons Debates (Hansard), 11 June 1987 to 17 December 2004) (Hon. Chris Mullin), online: 
<http://hansard.millbanksystems.cornlpeople/mr-chris-mullinl>. 
283 A. Ashworth, The Criminal Process (Oxford: OUP, 1998) at 11; Hannah Quirk, "Identifying Miscarriages of 
Justice: Why Innocence in the U.K. is not the Answer" (2007) 70(5) MLR 759 at 772. Ashworth described the case 
of the Birmingham Six as being 'catalytic'. Quirk notes that despite the fact that very few of the miscarriage of 
justice cases created any legal precedents, " ... they had a profound impact upon the criminal justice system" (p. 773) 
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inasmuch as it was inside the framework of PACE, and it would further assist to allay concerns 
of an outraged public.284 It may be that PEACE not only served the function of providing a new 
training platform, but that it was a necessary public relations tool aimed at rebuilding trust with a 
concerned British public. 
When the PEACE model was devised, and it was decided that there would be a move 
away from "persuasive interviewing"285 towards, what was touted as an "ethical altemative",286 
training manuals began to be distributed to officers the following year.287 Professor Michael 
Zander describes it as follows: 
The Runciman Royal Commission on Criminal Justice was set up in 1991 as a result of great 
concern about some spectacular miscarriage of justice cases, some of which will have perhaps 
come to your notice. The three main cases all involved the IRA: the Macguire Seven, the 
Guildford Four, and the Birmingham Six. The police, in particular came in for a real pasting as a 
result of those cases. They felt defensive about the way they were being portrayed, and the way 
they had in fact behaved. As part of their reform program the police devised a new system they 
called "investigative interviewing. "288 
The Association of Chief Police Officers ""instigated the design of a training course" in 
investigative interviewing"289 "[i]n the light of concerns which have been expressed about the 
way in which police officers conduct interviews with suspects."290 
and they were a "compelling reform tool" (pg. 773). She further notes that the 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure and PACE and the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice and ultimately the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission were established in response to miscarriage of justice cases. 
284 Supra note 14 7. Snook et al. write: "Several high-profile wrongful convictions cases in the United Kingdom 
(e.g., Guildford Four, Birmingham Six) resulted in close scrutiny of investigative practices associated with those 
miscarriages of justice. One of the issues that garnered much attention was the system of interviewing tactics used 
to elicit confessions. It was determined that the overly manipulative and coercive nature of interrogation practices 
contributed to the wrongful convictions. The British response was to introduce substantive reforms, including 
implementation of the PEACE model of interviewing (Supra note 9 at. 219), Substantive reforms, culminating in the 
adoption of the inquisitorial (non-manipulative or coercive) interviewing method PEACE in 1992." See also supra 
note 13 at 23. 
285 Schol/um, ibid. at 43. 
286 Ibid. at 20 and 43. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Supra note I at 663. 
289 McGurk, Carr & McGurk, supra note 278 at 4. 
290 Ibid. 
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The Home Office's Police Research Group published an additional research paper in 
1993 called "Officer's Perspectives on Investigative lnterviewing"291 notes that " ... the vast 
majority [of officers] saw interviews as the most important part of any investigation,"292 and that 
it was a "commonly held view ... that interviews were often the only way of getting the 
information required,"293 particularly where there was only circumstantial evidence,294 but that 
"some officers voiced the view that interviews were 'getting harder'; many suspects were seen as 
'more professional' and as using the right to silence to avoid possible charges. These changes 
were clearly a source of frustration for a substantial number of officers."295 More generally, it 
was noted in that Home Office sponsored report that "After examining 400 video recordings of 
interviews conducted by constables and sergeants, Baldwin concluded that 'interviewing 
suspects causes some police officers serious difficulty and, even in the simplest cases, they 
contrive to make exceedingly heavy weather of it. "'296 
It appears that investigative interviewing was in place as a Home Office priority prior to 
the elimination of the right to silence, and PEACE was the training program developed. After 
the reforms to interviewing and interrogation were in place, we see the elimination of the right to 
silence. 297 
In 1993 " ... the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice released"298 two reports that 
suggested that the right to silence "should be retained,"299 and indicated that eliminating the right 
291 Janet E. Stockdale, "Management and Supervision of Police Interviews," in Police Research Group, Police 
Research Series: Paper No. 5, (London: Home Office Police Department, 1993) at 6. 
292 Ibid. at 6-7. 
293 Ibid. at 7. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ibid at 2. 
297 This point can be surmised, as the right to silence was eliminated in 1994, but PEACE was implemented prior to , 
that in 1992. After the reforms to interviewing and interrogation were in place, within a two-year time span the right ' 
to silence was reduced to meaninglessness. 
298 O'Rielly, supra note 216 at 426. 
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would likely increase the number of wrongful convictions.300 Despite these reports, the Home 
Secretary, Michael Howard, publicly declared the " ... decision to limit the right to silence at the 
Conservative Party conference in October 1993"301 "as part of a package of criminal justice 
reforms aimed at "getting tough" on crime. 302 He announced at the same conference that he has 
adopted the view of the Runciman commission's minority, and hence, rejected the majority's 
view.303 Moreover, he said: "The so-called right to silence is ruthlessly exploited by terrorists. 
What fools they must think we are. It's time to call a halt to this charade. The so-called right to 
silence will be abolished. "304 
Howard's remarks provoked a vocal response from critics (which was ignored) charging 
that the decision305 was made " ... to pander to public fears about crime, save money"306 and to 
placate English police, 307 who were upset about measures that had been taken to streamline the 
department. 308 As Stewart and Thomas describe this period: 
All the penal lessons that had been painfully learned in the early '80s were lost in a scramble for a 
law and order rhetoric with popular appeal. Inconvenient evidence was simply ignored. In this 
process, the Runciman Commission was cannibalized: anything that could be presented as a 
contribution to cost-effective crime control became an urgent political priority.309 
The elimination of the right to silence was the most significant feature of the first wave of 
Howard's crime control reforms.310 John Major's Conservative government eliminated it in 
1994, and enacted a law that would regard a suspect's refusal to answer questions during police 
299 Ibid. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid. at 423. 
302 Ibid. 
303 Supra note I at 667. 
304 Ibid. 
305 0 'Reilly, supra note 216 at 426. 
306 Ibid at 427. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Field & Thomas, supra note 24 at 7. 
310 Ibid. 
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interrogation (and to testify at trial), as evidence of his guilt.311 This was the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act (CJPOA),312 the justification313 for which was "to reduce the proportion of 
cases when the prosecution are ambushed by last minute changes in the defendant's story."314 
The Major government, in enacting the law contradicted the findings of two 
publications by the British government's own Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, only one 
year earlier, in 1993,315 which suggested that those who are innocent have good reasons for 
remaining silent, and that the elimination of the right316 "would not reduce crime."317 It also said 
that eliminating the right " ... would increase the likelihood of false confessions and "erroneous 
convictions"318 (i.e. wrongful convictions).319 The Major government enacted the law in spite of 
these concerns. 
Proponents of eliminating the right to silence made a number of arguments in favour of 
doing so. They asserted that: (i) the right to silence deprives the police of the valuable 
information that can be obtained if the accused is forced to talk320 (ii) removing the right will 
allow the police to investigate the validity of the information provided by the accused and it 
would prevent the defence from raising last minute ambush defences;321 (iii)under the new 
interviewing guidelines (PACE), the innocent are protected from aggressive interrogation, and 
they have access to counsel in the interview room. Hence, the innocent are not prejudiced or do 
311 0 'Reilly, supra note 216 at 402; The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, (Supra note 145). 
312 Supra note I at 667. 
313 Ibid. 
314/bid. 
315 0 'Reilly, supra note 216 at 403. 
316/bid. 
317 Ibid.; U.K., The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report, supra note 271. 
318 O'R ·11 "b"d e1 y, I I . 
319 Ibid. 




not face major risk by talking to the police;322 (iv) a substantial number of guilty people "beat the 
charges" by keeping quiet;323 and (v) that eliminating it will ultimately lead to a "more efficient 
f . . I . . ,324 h 325 Th I b . d system o cnmtna JUStice, among ot er reasons. ese arguments were a so etng rna e 
in 1993.326 
As with England, there are those in North America who are calling for the elimination of 
the right to silence. 327 These persons include scholars, law enforcement personnel, and 
politicians of a conservative stripe. Moreover, in the American context, " ... the United States 
Department of Justice advocated adopting a litigation strategy to urge the Supreme Court to 
allow adverse inferences from silence to remove a "shelter" for the guilty and provide an 
incentive for the accused to testify. "328 It is possible that advocates of this view could find 
sympathy and support from the press, the public and from politicians, 329 in an environment that 
is receptive to crime control efforts.330 It has been noted that the experience of England's 
limitation on the right to silence "merits close study, especially in light of the potentially 
fundamental impact of such a change on the American system of justice. "331 
The history demonstrates that trying to eliminate the right to silence taking a head-on 
approach failed numerous times. It failed in the early seventies when the idea was first 
introduced, it failed in the early eighties when the PACE reforms were enacted and the right was 
again put on the table, it failed in the late eighties when the Home Secretary announced a stated 
intention to reform it. Due to some high profile miscarriages of justice, the integrity of the entire 
322 Ibid. at 42-43. 
323 Ibid. at 42. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Ibid. 
326 Ibid.; Meng Heong Yeo, "Diminishing the Right to Silence: The Singapore Experience"(1983) Crim. L. Rev. 89. 
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criminal justice system was put into question, and the era of reform that followed created an 
opportunity to overhaul the system in numerous areas. By making other concessions, and 
specifically by designing a model of investigative interviewing to allay the concerns of the 
public, the Conservatives were on firmer ground when shortly thereafter they announced that 
they would be eliminating the right to silence. 
It is clear from the behaviour of the British government in 1990's that it was adamant 
about abolishing the right to silence. 332 However, the public reaction to the well publicized 
miscarriages of justice in Guilford four and Birmingham six333 forced the government to 
temporarily back away from its plans to abolish this right.334 But the British government was not 
ready to give up and the intense pressure brought about by the police to abolish this right335 
continued to fuel the government's determination to go through with its plan. 
The urgent desire to remove the right to silence was in fact caused by police reaction to 
the introduction and the implementation of PACE. 336 Professor Steven Greer who was writing in 
1990, tells us that "the police have been in the forefront of the current abolitionist offensive in an 
attempt to recover ground perceived to have been lost as a result ofPACE.337" The crucial factor 
in the government's anti- right to silence campaign was the " ... perception in some quarters of 
332 Steven Greer, "The Right to Silence: A Review of the Current Debate" (1990) 53(6) Mod. L. Rev. 709 at 709. 
333/bid at 724. 
334 Ibid. at 709. However soon the " ... fear arose that guilty defendants were using the right to silence in conjunction 
with the new access to solicitors to escape convictions, and concerns shifted from protecting injustices in such cases 
as the Guilford Four and the Birmingham Six to protection of society." A.A.S. Zuckerman, the Principles of 
Criminal Evidence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) at 326-327. 
335 Greer, ibid 
336 Ibid. at 7 I 6. 
337 Ibid. See also Michael Zander, "Abandoning an Ancient Right to Please the Police" THE INDEPENDENT 
(London) Oct. 6, 1993, at 25 (editorial). Also Gregory W. O'Reilly states " ... the police had continued to press for 
the abolition of the right in reaction to the PACE refonns of the 1980s." (O'Reilly, supra note 218 at 427). 
-338-
the changing balance between police powers and the rights of the suspect as this operated under 
PACE."338 
Once the PACE reforms were introduced, the British government seized the opportunity 
to forcefully advance the argument that the increased rights of the suspects had altered the 
balance between the need to combat crime and the rights of suspects. Professor Mark Berger 
states this point in the following fashion: 
At the same time that the legislative process of recasting the rules governing police interrogation 
and confession admissibility had seemingly run its course, the Conservative government of Great 
Britain concluded that the time was ripe to challenge the right to silence. The debate was 
reopened by the Home Secretary in a speech to the Police Foundation in July 1987. Initially the 
speech defended the increased right of access to a solicitor granted by PACE. But it went on to 
question whether changing circumstances had altered the balance between the interests of society 
as a whole and the rights of the criminal suspect.339 
The judicial response to PACE package was a series of rulings that excluded statements 
obtained in breach of PACE regulations. 340 These rulings provoked a strong response on the part 
of the opponents of right to silence. The critics argued that PACE had changed the balance of 
power too far in favour of criminal suspects.341 Moreover they also claimed that as a result of 
PACE there was a sharp increase in the number of defendants refusing to give statements to 
police.342 Lord Chief Justice Lane echoed those sentiments in his judgment in the case of 
Alladice343: 
338 Supra note 320 at 21. 
339 Mark Berger "Of Policy, Politics, and Parliament: The Legislative Rewriting of the British Right to Silence" 
(1994-1995) 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 391 at 406. 
340 David Feldman, "Regulating Treatment of Suspects in Police Stations: Judicial Interpretation of Detention 
Provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984" (1990) Crim L. Rev. 452. According to Zuckerman, "if 
the courts become convinced that by their promoting of the suspect's right to consult a solicitor the police are unduly 
hindered in the investigation of crime, a reaction is bound to take place." Zuckerman, supra note 336 at 327. 
341 Mike Redmayne, "English Warnings" (2008) 30(3) Cardozo Law Review 1047 at 1053. 
342 PeterNeyroud "Wrongs About a Right" POLICE REV., Apr. 8, 1994, at 17. Upon reviewing the studies done on 
British confession rates, after the implementation of PACE, Gisili Gudjonsson made the following findings: 
The frequency with which suspects confess to crimes in England has fallen in recent years from over 60% 
to between 40 and 50%. This appears to have followed the implementation of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE), which came into force in January 1986. The reasons for this decrease seem to be 
associated with the increased use of solicitors by detainees, and changes in custodial interrogation and 
confinement procedures. The presence of solicitors during interrogation is most likely to discourage 
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It seems to us that the effect of section 58 is such that the balance of fairness between prosecution 
and defense cannot be maintained unless proper comment is permitted on the defendant's silence 
in such circumstances. It is high time that such comment should be permitted together with the 
necessary alteration to the words of the caution.344 
According to Zuckerman "Judges and policemen became alarmed that the balance was tilting 
too much in favour of suspects. They started pressing for the curtailment of the right to silence 
precisely because it was becoming a realistic option for suspects. The fact of the matter is that 
the right to silence could be tolerated because only a very small minority of suspects could resist 
police demands for answers. "345 Professor Steven Greer coined a phrase for the arguments of 
these critics: he called them "exchange abolitionists"346 The core argument of these critics is 
" ... that provided defendants' other legitimate interests are adequately protected, only the guilty 
will seek to hide behind silence in police station."347 
A segment of these detractors of the right to silence believed that " ... PACE has already 
gone far enough in securing defendants' rights"348 and that " ... increased availability of legal 
advise in the post-PACE era in England and Wales has resulted in a significant increase in the 
use of the right to silence especially by experience criminals charged with serious offences."349 
Hence, "The new rights granting liberal access to solicitors and the willingness of courts 
to enforce them were one factor leading to new restrictions on the right to silence adopted a 
decade later. "350 
suspects from confessing where the evidence against them is weak. (Gisili Gudjonsson, The Psychology of 
Interrogations, Confessions and Testimony, I st ed., (London: Wiley, 1992) at 324. 
343 R. v. Alladice (1988) 87 Cr. App R. 380 
344 Ibid. at 385. 
345 A.A.S. Zuckerman "The Inevitable Demise of the Right to Silence" (1994) New Law Journal 1 at 1. 
346 Supra note 1 at 719. 
347 Ibid at 719-720. 
348 Ibid. at 720. 
349 Ibid See also the intense opposition of Irish Police Commissioner, Patrick Culligan to right to silence, when in 
1994 he said that right to silence only benefited the " ... cunning, professional, hardened criminal." P.O. Mahoney, 
"The Ethics of Police Interrogation and the Garda Siochana" ( 1997) 6 Irish Criminal Law Journal 46 at 53. 
350 Gordon Van Kessel, "European Perspectives on the Accused As a Source ofTestimonial Evidence" (1997-1998) 
100 W.Va. L. Rev. 799 at 831. 
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Likewise in North America, the assault on the right to silence has been a protracted 
one. 351 Will the interests calling for the elimination of that ancient right be assisted by the 
adoption of PEACE in North America? If there is a move away from police trickery and 
pressure tactics, particularly due to false confession related concerns, it is difficult to see how the 
police will be able to go back, if it turns out that a less aggressive approach fails to get 
351 The following are examples of two notable academics advocating the elimination of the right to silence in the 
context of trial in Canada: 
Steven Penney, "What's Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-
Charter Era. Part 1: Justifications for Rules Preventing Self-Incrimination" (2003-2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 249 at 250: 
"I argue that there is in fact nothing inherently wrong with compelling self-incrimination and that the Court's 
preoccupation with preserving free choice has produced a self-incrimination jurisprudence that too often elides the 
legitimate interests at stake in the criminal justice process. Put simply, there is nothing wrong with denying criminal 
justice suspects the right to choose whether to respond to criminal accusations, as long as the state has sufficient 
grounds for suspicion, avoids cruel methods of inducing cooperation, and ensures that compelled evidence is 
reasonably reliable." 
Ed Ratushny, (Supra note 220) at 343: " ... there is every justification for expecting the accused to respond to the 
evidence against him at a criminal trial which respects the fundamental principles upon which our criminal process 
has been established." 
Moreover, there appear to have been alarming developments in limiting the scope of the right to silence, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 at footnote 133. A more recent example of the right's curtailment can also be seen in the 
Combating Terrorism Act, R.S.C. 2013, c. C-9, s. I 0. The amendments impact Criminal Code sections 83.28 to 
83.3, specifically. These are the sections of the Code that create the Investigative Hearing regime for alleged 
terrorist offences. The legislation provides that, on the order of a Judge, persons may be compelled to attend a 
hearing before the Judge and answer questions put to them by an agent of the Attorney General regarding the 
commission or planned commission of acts of terrorism. An attendee is not permitted to refuse to answer questions 
put to him on the ground that the answer may tend to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty or proceeding. 
Any answer given may result in prosecution under section 132 (perjury) or 136 (giving contradictory evidence) in a 
later proceeding. These carry a sentence of up to fourteen years imprisonment where there is a conviction. Beyond 
this, evidence obtained cannot otherwise be used to incriminate the attendee. 
More examples of the limitations of the right to silence in Canada can be cited. For instance: 
I) Notice requirements of alibi evidence may arise solely from the testimony of an accused individual, meaning 
that, should an accused person testify that he/she was elsewhere at the time of the commission of the offence, 
he/she should provide advance notice of that evidence to the crown. Otherwise the trier of fact may be entitled to 
draw an adverse inference from the lack of timely notice (R. v. Letourneau, [1994] B.C.J. No. 265 (B.C.C.A.)). 
The failure of the accused person to testify in relation to alibi evidence may also lead to an adverse inference of 
guilt (R. v. Noble, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874). 
2) Under certain circumstances, the failure ofthe accused person to answer questions put to him by state agents may 
be admissible as part ofthe narrative between the accused and the police. However, the trial judge needs to 
instruct the jury that the purpose of introducing the evidence of the accused's silence is for narrative only and no 
inference of guilt can be drawn from it (R. v. Turcotte, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 519). 
3) The failure of a trial judge to provide mid-trial instructions to the jury about the co-accused's counsel's invitation 
to draw an adverse inference from an accused's failure to testify, may not be deemed as sufficient grounds to 
order a new trial (R. v. Prokofiew, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 639). 
4) Courts of Appeal are permitted to consider the failure of an accused person to testify at trial (R. v. Leaney, [I 989] 
2 S.C.R. 393 at 418). 
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confessions. They will then turn their sights on the right to silence, and they will be on much 
firmer footing in launching their assault upon it than they had been previously. 
There is another important feature of PEACE that merits attention: the stylistic approach 
of the model. In a pithy phrase, the philosophy of PEACE might be summed up by the following 
adage: 'you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar.' Whereas the Reid tactics are a more 
obvious and direct way to extract confessions, the PEACE approach may lull a suspect into a 
false sense of security, by effectively obscuring the seriousness of the situation he is actually in 
through the officer's efforts to portray himself as a sympathetic personality throughout the 
course of the interview. A police officer is no friend of a suspect; but PEACE might have 
suspects believe otherwise. By establishing rapport with the suspect, by taking the time to listen 
without interruption, seeking clarification of answers, and avoiding rationalization, projection 
and minimization, PEACE buys officers considerably more goodwill with their detainees than 
Reid will permit. 
We should consider the implications of such an approach, beyond the fact that it is more 
pleasant and more humane. Certainly, from a public relations perspective, PEACE is a superior 
model to Reid, or other harder methods of interrogation. It should not surprise us that the 
PEAC~ model was developed in the wake of several high profile exonerations of individuals 
who were wrongfully convicted; it has many positive selling points, chief amongst them is that it 
is a less oppressive model. But let us not forget that the model was designed by the Home Office 
in heavy consultation with the Association of Chiefs of Police (ACPO), both of whom had been 
pushing for an effective elimination of the right to silence, to be replaced with an adverse 
inference. This was achieved, finally, in 1994. A few years previous to this, these stakeholders 
were sitting down together and developing an interview model that would assist to avoid 
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miscarriages of justice; as they were doing so, is it possible they might have had the right to 
silence in mind as well? 
Let us look at what one of the major effects of PEACE may be, insofar as the congenial 
approach of officers and the less oppressive tactics that create a false sense of security or a false 
sense that the officer is there to help. If the PEACE approach obscures the adversarial nature of 
the relationship between the accused individual and the accusing state, and facilitates the 
impression in the mind of the accused that his interrogator is there to hear his story in a fair and 
impartial way, then he may be more inclined to speak to the officer. That is, he may be more 
inclined to waive his right to silence, and make a statement. After all the officer has been 
pleasant enough in his approach, wants to hear his side of the story and would like to give him 
the opportunity to clear everything up. 
In the United Kingdom, the adverse inference has come in to ensure that the right to 
silence will be waived, and the accused will often be led to the choice to give a statement just to 
clear things up; to do otherwise will look particularly damaging in front of the jury. In the 
Canadian environment, where the right to silence continues to exist, battered by recent crime 
control judgments though it may be, PEACE may in fact be a skillful bait-and-switch tactic; that 
is, baiting a commitment to talk by carrying on pleasant and hope-inspiring impressionistic 
interactions (without ever explicitly holding out a hope of advantage). The switch happens when 
it occurs to the accused what a dire predicament he has put himself in by putting misplaced trust 
in the friendly seeming officer, who he will then realize was not in fact his friend and was not 
there to help him out in any way. A police caution may not be enough to mitigate this kind of 
risk. Research on the caution has shown that it " .. .is linguistically complex"352 and difficult for 
352 Timothy Moore & Karina Gagnier, ""You Can Talk if you want to": Is the Police Caution on the 'Right to 
Silence' Understandable?" (2008) 51 C.R. (6th) 1 at 4. 
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many persons to properly understand, and that perceptions of the relationship between the 
suspect and the detaining officer forged after the caution has been delivered may undermine the 
message that the caution seeks to convey. 353 
Recall that central tenet of the PEACE method is completely consistent with the Supreme 
Court of Canada's position on the scope ofthe right to silence laid down in Hebert and Singh. 
Singh cemented the rule that even when a suspect asserts his right to silence, the interrogating 
officer is under no duty to discontinue questioning him. To force the suspect to remain in the 
interrogation room, and to be questioned, coaxed, cajoled or otherwise harassed to answer police 
questions, is permissible under Canadian law. The PEACE method supports the exact same 
approach. As noted, police interviewers are not bound, according to the method, to accept the 
first answer given by suspect, questioning is not considered to be unfair merely because it is 
persistent, and even when the right to silence is exercised by a suspect the police still consider 
themselves to have a right to put questions to the suspect. Thus, the approach under PEACE is 
not a departure from Reid or from the parameters of current confessions law having regard to the 
right to silence; there is no obligation to respect the assertion of that right by a suspect. 
The difference is in how PEACE interviewers go about getting a suspect to begin talking. 
During the Engage and Explain stage, the focus of the interviewer is on building rapport with the 
detainee, making him feel comfortable, and selling him the idea that the interviewer is someone 
who can be trusted. The law ensures that inducements must be avoided, but, as the saying goes, 
good manners cost nothing but are worth everything, 354 and this is how the interviewer inveigles 
the suspect to open up. In Reid, an interrogation is typically preceded by an interview. The 
353 Ibid. at 24-25. Research by Moore & Gagnier, moreover, indicates that innocent participants would not be any 
Jess Jikely to give a statement to po1ice if the caution, like the Miranda warning, said that statements could be used · 
against them in evidence (p. 4-19). 
354 Ord, Shaw & Green, supra note 46 at 16. 
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interview is non-confrontational and non-accusatory in nature, whereas the interrogation stage of 
Reid, should it get that far, is characteristically different because it is confrontational and the 
interrogator exercises control over the suspect. In other words, the first stage of Reid is similar 
to what PEACE advocates purport to be the entirety of their model. 
With respect to trying to have a stubborn suspect waive their right to silence, Reid relies 
on harder tactics, and in particular presenting the suspect with false evidence and posing 
behaviour provoking, baiting questions; PEACE eschews these tactics. It's not clear which 
method of persuading a non-compliant suspect to talk is more effective; PEACE did not coexist 
with the right to silence for a long enough time to be able to discern the degree of its 
effectiveness at prompting suspects to talk. But it is possible that putting the emphasis on the 
officer presenting himself as a sympathetic benefactor to the suspect who can help rather than 
emphasizing that the suspect is in grave trouble, may be a more effective way to prompt a 
statement. In truth, some measure of both will be required - Reid favours the use of fear more 
than PEACE, whereas PEACE favours the use of hope more that Reid. 
Nevertheless, PEACE does resort to Conversation Management (CM) techniques in the 
interview proper, the goal of which is to exercise control over uncooperative detainees, and is 
incrementally closer to Reid than the cognitive interview, which is typically resorted to for 
compliant detainees. 
Perhaps the PEACE model can be seen as a kind of Trojan Horse in yet another respect. 
By relying on rapport-building and sympathy, the PEACE model obscures the true relationship 
between the interviewer, a state agent, and the individual. The suspect is lured into a false sense 
of security and may, through the amicable presentation of the officer, come to believe that this is 
someone he can put trust in to help him out of a bad situation. This approach can assist to 
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prompt the suspect to waive the right to silence and put something on the record. Where the 
suspect is refusing to speak, lying or being evasive, a harder approach, conversation management 
may be resorted to; but the approach, here is to get the horse inside the fortifications - to get the 
suspect talking. Once he begins to speak, if he is lying, he will be creating a record of lies that is 
open to attack in the courtroom. 
Proponents may recognize nothing objectionable about this duplicitous approach. The 
coercion is minimal, the much-maligned maximization and minimization tactics are not used, 
and it may be an effective way to get the suspect's side of the story. In fact the approach has 
been found to be far more effective than the domineering approach. Research has found a 
relationship between admission or denial and the suspects' ratings of police behaviour. It has 
been found that "participants who perceive humanitarian attitudes from their interviewers were 
more likely to admit crime"355 and that "for those whose ratings indicated that they felt respected 
'the odds of admission are 5.92 times greater, than those who did not feel respected."356 A 
dominating style is more likely than a respectful approach to result in suspect denials. 357 
However the statements that are given may be voluntary within the meaning of the 
common law confessions rule, but may not be based upon correct apprehension of the situation 
the detainee is in. If the treatment of the detainee by the officer leads the former to conclude he 
is being dealt with sympathetically, then he is the victim of inaccurate information. With 
information which is false, he cannot make an informed choice. A voluntary statement made on 
the basis of a misapprehension of the circumstances cannot be said to have been made because a 
355 Rebecca Milne & Ray Bull, Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts, 2nd ed. by David Carson & Ray Bull, 
(John Wiley and Sons, Sussex: 2003) at 121. 
356 Ibid. 
357 Ibid. 
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meaningful decision to do so was reached; the statement was made because there was a kind of 
subtle misrepresentation at play. 
The friendly approach of PEACE is insidious because it will not be shocking or flagrant 
enough to raise oppression; it won't be distorting or psychologically deteriorating so as to raise 
operating mind issues and it won't appear as explicit enough an inducement to render the 
statement legally involuntary on that basis either. Thus, when skillfully deployed, this tactic can 
prompt legally voluntary statements because it is so subtle. But there is the risk that the 
statements were made on the basis of an inaccurate perception of the situation the suspect found 
himself in, and allowed the police to get a confession they would not been able to had they used 
less obfuscation in their approach. 
Another significant point that should be made about the PEACE model is that the effect 
of PEACE training may have a limited impact upon the way actual interviews are carried out. In 
1997, " ... a senior police officer in England"358 reported " ... research demonstrating a belief 
among police officers that the main aim of an interview with a suspect was still to obtain a 
confession."359 In research conducted by forensic psychologists on PEACE trained interviewers 
in England, it has been discovered that police officers' evaluations of interviewing skills differs 
from the assessments of forensic psychologist experts;360 whereas police officers' evaluations are 
largely confession driven, forensic psychologists focus on 28 distinct "interviewing skills"361 
which are benchmarks of good interviewing. 362 In a study conducted by Holmberg and 
Christianson, persons in prison for murder and sexual offences were asked to give their 






judgments and perceptions363 of the "behavior/manner/attitudes of the police officers who had 
interviewed them during the investigation."364 The data indicated that only a few of the English 
interrogators365 were perceived366 " ••• as having shown a great personal interest"367 and in "having 
tried to create a personal conversation,"368 or were seen "as highly sympathetic or 
empathetic."369 Few had seen the interviewers " ... as having shown a very positive attitude 
towards them as human beings."370 On the other hand, few perceived " ... their interviewers as 
aggressive and explicitly confrontational."371 Most, however, said " ... that they experienced the 
police interviewers to display impatience, condemning attitude, and a lack of empathy."372 It 
may be that the PEACE training does not work as well as it might. 
Conclusion 
I propose, with respect to PEACE, that we keep an open-mind, surmise where problem areas 
are likely to arise, and empirically check our hypotheses against gathered data where it is 
available. We can say with some confidence that there are significant problems associated with 
the use of the Reid Technique. Forensic psychological research (discussed in chapter 4) has 
demonstrated as much. Let us now treat the proposed "ethical alternative" as a working model 
that is subject to review, revision and ongoing improvement, rather than as the "silver bullet" 
that it is often touted as. If we are truly committed to discovering ethical alternatives, as we say 
we are, then let us take the a priori "ethical" interviewing model, PEACE, as a starting point and 
as a means-to-an-end, rather than an end-in-itself. Let us allow our ethical alternative to be 









372 Ibid. at 121. 
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tempered by considerations of efficacy, practicality, competing values, whether it is executable, 
etc; and then improve upon it accordingly as necessity dictates, or scrap it altogether and replace 
it with something else if the model cannot be made practicable. Realization of the PEACE 
dividend in the realm of interview and interrogation may not be as simple as bringing together a 
quorum of scholars, bureaucrats, police officials, and politicians to fashion an interview and 
interrogation policy anew. 373 Let us improve interview and interrogation incrementally and in a 
considered way based upon scientific research and a careful consideration of our values in the 
sphere of criminal justice. It would be a mistake to succumb to the binary logic that says "if not 
Reid then PEACE"; instead, let's treat interview and interrogation as being like a management 
problem. The methodology that we settle upon should be the one that gives us the most (i) 
effective results, (ii) with respect to realizing our values, and (iii) in consideration of the current 
operating interview and interrogation legal-environment inclusive of constraints, enjoinments 
and permissible behaviours. 
We have now discussed the PEACE model. While it is not yet possible to say whether 
PEACE is less dangerous for eliciting false confessions than Reid, this does seem plausible. 
However, in the United Kingdom, where PEACE is used, the right to silence has effectively been 
eliminated. This is cause for concern because PEACE seems as though it is designed to be 
successful in an environment without an effective right to silence. The fear is that if PEACE is 
introduced in North America, the effective elimination of the right to silence through a 
modification to the Canada Evidence Act may follow. 
It is argued that Reid and PEACE create problems in the procurement of confessions because 
they, for various reasons, undermine the voluntariness of the suspect who is the target of them. 
We now turn to an alternative mode of questioning which could replace these interrogation 
373 As the United Kingdom's Home Office did in 1992. 
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methods: in-court examination by a magistrate. It is argued that such a system, provided the 
proper protections are built in, could ensure that any and all statements given would be truly 
voluntary. This would drastically reduce the risk of false confessions, and accordingly, reduce 
the number of wrongful convictions. Judicial examination is discussed in the next chapter. 
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CONCLUSION: REFORMING INTERROGATION AND 
CONFESSIONS LAW IN CANADA: The Judicial Model 
We have now given the subject of interrogation and confession thoroughgoing 
treatment. It is the position here that the current range of practices on offer are 
problematic as they raise the probability of inducing false confessions. It is argued that 
there is a better way to go about collecting statements from suspects. 
The current environment is problematic in several respects. The law of 
voluntariness is exceptionally permissive of police trickery and deception, and therefore 
lends itself to abuse. 1 In the interrogation room setting, some precautions are required to 
be taken according to the law, but in other areas, comers may be easily cut. As has been 
discussed, higher Canadian courts do not, in principle, have any problem with the Reid 
Technique of interrogation, insofar as any given interrogator is able to stay within 
"voluntariness" and Charter limits recognized by the courts.2 These limits mean no quid 
pro quo inducements that overwhelm the will of the subject are allowed to be made by 
persons in authority, 3 but otherwise what degree of inducement falling short of 
overwhelming the will of the subject will qualify a statement as being excludable from 
evidence is less settled, and ultimately left to the discretion of individual judges.4 
Furthermore, police trickery, deception and other forms of abuse will not necessarily give 
rise to an exclusionary remedy unless they "shock the conscience" of Canadians, 5 and 
police oppression is similarly tightly circumscribed.6 The law permits a great deal of 
1 R. v. Oick/e [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
2 R. v. Barrett, (1993) I3 O.R. (3d) 587, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 266. 
3 R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC I 1, [2007] I S.C.R. 500. 
4 R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151. 
5 Supra note I. 
6 /bid. 
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leeway to investigators in their efforts to obtain incriminating statements from suspects 
and accused persons. It is argued that the techniques that are on offer are necessarily a 
response to the loose constraints of the legal environment in which they were devised. 
The Nature of Police Interrogation: 
According to Ratushny, there is a kind of hypocrisy that is built in to the system of 
interrogation. 7 With respect to custodial interrogations we have the popular Reid 
technique, on the one hand, and the proposed ethical alternative, the PEACE model, on 
the other. The Reid Technique has come into existence in our current environment, and 
when it is properly used it fits within the parameters of the confessions rule. The PEACE 
model was developed, ostensibly, in response to several miscarriages of justice that 
occurred in the United Kingdom. PEACE, unlike Reid, makes use of techniques that are 
considered to be based in sound psychology, and purports to eschew the manipulative 
tactics that characterize the Reid Technique. In the United Kingdom, very soon after 
PEACE was introduced, the right to silence was effectively eliminated through 
legislation. It is unclear whether PEACE can operate effectively with an entrenched 
right to silence. The reason for this is that there is no reliable data available describing 
rates of confession in an environment with a fully articulated right to silence and the 
PEACE method. 
Between Reid and PEACE then, we have two choices, which appear to leave 
much to be desired. But there is a third way. Implementing it will require legislative 
7 Ed Ratushny, Self-Incrimination in the Canadian Criminal Process (Toronto: CarsweiJ, I 979) at 252-53. 
Ratushny argues that "there is a hypocrisy to a system which defines a person's rights and obligations in its 
laws and then depends upon the ignorance of those same laws to ensure that they are largely ineffective in 
their practical application." 
Ratushny further claims that, "there is a hypocrisy to a system which provides [protections to suspects], but 
aiJows them aiJ to be ignored at the pre-trial stage where interrogation frequently occurs in secret", (and 
since Ratushny wrote with only a brief telephone contact with counsel)." (at 253). 
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change and, perhaps judicial support, as well. That alternative is to revive judicial 
examination of the accused and implement it in place of police interrogation. 
Canvassing the Alternatives: 
For the most part, the ideas for improvements are about creating some type of 
balance between police and suspect in the interrogation room8 " •.• by making legal advice 
equally available to all. "9 The point of the right to counsel is to make 10 the " ... accused to 
be aware of his position in law before making the serious decision whether or not to make 
a statement to police."11 Issues relating to12 the " ... effectiveness of the warning and the 
difficulty of weighing the credibility of conflicting accounts have led to further 
recommendations that detailed logs be kept by the police of every step in the 
incarceration and interrogation, and that statements be recorded." 13 The other alternative 
would be to ensure that no statements are admissible unless14 given in the "presence of 
counsel."15 
I agree with professor Ratushny that these proposed solutions do not provide a 
concrete solution to problems associated with custodial interrogations. 16 Essentially, 
counsel can only advise an accused to keep silent and not to answer any questions. 17 But 
police interrogation is filled with so many dangers18 " ••• that it would take exceptional 









17 Ibid at 273. 
18 Ibid. 
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circumstances for competent defence counsel to advise his client to abandon"19 the right 
to silence. 20 The pressing issue here pertains to the very real possibility an accused may 
make incriminating utterances that would seal his fate at his/her trial. According to 
Ratushny the ideal time to answer, if at all, " .. .is at trial, after the specific charge is 
known and the Crown's full case has been presented and tested by cross-examination."21 
The limited role of counsel at this stage essentially amounts to a22 " ••• simple 
direction to say absolutely nothing to the police."23 The same could be achieved by 
making all statements to the police inadmissible, and there would be no need to worry 
abour4 whether section lO(b) was rightly administered or whether the accused properly 
understands his right to silence. 25 If the accused " .. .is entitled to the protection of 
remaining silent, then why not make the protection fully effective"26 by excluding 
statements made to the police?27 
If the right of police to take statements was eliminated "there would be no need to 
expect the judiciary to make discretionary decisions"28 on admissibility,29 there would be 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. I should point out that I disagree with Ratushny's assertion that an accused person should be 




25 Ibid. At the time Ratushny was writing, there was no section IO(b), but instead he says " ... there would 
be very little need to be concerned about making counsel available at this initial stage."- Ibid. 
26 Ibid. Note: The author had a question mark at the end of this quotation. 
27 George Dix, "Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation ofBenefit, and the Modem Law of Confessions" (1975) 
Wash. U. L. Q. 275 at 330. Professor Dix argues that" intentional deception" (p. 277) by state agents in 
procuring a confession is" manifestly inappropriate" (p. 277) and that accused persons should have "the 
same opportunities" (p. 330) and knowledge base before they confess as they do before pleading guilty in 
court (p. 330). 
28 Supra note 7 at 273. 
29 We should also remember the inherent unfairness in the procedure governing voir dires. As many 
practitioners in criminal law would acknowledge voir dires on admissibility of statements often comes 
down to credibility contests between an accused person and officers, and this contest is usually won by 
officers. As Mr. Justice Morand stated "To a very large extent in criminal cases and to a lesser, but 
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no conflict of interest in the officer whose job it is to get a statement administering a 
proper waming,30 there would be no need for officers to lie in their evidence about the 
taking of statements to ensure that the confession is admissible,31 and courts would32 not 
" ... be placed in the difficult position of having to assess the credibility of police officers 
in relation to the taking of statements. "33 
Compared to the elimination of police interrogation, the other recommendations 
such as video or audio recording interrogations34 " ••• with the resulting need for transcripts 
seem awkward and convoluted."35 These practices clearly lead to increasing " ... the 
number, length and complexity of voir dires."36 
Judicial Examination 
The revival of judicial examination37 may sound at first like an unconventional 
idea; however permit me to explore it and make a case for why it would make for a better 
policy for the taking of statements than either police interrogation like the Reid 
Technique, or police investigative interviewing like the PEACE method. 
significant, extent in civil cases, the proof of the facts depends upon evidence given by the police. There is 
a natural tendency among Judges, as among the public generally, to accept the sworn testimony of a police 
officer, particularly when it contradicts the words of a person whose credibility is suspect by the very 
reason ofhis involvement with the law." The Royal Commission Into Metropolitan Toronto Police 
Practices, The Honourable Mr. Justice Donald Morand, Commissioner, 1976, Digitized in 20 I 0 at page 
123. Given this sad reality, many defence counsel do not put their clients on the stand in order to challenge 
the police version of events. Thus, this seriously impairs their prospects of establishing violations of their 
client's constitutional rights or raising a reasonable doubt in the voluntariness of their client's statement. 





35 Ibid. See also discussion of videotaping statements in Chapter 2, footnote# 85. 
36 Ibid 
37 Currently, the only time that judicial examination occurs in our system takes place at the end of the 
preliminary inquiry, where the presiding Judge at the conclusion of the Crown's case, asks the accused ifhe 
wishes to say anything in response to the evidence. The accused individuals also routinely, through 
counsel, decline the invitation to respond to the allegations. 
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The first task is to describe what judicial examination is. Most generally, this 
model would involve Justices of the Peace, or some other judicial official, asking an 
accused to make a statement regarding the Crown's allegations against him, in open-
court, at his appearance for bail, within 24 hours of his arrest. The accused would be 
asked to make a statement directly and without the benefit of counsel speaking on his 
behalf, but he would also be free to assert and effectively exercise his right to silence, 
indicate as much to the court and refrain from providing any reply to the Justice of the 
Peace's questioning. Upon such an assertion, questioning would stop. If the accused 
provided an explanation, it would be the prerogative of the presiding judicial official to 
conduct an examination in search for the truth. It will be important to clearly define what 
the nature and scope of this examination should consist of, and this is a matter to which 
we shall return momentarily. One principle feature of such a system would be that the 
accused could provide a piecemeal explanation; that is, he could choose to answer some 
questions while asserting a right to silence with respect to others. This assertion of the 
right would not be held against him and the portions over which the right was asserted 
could be edited from the statement that would make its way before a jury. This is 
consistent with the general rule that holds that it is permissible at the defence's request to 
have a statement edited if the portions in question would be prejudicial to the accused and 
excluding those portions that would not undermine the integrity of the statement taken as 
a whole. 38 Potentially exculpatory statements made by the accused would be required to 
be admitted along with the rest of the statement if the Crown sought to adduce it; 
however, as always, the Crown would retain the right to decide whether the statement 
38 R. v. Grewal/, [2000] B.C.J. 2386 at para. 36, where it was decided that courts are entitled to redact 
statements if the probative value is exceeded by the prejudicial effect. Grewal/ was cited approvingly by 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in R. v. Minoose, 20 I 0 ONSC 7175 at para. 21. 
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should be adduced or not, with the customary editing for prejudice at the request of the 
defence being applied in the usual way. Each of the system's components merit further 
elaboration; let us go through each step from detention to judicial examination. 
Upon the detention of a suspect, police have the opportunity to create a record of 
the interactions that they have with this person. Currently, the most significant contact 
that they potentially will have is during the custodial interrogation of the suspect. These 
interactions, according to the judicial examination model, should be kept off-the record, 
in the sense that they will not be permitted to be adduced as evidence against the accused 
at his trial. Thus, the statements an accused person makes to police following his 
custodial detention, but prior to his presentment in court, would not admissible into 
evidence. 
This rule could potentially be applied to statements made during the pre-detention 
phase of the investigation of a suspect as well, however, a discussion of why that may be 
a good or bad idea is beyond the consideration of this piece. 
Questioning of a suspect will not be permitted at law at all, and any information 
obtained, or for that matter volunteered to the police at this stage will be the subject of an 
automatic exclusionary rule and will be inadmissible. 
Police may still be tempted to question a suspect for the purpose of obtaining 
derivative evidence from him. If it is discovered and established that evidence has been 
procured in this way, the evidence so procured would be subject to potential exclusion. 
Moreover, a failure on the part of police to respect the bright-line rule that custodial 
interrogation is forbidden may give rise to a court challenge. 
,_ 357 ,_ 
As stated, the current requirement is to bring an individual to a show cause 
hearing for bail within 24 hours of his or her arrest. 39 What the system of judicial 
examination would require is that the accused be presented before a judicial officer, most 
probably a justice of the peace, not only for his show cause hearing, but additionally (and 
prior to the show cause hearing) to be given the opportunity to make a voluntary 
confession if he or she should choose to do so. 
As a safeguard against any intimidation, persuasion, abuse or other such 
incentivization of the accused by police, while in custody, to give an inculpatory 
statement to the presiding judicial official, it would be mandatory that the last person the 
accused speak with prior to entering the courtroom for his examination and show cause 
hearing would be a defence lawyer. Defence lawyers would be provided the opportunity, 
instead of having a single pre-interrogation phone call, as the current law specifies, to 
meet with their client in the cells at the courthouse prior to his presentment, and to 
provide the client with legal advice on his forthcoming examination, as well as take the 
opportunity to undo any inducements, or other impediments to voluntariness that may 
have been impressed upon the accused during the time that he was in police custody. 
The accused would then be brought before the court for his examination. No 
lawyers or police investigators would be permitted in the courtroom. The court would 
contain the justice of the peace, court staff, such as the reporters and clerks, the duty 
officer, and the accused. This would ensure that the accused would feel no pressure that 
may interfere with the voluntariness of his statement from either the Crown prosecutor or 
39 Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 503(1 )(a). 
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the police, and that the defence lawyer of the accused would not have the opportunity to 
intervene to prevent his client from answering questions. 
The presiding judicial official would be provided with a synopsis explaining the 
charges and the substance of the allegations against the accused. The content of the 
synopsis would be read to the accused. Following this, the justice of the peace would be 
required to confirm with the accused that he had received his right to counsel prior to the 
presentment, and would advise the accused of his right to remain silent. He would also 
explain to the accused the implications of providing a statement: namely, that whatever 
he says may be used in evidence against him, however any attempt to introduce the 
statement into evidence would be at the discretion of the Crown prosecutor, such that 
anything exculpatory that the accused should say in his defence may not come out on the 
record at his trial, and that anything incriminating that he should say in making a 
statement, the Crown would be free to use against him. 
Following the judicial caution the accused would be asked if he would like to take 
the opportunity to respond to the Crown's allegations against him. 
In the event that the accused indicated that he did not want to make a statement in 
response to the allegations, the questioning would cease, and the accused would be 
traversed to another courtroom in order to commence his/her bail hearing before a 
different judicial official. In the event that the accused did make a statement, it would be 
given on the record in open court. The presiding judicial official would then be permitted 
to engage the accused in questioning on the content of his statement in light of the 
Crown's allegations. In either situation, whether the accused person gives a statement or 
not, his bail hearing would be held before a different judicial official. 
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The rules for judicial examination would be circumscribed so as to limit the 
questions asked to open-ended ones, to the exclusion of leading questions. It would also 
be strictly prohibited for the judicial officer to resort to deception, manipulative or 
abusive tactics in order to persuade the accused to make a statement or alter the content 
of his answer. This would ensure fairness, and it would ensure the voluntariness of the 
statement. The accused could additionally exercise his right to silence in response to 
certain questions posed from the bench while choosing to answer others, with portions of 
the tape where he refused to answer a question edited at the request of the defence. Such 
a system has a historical precedent40• However the problem with the system historically 
was that judicial officers were very abusive in nature to the accused and more importantly 
to the rights of the accused.41 Persons would be called before officials without any 
specific allegation of wrongdoing and would be subjected to a broad range of questions.42 
Moreover, a refusal to be sworn and submit to examination would result in severe 
punishment; that principle which says an accused person cannot be compelled to testify 
in their own trial was not established until the second half of the seventeenth century. 43 
Examination by judicial officers developed in the context of the preliminary 
hearing.44 The office of justice of the peace was created by statute in 1327,45 and at that 
40 
"The judicial examination system has a historical precedent. Prior to the invention of modem day police 
forces, it was the responsibility of a magistrate to question an accused upon presentment before him, 
typically at the trial itself, which would proceed rapidly following arrest" -Alfred H. Knight, The Life of 
the Law (New York: Crown Publishers Inc., 1996) at 63. 
41 From the opinion of the justices to the Commons, "in what cases the Ordinary may examine any person 
ex officio upon oath": Of Oaths before an Ecclesiastical Judge Ex Officio (1606), 12 Co. Rep. 26, 77 E.R. 
1308. "[L]ay-men for the most part are not lettered, wherefore they may easily be inveigled and entrapped 
and principally in heresy and errors of faith". 
42 Supra note 7 at 172; From the opinion of the justices to the Commons, "in what cases the Ordinary may 
examine any person ex officio upon oath": (Ibid.). 
43 Ibid at 133. 
44 Silas E. Halyk, "The Preliminary Inquiry in Canada" (1967) I 0 Crim. L.Q. 181 at 181. 
45 Ibid. 
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time "no legal duty was imposed',46 to "conduct preliminary examinations;',47 the 
magistrate " ... was a royal officer armed with police powers"48 who was responsible for 
" ... committing suspects for formal accusation. "49 In the 16th century, further statutory 
enactment established that judicial officials must conduct an " ... examination of any 
prisoner brought before them charged with or suspected of a felony. "50 The examination 
procedure " ... was strictly inquisitorial, the accused being fully questioned as to all the 
circumstances surrounding the offence suspected. "51 When the rule against self-
incrimination took shape, the examination was gradually abandoned. 52 It first became 
standard practice and precedent for judicial officers to advise " ... an accused that he need 
not make any statement, "53 and if they did " . .it could be used against them in later 
proceedings. "54 It also came to be considered improper to try to extract an involuntary 
statement from accused person. 55 The formal repeal of all inquisitorial examinations and 
the enshrining of the judicial inquiry was legislated in 1848 by the Indictable Offences 





50 Ibid at I82. 
51 Ibid; See also E.M. Morgan, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (1949) 34 Minn L.R. I at I8. 
According to Morgan, "From the middle the sixteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth, the accused 
was subject to a preliminary examination before committing magistrates and expected to answer. He was 
not warned that he need not answer; and, indeed, any refusal to answer, whether of his own initiative or on 
advice of another, was reported and stated by the magistrate in his testimony at the trial." 
52 Halyk, ibid. at 183. 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid. at 185. 
55 Ibid. The gradual shift that occurred from an inquisitorial inquiry to judicial proceedings was 
precipitated by " ... reforms in the magistracy itself and the development of an efficient police system" 
(Halyk p. 184) following the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 (10 Geo. IV, c. 44). 
56 Halyk ,ibid. at I84; See also II & 12 Viet. c. 42, s. 18. (The Indictable Offences Act). 
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neutral adjudicative role to participate in the examination of accused persons or otherwise 
participate in their prosecution. 57 
I am not proposing a return to a system that is identical to the one that existed in 
England prior to 1848. As described above, any return to examination by a judicial 
officer would have ample safeguards built in to avoid the abuse of process that this 
system seemed to have represented in earlier times. Crucially, unlike in earlier times, the 
presumption of innocence and the right to silence would remain fully intact during these 
in-court examinations, and the accused would face no adverse inference against him for 
declining to respond to the Crown's allegations or for declining to answer questions put 
to him from the bench. 
There are compelling reasons to move in the direction of implementing the system 
of judicial in-court examination. Such a system, if implemented, would to a large extent 
insulate statements from challenges of admissibility, and this would in turn yield some 
positive benefits. It would do this because it would effectively expunge many of the 
contradictions from the law of confessions and the admissibility of statements, and 
replace it with a system where the statements would be, with clarity, truly voluntary, both 
within the meaning of the legal concept of voluntariness, and in a more expansive sense, 
as well. 
The driving force behind threats or promises made to an accused person by a 
person in authority, as well as deception, trickery, oppression and other potential forms of 
unfairness during custodial interrogation, would be removed when the goal of police to 
procure confessions was eliminated. Moreover, it would also reduce the likelihood of 
more severe forms of police abuse of persons taken into custodial detention, which, 
57 Halyk, ibid. at 185. 
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though by no means common, are nevertheless not unheard of, including beatings. 58 In 
the absence of any confession that may result from such transgressions having any 
evidential value to the Crown, the police will have no particular incentive to engage in 
them. 
There will likely be cost savings in other areas of the criminal justice system as 
well, should the in-court examination by a judicial officer be made to replace police 
interrogation. 
From a policing perspective, the budgetary advantages would include 
substantially lower costs associated with training officer's to extract statements and it 
would also free up many hours for officers to do other investigative work. 
From the perspective of the courts, the amount of judicial resources required and 
court time per case would also be reduced. This is because there will be fewer lengthy 
challenges to admissibility that eat up valuable court time, for which courtrooms must be 
reserved and staff members including judges, clerks and reporters must be paid. Legal 
Aid resources devoted per file will also reduce, because it is costly and time consuming 
for defence counsel to prepare and argue applications on the admissibility of evidence. It 
will no longer be required that government-funded legal aid organizations fund these 
applications in as many cases, because the nature of the proposed rules of judicial 
58 According to Skolnick and Leo, at least in the American context, "since the I960s, and especially since 
Miranda, police brutality during interrogation has virtually disappeared in America. Although one 
occasionally reads about or hears reports of physical violence during custodial questioning, police 
observers and critics agree that the use of physical coercion during interrogation is now exceptional."-
(Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard Leo, (1992) "The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation," II Crim. Just. Ethics 
3 at 3). For one such exceptional example, one may look to the case of R. v. Singh, 2013 ONCA 750, 
[2013] O.J. No. 5727, where the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the finding of the trial judge that police 
used torture to extract statements from the two accused persons. Based on this finding, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal overturned the conviction of the appellant for armed robbery and ordered the stay of the charges. 
The authors also assert that "psychological persuasion and manipulation have replaced physical coercion as 
the most salient and defming features of contemporary police interrogation. Contemporary police 
interrogation is routinely deceptive." -Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard Leo, (1992) "The Ethics of 
Deceptive Interrogation," II Crim. Just. Ethics 3 at 3. 
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examination will largely insulate statements given in-court from challenges for 
admissibility. 
There may be further savings at the appellate court level, as well, since a fair 
number of rulings on challenges for admissibility are appealed. 
Perhaps most importantly, in-court questioning will almost certainly reduce the 
number of false confessions and wrongful convictions. The proposed system eliminates 
the subtle creation of incentives by officers that can lead all too easily to coerced-
compliant confessions, where a detained suspect makes a 'rational choice' based upon the 
(misrepresented) information available to him, that notwithstanding his factual 
innocence, the hopelessness of the situation suggests that his best option is to confess to 
the truth of the allegations against him. By drastically reducing the chance that an 
innocent suspect will conclude that it is in his best interests to confess, one cause of false 
confessions will have been addressed. Additionally, with respect to persons who are of 
weak mind or unsound mind, the screening system of having a lawyer in place prior to in-
court examination, as well as the fact that there is no coercion or deception from the JP 
will provide protection against uttering a false confession to these individuals. 
The result of cutting down on false confessions, and by extension, wrongful 
convictions will yield additional benefits to confidence in the administration of justice 
and will promote the image of a judicial system with integrity. The more false 
confessions and wrongful convictions that there are, the more public confidence in the 
police and in the justice system becomes eroded. Thus, it is a worthwhile goal to take 
steps to reduce such occurrences. By the same token, reducing the opportunity of the 
police to engage in trickery and deception during the course of their investigations, will 
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also serve to bolster their reputation in the public eye, and instill greater public 
confidence in that institution. 
Addressing Criticisms: 
Critics will argue that the judicial model of examination is too favourable to due 
process imperatives, at the expense of crime control concerns. 59 There is the concern that 
there would be a substantial cost in terms of potentially guilty individuals escaping 
responsibility in a system with the safeguards for the accused that the judicial model has. 
There are situations where the police have only reasonable and probable grounds 
to arrest suspects but do not have sufficient evidence to get a conviction. In these 
situations the use of the suspect as an evidentiary resource is invaluable to police 
investigations. 
But despite the accuracy of the criticism that there will be more guilty suspects 
who will go free, it is worth the price. This is for two reasons. 
The first reason is because the system of judicial examination will drastically 
reduce the number of false confessions that are made. The adage that it is better to let ten 
guilty men go free than to send one innocent man to prison may be trite wisdom, 60 but it 
is wisdom nonetheless. 61 From the wrongful convictions exonerations discussed in 
59 See, for example, Steven Penney, "What's Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of Self-
Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era- Part I: Justifications for Rules Preventing Self-Incrimination" 
(2003) 48(2) Crim. L. Q. 249 at 263. "I should make it clear that I am not advocating for a system of 
mandatory judicial questioning to replace police interrogation. That proposal has its flaws, not the least of 
which is the fact that it is likely to produce far less self-incriminating evidence than police interrogation." 
60 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 1760 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott, 1893). 
"It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer". 
61 As Lord Devlin described it: "Ifthe success of a system of criminal prosecution is to be measured by the 
proportion of criminals whom it convicts and punishes, the English system must be regarded as a failure ... 
When a criminal goes free, it is as much a failure of abstract justice as when an innocent man is 
convicted ... but an injustice on the one side is spread over the whole of society and an injustice on the other 
is concentrated in the suffering of one man ... Since we know that the ascertainment of guilt cannot be made 
infallible and that we must leave room for a margin of error, we should take care to see that as far as 
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Chapter 5, we know that innocents have been sent to prison following false confessions. 
With the absence of coercion and manipulative psychological tactics, and a right to 
silence that will be respected in court, there is little risk of suspects being railroaded or 
duped into making a false confession. The elimination of false confessions as a 
significant contributor to wrongful convictions should be reason enough to reform pre-
trial questioning procedures. 
But there is also a second reason. A system of judicial examination will ensure 
that the confessions that are made, are truly voluntary ones. The confessions rule is 
designed only to allow voluntary statements into evidence. But as has been discussed, in 
light of the realities of custodial interrogation, the rule is failing. This is because the 
police are allowed to trick suspects into confessing and also because of the coercive 
nature of police interrogations. 
If the desired test for admissibility is truly voluntariness, then what could be better 
than implementing a system that ensures that statements are voluntary, as judicial 
examination does? Any state action that coerces an individual to furnish evidence 
against himself or herself in a proceeding where the state and the individual are 
adversaries violates the principle against self incrimination. Coercion entails the denial 
of free and informed consent. Where police trickery is involved, there can be no 
informed consent. Thus, the situation arises where detainees are making involuntary 
confessions. 
These confessions, as we know, may be unreliable and false. That has 
historically been the reason why the doctrine of voluntariness exists. On the other hand, 
humanly possible, the margin is all on the side of the defence." Patrick Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution 
in England(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960) at 113. 
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they may be true confessions, but even if they are, they were still gathered by an abuse of 
state power. 
The concern of the confessions' rule are twofold: to ensure reliable statements, 
and to ensure a process which is not abusive to suspects. The in-court system of judicial 
examination does a superior job of ensuring these two concerns than a system of 
custodial interrogations with a confessions rule to provide protections to suspects. The 
concerns of whether the confession was threatened or promised by some form of quid pro 
quo from a police officer are absent when the examination of the accused is done on the 
record, in court. There is also no need to worry about oppressive circumstances; the 
entire procedure, again on-the-record, is transparent and reviewable. Finally, with the 
Crown having the obligation to disclose the charges and the strength of the case against 
the accused before any confession is made, we can truly say that there was informed 
consent to the procurement of any resulting confession. 
Implementation 
The question immediately arises: should a move towards judicial examination be 
made by the courts, or by the legislature. It would appear, that the legislature is the most 
appropriate place for the change to originate, and as argued by professor James 
Stribopoulos, there may be several reasons why courts are poorly suited to the 
implementation of due process oriented reforms. 62 First, courts are limited " ... by the 
cases and parties that happened to come before them,"63 and as such may not be able to 
62 James Stribopoulous, "Packer's Blind Spot: Low Visibility Encounters and the Limits of Due Process 
versus Crime Control" in Francois Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopolous eds., Rethinking Criminal Law 
Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational and International 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 20 12) at 193. 
63 Ibid. at 213. 
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deal with issues "in a comprehensive and prospective way."64 Second, " ... judges are 
generalists"65 who often lack the " ... expertise to choose between"66 " ••• specialized policy 
options."67 Third, constrained by the nature of the " ... adjudicative process,"68 the courts 
are not well-placed " ... to ascertain the sort of relevant social facts that are essential for the 
development of sound policy."69 Fourth, courts cannot " ... monitor the effects"70 of the 
rules they create and make timely modifications to the rules as the policy-effects may 
require.71 And finally, courts usually deal with people who are " ... guilty,"72 and this may 
" ... not encourage the broader perspectives"73 that would be required for change to be 
initiated in the first place. 74 
Legislatures, on the other hand can build a comprehensive statutory regime, that 
takes into account the nuances required of such a system, and can make modifications to 
it as required over time. A legislature can design a system from start to finish, whereas 
courts would be more likely to implement reforms "piecemeal"75 on a case-by-case basis. 
It would therefore take a significant amount of time, as well as trial-and-error for a 
regime of judicial examination to replace custodial interrogation by police. 
Another advantage of leaving the development of judicial examination to the 
legislature is that it is within the competence of the legislature to enact an outright ban on 







70 Ibid at 214. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. at 216. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. at 213. 
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the system proposed. Such a ban could not realistically be left to the courts, since it 
would require the mass-use of the judicial discretion, to exclude all statements taken by 
police of suspects in custody. 76 Stare decisis simply would preclude this from ever 
happening. 
A Final Word 
It is my position that the laws of confession should be about protecting certain 
fundamental values such as privacy, human dignity, moral autonomy, fairness and 
protecting the innocent. Ultimately the laws of confession touch upon a very important 
normative question: How far can a liberal state go in conscripting an individual to 
incriminate himself/herself? The search for an answer to this question has traditionally 
forced courts and politicians to try to strike a balance between conflicting concerns of 
fairness to the individual as opposed to the state's need to combat crime. The answer to 
this question defines the boundaries of the relationship between the state and individual 
in the context of criminal law. However the answer has proven to be very fluid and it 
constantly changes from one historical era to next. At the moment the status of our 
confessions laws are such that the due process values have been relegated to a place of 
secondary importance. This is unfortunate, since fairness to an accused person and the 
protection of the innocent against false confessions should always be the primary 
consideration. 
In this thesis I have attempted to show that the extensive literature on false 
confessions from forensic psychology and other legal research raise the terrifying 
prospect that false confessions are a real problem and our confessions laws are to a large 
extent trapped in an 18th century mentality. Hence these laws are not capable of 
76 Ibid. at214-215. 
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adequately dealing with this problem. It is hoped that the future generation of judges in 
the Supreme Court and our politicians take the initiative to equip themselves with the 
latest knowledge in forensic psychology and legal research on the phenomena of false 
confessions and show the necessary leadership to resurrect the principle of fairness to its 
proper place of predominance. 
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